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	{{two other uses\|the definition of the specific type of war\|civil wars in history\|List of civil wars}}
	{{history of war}}
	A '''civil war''' is a ] between a ] and international political actors that are in control of some part of the territory claimed by the state. It is high-intensity conflict, often involving ], that is sustained, organized and large-scale. Civil wars result large numbers of ] and the expenditure of large amounts of resource. A civil war involves two-sided violence; for example a ] of civilians by the state is not a civil war. Similarly, less intense forms of societal conflict, such as ]s or ]s, are excluded from the definition.<ref name=hironaka3>Ann Hironaka, ''Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War'', Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2005, p. 3, ISBN 0674015320</ref>

	Civil wars since the end of ] have lasted on average just over four years, a dramatic rise from the one-and-a-half year average of the 1900-1944 period. While the rate of emergence of new civil wars has been relatively steady since the mid-1800s, the increasing length of those wars resulted in increasing numbers of wars ongoing at any one time. For example, there were no more than five civil wars underway simultaneously in the first half of the twentieth century, while over 20 concurrent civil wars were occurring at the end of the ], before a significant decrease as conflicts strongly associated with the superpower rivalry came to an end. Since 1945, civil wars have resulted in the deaths of over 25 million people, as well as the ] of millions more. Civil wars have further resulted in economic collapse; ] (Myanmar), ] and ] are examples of nations that were considered to have promising futures before being engulfed in civil wars.<ref>Hironaka (2005), pp. 1-2, 4-5</ref>

	Scholars of war divide theories on the causes of civil war into either ]. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by who people are, whether that be defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social affiliation, or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.<ref>See, for example, Hironaka (2005), pp. 9-10, and ], Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, eds, ''Understanding Civil War'', Volume 1: Africa, The World Bank, 2005, p. 13</ref>

	== Definition ==
	The ] do not specifically define the term 'civil war'. They do, however, describe the criteria that separate any act committed by force of arms (anarchy, terrorism, or plain banditry) from those qualifying as 'armed conflict not of an international character', which includes civil wars. Among those conditions listed are these four basic requirements.<ref>Final Record of the ], (Volume II-B, p. 121)</ref>

	*The party in revolt must be in possession of a part of the national territory.
	*The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population within the determinate portion of the national territory.
	*The insurgents must have some amount of recognition as a belligerent.
	*The legal Government is "obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military."

	The ] (ICRC) further clarified Article 9 of the ]. They stated that the nature of these armed conflicts, not of an international character "generally refer to conflicts with armed forces on either side which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country."<ref></ref>

	], ], 1863]]
	The ] has adopted the principles set by the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva for their definition of civil war. However, it adds an fifth requirement for "identifiable regular armed forces".<ref> December 1990 version of ] (]s in ])</ref>

	===Academic ===
	] into ], 2001]]
	Scholars use two criteria: the warring groups must be from the same country and fighting for control of the political center, control over a ] state or to force a major change in policy. A second criterion, used by some academics, is that at least 1,000 people must have been killed in total, with at least 100 from each side.<ref> Edward Wong, "A Matter of Definition: What Makes a Civil War, and Who Declares It So?" ''New York Times'' November 26, 2006 online at </ref> The ], a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is a small fraction of the millions killed in the ] and ], for example, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such as ] of ] and the struggle of the ] in ]-era ]. Based on the 1000 casualties per year criterion, there were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997, 104 of which occurred from 1944 to 1997.<ref name=hironaka3/>

	==Causes of civil war==
	One of the most comprehensive studies of civil war was carried out by a team from the ] in the early 2000s. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier-Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1167 five-year increments of "no civil war" for comparison, and subjected the data set to ] to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically-significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were:<ref name=cs17>Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, p. 17</ref>

	;Availability of finance
	]s being mined by these children in ], in GDP increases the risk of civil war]]
	A high proportion of primary ] in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at "peak danger", with commodities comprising 32% of ], has a 22% of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only ] and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high-level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth, e.g. it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services.<ref name=cs16>Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, 2005, p. 16</ref>

	A second source of finance is national ]s, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war.<ref name=cs16/>

	;Opportunity cost of rebellion
	Higher male secondary school enrollment, per capita income and economic growth rate all had significant effects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a male secondary school enrollment 10% above the average reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earnings foregone by rebellion, and therefore that lower foregone earnings encourages rebellion.<ref name=cs16/> Phrased another way: young males (who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebellion if they are getting an education and/or have a comfortable salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future.

	Low per capita income has been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion. However, for this to be true, one would expect economic inequality to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of ] better explained the findings.<ref name=cs17/>

	;Military advantage
	High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the presence of mountainous terrain increased the chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels, as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek sanctuary.<ref name=cs16/>

	;Grievance
	] soldiers during the ], ], 1941]]
	Most proxies for "grievance" - the theory that civil wars begin because of issues of identity, rather than economics - were statistically insignificant, including economic equality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance, the case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, increased the risk of civil war. A country characterized by ethnic dominance has nearly twice the chance of a civil war. However, the combined effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization, i.e. the more chance that any two randomly chosen people will be from separate ethnic or religious groups the less chance of a civil war, were also significant and positive, as long as the country avoided ethnic dominance. The study interpreted this as stating that minority groups are more likely to rebel if they feel that they are being dominated, but that rebellions are more likely to occur the more homogeneous the population and thus more cohesive the rebels. These two factors may thus be seen as mitigating each other in many cases.<ref name=cs18>Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis, 2005, p. 18</ref>

	;Population size
	The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population.<ref name=cs17/>

	;Time
	The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may represent the ] of whatever ] the rebellion was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. The study found that the presence of diaspora substantially reduced the positive effect of time, as the funding from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion-specific capital.<ref name=cs18/>

	==See also==
	*]
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	==References==
	{{reflist}}

	==Bibliography==
	* Ali, Taisier Mohamed Ahmed and Robert O. Matthews, eds. ''Civil Wars in Africa: roots and resolution'' (1999), 322 pages
	* Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, ''Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars'' (Lynne Rienner, 2000).
	* Paul Collier, ''Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war and development policy'' World Bank (2003) - 320 pages
	* Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" ''World Politics'' 54, no. 1 (2001): 99-118.
	* David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. ''The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation'' (Princeton University Press, 1996).
	* Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945--1993," ''American Political Science Review'' 89, no. 3 (summer 1995): pp 681-690.
	* Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," ''Journal of Peace Research'' 39, no. 5 (2002): pp. 515-525.
	* David M. Malone and Mats R. Berdal. ''Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars'' (2000), 251 pages
	* David T. Mason and Patrick 3. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," ''Journal of Conflict Resolution'' 40, no. 4 (fall 1996): 546-568.
	* Patrick M. Regan. ''Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict'' (2000) 172 pages
	* Stephen John et al, eds. ''Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements'' (2002), 729 pages
	* Monica Duffy Toft, ''The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory'' (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). ISBN 0-691-12383-7.
	* Barbara F. Walter, ''Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars'' (Princeton University Press, 2002),
	* Elisabeth Jean Wood; "Civil Wars: What We Don't Know," ''Global Governance,'' Vol. 9, 2003 pp 247+

	==External links==
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Revision as of 18:25, 3 August 2008