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Battle of Kumanovo
Part of First Balkan War
Date 23 - 24 October 1912 Location Kumanovo, Ottoman Macedonia Result Serbian victory
Belligerents
File:Flaf of Serbia (1882-1918).png Kingdom of Serbia	Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
File:Flaf of Serbia (1882-1918).png Radomir Putnik File:Flaf of Serbia (1882-1918).png Crown Prince Alexander	Zekki Pasha
Strength
132,000 men 148 artillery pieces 100 machine guns	65,000 men 164 artillery pieces 104 machine guns
Casualties and losses
4,564 (687 killed, 3,280 wounded, 597 missing)	4,500 (1,200 killed, 3,000 wounded, 327 captured)

The Battle of Kumanovo (Macedonian and Serbian cyrillic: Кумановска битка) on 23 - 24 October 1912 was a major battle of the First Balkan War. It was an important Serbian victory over the Ottoman army in Vardar Macedonia, shortly after the outbreak of war.

Planning

The objective of the Serbian war plan was to destroy the Ottoman army in a decisive battle before the Ottomans can complete the mobilisation and concentration of forces. The Serbian planners assumed that the main Ottoman force will be deployed defensively in the valley of Vardar and on the strategically important plateau of Ovče Pole. The aim was to double envelop the Ottoman army by using three armies:

• 1. Armija, under Crown Prince Alexander, comprising of five infantry and one cavalry division (132,000 men), was deployed in the area around Vranje, with the task to attack the enemy frontally.

• 2. Armija, under Stepa Stepanovic, comprising of one Serbian and one Bulgarian division (74,000 men), deployed in the area around Kyustendil, was assigned to the easternmost attack, with the objective of attacking the right flank of the enemy.

• 3. Armija, under Bozidar Jankovic, comprising of four infantry divisions and one infantry brigade (76,000 men), deployed in two groups, the first one at Toplica and the second one at Medveđa, was assigned to the westernmost attack, with the task to take Kosovo and then move south to attack the left flank of the enemy.

• smaller units were sent to take Sandžak. The Serbian commander-in-chief was general Radomir Putnik.

According to the initial Ottoman plan, created by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, the Ottoman forces in Macedonia would stay in defense and, if necessary, retreat to Albania. The decisive battle would take place in Thrace, versus the Bulgarian army. However, Nazim Pasha, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, decided to surprise the Serbs by taking an offense in Macedonia. The plan also included the offense in Thrace. His goal was to win the initial battles against the surprised allies, hoping that the Great powers would then intervene and stop the war. However, the Ottoman mobilisation in Macedonia was slow, and the Ottoman Vardar Army, led by Zekki Pasha, had little more than a half of manpower mobilised when the war started. It comprised of:

• 5. Topluluk, under ?, comprising of 4 divisions (32,000 men), deployed in the area around Štip.

• 6. Topluluk, under Djavid Pasha, comprising of 2 divisions (6,000 men), deployed in the area around Veles.

• 7. Topluluk, under Feti Pasha, comprising of 3 divisions (19,000 men), deployed in the area around Kumanovo.

• smaller units in Kosovo.

Prelude

Even before the war was declared, the border skirmishes occurred. On the 15 October, on the front of the Toplica group of 3. Armija, Serbian chetniks, acting on their own, attacked the Ottoman forces, although the Serbian deployment hasn't been completed yet. The Ottomans counterattacked, but they were stopped by Moravska divizija II poziva. The fighting on the border lasted until 19 October when the Ottomans were forced to retreat. On 21 October the entire 3. Armija began it's advance and on 22 October, without serious resistance, entered Priština.

On the 18 October, Bulgarian 7. Rilska pehotna diviziya of 2.Armija started it's advance towards Gorna Dzhumaya, while the rest of the army advanced towards the village of Stracin and captured it on 21 October.

1. Armija crossed the border on 20 October and in the evening of 22 October reached the outskirts of Kumanovo.

On the other side, as soon as his forces were deployed, Zekki Pasha decided to take the offense towards Kumanovo. In the evening of 22 October Vardar Army gathered in the valley of Pčinja River. While Zekki Pasha had the precise informations about the strength and disposal of the Serbian forces, the Serbian command didn't realise that the battle with the main Ottoman force will start the very next morning. Not expecting the attack, Serbs didn't fortify their positions, which were, on the other hand, topographically strong. Still, only two out of five infantry divisions were deployed in the front echelon - Dunavska divizija I poziva on the left wing, with Konjička divizija (Cavalry division) behind it, and Moravska divizija I poziva on the right wing. The left wing was particularly vulnerable, because Srtevica, the important topographic object, was defended by Macedonian irregulars.

During the night of 22/23 October, 6. Topluluk (17. piyade tümeni and Monastir piyade tümeni) took the position in the Ottoman centre, on the hill of Zebrnjak. The main forces of 5. Topluluk (13. piyade tümeni and Štip piyade tümeni) were on the right Ottoman wing, while the main forces of 7. Topluluk (19. piyade tümeni and Üsküb piyade tümeni) were on the left wing.

23 October

The morning of 23 October was foggy, and reconnaissance couldn't be performed properly. On the Serbian left wing, the observers noticed the troops of 17. piyade tümeni in movement, but mistaken them for the Ottoman battery withdrawing from Stracin. Troops of the 18th regiment of Dunavska divizija I poziva which moved forward to capture it were pushed back, as well as the reconnaissance forces of Konjička divizija.

Observing the retreat of these Serbian units, Zekki Pasha concluded that the Serbian left wing is weak. Since there were no actions of 2. Armija from Stracin, he decided to attack. Around 11:00, with the artillery support, 5. and 6. Topluluk attacked the positions of Dunavska divizija I poziva. Soon, 13. and 17. piyade tümeni forced the 18th regiment to retreat in disorder, but, instead of continuing the attack, Zekki Pasha decided to wait for the arrival of Štip piyade tümeni from the rear and to use this division to attack the Serbian flank and rear. That enabled the Serbian 7th regiment to aid the wavering 18th regiment and to consolidate the defense. Soon after that, the Serbian 8th regiment arrived, and 7th regiment was able to move to the left flank and reinforce the defense of Srtevica, which was endangered by an attack of Štip piyade tümeni. On the right flank of Dunavska divizija I poziva, it's 9th regiment halted the advance of the weakened Monastir piyade tümeni.

Around 12.00, 7. Topluluk started it's attack on the positions held by Moravska divizija I poziva. However, Serbian infantry and artillery were already deployed for combat, as the artillery fire from the east suggested that the battle has started. After the initial Ottoman progress, Serbs have counterattacked and pushed them back to the starting positions. After that, the Ottoman units have been kept at bay by the well organised Serbian artillery fire until the end of day.

The Serbian rear echelon divisions (Dunavska divizija II poziva on the left, Drinska divizija I poziva in the centre and Timočka divizija II poziva on the right) and the army artillery weren't informed about the combat operations. They remained in the rear, without participating in the first day of the battle. 1. Armija command didn't receive precise informations about the battle and didn't have any influence on the actual combat. Despite these facts, the Ottoman attack of the 23 October was not successful, mostly thanks to "the high devotion of (Serbian) troops and lower officers".

24 October

Uninformed about the situation in the field, the command of 1. Armija didn't realise that the attack of the main Ottoman forces has occurred, as those forces were expected on Ovče Pole. Assuming that the Ottoman units north of Kumanovo are merely forward detachments, it ordered the troops to continue their advance towards south, as previously planned. After midnight, it received a report from Dunavska divizija I poziva which stated that the division was attacked by the strong enemy forces and suffered heavy casualties, but at that moment it was too late for any change of orders.

On the other side, Zekki Pasha decided to continue the attack, hoping that his forces will be able to achieve victory on the following day.

The Ottoman attack on their right wing started around 5:30. 6. Topluluk was assigned to tie up as many enemy forces as possible by attacking from the front, while Štip piyade tümeni was again assigned to flank attack. Dunavska divizija I poziva again had to withstand heavy pressure, but around 10:00 parts of Dunavska divizija II poziva arrived from the rear and strengthened it's defense. At the same time, Konjička divizija moved to the left bank of Pčinja and slowed the advance of Ottoman forces towards Srtevica. Around 12:00, parts of Dunavska divizija II poziva reinforced the defense of Srtevica, definitely stopping the advance of the Ottoman right wing.

On the left Ottoman wing, a lot of reservists from Üsküb piyade tümeni had deserted during the night, upon hearing that 3. Armija has captured Priština and that it is marching towards Skopje. Still, at 5:30, 7. Topluluk started the attack. However, Moravska divizija I poziva has counterattacked at 6:00, and with the arrival of Timočka divizija II poziva from the rear, forced the entire Ottoman left wing to retreat.

Around 9:30, Drinska divizija I poziva from the rear echelon of 1. Armija arrived to the front and attacked the Ottoman centre. Around 11:00, Monastir piyade tümeni started to retreat. The commander of 6. Topluluk managed to temporarily halt the Serbian advance by using his last reserves, but in the repeated attack around 13:00, Drinska divizija I poziva managed to capture Zebrnjak, the main object in Ottoman defense, and to force 17. piyade tümeni to retreat. With Üsküb piyade tümeni and Monastir piyade tümeni already retreating, the battle was solved. At 15:00, Moravska divizija I poziva entered Kumanovo.

Ottoman forces retreated in disorder: 7. and parts of 6. Topluluk towards Skopje and 5. and parts of 6.Topluluk towards Štip and Veles. Serbian troops missed the chance to pursue them.

Results

The Ottoman Vardar Army fought the battle according to plan, but despite this, suffered heavy defeat. Although Zekki Pasha operationally surprised the Serbian command by attacking suddenly, the decision to act offensively against the superior enemy was, in fact, a grave error which determined the outcome of this battle. On the other side, Serbian command started the battle without plans and preparations, and missed the chance to pursue the defeated enemy and effectively end the operations in Vardar Macedonia, although it has the fresh troops of the rear echelon capable for such action. Even after the end of battle, Serbs still believed that it was fought against weaker Ottoman units and that main enemy forces are on Ovče Pole.

Still, the Battle of Kumanovo was decisive for the outcome of the war in Macedonia. The Ottoman plan for an offensive war has failed, Vardar Army has abandoned large territory and lost a large number of artillery pieces without the possibility to reinforce, as the supply routes from Anatolia were cut out.

The Vardar Army wasn't able to organise the defense on Vardar River and was forced to abandon Skopje, retreating all the way to Prilep. 1. Armija advanced slowly and entered Skopje on 26 October. Two days later, it was strengthened by Moravska divizija II poziva, while the rest of 3. Armija was sent to Metohija and then through northern Albania to the Adriatic coast. 2. Armija was sent to aid the Bulgarians in the Siege of Adrianople, while 1. Armija was preparing for an offense towards Prilep and Bitola.

References and notes

1. ^ Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 70.
2. ^ Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. The Ottoman casualties don't include the significant number of soldiers who deserted during and after the battle.
3. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 39-45. Serbian war plan and order of battle.
4. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 45-48. Ottoman war plan and order of battle.
5. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 68-70.
6. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 70.
7. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 70-71.
8. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 72-73.
9. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 74.
10. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 76. Quote in Serbian latin: "Iako vođena bez plana i bez uticaja komande armije, koja nije imalaa vezu sa divizijama, odbrana je uspela da odbije napad nadmoćnijih snaga neprijatelja zahvaljujući krajnjem požrtvovanju trupa i nižih starešina, posebno Dunavske divizije I poziva, koja je podnela najveći teret bitke i pretrpela teške gubitke."
11. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 76.
12. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 79.
13. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 80.
14. ^ Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. Result an significance of the battle. Cite error: The named reference "fourteen" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
15. Vojvoda Živojin Mišić, Moje uspomene, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1985, page 236. Mišić states that general Putnik believed that Vardar army still has the ability to fight a battle on Ovče Pole even after it's defeat at Kumanovo.
16. Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 87.

• 1912
• Battles involving the Ottoman Empire
• Battles involving Serbia