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Philosophy: Metaphysics / Logic / Mind Stub‑class High‑importance

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Split

OK, this needs to be split up. Any ideas for useful page titles? --FOo 23:01 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Point Clarification

I'm curious what the point of this paragraph is:

Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.

Whatever it is, I think it would be expressed more clearly in something like this:

We sometimes say two things are identical iff they have every property except spatial location in common. This we can say "this box is identical to that one." At other times, though, we say two things are identical iff they have absolutely every property in common. If we take "identity" in this sense, it's impossible to point to two identical boxes.

Would this be a reasonable replacement, or would the replacement result in missing some more profound point? Maybe something more profound would arise, for example, if we considered non-spatial things -- because non-spatial things don't have the constraint that "they can't be in the same place at the same time".

--Ryguasu 12:48, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)

Response

I think the notion of identity in metaphysics goes deeper than that. Identity is an object's relation to itself, not merely to objects that resemble it strongly. It doesn't really make sense to say that "two objects are identical if ...", because if x and y are identical, then they are not two objects; they are two names for one object.

You mean, presumably, that "they" are a single object with two names (Be clear: are x and y the things or the names?)

What we are asking, it seems to me, is not "Are two objects interchangeable if ... ?" but rather "What is that relationship, which x has to itself, that it does not have to any object other than itself?" Or, put another way, "Given two names or descriptions x and y, by what means can we discern if they in fact name the same object?"

If you are familiar with the Lisp programming language, you might consider the difference between the predicates EQ and EQUAL. (EQUAL X Y) returns truth if the variables X and Y refer to data objects that are equivalent -- roughly, if you print them both out, they will look the same. (EQ X Y), however, returns truth only if X and Y are two names for the same data object in memory. --FOo 14:27, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)

Response2

I would like to take Ryguasu's proposal one step further: a definition of identity should not refer to any particular property, not even spatial location: after all, we may wonder if two things we see in the same spot, but at different times, are the same. So my phrasing would be something like:

The identity of an object is its being a particular member of a given set, rather than some other member. Put in terms of traditional theory on semantics, it is the reference of a description (a predicate). For example, a description could be the owner of the bike with a broken saddle who was here yesterday; it refers to a particular person; this relationship between this description and the person we call the identity of that person. (It's a property of a term within this description, not a property of the person himself!)

This is much too confusing. Why bring in sets at all? Surely the first sentence would be better expressed by "...it's being a particular object and not any other object". That way one also doesn't raise the specter of things tat can't belong to sets, such as (arguably) properties, "proper classes" (or, as Quine called them, "ultimate classes", and vague objects, all of which haev been discussed extensively by philosophers and logicians in relation to identity. Descriptions and predicates are not quite the same. (The description you offer is not a predicate; if it began with the word is, it would be one.) And not all objects are referred to by descriptions, or at all. (First, there is the issue of substitutional versus ontic quantification. Second, there is the difference between names and descriptions.) And no, despite some careless remarks by Frege, it is generally agreed by logicians that identity is not a relation between terms, but between objects. (What you are thinking of is the fact that identity statements are informative only when expressed using two different referring expressions.)

Identity is a controversial issue in computer programming, mathematical logic, and particularly in their meeting ground, database theory. Traditional logic, and relational database theory, describes things in terms of their observable properties and relationships: reference and identity do not exist between elements of a description, but are links between the description and the world it applies to. In terms of the description, objects cannot be compared other than by comparing their observable properties. Programming languages, however, are full of references (pointers), and the issue is whether such a thing should be allowed in conceptual descriptions of the world - such as relational databases. Does it make sense to be able to state that a person's parent is identical to some other person's parent, or should we fundamentally state this relationship in terms of observable properties that we hold in the database, and by which parents can be identified? A system that supports the former is said to support object identity.

Rp 22 Nov 2003

Shared Identity

Identity has a sense in which things share An Identiy, i.e. "black", or two " black and four footed", or more "black four footed and called 'puss' ". In another sense it's scope includes cultural and phyiological filters or precepts. It is cumulative, quantitative and qualitative, it accretes, like datae or quantae. This is proximately related to categories and "forms". Taken as such we can look on socrates idea of "joints" rather clearly. Thus the aforementioned "ambiguity" is really the ambiguity of "grey" in that it can be more grey or less, more ore less identical. It is a primitive term to some philosophical systems. An identity may subsume a name, names associate with other names, systems are built. Some of the 'identiy' concepts are found in group theory, in some things it is identical but it is different in others. Thus the concepts of Definition or 'naming' by shared and/or excluded traits.

An identity/name may refer to a braod category or small. As names are added the category narrows till an idividual is represented, that is a thing is represented which by it's exclusions can only represent one thing; holding, by convention , some terms as absent ( eg time, for an a individual man). comments please.wblakesx

Move

I moved the following paragraph from metaphysics to here (it was already discussed above as, well, at least questionable):

Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.

Misplaced Pages is an encyclopedia - so in the paragraph "Metaphysics" in the article "Identity" it should describe, what identity means in metaphysics - and there, the above paragraph makes no sense. If two descriptions of objects share all properties - well, then that's it, it's the same object they refer two. --denny vrandečić 15:31, Sep 6, 2004 (UTC)

ID

What about the most common use of the word identity, as in one's identification or proof of identity?Pedant

• see Identity document. But you're right, there should be a link - I added the link to the Identity disambiuation page. --denny vrandečić 11:47, Sep 7, 2004 (UTC)

So many identities!

In my hunt for an identity operator article, I discovered many pages relating to identity in its different contexts and meanings. Many of these pages have overlapping content, poor clarification what the word identity means in different fields, etc. Perhaps this is due to the ambiguety of the word itself, but I still feel that this could be cleaned up or better organized. Just some examples: identity, Identity (disambiguation), List of mathematical identities, Identity (mathematics), Identity element, Identity function, Identity Property of Addition. For instance, this page seems to focus on the philosophy meaning but it has sections on logic and computer programming which seems inappropriate. It seems there are two directions this page can go in:

• Remove content about identity meanings unrelated to philosophy and allow the disambig page to sort those differences out.
• Include other sections on alternate meanings of identity such as Mathematical identity (identity element and identity) with links to their respective main pages, much like the Operator article does.

Personally, I'd be in favor of the second route, but give me some input. -Dan Granahan 18:45, 21 July 2005 (UTC)

Dan, I prefer the first idea; most of the page is about the philosophical concept of identity. I think it should be renamed Identity (Philosophy) to be consistent with other Identity pages. Bryan 17:25, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

OK, I did it. Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

The logical aspect of identity very much does belong to philosophy. Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, all working in philosophy of logic. (Dan 3/11)

Calling All Philosophers

I've done what I could to clean up this page; it needs help, now, from someone who can integrate the material (see ). Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Another possible merger?

How about merging this with Ship of Theseus itself? The two are quite similar.

I like having articles at places like the ship and the axe, although much of the discussion of the interpretation of those metaphors in the context of identity should be put into this article (and some should be removed from those). But the stories themselves, especially the ship, are as encyclopedic as many of Aesop's fables or ]. Smmurphy 07:31, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

The Ship of Theseus thought experiment is important in its own right and should not merge with this article.

I agree that the Ship of Theseus should not be merged with identity, altough it is a puzzle about identity it also a puzzle about material constitution and material coincidence. --RickardV 21:10, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

Qualitative versus numerical identity

This section looks somewhat spurious to me. I assume that what should be being talked about is duplicates sharing intrinsic properties, not qualitative properties? A proper philosopher needs to fix this section up. Ben Finn 20:18, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Merger with Law of identity

This was just a thought. I think both titles should direct to the same article (or possibly one of them to a section, etc.) Gregbard 06:44, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

One is mathematics and logic, the other is philosophy and psychology. -- Craigtalbert (talk) 23:05, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps this is too anal

But "Clark Kent = Superman" is not, to my mind, an expression of mathematics.

also, the "Charlie Brown = Satan" example seems like it ought to be removed... either that or I'm missing the point.. or am woefully behind on my popular culture?... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.236.169.226 (talk) 04:40, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Identity = sameness?

In ordinary discourse, identity, sameness and equality are not at all the same (no pun intended).

Moreover, these terms have been run-together for far too long by logicians and philosophers, an issue raised here:

Saunders, S. (2006), 'Are Quantum Particles Objects?', Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62

and in more detail at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm

Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 16:46, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

The concepts have different origin. However there is a law in philosophy that states that two things sharing every attribute are not only similar, but – by definition – are the same thing. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 10:51, 6 December 2010 (UTC)

Opening paragraph

Is surely VERY weak, and personal essay like.--Philogo (talk) 01:36, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

SHARNI —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.100.108.130 (talk) 18:24, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

See also

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Baruch Spinoza, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause --- Are they that important? More important than Leibniz? None of them is mentioned in the article.

The Golden Rule, Shunyata --- certainly everything is somehow related to everything else (in philsophy), but in some cases the relation is a long-distance one. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.152.208.69 (talk) 02:26, 9 December 2010 (UTC)

Lede restored

I removed the essaylike wall of text that was added before the lede. Please _DO NOT_ restore this text as it was; we can discuss here on this article talk page what, if anything should be incorporated to the article, but the lede must be a brief, accessible precis of the article contents. Moreover, the tone of the text removed was, to my mind (and I'm willing to be convinced otherwise) not appropriate for an encyclopedia article. BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 19:41, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Well done, you have just removed text that provided any means of understanding what the article is about, and restored it (the article) effectively to a set of meaningless cited quotes! Philosophy doesn't fit well into WP policy, which, it seems, disallows interpretation, discussion of ambiguities, or giving illustrative examples! When you take all that out of a philosophy article, what are you left with? A series of small cited quotes which mean absolutely nothing! Surely, a good lede should explain what the article is about, and why we should care? Still, you know best!! For the present, I will restore the remove text below:

• Stub-Class Philosophy articles
• High-importance Philosophy articles
• Stub-Class metaphysics articles
• High-importance metaphysics articles
• Metaphysics task force articles
• Stub-Class logic articles
• High-importance logic articles
• Logic task force articles
• Stub-Class philosophy of mind articles
• High-importance philosophy of mind articles
• Philosophy of mind task force articles