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===Battle of Mersa Matruh=== ===Battle of Mersa Matruh===
While preparing the Alamein positions Auchinleck fought strong delaying actions first at Mersa Matruh on ] and then Fuka on ]. The late change of orders resulted in some confusion in the forward formations (X Corps and XIII Corps) between the desire to inflict damage on the enemy and the intention not to get trapped in the Matruh position but retreat in good order. As a result there was poor coordination between the two forward Corps and units within them. Inland the ] found itself surrounded by 21st Panzer Division at Minqar Qaim but succeeded in breaking out on the night of ] to join the rest of XIII Corps at the Alamein position without serious losses.<ref name="NZ88"></ref> However, the withdrawal of XIII Corps had left the southern flank of X Corps on the coast at Matruh exposed and their line of retreat compromised. They too had had to break out and in the process sustained heavy casualties including the destruction on Indian 29th Infantry Brigade at Fuka. While preparing the Alamein positions Auchinleck fought strong delaying actions first at Mersa Matruh on ] and then Fuka on ]. The late change of orders resulted in some confusion in the forward formations (X Corps and XIII Corps) between the desire to inflict damage on the enemy and the intention not to get trapped in the Matruh position but retreat in good order. As a result there was poor coordination between the two forward Corps and units within them. Inland the ] found itself surrounded by 21st Panzer Division at Minqar Qaim but succeeded in breaking out on the night of ] to join the rest of XIII Corps at the Alamein position without serious losses.<ref name="NZ88"></ref> However, the withdrawal of XIII Corps had left the southern flank of X Corps on the coast at Matruh exposed and their line of retreat compromised. They too had had to break out and in the process sustained heavy casualties including the destruction on Indian 29th Infantry Brigade at Fuka. On the morning of 29 June, at 0930 hours, Colonel Scirocco's 7th Bersaglieri Regiment stormed the fortress of Mersa Matruh, after the German 90th Light Division had attacked the forward posts, the Italian shock-troops capturing 6,000 defenders.


===Defenses at El Alamein=== ===Defenses at El Alamein===

Revision as of 01:47, 23 June 2008

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First Battle of El Alamein
Part of World War II, North African Campaign

Allied infantry manning a sandbagged defensive position near El Alamein, 17 July 1942.
DateJuly 1July 27, 1942
LocationEl Alamein, Egypt
Result Tactical stalemate; Strategic Allied victory
Belligerents
Australia Australia
India India
New Zealand New Zealand
South Africa South Africa
United Kingdom United Kingdom

Germany Germany

Italy
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Claude Auchinleck
United Kingdom Dorman Smith
Germany Erwin Rommel
Strength
150,000 troops in 3 army corps, 7 infantry and 3 armoured divisions 1,114 tanks, over 1,000 artillery and over 1,500 planes 96,000 troops (including 56,000 Italians) 8 infantry and 4 armoured divisions (2 Panzer 2 Italian) 585 tanks (fewer than half of which were Panzers), fewer than 500 planes.
Casualties and losses
13,250 killed, wounded or captured 10,000 killed or wounded
7,000 Captured

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Western Desert Campaign
1940

1941

1942


Associated articles

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Area of Western Desert Campaign 1941/2 (Click to enlarge)

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The First Battle of El Alamein 127 July 1942 was a battle of the Western Desert Campaign of World War II, fought between Axis forces commanded by Erwin Rommel, and Allied forces commanded by Claude Auchinleck. The battle halted the furthest (and final) advance made by the Axis forces into Egypt, El Alamein being only just over 50 miles from Alexandria.

Prelude

Retreat from Gazala

Following the defeat at the Battle of Gazala in June 1942, the Eighth Army had retreated from the Gazala line to Mersa Matruh, roughly 100 miles inside the Egyptian border. On 25 June General Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C Middle East Command relieved Neil Ritchie and assumed direct command of Eighth Army himself. He decided not to seek a confrontation at the Mersa Matruh position: it had an open left flank to the south of the sort well exploited by Rommel at Gazala. He decided instead to withdraw a further 100 miles or more east to near El Alamein on the Mediterranean coast. Only 40 miles (60 km) to the south of El Alamein the steep slopes of the Qattara Depression ruled out the possibility of armour moving round the southern flank of his defenses and limited the width of the front he had to defend.

Battle of Mersa Matruh

While preparing the Alamein positions Auchinleck fought strong delaying actions first at Mersa Matruh on 26 June and then Fuka on 28 June. The late change of orders resulted in some confusion in the forward formations (X Corps and XIII Corps) between the desire to inflict damage on the enemy and the intention not to get trapped in the Matruh position but retreat in good order. As a result there was poor coordination between the two forward Corps and units within them. Inland the 2nd New Zealand Division found itself surrounded by 21st Panzer Division at Minqar Qaim but succeeded in breaking out on the night of 27 June to join the rest of XIII Corps at the Alamein position without serious losses. However, the withdrawal of XIII Corps had left the southern flank of X Corps on the coast at Matruh exposed and their line of retreat compromised. They too had had to break out and in the process sustained heavy casualties including the destruction on Indian 29th Infantry Brigade at Fuka. On the morning of 29 June, at 0930 hours, Colonel Scirocco's 7th Bersaglieri Regiment stormed the fortress of Mersa Matruh, after the German 90th Light Division had attacked the forward posts, the Italian shock-troops capturing 6,000 defenders.

Defenses at El Alamein

Alamein itself was an insignificant railway station on the coast. Some twenty miles to the south lay the Ruweisat ridge, a low stony ridge that nontheless gave excellent observation for many miles over the surrounding desert. Another thirty miles ot the south of that lay the Qattara Depression. The British had commenced construction of several "boxes" (localities with dug-outs and surrounded by minefields and barbed wire), but in reality the "line" was just open empty desert.

The British position in Egypt was in a critical position. The rout from Mersa Matruh had created a panic in the British headquarters at Cairo, something later called "the Flap". In courtyards of British headquarters, rear echelon units, and the British Embassy, confidential papers were frantically burned before what was expected to be the entry of Axis troops into the city - which was to be nicknamed "Ash Wednesday". The Axis too believed that the capture of Egypt was imminent - Mussolini, sensing an historic moment, flew to Libya in preparation for what he expected would be his triumphal entry to Cairo.

On 30 June Rommel's Afrika Korps approached the Alamein position. The Axis forces were exhausted and understrength, but Rommel was confident of continuing the advance on to the Nile. Rommel's plan was for the 90th 'Afrika' Division to screen the 1st South African Division (who occupied the northern most position around Alamein), while the 15th Panzer Division and 21st Panzer Division struck past the Ruweisat Ridge. However, Axis intelligence had failed to disclose the presence of a British brigade, 18th Indian Brigade, which had occupied an exposed position just west of Ruweisat Ridge at Deir el Shein late on 28 June after a hasty journey from Iraq.

Battle

Panzer Army Africa attacks

On 1 July 90th Light Infantry Division attacked along the coast but was repulsed by the South African 1st Division in the Alamein box supported by heavy artillery fire. At about 1000 hours on 1 July 21st Panzer Division attacked Deir el Shein. The Indian brigade held out the whole day in desperate fighting but by the evening had been overrun. However, the time they bought allowed Auchinleck to organise a hasty defence at the western end of Ruweisat Ridge.

On 2 July Rommel ordered the offensive to be resumed, with Afrika Korps to drive over the Ruweisat ridge outflanking the South African positions at Alamein. By this time Afrika Korps was at a very low strength (just 37 tanks), but the British defence of Ruweisat ridge relied on an improvised formation called Robcol, comprising a regiment each of Field artillery and light anti-aircraft artillery and a company of infantry. Robcol, in line with normal British army practice for ad hoc formations, was named after its commander, Brigadier Robert Waller, the artillery commander of Indian 10th Infantry Division. Robcol was able to buy time, and by late afternoon two British armoured brigades joined the battle. Repeated attempts by the Axis armour were driven back and by dusk they withdrew. Ruweisat was further reinforced on the night of 2 July and with its growing size Robcol presently became Walgroup. All this time, the Axis units were subjected to heavy air attacks from the Royal Air Force.

Rommel ordered the offensive against the Ruweisat ridge to be resumed on 3 July. This time the Italian XX Motorised Corps would take the leading role, an indication of the exhaustion and low strength of Afrika Korps. The advance of Afrika Korps that morning was soon halted by the combination of British artillery fire and constant air attacks - on 3 July the Royal Air Force flew a total of 780 sorties. Although the Afrika Korps was halted, the Italian Ariete Armoured Division initially made good progress along Ruweisat ridge. But as the Italian tanks drove along the ridge they became engaged in a battle with more numerous and better armed British tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade.

To relieve the pressure being exerted on the right and center of the Eighth Army line XIII Corps on the left advanced from the Qattara box (also known as the Kaponga box by the New Zealanders) on 3 July. It was planned that the 2nd New Zealand Division with the remains of 5th Indian Division and 7th Motor Brigade under command would swing north to threaten the Axis flank and rear. It was this force that encountered the Ariete Armoured Division's artillery which was driving on the southern flank of the division as it attacked Ruweisat. The Italian commander ordered his battalions to fight their way out independently but the Ariete lost 531 men (about 350 were prisoners) 36 pieces of artillery, six or eight tanks and 55 trucks. By the end of the day the Ariete Division had been reduced to just five tanks. Attempts by Rommel to resume the attack with the Afrika Korps ran into the British 22nd Armoured Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade, and after a fierce tank battle, halted.

To the south the New Zealand group pushed on again on 5 July but came under heavy fire from the "Brescia" Division at El Mreir and the XIII Corps attack was called off.

Rommel digs in

At this point Rommel decided his exhausted forces could make no further headway without resting and regrouping. Afrika Korps had just 36 Panzers, his three German Divisions numbered just 1200-1500 men each, and his men were exhausted and operating at the end of their supply lines. On 4 July Rommel ordered the Axis forces to go on the defensive.

Rommel was by this time suffering from the extended length of his supply lines. The Allied Desert Air Force was concentrating fiercely on his fragile and elongated supply routes while British mobile columns moving west and striking from the south were causing havoc in the Axis rear echelons. Rommel could afford these losses even less since shipments from Italy had been substantially reduced (during June he received 5,000 tons of supplies compared with 34,000 in May and 400 vehicles compared with 2,000 in May) Meanwhile, the Eighth Army was reorganising and rebuilding, benefitting from its short lines of communication. By 4 July, the Australian 9th Division had entered the line in the north, and on 9 July Indian 5th Infantry Brigade also returned taking over the Ruweisat position. At the same time the depleted Indian 5th Infantry Division was reinforced with the fresh Indian 161st Infantry Brigade.

Tel el Eisa

On July 10 the 9th Australian Division made its presence known, launching an attack at Tel el Eisa in the north. The 621st Radio Intercept Company and 835 Italian troops from the "Sabratha" Division were taken prisoner by the 2/48th Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Hammer. The newly arrived 382nd German Infantry Regiment and a battalion of the Italian Bersaglieri was committed to plug the gap and initially recovered some of the lost ground at Tel el Eisa... According to the 2/48th Battalion diary, "At approx 2000 hrs enemy tks--number unknown-- and inf attacked D Coy front. They overrun posn and enemy inf forced D Coy to withdraw and occupied their psn." While the Bersaglieri and German infantry suffered crippling losses in the attack, it bought time to allow Italian XXI Corps to rush in a battalion of the "Trieste" Division and L3 and M13/40 tanks of the 3rd "Novara" Armoured Group and Major Gabriele Verri's 11th Armoured Battalion to affected sector seal off the Australian breakthrough. (Source: Paolo Caccia-Dominioni, Alamein: An Italian Story) Nevertheless the loss of the German radio intercept unit was to be of vital importance - Rommel had relied heavily on signals intercepts from this unit for his intelligence.

Ruweisat Ridge

As the Axis forces dug-in, Auchinleck developed a plan to attack the Ruweisat ridge, codenamed Operation Bacon. The intention was for the 4th New Zealand Brigade and 5th New Zealand Brigade to seize the ridge in a night attack, then for the 2nd Armoured Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade to move forwards to protect the infantry as they consolidated on the ridge. The attack commenced at 2300 hours on 14 July. The two New Zealand brigades successfully took the ridge in the night attack, but minefields and pockets of resistance created disarray among the attackers. As a result, the New Zealand brigades occupied exposed positions on the ridge without support weapons. More significantly, communications with the two British armoured brigades collapsed, and the British armour failed to move forwards to protect the infantry. The 15th Panzer Division launched an immediate counter-attack, which drove the New Zealanders from the ridge with heavy losses. More than 2000 Axis prisoners of war were taken, mostly from the "Brescia" and "Pavia" Divisions, as against 1405 New Zealand casualties.

On July 22 the Eighth Army attacked the Ruweisat Ridge in the centre. The Axis position was in the main part held by Colonel Gherardo Vaiarini's 65th Regiment and Colonel Umberto Zanetti's 66th Regiment both from the "Trieste" Motorised Infantry Division and the 9th Bersaglieri Regiment. In the second battle the inexperienced British 23rd Armoured Brigade was virtually wiped out in attempting to cross a minefield and then running into a hastily created anti-tank screen. The rest of the 21st Panzer then destroyed what was left of the brigade. The resulting failure of armour to reach the infantry in time led to the loss of 700 men. More than 2,300 New Zealanders were killed, wounded, or captured in the two battles. It was during these battles that Vaiarini and Zanetti were mortally wounded and, for their gallant actions decorated posthumously. (Source: Paolo Caccia-Dominioni, Alamein: An Italian Story, p.83)

A notable feature of the first battle was the result of the engagement between units of the 21st Panzer Division and Indian 5th Infantry Brigade which had recently had its 2-pounder anti-tank guns replaced with the new 6-pounder guns. These proved highly effective and knocked out 24 of the attacking tanks before they withdrew.

In the meantime Colonel Angelozzi's 1st Battalion 85th Infantry Regiment of the "Sabratha" Division, after regrouping, had launched a fierce counterattack on the 2/48th Battalion on 14 July. In the afternoon the Australians had a desperate battle to hold on to Tel el Eisa against what was incorrectly reported as German counter-attacks. Supported by tanks, the Italian soldiers in the evening broke into the Australian positions. So fierce had the attack been that under the cover of darkness the Australian /48th Battalion abandoned this very important position. On 16 July, the 2/23rd Battalion, supported by British tanks, attacked the important Tel el Eisa feature, but they suffered nearly 50 percent casualties and had to withdraw.

Italian counter-attacks continued on 17 July when the 3rd Battalion, 62nd Regiment of the "Trento" Motorised Division attacked with a column of tanks and succeeded in inflicting crippling losses and capturing 200 troops from the 2/32nd Battalion that had stormed the feature Trig 22 held by 100 men of the Italian 32nd Combat Sappers Battalion. (Although the Australian Official History of 2/32 battalion describes the counterattack force as "German", the Australian historian Mark Johnston reports that German records indicate that the Italians were responsible for overruning the Australian battalion. Barton Maughan, Australia's official historian has written that "two forward platoons of the 2/32nd's left company were overrun, 22 men were taken prisoner" but fails to shed more light on this attack.)

Auchinleck was determined to retain the initiative and another two attacks were launched on July 27. One in the north at Tel el Eisa was a moderate failure. The other at Miteiriya, however, sustained heavy losses as the minefields were not cleared and the infantry were left without armour support when faced with a Italo-German armoured counter-attack. The Australian 2/28th Battalion lost 65 men dead and 490 captured, in an attack on the 62nd Regiment of the "Trento" Motorised Division entrenched along Sanyet el Miteiriya that was supported by the Armoured Reconnaissance Group of the "Trieste" Division. The Commonwealth forces lost about 600 in the fighting.

The Eighth Army was exhausted, and by July 31 Auchinleck ordered an end to offensive operations and the strengthening of the defences to meet a major counter-offensive.

Rommel was later to say that in the fighting to restore the broken lines "the Italians were willing, unselfish and good comrades in the frontline. There can be no disputing that the achievement of all the Italian units, especially the motorised elements, far outstripped any action of the Italian Army for 100 years. Many Italian generals and officers earned our respect as men as well as soldiers." (Erwin Rommel & John Pimlott, Rommel: In His Own Words, London, 1994, Greenhill Books, p. 128)

Aftermath

The battle was a stalemate, but the Axis advance on Alexandria (and then Cairo) was halted. Eighth Army had sustained over 13,000 casualties in July (including 4,000 in the New Zealand Division, 3,000 in the Indian 5th Infantry Division and 2,552 battle casualties in the Australian 9th Division) but had taken 7,000 prisoners and inflicted heavy damage on the Axis forces in terms of men and armour.

In early August Winston Churchill and General Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff visited Cairo on their way to meet Joseph Stalin in Moscow. They decided to replace Auchinleck, appointing XIII Corps commander Lieutenant-General William Gott to the Eighth Army command and General Sir Harold Alexander as C-in-C Middle East Command. Persia and Iraq were to be split from Middle East Command as a separate Persia and Iraq Command and Auchinleck offered the post of C-in-C (which he refused). But Gott was killed on the way to take up his command when his air transport was caught by a Messerschmitt and Gott was shot through the heart. Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was appointed in his place.

A second attempt by Rommel to bypass or break the Commonwealth position was repulsed in the Battle of Alam Halfa in August, and in October the Eighth Army decisively defeated the Axis forces in the Second Battle of El Alamein.

See also

References

Footnotes

  1. ^ Mackenzie (1951), p. 589
  2. Watson (2007), p. 6
  3. Scoullar (1955), Chapters 10, 11 and 12
  4. Barr.N (2005), p.69
  5. Mackenzie (1951), p.580
  6. Barr.N, (2005, p.81
  7. Mackenzie (1951), pp.581–582
  8. ^ Mackenzie (1951), p. 582
  9. Barr.N, (2005), p.88
  10. ^ Mitcham (2007), p. 113
  11. Walker.I, (2003), p.141
  12. Barr.N, (2005), p.92
  13. Clifford (1943), p.285
  14. Scoullar (1955), p. 79
  15. Mackenzie (1951), p. 583
  16. Barr.N, (2005), pp.111-114
  17. Barr.N, (2005), pp.118-142; Scoullar.J.L, (1955), pp.232-298
  18. Mitcham (1982), p. 122
  19. NgaToa, the kiwi veterans' website: Ruweisat Ridge 14-15 July 1941 Accessed 13 January, 2007
  20. NgaToa, the kiwi veterans' website: EL Mreir 22 July 1941 Accessed 13 January, 2007
  21. Mackenzie (1951), p. 587
  22. "Australians at War: 2/32 Battalion". Australian War Memorial website. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 2007-12-27.
  23. Johnston (2000), p. 13
  24. Maughan (1966), p. 575
  25. Stanley, Dr. Peter (28 July, 2002). "Remembering 1942:Ruin Ridge, 26–27 July 1942". Transcript of speech. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 2007-01-13. {{cite conference}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
  26. Caccia-Dominioni (1966), pp. 87-88
  27. Alanbrooke (2002), p.294
  28. Clifford (1943), p.296

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