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| {{Redirect|Nuclear War}} | |||
| {{Dablink|Not to be confused with ] or ], i.e. the achievement of military or political ends through the possession of nuclear weapons without their actual use.}} | |||
| {{Refimprove|date=May 2009}} | |||
| {{war}} | |||
| ] ] (ICBM) carried a 9 ] ] warhead, one of the most powerful ]s fielded by the ] during the ].]] | |||
| '''Nuclear warfare''', or '''atomic warfare''', is a military conflict or political strategy in which ]ry is detonated on an opponent. Compared to ], nuclear warfare can be vastly more destructive in range and extent of damage. A major nuclear exchange could have severe long-term effects, primarily from ] release but also from possible atmospheric pollution leading to ], that could last for decades, centuries, or even millennia after the initial attack.<ref></ref><ref></ref> Nuclear war is considered to bear ] for civilization on Earth.<ref> from </ref><ref>The Nuclear Winter: The World After Nuclear War, Sagan, Carl et al., Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985</ref> | |||
| The first, and to date only, nuclear war was ]: near the end of the war, the ] dropped atomic bombs on ], ].<ref name="gordin">{{cite book|title= Five days in August|last= Gordin|first= Michael D.|authorlink=|coauthors=|year= 2007|publisher= University Press|location=|isbn= 0691128189|page= 5|pages= 209|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=N7eq7AgZKokC&printsec=frontcover#PPA5,M1|accessdate=2009-03-27}}</ref><ref name="lebaron">{{cite book|title= America's nuclear legacy|last= LeBaron|first= Wayne D.|authorlink=|coauthors=|year= 1998|publisher= Nova Publishers|location=|isbn= 1560725567|page= 16|pages= 320|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=cr81ZHY-6H0C&printsec=frontcover#PPA16,M1|accessdate=2009-03-27}}</ref> At the time of those bombings, the United States was the only country to possess atomic weapons. After World War II, nuclear weapons were also developed by the ], ], the ], and the ], which contributed to the state of conflict and tension that became known as the ]. In the 1970s, ] and 1990s, ], countries openly hostile to each other, developed nuclear weapons. ], ], and ] are also believed to have developed nuclear weapons, although South Africa subsequently abandoned them. | |||
| After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resultant end of the Cold War, the threat of a major nuclear war between the ]s was generally thought to have receded. Since then, concern over nuclear weapons has shifted to the prevention of localized nuclear conflicts resulting from ], and the threat of ]. | |||
| <!-- Lead needs to be expanded to reflect the rest of the article. --> | |||
| ==Types of Nuclear Warfare== | |||
| {{Unreferenced section|date=August 2010}} | |||
| The possibility of using nuclear weapons in war is usually divided into two subgroups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments. | |||
| The first, a ''limited nuclear war'' (sometimes ''attack'' or ''exchange''), refers to a small scale use of nuclear weapons by one or more parties. A "limited nuclear war" would consist of a limited exchange between two nuclear powers targeting each other's military facilities, either as an attempt to pre-emptively cripple the enemy's ability to attack as a defensive measure or as a prelude to an invasion by conventional forces as an offensive measure. This term would apply to any limited use of nuclear weapons, which may involve either military or civilian targets.{{Dubious|date=August 2010}} {{Whom?|date=August 2010}} | |||
| The second, a ''full-scale nuclear war'', consists of large numbers of weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including military, economic and civilian targets. Such an attack would almost certainly destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of the target nation, and would possibly (depending on the severity of the nuclear exchange) have a devastating effect on Earth's biosphere. | |||
| Some ] strategists such as ]<ref>http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/kissinger_henry_t.html</ref> argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily armed superpowers (such as the ] and the ]) and if so several predicted that a limited war could "]" into an all-out war. Others{{Who|date=August 2010}} have called limited nuclear war "global nuclear holocaust in slow motion" arguing that once such a war took place others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer and more agonizing path to reach the same result. | |||
| Even the most optimistic predictions of the effects of a major nuclear exchange foresee the death of a hundred million people within a very short amount of time; more pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could bring about the ] or its near extinction with a handful of survivors (mainly in remote areas) reduced ] and ] for centuries after and cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, Earth's ecosystems, and the global climate, particularly if predictions of ] are accurate. It is in this latter mode that nuclear warfare is usually alluded to as a ] scenario.{{Whom?|date=August 2010}} Such hypothesized civilization-ending nuclear wars have been a staple of the ] literature and film genre for decades. | |||
| Either a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange could be an ''accidental nuclear war'', in which a nuclear war is triggered unintentionally. Possible triggers for this scenario have included malfunctioning early warning devices and targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, accidental straying of planes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or misscommunicated messages, and so forth. A number of these scenarios did actually occur during the Cold War, though none resulted in a nuclear exchange.<ref>Alan F. Philips, .</ref> Many such scenarios have been depicted in ], such as in the 1962 novel '']'' (released as a film in 1964) and the film '']'', also released in 1964. | |||
| ==History== | |||
| {{Main|History of nuclear weapons}} | |||
| ===Hiroshima to Semipalatinsk=== | |||
| {{Unreferenced section|date=June 2010}} | |||
| ] | |||
| The ] is the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons during war, ] on the ]ese cities of ] and ] in 1945. | |||
| Immediately after the bombings of Japan, the status of atomic weapons in international and military relations was unclear. Presumably, the United States hoped atomic weapons could offset the Soviet Union's superior conventional ground forces in Eastern Europe, and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader ] into concessions. Stalin pursued his own atomic capabilities through scientific research and espionage against the American program. The Soviets believed that the Americans, with their limited nuclear arsenal, were unlikely to engage in any new world wars, while the Americans were not confident they could prevent a Soviet takeover of Europe, despite their atomic advantage. | |||
| Within the United States the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from military control and put instead under the civilian control of the ]. This decision reflected an understanding that nuclear weapons had unique risks and benefits separate from other military technology. | |||
| ] bomber]] | |||
| For several years after ], the US developed and maintained a strategic force based on the ] bomber that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the US. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the US defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States. | |||
| Many proposals were suggested to put all US nuclear weapons under international control—for example, by the newly formed ] — as an effort to deter both their usage and an arms race. However no terms could be arrived at that would be agreed upon by both the US and the USSR. | |||
| ] | |||
| On August 29, 1949 the ] tested its ] at ] in ] (see also ]). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the US was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Russians had conducted significant espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist ]. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the ] device. | |||
| With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The ] tested its first independent atomic bomb in 1952, followed by ] in 1960 and then the ] in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the USA and the USSR, Western Europe's nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the ]. A top-secret ] produced for the British Government in 1959, compiled by the ], estimated that British atomic bombers were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16 million deaths in the USSR (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) ''before'' bomber aircraft from the United States' ] reached their targets. | |||
| ===The 1950s=== | |||
| Though the USSR had nuclear weapon capabilities in the beginning of the ], the US still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the US would have been capable of bombing the USSR, while the USSR would have more difficulties arranging the reverse. | |||
| The widespread introduction of ]-powered ] upset this imbalance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the US bomber fleet. In 1949 ] was placed in command of the ] and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the ] and ] were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the USSR more easily. | |||
| <!-- Deleted image removed: ] urged the socialist camp not to fear nuclear war with the United States since, even if '' 'half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist'.''<ref>"". TIME. September 20, 1976.</ref>]] --> | |||
| Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons used in a tactical role. It is debatable whether such use could be considered "limited" however, because it was believed that the US would use their own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the USSR deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. ], an American general, was fired by President ], partially because he persistently requested permission to use his own discretion in deciding whether to use atomic weapons on the ] in 1951 (as the ] was raging).<ref></ref>{{Dead link|date=July 2010}} | |||
| Several scares about the increasing ability of the USSR's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the US was to deploy a fairly strong layered defense consisting of ] and ]s, like the ], and guns, like the ], near larger cities. However this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal nuclear strategy was to massively penetrate the USSR. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the USSR would lose any exchange. | |||
| This logic became ingrained in US nuclear doctrine and persisted for the duration of the ]. As long as the strategic US nuclear forces could overwhelm their USSR counterparts, a Soviet preemptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the USSR could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve nuclear parity. | |||
| Soviet nuclear doctrine, however, did not match US nuclear doctrine {{Citation needed|date=April 2009}}. Soviet planning expected a large-scale nuclear exchange followed by a conventional war which itself would involve heavy use of tactical nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, US doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar—the ''mutual'' in ] necessarily requiring that the other side see things in much the same way, rather than believing, as the Soviets did, that they could fight a large-scale, combined nuclear and conventional war. | |||
| A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the ] (ICBM), which the USSR first successfully tested in August 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty of interception of the ICBMs due to their high altitude and speed. The USSR could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the US in terms of raw numbers, although for a time they appeared to have chosen not to. | |||
| Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the US military, something the launch of ] would do for the public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-] ] suggested a "]" between the Soviets and the US.<!--This was a savvy political ploy as the US administration almost certainly knew better and also knew that they could not be corrected without violating military security. (Though it should be pointed out, Eisenhower's own ] had also overestimated Soviet nuclear capabilities in their 1957 report). One result of this, however, was that the Soviets believed the vulnerability actually existed, with resulting temptation; luckily cooler heads prevailed. After Kennedy won the 1960 Presidential election, the "missile gap" conveniently went away.--><!--This political interpretation needs to be attributed or made neutral.--> The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several ] and ]s were designed and deployed to observe Soviet progress. | |||
| ===1960s=== | |||
| ] reconnaissance photograph of the MRBM launch site in ] (1962).]] | |||
| Issues came to a head during the ] in 1962. The Soviet Union placed medium range missiles {{convert|90|mi|km}} from the US - a move considered by many{{Who|date=August 2010}} as a direct response to American ]s placed in Turkey. After intense negotiation, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive building program of their own. In exchange, the US dismantled its launch sites in Turkey, although this was done secretly and was not publicly revealed for over two decades. Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. | |||
| By the late 1960s, the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that it was believed either the USA or USSR was capable of completely destroying the other country's infrastructure. Thus a ] system known as ] (''MAD'') came into being. It was thought that any full-scale exchange between the powers could not produce a victorious side and thus neither would risk initiating one. | |||
| <!--these next two paragraphs should be elsewhere in the text, not in "1960s"--> | |||
| One drawback of this doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early ]s were notoriously error-prone. On 78 occasions in 1979, for example, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections potentially threatening to the North American continent. Some of these were trivial errors, spotted quickly. But several went to more serious levels. On September 26, 1983, ] received convincing indications of a US first strike launch against the USSR but positively identified the warning as a false alarm. Though it is unclear what role Petrov's actions played in preventing a nuclear war, he has been honored by the United Nations for his actions. | |||
| Similar incidents happened many times in the US, due to failed computer chips,<ref>, ''20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War'', by Alan F. Phillips, M.D., January 1998, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</ref> flights of geese, test programs, and bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. For many years, US strategic bombers were kept airborne on a rotating basis round the clock, until the number and severity of accidents persuaded policymakers it was not worthwhile. {{Citation needed|date=January 2009}} | |||
| ===1970s=== | |||
| By the late 1970s, citizens in the US and USSR (and indeed the entire world) had been living with ] for about a decade. It became deeply ingrained into the popular culture. Such an exchange would have killed many millions of individuals directly and possibly induced a ] which could have led to the death of a large portion of humanity and, potentially, the collapse of global civilization. | |||
| On May 18, 1974, ] conducted its first nuclear test in the ] test range. The name of the operation was ] and India termed the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion". | |||
| According to the 1980 ] report ''General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General'', it was estimated that in total there were approximately 40,000 nuclear warheads in existence at that time with a total yield of approximately 13,000 ]s. By comparison, when the volcano ] erupted in 1815 (turning 1816 into the ] due to the levels of ash expelled), it exploded with a force of roughly 1,000 megatons. Many people believed that a full-scale nuclear war could result in the ], though not all analysts agreed on the assumptions required for these models. | |||
| The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its ] allies because it was believed until the 1970s that a Soviet tank invasion of Western ] would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of escalating to tactical nuclear weapons. | |||
| A number of interesting concepts were developed. Early ICBMs were inaccurate, which led to the concept of ] strikes — attacks directly on the enemy population leading to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. During the Cold War the USSR invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure such as large nuclear-proof bunkers and non-perishable food stores. In the US, by comparison, smaller scale ] programs were instituted starting in the 1950s where schools and other public buildings had basements stocked with non-perishable food supplies, canned water, first aid, ] and ] radiation measuring devices. Many of the locations were given "]" designation signs. Also, ] Radio information systems were adopted, whereby the commercial radio sector would broadcast on two AM frequencies in the event of a CD emergency. These two frequencies can be seen on 50's vintage radios on online auction sites and museums, with many of these radios still in use on tabletops across America. Also, the occasional backyard fallout shelter was built by private individuals. | |||
| This strategy had one major and possibly critical flaw, soon realised by military analysts but highly underplayed by the US military: Conventional ] forces in the European theatre of war were outnumbered by similar Soviet and ] forces, and while the western countries invested heavily in high-tech conventional weapons to counter this imbalance, it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly perceived as the "red tanks rolling towards the ]" scenario) that NATO, in the face of conventional defeat, would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would become almost inevitable. According to then Secretary of State ] by 1976 the USA had a 6-to-1 advantage in the number of nuclear warheads over the Soviet Union.<ref name="StudiesIntell85">{{cite web | |||
| |url=http://cryptome.org/nara/wh/wh-76-0727.pdf | |||
| |title=Memorandum of Conversation: J. Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia, President Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, et al. | |||
| |date=July 27, 1976 | |||
| |publisher=The White House | |||
| |accessdate=2011-01-03 | |||
| }}</ref> | |||
| As missile technology improved, the emphasis moved to counter-force strikes: ones that directly attacked the enemy's means of waging war. This was the predominant doctrine from the late 1960s onwards. Additionally the development of warheads (at least in the US) moved towards delivering a small explosive force more accurately and with a "cleaner" blast (with fewer long-lasting ] ]s). In any conflict therefore, damage would have been initially limited to military targets, there may well have been "withholds" for targets near civilian areas. The argument was that the destruction of a city would be a military advantage to the ''attacked''. The enemy had used up weapons and a threat in the destruction while the attacked was relieved of the need to defend the city and still had their entire military potential untouched. | |||
| Only if a nuclear conflict were extended into a number of "spasm" strikes would direct strikes against civilians occur, as the more accurate weapons would be expended early; if one side were "losing", the potential for using less accurate submarine-launched missiles would occur. | |||
| ===The 1980s=== | |||
| ] ] and the paths of its reentry vehicles.]] | |||
| ]s during the 1980s. The resulting ] is indicated with the darkest considered as "lethal" to relatively fall-out free yellow zones{{Citation needed|date=May 2010}}.]] | |||
| In the late seventies and early eighties the balance, in terms of nuclear weapons, shifted towards the Soviets{{Citation needed|date=January 2010}}. However, with the ascension to the presidency by ], the US renewed its commitment to a powerful military, which required large spending on military programs. These programs, originally part of President Jimmy Carter's defense budget, included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems, as well as defensive systems like ]. | |||
| Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development of the ]-launched ballistic (nuclear) missile, the ]. It was hailed by some military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs, which can move with stealth virtually anywhere in the world, give a nation a "]" capability. Before the advent of SLBMs, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus a first strike was much less of a feasible option, and nuclear war was held to be less likely. | |||
| However, it was soon realized that submarines could "sneak up" close to enemy coastlines and decrease the warning time—the time between detection of the launch and impact of the missile—from as much as half an hour to under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain, and China, with their capitals all within {{convert|100|mi|km|-1.6}} of their coasts. Moscow was more secure from this type of threat. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one of the factions and theoretically made it possible to knock out or disrupt the ] before a counterstrike could be ordered. It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tension, and increasing calls for ] control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive (one fully equipped nuclear powered nuclear missile submarine could easily cost more than the entire ] of a ] nation),<ref>{{cite news|url=http://americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/cost/index.html|title=The Cost of Submarines|accessdate=2008-07-13|work=Fast Attacks and Boomers}}</ref> but the greatest cost came in the development of both sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the chain of command. As a result, military spending skyrocketed. | |||
| South Africa developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s. | |||
| On Sept. 1, 1983, ] was shot down by Soviet Jet Fighters. On the 26th, a Soviet early warning station under the command of ] falsely detected 5 inbound ]s from US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors. It is quite possible that this prevented World War III, as the Soviet policy at that time was immediate nuclear response upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.{{Citation needed|date=August 2010}} | |||
| The world came unusually close to nuclear war (although perhaps not as close as during the Cuban Missile Crisis) when the Soviet Union thought the NATO military exercise ] was a cover up to begin a nuclear strike. The Soviets responded by readying their nuclear arsenal. Soviet fears of an attack went away once the exercise concluded without incident. | |||
| ===Post–Cold War=== | |||
| Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and greatly reduced tensions between the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union's formal successor state), both nations remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a significant number of warheads in both nations. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the US Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "]". | |||
| The former chair of the United Nations disarmament committee states there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage. The U.S. has nearly 7,000 ready for action and 3,000 in storage and Russia has about 8,500 on hand and 11,000 in storage, he said. ] has 400 nuclear weapons, ] 200, ] 350, ] 120, and ] 90. ] is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many (a common estimate is between 1 and 10). ] is also widely believed to ]. NATO has stationed 480 US nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, with several other countries in pursuit of an arsenal of their own.<ref></ref> | |||
| A key development in nuclear warfare in the 2000s has been the ] of nuclear weapons to the ], with ] and ] both publicly testing nuclear devices and ] conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The US Geological Survey measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the test occurred. A further test was announced by the North Korean government on May 25, 2009.<ref></ref> ], meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under scrutiny by the United Nations and individual states. | |||
| Recent studies undertaken by the ] cite the enduring India-Pakistan conflict as the most likely to escalate into nuclear war. During the ] in 1999, Pakistan came close to using its nuclear weapons in case of further deterioration.<ref></ref> Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that it would "use any weapon in our arsenal", hinting at a nuclear strike against India;<ref>“Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, Islamabad, | |||
| May 31, 1999</ref> the statement was condemned by the international community with Pakistan denying it later on. It remains the only war between two declared nuclear powers. The ] again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries. | |||
| Despite these very serious threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. A bus line directly linking Indian and Pakistani-administered ] has recently been established. However, with the ], India does not rule out war with Pakistan. | |||
| Another flashpoint which has analysts worried is a possible conflict between the ] and the ] over ]. Although economic forces have decreased the possibility of military conflict, there remains the worry that increasing military buildup (] is rapidly increasing their naval capacity) and a move toward ] could spin out of control. | |||
| ] is another possibility as it is thought to possess between one hundred and four hundred nuclear warheads. It has been asserted that the submarines which Israel received from ] have been adapted to carry missiles with nuclear warheads, so as to give Israel a ] capacity.<ref></ref> Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbours on numerous occasions, and its small geographic size would mean that in the event of future wars the Israeli military might have very little time to react to a future invasion or other major threat; the situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios. | |||
| In the Persian Gulf, ] appears to many observers to be in the process of developing a nuclear weapon, which has heightened fears of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, either with Israel or with Iran's ] neighbors. | |||
| ===Potential consequences of a regional nuclear war=== | |||
| A study presented at the annual meeting of the ] in December 2006 asserted that even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of ] and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario in which two opposing nations in the ] each used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (ca. 15 kiloton each) on major populated centers, the researchers estimated fatalities from 2.6 million to 16.7 million per country. Also, as much as five million tons of ] would be released, which would produce a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and ], including most of the grain-growing regions. The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic" according to the researchers.<ref></ref> | |||
| ===Sub-strategic use=== | |||
| The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e. ]. However, many nuclear powers are believed to have the ability to launch more limited engagements. | |||
| The United Kingdom has reserved the possibility of launching a sub-strategic nuclear strike against an enemy, described by its Parliamentary ] as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve". This would see the deployment of ] in a very limited role rather than the battlefield exchanges of ]. Such a strategy is based on the assumption that an enemy country such as the ] or the ] with a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons would not retaliate with far greater force than had been used by Britain.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}} | |||
| British ]armed ] nuclear submarines are believed to carry some missiles for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one ] against a single target. Former Defence Secretary ] argued that this capacity offset the reduced credibility of fullscale strategic nuclear attack following the end of the Cold War. | |||
| Commodore ], former Director of Nuclear Policy at the ], has described it as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage".<ref></ref> | |||
| However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the acceptability of using nuclear weapons. The related consideration of new generations of limited-yield nuclear weapons by the United States has also alarmed anti-nuclear groups, who believe it will make the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable. | |||
| Similarly, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at "non-state actors" armed with ].<ref>Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, "Senseless policy", '''', November/December 1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011.</ref> | |||
| ==Nuclear terrorism== | |||
| {{Main|Nuclear terrorism}} | |||
| ] by non-state organizations is an unknown factor in nuclear deterrence thinking, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind, but sub- or trans-state actors are not. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the possibility that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the ] (so-called 'loose nukes'), while no warheads are known to have been mislaid, it has been alleged that ] might be unaccounted for. | |||
| Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called ]s. The detonation of a dirty bomb would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a lot of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially costly decontamination.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs-bg.html|title=Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs|author=US Nuclear Regulatory Commission|date=2007-05|accessdate=2010-04-26}}</ref> | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| {{Wikinews|Bush and Putin suggest potential for World War III}} | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| '''Cold war:''' | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| '''Proliferation:''' | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| '''US specific:''' | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * '']'' | |||
| '''Post nuclear exchange:''' | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| '''General:''' | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| ==References== | |||
| {{Reflist}} | |||
| ==External links== | |||
| * | |||
| * - slideshow by '']'' | |||
| *'''' (1979) — handbook produced by the United States Office of Technology Assessment (hosted by the ]) | |||
| *'''' (1987) — assessment of the effects of a major Soviet attack on the United States produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hosted by the ]) | |||
| *'''' (1979/1987) — handbook produced by ] (use menu at left to navigate) | |||
| * OpenCourseWare from the ] | |||
| * at HavenWorks.com | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * by Alan F. Philips, M.D. | |||
| * | |||
| * Interactive Timeline of the Nuclear Age | |||
| * | |||
| * DeVolpi, Alexander, Vladimir E. Minkov, Vadim A. Simonenko, and George S. Stanford. 2004. ''Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry'', Vols. 1 and 2. Fidlar Doubleday. | |||
| * An in depth history of American air weapons and nuclear bombs from the reference book ''American Combat Planes of the 20th Century'' by Ray Wagner | |||
| {{Nuclear Technology}} | |||
| {{DEFAULTSORT:Nuclear Warfare}} | |||
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