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The Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as Taiwan) maintains a large military establishment, which accounted for 16.8 % of the central budget in the fiscal year of 2003. It is historically continuous with the Nationalist Army that retreated from mainland China to Taiwan with the Kuomintang (KMT) at the end of the Chinese Civil War, when the mainland was taken over by the Communist Party of China.

Until the 1970s, the military's primary mission was to retake mainland China from the Communists. The military's current foremost mission is the defense of the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu against a possible invasion by the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China, which is seen as the predominant threat to the ROC in the ongoing dispute over the political status of Taiwan.

Personnel

The ROC's armed forces number approximately 300,000, and reserves reportedly total 3,870,000. Conscription remains universal for qualified males reaching age 18. Force streamlining programs under way since 1997 are combining redundant institutions and steadily reducing the military to 270,000 personnel by 2012. However, even then there would be compulsory basic training for all males reaching 18. As the size of the force decreases, Taipei intends to gradually expand the number of volunteer soldiers with the eventual goal of forming an all volunteer military.

The ROC military's officer corps is generally viewed as being competent, capable, technically proficient, and generally pro-U.S. in outlook, displaying a high degree of professionalism. However, as a whole, the culture in the officer corps tends to be very cautious and conservative. The military also faces difficulties in the recruitment and retention of junior officers and NCO's due to competition with the private sector.

Morale in the enlisted corps is generally believed to be rather low, due in part to difficulties in retention of experienced NCO's, force reduction, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures which discourages lower-level risk-taking, and competition with the private sector which is generally viewed as offering better opportunities, especially for the technically savvy.

There are, however, reports that this is changing as military benefits have been increased to compete more favourably with the private sector. In 2005 the MND exceeded its recruitment goal of volunteer enlisted personnel by almost twice the required amount. This may be indicative of changing cultural perceptions of military service as well as more experience on the part of MND recruiting officers.

Because of the historical legacy having once controlled Mainland China, the army has traditionally been the most important of Taiwan's military forces, although this has declined in recent years with the realization that the army's role in defending against a PRC invasion is limited. For the same reason, more emphasis is being placed on the development of the navy and air force.

Organization

Military branches and structure

The following service commands are directly subordinate to the General Staff, which in turn answers to the Minister of Defense and the ROC President:

• Republic of China Army (ROCA)
• Republic of China Navy (ROCN)
  • Republic of China Marine Corps (ROCMC)
• Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF)
• Republic of China Military Police (ROCMP)

The Republic of China Coast Guard was created as a separate branch in 2001 from related police and military units and is administered by the Executive Yuan.

Reforms and development

Civilian control of the military

Two defense reform laws implemented in 2002 granted the civilian defense minister control over the entire military and expanded legislative oversight authority for the first time in history. In the past the ROC military was closely linked with and controlled by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). Following the democratization of the 1990s the military has moved to a politically neutral position, though the senior officer ranks remain dominated by KMT members.

Arms purchases

Acquisitions over the next several years will emphasize modern C 4 ISR equipment that will vastly improve communications and data-sharing among services. These and other planned acquisitions will gradually shift the island’s strategic emphasis to offshore engagement of invading Chinese forces. It is hoped that this will serve to reduce civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure in the event of armed conflict.

The ROC's armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the United States which has supplied it with 150 F-16A/B Block-20 MLU fighters, 6 E-2 Hawkeyes, the licensed production of Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, 63 AH-1W attack helos, 39 OH-58D scout helos and 200 Patriot PAC-II SAMs, among other weapons. The United States has also authorized the sale of eight diesel submarines in 2001, although it is not clear if and how these subs are to be delivered since the United States does not build diesel submarines and other nations are unlikely to sell these weapons because of PRC pressure. As a consequence Taiwan might get a modernised Barbel-class design. Taiwan has already taken delivery of four Kidd-class destroyers starting from late 2005. In addition delivery of M109A6 units started in 2003 together with two additional E2C Hawkeyes and nine Chinook heavy transport helos in 2004. In 1992 the USA also agreed to sell the AEGIS SPY 1F to Taiwan to be installed on a special version of the Perry. However due to technical difficulties this plan was later given up by Taiwan. In light of the continuous ballistic missile buildup by the PRC, Taipei has also expressed interest in participating in or developing ballistic missile defense capabilities, possibly in conjunction with the U.S. or Japan, though it is unclear whether the U.S. would permit such collaboration to take place.

The ROC has also procured two Zwaardvis MK2 class submarines from the Netherlands, and 60 Mirage 2000-5Di/Ei fighters from France together with six French La Fayette stealth frigates. Also Taiwan acquired four minesweepers from Germany. These sales were made in the late 1980s/early '90s and because of PRC pressure, future large scale sales from Europe appear unlikely.

The military has also stressed military "self-reliance," which has resulted in the growth of indigenous military production in certain fields most notably the Indigenous Defense Fighter, Taiwan's own MLRS the RT-2000 and SAMs like the Sky Bow I and II. Taiwan also developed its own Hsung Feng series of supersonic anti-ship missile. The ROC's efforts at arms purchases have consistently been opposed by PRC. In addition the PRC has consistently attempted to block communications between the ROC military and other militaries.

Doctrine and exercises

The primary goal of the ROC Armed Forces is to provide a credible deterrent against hostile action by establishing effective counterstrike and defense capabilities. Should hostilities occur, current ROC military doctrine centers upon the principle of "offshore engagement" where the primary goal of the armed forces in any conflict with the PRC would be to keep as much of the fighting away from Taiwan proper for as long as possible to minimize damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties. The military has also begun to take the threat of a sudden "decapitation attack" by the PRC seriously. Consequently, these developments have seen a growing emphasis on the role of the Navy and Air Force (where the Army had traditionally dominated); as well as the development of rapid reaction forces and quick mobilization of local reserve forces.

A series of computer simulations conducted by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in 2004 predicted that, in the event of a full scale invasion by the PRC, Taipei would fall after almost three weeks. It also showed that the ROC Air Force would be eliminated by about the fifth day. However, the simulation results indicate that the PRC would lose about two-thirds of all its military forces in the process. The results of the simulation are hotly debated since they came at a time when the Legislative Yuan was debating one of the largest arms procurement packages in recent years.

Foreign cooperation

Japan

While some reports have also indicated the presence of retired JSDF personnel as advisors, there is no official cooperation between the ROC military and the JSDF. It is believed that any Japanese involvement in a cross-Straits conflict would be very much contingent upon the US response, due to the nearest US forces in the region being based in Japan and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.

Singapore

Starting in 1975, Singapore has sent units from its military to train in Taiwan due to the lack of space in the city-state under the Starlight training program (星光計畫). Singapore forces training in Taiwan numbered roughly 3000 as of 2005.

Singapore being an island surrounded by larger countries found similarity with Taiwan; might contributed to it suitability as a training ground. However this became a point of conflict between Singapore with Beijing. Beijing demanded the withdrawal of troops and offered to provide another training ground on Hainan Island. Singapore refused the offer, rather stated it would withdraw it's forces and not take part in any confrontation.

United States

Collaboration between the ROC and US militaries began during World War II when both nations were members of the Allied forces, and continued through the Chinese Civil War when ROC forces were supplied primarily by the US until the final evacuation of ROC forces to Taiwan in 1949. Initially the U.S. expected the ROC government to fall and withdrew support until the outbreak of the Korean War when the U.S. 7th Fleet was ordered to the Taiwan Straits both to protect Taiwan from a PRC attack, and to stop ROC actions against the PRC. A formal US-ROC security pact was signed in 1954 establishing a formal alliance that lasted until US recognition of the PRC in 1979. During this period US military advisors were deployed to the ROC and joint exercises were common. The US and ROC also collaborated on human and electronic intelligence operations directed against the PRC. ROC units also participated in the Korean War and the Vietnam War in noncombat capacities, primarily at the insistence of the United States which was concerned that high profile roles for ROC forces in these conflicts would lead to full scale PRC intervention.

High-level cooperation ended with the US recognition of the PRC in 1979, when all remaining US forces in Taiwan were withdrawn. The US continued to supply the ROC with arms sales per the Taiwan Relations Act, albeit in a diminished role. While ROCAF pilots continued to train at Luke AFB in Arizona, cooperation is still limited primarily to civilian contractors.

In recent years, the ROC military has again begun higher level cooperation with the U.S. Military after over two decades of relative isolation. Senior officers from the U.S. Pacific Command observed the annual Han Kuang military exercises in 2005. The US also upgraded its military liaison position in Taipei from a position held by retired officers hired on a contractual basis to one held by an active duty officer the same year.Nonetheless the US continues to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity as to whether or not it would intervene in a cross-Straits conflict.

Military ranks

The ROC Military's rank structure is patterned after that of the U.S. Armed Forces. Note that the titles of each rank are the same in Chinese for all four military branches. The corresponding titles in English for each service are also provided.

Major deployments, battles & incidents

ROC on Mainland China (1912-1949)

• Northern Expedition: 1926 - 1928
• Central Plains War: May 1930 – November 4, 1930
• First Communist Insurrection/Purge: 1927-1937
  • Nanchang Uprising: 1927
  • Autumn Harvest Uprising: 1927
  • Xi'an Incident: December 12, 1936
• Second Sino-Japanese War / World War II: 1937-1945
  • Marco Polo Bridge Incident: July 7, 1937
  • Battle of Shanghai: August 13 - November 9, 1937
  • Battle of Nanjing: October - December, 1937
  • Battle of Taierzhuang: March 24 - April 7, 1938
  • First Battle of Changsha: September 17 - October 6, 1939
  • Second Battle of Changsha: September 6 - October 8, 1941
  • Third Battle of Changsha: December 24, 1941 - January 15, 1942
  • Defense of Sichuan: 1942 - 1943
  • Battle of Hengyang-Changsha: June 1944 - April 1945
• Chinese Civil War: 1946 - 1950
  • New Fourth Army Incident: 1940
• 228 Incident: February 28 - March 1947

ROC on Taiwan (1949-present)

• Battle of Kuningtou: October 25 - October 28, 1949
• Battle of Denbu Island: November 3 - 5 , 1949
• First Battle of Dadan island: July 26, 1950
• Korean War: 1950-1953, Translators, cross border raids into southwest China from Burma.
• Battle of Nanri island: April 11 - 15 , 1952
• Dongshan Island Campaign: July 15, 1953
• First Taiwan Strait Crisis: August 1954 - May 1955
  • Battle of Yijiangshan: January 18, 1955
  • Tachen Evacuation: February 7 - 11, 1955
• Second Taiwan Strait Crisis: August 23 - early October, 1958
  • Second Battle of Dadan island:August 26 , 1958
• Vietnam War: 1960s, Deployment of small groups of ROC troops disguised as locals, transportation, and technical assistance. Not widely publicized to avoid PRC involvement.
• Battle of Dong-Yin:May 1, 1965
• Battle of Wuchow:November13-14, 1965
• Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: July 21, 1995 - March 23, 1996
• Southeast Asian tsunami relief: January 2005

Nuclear weapons program

The development of nuclear weapons by the ROC has been a contentious issue, as it has been cited by the PRC as a reason to attack Taiwan. The U.S., hoping to avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, has continually opposed arming Taiwan with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the ROC adheres to the principles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has stated that it does not intend to produce nuclear weapons. Past nuclear research by the ROC makes it a 'threshold' nuclear state.

In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the auspices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. The ROC was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States) allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to develop fuel for nuclear weapons.

After the International Atomic Energy Agency found evidence of the ROC's efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Though the nuclear reactor was soon shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S., work continued secretly.

A secret program was revealed when Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER who was a sleeping agent for the CIA, defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted.

During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then ROC President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate the program, but was forced to back down a few days later after drawing intense criticism.

See also

Template:ChineseText

• National Revolutionary Army
• Whampoa Military Academy
• Chiang Kai-shek
• Sino-German cooperation (1911–1941)
• Warlord era
• Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology
• Military history of China
• Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction
• History of the Republic of China
• People's Liberation Army
• Military of the People's Republic of China

References

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2. "Overview - Taiwan Military Agencies". globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
3. "2004 National Defence White Paper" (PDF). ROC Ministry of National Defense. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
4. ^ "2004 National Defense Report" (PDF). ROC Ministry of National Defense. 2004. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
5. "Ministry of National Defense - Taiwan Military Agencies". globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
6. "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait". Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill. U.S. Department of Defense. 1999. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
7. Roy, Denny (2003). "Taiwan's Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within" (PDF). Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
8. Peter, Brookes (2003). "U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration". Heritage Lecture #808. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
9. ^ Swaine, Michael. "3". Tawian's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants (PDF). RAND Corporation. p. 65. ISBN 0-8330-3094-9. Retrieved 2006-03-05. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
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11. "China expresses strong indignation for "US-Taiwan defense conference": FM spokesman". People's Daily. 2004-10-10. Retrieved 2006-03-05. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
12. Shlapak, David (2000). "2". Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (PDF). RAND Corporation. pp. 7–30. ISBN 0-8330-2897-9. Retrieved 2006-03-05. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help) Example of a simulated wargame of a cross-straits conflict.
13. "「星光」重要性不如以往 ("Starlight" not as important as it once was)". The Liberty Times. 2005-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
14. U.S. Department of Defense (1950). "Classified Teletype Conference, dated June 27, 1950, between the Pentagon and General Douglas MacArthur regarding authorization to use naval and air forces in support of South Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files". Truman Presidential Library & Museum. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
15. "Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China". taiwandocuments.org. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
16. ^ S. Goldstein (2000). "The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies" (PDF). Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
17. "Military attache starts work at AIT next month". The Taipei Times. 2005-07-30. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
18. "U.S. Official Urges Balanced Approach to PRC-Taiwan Differences" (Press release). U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong. 2003-02-14. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
19. "Taiwan". The International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia Around the World. Retrieved 2006-03-05.
20. Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8805-2.

External links

• ROC Ministry of National Defense (Traditional Chinese)(English)

• Military of the Republic of China
• 1925 establishments