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1688 Invasion of England
The sailing order of the Dutch fleet.
Date November – December 1688 Location North Sea, English Channel and the England
Belligerents
Dutch Republic Williamites	English Government
Commanders and leaders
William III of Orange Schomberg Torrington Cornelis Evertsen Philips van Almonde	James III Feversham Marlborough (defected) Dartmouth
Strength
Army strength 16,000-21,000 men Naval strength 40 ships of the line 9 frigates 28 galliots 9 fireships 9,500 sailors 2,400 guns >400 smaller vessels	Army strength 30,000 men Naval strength 31 Man-of-war several smaller vessels 11,500 sailors 2,000 guns
Casualties and losses
low	low

Prelude

To prevent an alliance between England and France in the upcoming Nine Years' War and a repeat of 1672, William III of Orange and the Dutch States General resolved to stage a pre-emptive strike on England. William was careful not to appear as a conqueror and domestic unrest in England allowed him to request an invitation from seven important English figures. The invitation from the "Immortal Seven" in early July 1688 gave William’s planned expedition the veneer of legitimacy he wanted. Louis XIV, under the impression that James II was strong enough to keep William occupied with a protracted struggle in England, attacked Philippsburg and moved into the German lands. This action removed the immidiate French threat to the Dutch Republic and cleared the path for William's mission to England.

preperations

The seven politicians who invited William III to intervene in England were confident of the invasion's prospects for success. They assessed that "nineteen parts of twenty of the people are desirous of a change," noting widespread dissatisfaction among army officers and a strong aversion to Catholicism among the soldiers. Despite this optimism, William III deemed it essential to assemble a formidable army and navy to ensure nothing was left to chance. While the English conspirators recommended a small force supported by a large fleet, William insisted on commanding enough troops to decisively confront James II’s army if necessary.

The preparations for the expedition were managed collaboratively by William, Hans Willem Bentinck, Gaspar Fagel, Job de Wildt (Secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty), and Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen. Financial backing came primarily from the States-General, which decided in late July to expand the Dutch fleet by 9,000 personnel. To fund this expansion, a state loan of 4 million guilders was issued at William’s request. Additional financial support came from Francisco Lopes Suasso, a financier of Portuguese-Jewish origin, who lent 2 million guilders. When asked about collateral, Suasso famously responded, "If you succeed, I know you will repay me; if not, I will accept the loss."

The actual invasion force comprised around 15,000 Dutch soldiers, in addition to up to 5,000 British and French volunteers. To safeguard the homeland against the threat of a French attack, 30,000 troops stayed behind, bolstered by an additional 19,000 elite German and Swedish forces that were hired by the Dutch. Half of the troops and the entire fleet crew were funded by the city of Amsterdam, with minimal involvement from the other Dutch admiralties except Rotterdam. The combined expenses for the army and navy exceeded 7 million guilders.

Oppposing forces

English navy

English army

At the time of William's invasion in 1688, the English army had undergone a modest expansion under James II but remained relatively small compared to continental standards. Following the Monmouth Rebellion in 1685, the army had grown to approximately 19,778 soldiers, including garrison troops and field units. By the autumn of 1688, bolstered by troops 2,820 men from Ireland and the entirety of the 2,946-strong Scottish army, James's forces theoretically numbered almost 40,000 on paper. But even on paper the actual number of trained and battle ready troops was closer to 29,000–30,000, with some still undergoing training and others on garrison duty. More modern scholarship suggests that the field army James assembled on Salisbury Plain would ultimately effectively consist of just 19,000 men. And despite the apparent growth, many of the newer regiments lacked sufficient training and equipment, reducing their effectiveness in the field.

Overlooking John Churchill, James II had appointed the Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham, the nephew of Turenne, as commander-in-chief in 1685. Feversham, a long-time associate of James since the 1660s and a nephew of the famed Turenne, had a nominal military reputation. However, his leadership would prove disastrously inadequate. At the decisive Battle of Sedgemoor on 6 July, Feversham’s poor judgment nearly cost James the victory and it were Churchill’s efforts that saved the situation. Despite this, the credit went to Feversham. Despite his incompetence, James reappointed him in 1688.

Conspiracy

William's invasion fleet

Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, the ex-Royal Navy officer, who carried the invitation to William with him in June 1688 was actively involved in the preparations for the 1688 invasion and for propaganda purposes the Prince appointed him as the lieutenant-admiral general of the Dutch States Navy and commander-in-chief of the fleet which would take him to England on 6 October. However, Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen the Youngest remained in during the preperations and after the campaign to England. Additionally the Prince decreed that until the moment of rendezvous with the English fleet, Herbert would share command with Eversten and consult with him on all significant matters. Cornelis Tromp, the famous aging Dutch officer who still nominally held the post of lieutenant-admiral general, was not consulted by the Prince.

William's army

William took 15,269 troops with him that formed part of the Dutch States Army. The quality of these troops was superior to the forces James could muster. Many were experienced veterans and 2,000 of the 11,000 infantrymen were part of the elite Dutch Blue Guards and 3,000 of the elite Scots Brigade. Additionaly, due to the reforms of William and Georg of Waldeck during the Franco-Dutch War, Dutch infantry had acquired a reputation for being the best in Europe. Dutch infantry was better trained and more disciplined than their peers and in 1688 also enjoyed a technological advantage in weaponry. Dutch soldiers were equipped with the new flintlock muskets which meant they could achieve a higher rate of fire. Dutch artillery crews were equally well regarded, and although the reputation of the Dutch cavalry was not on par with the infantry and artillery, half of the cavalry William brought with him consisted of elite regiments. Ignatius White, James II's envoy extraordinary in the Dutch Republic, wrote: 'There is not in Christendom a better army of the number,' and; 'you may thinke what you please, they dont believe they will meet with great opposition.' It is commonly accepted that this army was supplemented by 5,000 British exiles and Huguenots who volunteered, although the Dutch historian Machiel Bosman reduces their number to 1,200.

William III would personally led the army. He was a capable military commander who had gained experience with leading large armies during the Franco-Dutch War. As his deputy commander he appointed the seasoned general Frederick Schomberg. The Duke of Schomberg had been one of Louis XIV's better commanders but, as he was a protestant, left France for the Dutch Republic in 1685 after the Edict of Fontainebleau. Other important officers included Hendrik Trajectinus, Count of Solms, Godard van Reede-Ginkel,

Naval campaign

Land campaign

Aftermath

Footnotes

1. At the time of the Eighty Years' War Schomberg had served in the Dutch army, under Frederick Henry or Orange.

References

1. ^ Bosman 2016, p. 208—217.
2. Troost 2005, p. 196.
3. Western 1972, p. 260.
4. ^ Childs 1980, pp. 4. Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEChilds19804" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
5. Powley 1928, p. 61.
6. ^ Troost 2005, p. 195.
7. Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 182. sfn error: no target: CITEREFVan_Nimwegen2020 (help)
8. Hoak 1996, p. 18.
9. Jones 1993, p. 27.
10. Prud'homme van Reine 2009, p. 288–289.
11. ^ Stapleton (2003), p. 115. Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEStapleton2003115" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
12. Chandler 1995, p. 144.
13. Nimwegen 2020, p. 44,85,236.
14. Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 236. sfn error: no target: CITEREFVan_Nimwegen2020 (help)
15. Israel 1995, p. 130.
16. Nimwegen 2020, p. 36.
17. Stapleton (2003), p. 270.
18. Van der Aa 1852. sfn error: no target: CITEREFVan_der_Aa1852 (help)

Sources

• Aa, Abraham Jacob van der (1874). "Frederik Herman von Schomberg". Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden. Deel 17.
• Bosman, Machiel (2016). De roofkoning: prins Willem III en de invasie van Engeland (The robber king: Prince William III and the invasion of England). Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep.
• Chandler, David (1995). The art of warfare in the age of Marlborough. Sarpedon. ISBN 978-1885119148.
• Childs, John (1980). The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-0688-3.
• Deen, Femke; Onnekink, David; Reinders, Michiel (2011). Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic. Brill.
• Hoak, Dale (1996). Hoak, Dale; Feingold, Mordechai (eds.). The Anglo-Dutch revolution of 1688–89 in 'The World of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688–89'. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2406-7.
• Israel, Jonathan (1995). The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-873072-1.
• Jones, J.R. (1993). Marlborough. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-37593-2.
• Knoop, Jan Willem (1881). "1688 en 1689". De Gids (45): 1–44.
• Nimwegen, Olaf van (2020). De Veertigjarige Oorlog 1672–1712: de strijd van de Nederlanders tegen de Zonnekoning [The Forty Years' War 1672–1712: the Dutch struggle against the Sun King] (in Dutch). Prometheus. ISBN 978-90-446-3871-4.
• Powley, Edward (1928). The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688. Cambridge University Press.
• Prud'homme van Reine, Ronald (2009). Opkomst en Ondergang van Nederlands Gouden Vloot – Door de ogen van de zeeschilders Willem van de Velde de Oude en de Jonge. De Arbeiderspers. ISBN 978-90-295-6696-4.
• Stapleton, John. M (2003). Forging a Coalition Army: William III, the Grand Alliance, and the Confederate Army in the Spanish Netherlands, 1688–1697. Ohio State University.
• Troost, Wouter (2005). William III the Stadholder-king: A Political Biography. Routledge. ISBN 978-0754650713.
• Western, John R. (1972). Monarchy and Revolution. The English State in the 1680s. Blandford Press. ISBN 978-0-7137-3280-1.