Misplaced Pages

Sinking of PNS Ghazi: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 10:10, 15 October 2011 editTopGun (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users, Pending changes reviewers20,007 edits shifting indian version to appropriate section. re writing & adding neutral source to the starting, removed a source that didnt support indian version.← Previous edit Revision as of 10:14, 15 October 2011 edit undoTopGun (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users, Pending changes reviewers20,007 edits adding another neutral claimNext edit →
Line 28: Line 28:


The mysterious '''sinking of ]''' was took place somewhere around 4&nbsp;December 1971 during ]'s ] assault on the ] ] and/or ]-laying mission on ] Port, ].<ref>Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.</ref> The mysterious '''sinking of ]''' was took place somewhere around 4&nbsp;December 1971 during ]'s ] assault on the ] ] and/or ]-laying mission on ] Port, ].<ref>Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.</ref>

One independent source comes from an Egyptian naval officer serving at that time on an Egyptian submarine under refit in Visakhapatnam harbour. He confirmed the occurrence of a "big explosion" in the vicinity of the harbour around late night which rocked the harbour so much that some of the shores supporting the submarine in the graving dock, where she was docked, fell off. There were no naval ships, as reported by this officer, outside the harbour at that time and it was not until about an hour after the explosion that two Indian naval ships were observed leaving harbour.<ref>http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm</ref>


==Background== ==Background==

Revision as of 10:14, 15 October 2011

It has been suggested that this article be merged with PNS Ghazi. (Discuss) Proposed since July 2010.

Sinking of PNS Ghazi (1971)
Part of the Naval Conflict of Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
USS Diablo in the Caribbean in 1949
Date4 December 1971
LocationVishakapatnam, Bay of Bengal
Result PNS Ghazi sinks mysteriously, Indian control of Naval routes and operations of East-Pakistan.
Belligerents

 Pakistan


Pakistan Navy

 India


 Indian Navy
Commanders and leaders
CDR Zafar M. Khan  Capt. Inder Singh
Strength
PNS Ghazi (Submarine)

INS Rajput (Destroyer)

INS Vikrant (Aircraft Carrier)
Casualties and losses
PNS Ghazi sunk
Total of 92 men lost their lives.

None

(INS Vikrant escaped to saftey)
Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
Western Front
Eastern Front
Indo-Pakistani conflicts
Kashmir conflict

Other conflicts

Border skirmishes

Strikes

The mysterious sinking of PNS Ghazi was took place somewhere around 4 December 1971 during Pakistani Navy's submarine assault on the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and/or mine-laying mission on Vishakapatnam Port, Bay of Bengal.

One independent source comes from an Egyptian naval officer serving at that time on an Egyptian submarine under refit in Visakhapatnam harbour. He confirmed the occurrence of a "big explosion" in the vicinity of the harbour around late night which rocked the harbour so much that some of the shores supporting the submarine in the graving dock, where she was docked, fell off. There were no naval ships, as reported by this officer, outside the harbour at that time and it was not until about an hour after the explosion that two Indian naval ships were observed leaving harbour.

Background

Main article: Naval operations in the Eastern theatre

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, Indian Navy went to a rapid program of modernization and expansion. Pakistan's Eastern Naval Command Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff had proposed the idea of deploying of single combatant squadron of warships and strengthening naval defense of East-Pakistan. The Naval Combatant Headquarter of Pakistan Navy considered the proposals till the end of the year of 1971. None of the measures were made feasible and Pakistan Navy in eastern theater was in no position to counter the Indian Naval challenge by the end of the year. Pakistan response to Indian military deployments around East Pakistan were a series of ad hoc measures, taken from time to time, as a reaction to the Indian build-up. Dispatch of Ghazi to India's eastern seaboard, not part of the original plans, was one such step taken on the insistence of Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Eastern Command.

The Pakistan Army's Combatant Headquarter, The GHQ, exerted a mounted pressure on the Pakistan Navy to extend the sphere of its operations into the Bay of Bengal increased with the growth of Indian and Indian-inspired naval activities in and around East Pakistan. Ghazi aging but being the only submarine which had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy was pressed into operation to destroy or damage Vikrant. The Officer in Command of Submarine Service Branch of Pakistan Navy and the junior officers and commander of Ghazi, had objected the plan as it was proposed by the Army and Naval officers during the briefing session. And, it was difficult to sustain such naval operations in a distant area of Bay of Bengal, in the total absence of repair, logistics, and recreational facilities in the vicinity. At this time, submarine repair facilities were totally absent at Chittagong — the only sea port in the east during this period. To her earlier commanders, the mission was considered highly dangerous and impossible to achieve by sending an obsolute submarine behind enemy lines. The commanders at NHQ overruled the objections, and instead planned a reconnaissance operation, which led to launching of the Submarine operations in the eastern theater. Per the recommendation of senior naval officers and commanders, Ghazi's command was changed immediately to the newer and younger naval officers. On 14 November of 1971, Ghazi sailed out from her base under the new command of Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, who was promoted to this rank prior to 4 days ago, with 92 men aboard.

Operation

Main article: Submarine operations, 1971

On 14 November of 1971, Ghazi sailed out of harbour on a reconnaissance patrol mission under the command of Cdr. Zafar Muhammad Khan with 93 hands on board. It was expected to report on 26 November. Deployment of Ghazi was part of Pakistan Navy reconnaissance operations in Arabian sea and Bay of Bengal.

The Ghazi was 400 miles off Bombay on 16 November, off Ceylon on 19 November, and entered the Bay of Bengal on 20 November 1971. She started looking for the Vikrant on 23 November off Madras but was not aware that she was 10 days too late and the Vikrant was actually somewhere near the Andaman islands. Vice Admiral Krishnan sent for Captain Inder Singh, the Commanding officer of the Rajput for detailed briefing at about 16:00 on 1 December and told him that a Pakistani submarine had been sighted off Ceylon and was absolutely certain that the submarine would be somewhere around Madras/Vishakaptanm. He made it clear that once Rajput had completed refueling, she must leave the harbor with all navigational aids switched off.

At 23:40 on 3 December, taking on board a pilot, Rajput moved through the channel to the exit from Vishakhapatnama.

Exactly at midnight, shortly after passing the entrance buoy, starboard lookout reported breaker on the surface of the water right on the nose. Singh, changing the course at full speed across the specified point and ordered to lose at this point, two depth charges, and that was done. The explosions were "stunning", and the ship suffered a serious concussion. However, visible results of this attack are not given. Rajput for some time surveyed the area dumping bombs, no longer found any contact — either visual or acoustic. A few minutes later the destroyer continued on her way to the coast of East Pakistan.

PNS Ghazi sank with all 92 hands on board due to unknown circumstances off the Vishakapatnam coast, allowing the Indian Navy to effect a naval blockade of then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

Intelligence and deception

According to Indian Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, who was Director of Intelligence during this period, its existence was revealed when signal addressed to naval authorities in Chittagong was intercepted, requesting information on a lubrication oil only used by submarines and minesweepers.

Management from the Indian Navy began to realize that the Pakistanis would inevitably be forced to send in the Bay of Bengal their submarine Ghazi as the sole ship which could operate in these waters. At that time, Vice Admiral N. Krishnan was the Flag officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy's eastern Naval Command. From his point of view, it was pretty clear that Pakistan would have deployed the Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal and a part of its plan was an attempt to sink the Indian aircraft carrier carrier Vikrant. Fearing a possible attack primarily against its own aircraft carrier deployed in the region, Indian commanders had taken early action, in the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities, to slip Vikrant aircraft carrier groups at a secret anchorage in the Andaman Islands, designated as "X-Ray". On 13 November, Vikrant with escort ships went from Madras to this point. At the same time concerted action was taken to disseminate information designed to mislead the enemy about the true location of the aircraft carrier, and to instill confidence in the Pakistani people that the carrier was stationed at Visakhapatnam.

Contracts were placed for delivery in Visakhapatnam of large quantities of food, especially meat and fresh vegetables, allegedly destined for the Eastern Fleet ships. A private telegram was allegedly sent from Vishakhapatnam from one of the sailors of the aircraft carrier, inquiring about the health of his ailing mother. All these activities were apparently successful in deceiving the enemy — as already mentioned. 25 November, the Pakistani command sent communication to the Ghazi saying that "intelligence indicates the finding of an aircraft carrier in port".

Aftermath

Ghazi was expected to report back to Karachi Naval dockyard on November 26th of 1971.Commanding officer of Ghazi, Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan was ordered to submit a report over the mission's course. On November 26th, Ghazi was failed to return to her base, and the base commander had repeatedly sent communication signals to Ghazi, but it wasn't answered. Anxiety grew day by day at the Naval Combatant Headquarter, The NHQ. Desperate for her return to the base, the NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the Ghazi, but she was failed to produce results. Before the 1971 Naval hostilities broke out, earlier commanding officers and submariners of Ghazi had doubted about the fate of the submarine had already begun to agitate the minds of submariners and many senior officers at Naval Headquarters (NHQ). The NHQ Commanders attributed to their junior officers that several reasons could, however, be attributed to the failure of the submarine to communicate.

On December 9th, Indian Navy strangely issued a statement about the fate of Ghazi. The first indication of Ghazi's tragic fate came when a message by NHQ of India, claiming sinking of Ghazi on the night of 3 December, was intercepted. The Indian NHQ issued the statement few hours before the loss of INS Khurki, and prior to launch of Operation Python.

Pakistani version

According to Pakistan, the Ghazi sank when the mines it was laying were accidentally detonated. Another more plausible theory, also favored by Pakistan, is that the explosive shock from one of the depth charges set off the torpedoes and mines (some of which may have been armed for laying) stored aboard the submarine.

Indian version

India claimed that the submarine was sunk following a series of successful manoeuvres by the Indian Navy. Later some items of the ship like the logbook and official Pakistani tapes, were displayed in India's Eastern Naval Command. A submarine rescue vessel, INS Nishtar was sent to check the debris. India later built a "Victory Memorial" on the coast near where the Ghazi was sunk.

The official history of Indian Navy ‘Transition to Triumph’, authored by Vice-Admiral (Retd) G M Hiranandani, quotes naval records and top naval officials who commanded operations on the eastern waterfront as saying that INS Rajput was sent from Vizag to track down Ghazi. The book also noted that the time of dropping of the charges, the explosion which was heard by the people of Vizag and that of a clock recovered from Ghazi, matched.

References

  1. Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
  2. ^ http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html
  3. Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
  4. http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm
  5. See the article of Genesis of Break away at Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971
  6. ^ "Pakistan Naval Operations in the Bay of Bengal: The loss of PNS Ghazi" (html). Pakistan Military Consortium. (PMC). December 1972. Retrieved 2011. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference pd was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ http://www.almanacwhf.ru/?no=4&art=6
  9. Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
  10. Mihir K. Roy (1995) War in the Indian Ocean, Spantech & Lancer. ISBN 978-1897829110
  11. ^ http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/forgottenfeat.htm
  12. Trilochan Singh Trewn (July 21, 2002). "Naval museums give glimpse of maritime history". The Tribune. Retrieved May 16, 2007. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  13. "India/Andhra Pradesh/Visakhapatnam". WikiMapia. Retrieved May 16, 2007.
  14. Vice-Admiral (Retd) G M Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965–1975. ISBN 1897829728

External links

Tench-class submarines
 United States Navy
Completed
Canceled
Other operators
 Brazilian Navy
 Royal Canadian Navy
 Republic of China Navy
part of Hai Shih class
 Hellenic Navy
 Marina Militare
 Pakistan Navy
 Turkish Navy
 Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela
Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
History
Conflict
Pakistani peace proposals
Leaders
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Highest
awards
Param Vir Chakra
Nishan-E-Haider
Bir Sreshtho
Pakistan Armed Forces
Military history of Pakistan
Leadership
Ministers
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Services
Inter-Services
Paramilitary
Personnel
Ranks and insignia
Business interests
Foundations
Criticism
Categories (ArmyAir ForceNavy)
Categories: