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The Structure of the Soviet Ground Forces evolved from the early loose groupings and Red Guards of the Bolsheviks, through an increasingly formalised military system through the Russian Civil War, to a regular army in the 1920s. Not fully prepared for the German onslaught of 1941, due to Stalin's purges of the officer corps and some remaining military conservatism, amongst other factors, by the end of the Second World War (the 'Great Patriotic War' to the Soviet population) the Red Army had become the most formidable land force on Earth.

The Red Army was renamed the Soviet Army just after victory. The 500+ rifle divisions that had shed so much blood on the Eastern Front were quickly reduced in number, and the multibrigade tank corps and mechanised corps that had provided the main striking punch were converted to a divisional structure. Cavalry formations were converted into further mechanised divisions, and additional combat support arms added and expanded. The mass, mobilisable, characteristic remained, with the Soviet Ground Forces developing several different tiers of readiness states (A B V etc). During the Cold War the Ground Forces were X, Y, Z in strucural terms.. incl Khruschev's cutbacks (cite numbers as precisely as possible)- ref needed.

Historical Overview

The Soviet ground forces' structural evolution fell into five separate periods:

formative (1925 - 1936, the legacy of the Imperial Russian Army and the First World War experience that created the Soviet Union, the Civil War, and war with Poland),

combat (1936 - 1946) - the war only finished with consolidation in Asia (China and Korea)

transformative (1947 - 1961) - the 1957 reorganisation was prompted by several issues such as end of Stalin's period, realisation on the effects of radioactivity on tank crews, and results of the war in Korea. The real turning point in development of the Soviet Ground Forces can only be judged by the developments in the largest of its parts, infantry, and that came with the development of the BMP-1

consolidating (1962 - 1984) - this period was largely the consolidation of all the doctrinal and technological developments of the early 60s into what the Ragan Administration found so threatening

final (1985 - 1993) - accession of M.S. Gorbachev, adoption of defensive doctrine, rise in avoidance of conscription, finally dissolution of the USSR.

Feskov, because of his focus upon the postwar period, divided the 1945-91 period into four itself:

1st period June 1945 to May 1957 - reflects the political break

2nd period June 1957 to December 1964 - Feskov argues that the period lasted towards the increase in the numbers of motor-rifle troops and the introduction of BMP-1

3rd period January 1965 to December 1985

4th period January 1986 to December 1991

At the beginning of its existence, the Red Army functioned as a voluntary formation, without ranks or insignia. Democratic elections selected the officers. However, a decree of May 29, 1918 imposed obligatory military service for men of ages 18 to 40. To service the massive draft, the Bolsheviks formed regional military commissariats (voyennyy komissariat, abbr. voyenkomat), which today still exist in Russia in this function and under this name.

For Historical section, I'd like to suggest combining the event narrative with doctrinal development, and not just another "List of..." type section. This means actual writing-in of the lessons and mistakes that resulted from, or contributed to development of the Ground Forces

Higher direction - Politburo and MOD

Then go to the Structure and say how decisions were taken at strategic level, including the link to the Politburo,

• An introduction on the relationship between the Party-political policy-setting organs and the General Staff strategic planning roles within the Soviet general strategy and relationship of Ground Forces to other Services

Administrative organisation

Main Staff of the Ground Forces directorates .. technology developmental Directorates, mobilisation, budgets, test centres etc

Conscription, and officer recruitment

In January-February 1923, following ferocious debates over the merits of different military systems, the territorial principal of manning the Red Army was introduced. Initially, ten regular divisions were converted to territorials, with a regular core of 1,607 and a total mobilised strength of 10,959. In each region able-bodied men were called up for a limited period of active duty in territorial units, which comprised about half the Army's strength, each year, for five years. The first call-up period was for three months, with one month a year thereafter. A regular cadre provided a stable nucleus. By 1925 this system provided 46 of the 77 infantry divisions and one of the eleven cavalry divisions. The remainder consisted of regular officers and enlisted personnel serving two-year terms. The territorial system was finally abolished, with all remaining formations converted to the cadre divisions, in 1937–38.

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Like other armies, the Red Army used administrative departments (called Directorates) to develop, train and equip the many combat Arms of Service troops and their Service Corps support echelons. These were:

staffs, including armoured division staff, general armoured commands, and general command, Military District and Front command, and Officers of the Stavka

Soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Soviet infantry were redesignated rifle troops. Eventually they included rifle divisional staff, rifle training regiments, rifle and mountaineering units, ski troops and rifle unit staff

airborne troops - the VDV

cavalry units

tank troops, including armoured units, armoured training regiments

reconnaissance troops - mounted and motorised

armoured trains

artillery troops, including artillery training units, artillery observation units and artillery observation training units, mortar battalions (MRL), mounted artillery troops, and anti-aircraft troops of the Ground Forces,

anti-tank troops

machine gun troops

motorcycle units

motorised troops

mountain troop divisional staff

sapper troops including sapper training battalions

engineers, including armoured engineer companies, fortification engineers

signals troops, including ], fortification signals

medical troops, including medical officers and NCO and medical training units

army map and military survey

army propaganda troops

army dogs units

barrier troops

chemical troops

Frunze Military Academy

military field police

military justice units

mobilisation processing personnel

motor maintenance troops

railway troops, including railway engineer training companies

smoke training units

smoke troops

specialist officers

supply officers

technical officers

transport supply officer

transport troops, including ]

veterinary officers and NCOs

veterinary troops

Operational organisation

Two major inheritances influenced the early Red Army operational structure. The first was the militias and Red Guards of the Bolsheviks, and the second was the army in Russia before 1917, the Imperial Russian Army, organised conventionally in fronts (the largest wartime field formation, equivalent to an army group in many other forces), armies, corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions. The level of disorganisation within the nascent army (and in the country as a whole) was so great that Trotsky, soon installed as People's Commissar for War, had to focus his attention upon rebuilding a disciplined military force. Thus initially the new Red Army adopted the general organisational pattern of the previous Imperial Army, and even inducted several Imperial regiments into the new force, apparently only with a designation change. As the situation in the country stabilised and Red Army officials were able to focus on building a land force appropriate to Soviet needs, the force structure changed to reflect developing operational art and doctrine.

Russian Civil War

see also OB when available

Organisation evolution - multidivision armies with no corps echelon in some cases, eg First Cavalry Army The Rifle Corps was a formation that existed in the pre-Revolution Imperial Russian Army, and was inherited by the Red Army.

1922-41

see also OB when available

First suggestions for creation of large mechanised or tank formations in the Soviet Union were suggested based on development of doctrine for publication as PU-36, the field regulations largely authored by Marshal Tukhachevsky, and was created where "In the attack tanks must be employed in mass", envisaged as "Strategic cavalry". Although the name of "mechanised" may seem to the modern reader as referring to the infantry components of the Corps, in 1936 they referred to armoured vehicles only with the word "motorised" referring to the units equipped with trucks.

Development of unique fortified regions, which during World War II usually corresponded to an Army frontage formation.

Wartime

and OBs when available

War experience prompted changes to the way front-line forces were organized. On the outbreak of war the Red Army deployed mechanised corps and tank divisions whose development has been described above. The German attack battered many severely, and in the course of 1941 virtually all (barring two tank divisions in the Transbaikal Military District) were disbanded. After six months of combat against the Germans, STAVKA abolished the Rifle Corps intermediate level between the Army and Division level because while useful in theory, in the inexperienced state of the Red Army, they proved ineffective in practice. Following victory in the Battle of Moscow in the summer of 1942, the High Command began to reintroduce Rifle Corps into its most experienced formations. The total number of Rifle Corps started at 62 on 22 June 1941, dropped to six by 1 January 1942, but then increased to 34 by February 1943, and 161 by New Years' Day 1944. Actual strengths of front-line divisions, authorized to contain 11,000 men in July 1941, were mostly no more than 50% of established strengths during 1941, and divisions were often worn down on continuous operations to hundreds of men or even less.

The tank divisions and mechanised corps had been disbanded because it was much easier to coordinate smaller forces, and separate tank brigades and battalions were substituted. It was late 1942 and early 1943 before larger Tank corps were fielded in order to employ armor en mass again. By mid 1942 these corps were being grouped together into Tank Armies whose strength by the end of the war could be up to 700 tanks and 50,000 men.

After the Second World War

and other OBs where available

At the end of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army had over 500 rifle divisions and about a tenth that number of tank formations. Their experience of war gave the Soviets such faith in tank forces that from that point the number of tank divisions remained virtually unchanged, whereas the wartime infantry force was cut by two-thirds. The Tank Corps of the late war period were converted to tank divisions, and from 1957 the Rifle Divisions were converted to Motor Rifle Divisions (MRDs). MRDs had three motorized rifle regiments and a tank regiment, for a total of ten motor rifle battalions and six tank battalions; tank divisions had the proportions reversed. From 1970 to 1983, a motor rifle regiment was added to tank divisions and an independent tank battalion to motor rifle divisions, and major increases in artillery, mortars, and armoured personnel carriers, in line with the evolution of Soviet doctrine, which began to recognise the need for a conventional phrase, away from the previously expected purely nuclear operations. In the last years of the Soviet Union, the political decision by Gorbachev to reoriented military doctrine defensively meant further structural changes, which stripped field formations of some of their more overtly offensive weaponry, while being bitterly controversial amongst the Soviet military establishment.

By the middle of the 1980s the Ground Forces contained about 210 manoeuvre divisions. About three-quarters were motor rifle divisions and the remainder tank divisions. There were also a large number of artillery divisions, separate artillery brigades, engineer formations, and other combat support formations. However only relatively few formations were fully war ready. Three readiness categories, A, B, and V, after the first three letters of the Cyrillic alphabet, were in force. The Category A divisions were certified combat-ready and were fully equipped. B and V divisions were lower-readiness, 50–75% (requiring at least 72 hours of preparation) and 10–33% (requiring two months) respectively. The internal military districts usually contained only one or two A divisions, with the remainder B and V series formations.

Soviet planning for most of the Cold War period would have seen Armies of four to five divisions operating in Fronts made up of around four armies (and roughly equivalent to Western Army Groups). In the late 1970s and early 1980s new High Commands in the Strategic Directions were created to control multi-Front operations in Europe (the Western and South-Western Strategic Directions) and at Baku to handle southern operations, and in the Soviet Far East.

Criticisms(?)

(vi) Lastly, you can include a section on "Suvorov" and his views as criticisms, something other articles on Armies lack completely as if no one has ever criticises then.

Sources and References

1. Marshal Grigory Kulik and his horses - need ref
2. This is a judgement which will need sourcing and maybe changing, but will do for now.
3. Виталий Феськов © 2008 Военно-исторический журнал "Военный Рубеж," , Part I of the paper
4. Scott and Scott, 1979, p.5
5. Erickson, 1962, p.138
6. Scott and Scott, 1979, p.12
7. David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War 1941–43, University Press of Kansas, 2005, p.717 note 5.
8. John Erickson, The Soviet High Command 1918-41, MacMillian, London, 1962, p.19-20
9. p.179, Simpkin
10. ibid., p180.
11. See Erickson, 1962, p.406
12. Glantz, 2005, p.217–230
13. Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War 1941–43, University Press of Kansas, 2005, p.179
14. David Glantz, 2005, p.189
15. Mark L Urban, Soviet Land Power
16. British Army, Army Field Manual Vol. II, Part 2, Soviet Operations, 1986, Army Code No.73157 (Part 2), p. 3-4 & 3-5. (Declassified; original classificated 'Restricted'.)
17. Odom, 1998, p.118-123, 161
18. M J Orr, The Russian Ground Forces and Reform 1992–2002, January 2003, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, Sandhurst, p.1
19. M J Orr, 2003, p.1 and David C Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, Jane's Publishing Company, 1988, p.30
20. Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, Hamish Hamilton, 1982, gives this title, Odom (1998) also discusses this development

• The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment. FM 100-2-3, June 1991. Washington DC: United States Department of the Army.
• Fomin, N.N., Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (Template:Lang-ru), Moscow, 1978
• Simpkin, R., Deep battle: The brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii, Brassey's, London, 1987
• Glantz, David. Soviet Military Operational Art - In pursuit of deep battle. I would highly recommend it as it recapitulates the Simpkin research, and adds to it in a relatively slim volume. Somewhat more readable also because Simpkin wrote not only in the British style, but one from another era.