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The United States Naval Gunfire Support debate (also known as the United States Naval Surface Fire Support debate) is an ongoing debate between the Navy, Marine Corps, Congress, and independent groups like the United States Naval Gunfire Support Association on the issue of what role Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) / Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) should play within the Navy and how such a role can best be provided. At the heart of the issue is the role that naval artillery should play in the Navy of the 21st century.

The debate has its roots in the WWII bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by planes of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which demostrated the inability of battleships to defend themselves from air attack. After WWII the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship as the primary vessel for the United States Navy, and the demand for Naval Artillery further decreased with the advent of ship and submarine launched missiles and aircraft launched prescion guided munitions such as laser guided bombs that could acurately strike an enemy target. The most unique point of the debate in the United States centers on battleships: Owing to the longtime mainteince of the four completed Iowa-class battleships with the Navy's active and mothball fleets many still view battleships as viable solutions for gunfire support, and these members have questioned whether or not the Navy can adequately replace the gunfire support provided by a battleship's gun with the smaller guns on its current fleet of cruisers and destroyers.

The debate has played out across a wide spectrum of media, including newspaper and magazine articles, web blogs, and congressional research arms such as the Government Accountability Office. Each side has presented different arguments on the best approach to the problem, but most of the participants favor the continuation of the DD(X) program or the reinstatement of the Iowa-class battleships to the Naval Vessel Register. The Iowa-class battleships, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and Zumwalt-class destroyers have entered the debate as options put forward for naval gunfire support, while others advocate the use of newer missile systems that can loiter in an area as a replacement for naval gunfire.

Background

After World War II, the United States deactivated its battleships and placed them in the United States Navy reserve fleets, better known as the "mothball fleet". Most of these ships were eventually scrapped, but the four Iowa-class battleships were not, and on several occasions these four battleships were reactivated for naval gunfire support. The U.S. Navy has held onto the four Iowa-class battleships long after the upkeep and maintenance of operating and maintaining a battleship and the arrival of aircraft and precision guided munitions led other nations to scrap their big-gun fleets. Congress is largely responsible for keeping the four Iowa-class battleships in the United States Navy reserve fleets and on the Naval Vessel Register. The lawmakers argue that the battleships' large-caliber guns have a useful destructive power that is lacking in the smaller, cheaper, and faster guns mounted by U.S. cruisers and destroyers.

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proposed creating a 600-ship Navy as part of the overall defense department build-up to counter the threat of the armed forces of the Soviet Union; both the Red Army and the Soviet Navy had grown in the aftermath of the unification of Vietnam in 1975 and the loss of faith that Americans had in their armed services. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the 600-ship Navy was seen as too costly to maintain, and the navy made plans to return to its traditional 313-ship navy. This led to the deactivation of several ships in the navy's fleet, including the four reactivated Iowa-class battleships, which were removed from service between 1990 and 1992. Originally, the navy had struck all four ships and made plans to donate them, however Congress intervened in this plan with the passing of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. Section 1011 required the United States Navy to reinstate to the Naval Vessel Register two of the Iowa-class battleships that had been struck by the Navy in 1995; these ships were to be maintained in the United States Navy reserve fleets (or "mothball fleet"). The Navy was to ensure that both of the reinstated battleships were in good condition and could be reactivated for use in the Marine Corps' amphibious operations. Both battleships were to be maintained with the reserve fleet until such a time as the navy could certify that it had within its fleet the operational capacity to meet or exceed the gunfire support that both battleships could provide. To comply with this requirement the navy selected the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin for reinstatement to the Naval Vessel Register.

New Jersey remained in the mothball fleet until the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of 1999 passed through the United States Congress 18 October 1998. Section 1011 required the United States Secretary of the Navy to list and maintain Iowa and Wisconsin on the Naval Vessel Register, while Section 1012 required the Secretary of the Navy to strike New Jersey from the Naval Vessel Register and transfer the battleship to a non-for-profit entity in accordance with section 7306 of Title 10, United States Code. Section 1012 also required the transferee to locate the battleship in the State of New Jersey. The Navy made the switch in January 1999; since then, Iowa and Wisconsin have been maintained on the NVR in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996.

Alternatives to Naval Gunfire

During the period of time in which the battleships were out of commission in the United States several technological updates and breakthroughs enable naval ships, submarines, and aircraft to compensate for the absence of big guns within the fleet.

The earliest challenge to naval artillery was the advent of aircraft and armour piecing/incidenary bombs, which could be used against land based targets in support of troop formations ashore. Although in its infancy in the 1930s, some saw the potential for aircraft and sea based air support and envisioned th role it would have in future conflicts.

Replacing the battleships

The Navy, which sees the battleships as too costly, is working to persuade Congress to allow it to remove Iowa and Wisconsin from the Naval Vessel Register by developing extended-range guided munitions and a new ship to fulfill Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire support (NSFS).

The Navy plan originally called for the extension of the range of the 5-inch (127 mm) guns on the Flight I Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers (USS Arleigh Burke to USS Ross) with Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGMs) that would enable the ships to fire precision guided projectiles about 40 nautical miles (70 km) inland. The program was initiated in 1996 with a preliminary cost of US $78.6 million; however, the cost of the program increased 400% during its research and development phase. The results of the program had been similarly disappointing: the original expected operational capability date was pushed from 2001 to 2011 before being cancelled by the Navy in March 2008 for budget-related reasons and an apparent shift by the Navy from the ERGM program to the Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition (BTERM) program. These weapons are not intended or expected to satisfy the full range of the Marine Corps NSFS requirements.

The result of the latter effort to design and build a replacement ship for the two battleships was the Zumwalt-class destroyer program, also known either as the DD(X) or DDG-1000 (in reference to Zumwalt’s hull number). The DD(X) was to mount a pair of Advanced Gun System turrets capable of firing specially designed Long Range Land Attack Projectiles some 60 miles (100 km) inland. Originally, the navy had planned to build a total of 32 of these destroyers, however the increasing cost of the program lead the Navy to reduce the overall number of destroyers built from 32 to 24. In 2007 the total procurement of Zumwalt-class destroyers was further reduced to a total of seven, before being discontinued at a total of two destroyers in July 2008 as a result of the high cost of building each of the two ships.

The discontinuation of the class is due in part to concerns that the Zumwalts may deprive other projects of needed funding, a concern that has been raised by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the Government Accountability Office, all of which have issued reports that suggest that total cost of each ship could be as high as $5 billion or more, the inability of the DD(X) to fire the standard missile or provide adequate air defense coverage, and a "classified threat" which the navy feels can be better handled by the current Arleigh Burke-class destroyers than by the Zumwalt-class destroyers. The article also reported that the Marine Corps no longer needs the long-range fire support from the Zumwalts’ 155mm Advanced Gun System because such fire support can be provided by Tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision airstrikes.

Striking the Iowa-class battleships

DDG 1000 Zumwalt is being developed by the Navy to serve as the backbone of tomorrow’s surface fleet. DDG 1000 Zumwalt provides a broad range of capabilities that are vital both to supporting the Global War on Terror and to fighting and winning major combatant operations. Zumwalt’s multi-mission warfighting capabilities are designed to counter not only the threats of today, but threats projected over the next decade as well.

— Statement of the DD(X) program on the United States Navy's Program Executive Office, Ships,

On 17 March 2006, while the ERGM and DD(X) programs under development, the Secretary of the Navy exercised his authority to strike Iowa and Wisconsin from the Naval Vessel Register, which cleared the way for both ships to be donated for use as museums. The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps had both certified that battleships would not be needed in any future war, and have thus turned their attention to development and construction of the next generation Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyers.

This move has drawn fire from sources familiar with the subject; among them are dissenting members of the United States Marine Corps, who feel that battleships are still a viable solution to naval gunfire support, members of the United States Congress who remain "deeply concerned" over the loss of naval surface gunfire support that the battleships provided, and number of independent groups such as the United States' Naval Fire Support Association (USNFSA) whose ranks frequently include former members of the armed service and fans of the battleships. Although the arguments presented from each group differ, they all agree that the United States Navy has not in good faith considered the potential of reactivated battleships for use in the field, a position that is supported by a 1999 Government Accountability Office report regarding the United States Navy's gunfire support program.

In 2007, a thesis report submitted to the Joint Forces Staff College/Joint Advanced Warfighting School by Shawn A. Welch, a Colonel in the Army National Guard's Corps of Engineers analyzed the current capacity for naval gunfire support and made several conclusion based on the progress made since the retirement of the last two Iowa-class battleships. Welch's thesis report, which earned the National Defense Universities award for Best Thesis in 2007, estimates that the full force of DD(X) destroyers needed to replace the decommissioned Iowas will not arrive until 2020–2025 at the earliest, and alleges that the U.S. Navy has not accurately assessed the capabilities of its large caliber gun ships since 1990. The report alleges that the Navy has consistently scaled back or outright canceled programs intended to replace naval gunfire support capacity, in the process making no significant gains for offshore fire support since the retirement of the last Iowa-class battleship in 1992. This failure by the navy to meet Congressional mandates to improve naval gunfire support has caused a rift with the United States Marine Corps and to a lesser extent the United States Army; in the case of the former, the concern is great enough that several three and four star generals in the Marine Corps have openly admitted to the press their concern over the absence of any effective ship based gunfire support, and two separate Commandants of the Marine Corps have testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee on the risks faced by the Marines in the absence of any effective naval gunfire support.

In summary, the committee is concerned that the Navy has foregone the long-range fire support capability of the battleship, has given little cause for optimism with respect to meeting near-term developmental objectives, and appears unrealistic in planning to support expeditionary warfare in the mid-term. The committee views the Navy’s strategy for providing naval surface fire support as 'high risk,' and will continue to monitor progress accordingly.

— Evaluation of the United States Navy's naval surface fire support program in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007,

In response, the Navy has pointed to the cost of reactivating the two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned capability. The Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million, but this does not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish the gunpowder for the 16-inch (406 mm) guns because a survey found the powder to be unsafe. In terms of schedule, the Navy's program management office estimates that reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate memory and the shipyard industrial base.

Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship modernization improvements, according to the Navy's program management office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements include command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment; environmental protection (including ozone-depleting substances); a plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and wastewater alterations; firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea alterations; a modernized sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and new combat and self-defense systems. The Navy's program management office also identified other issues that would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be available or easily reconstituted. Other issues include the age and unreliability of the battleships' propulsion systems and the fact that the Navy no longer maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-inch (410 mm) gun system components and ordnance.

Although the Navy firmly believes in the capabilities of the DD(X) destroyer program, members of the United States Congress remain skeptical about the efficiency of the new destroyers when compared to the battleships. Partially as a consequence the US House of Representatives have asked that the battleships be kept in a state of readiness should they ever be needed again. Congress has asked that the following measures be implemented to ensure that, if need be, Iowa and Wisconsin can be returned to active duty:

1. Iowa and Wisconsin must not be altered in any way that would impair their military utility;
2. The battleships must be preserved in their present condition through the continued use of cathodic protection, dehumidification systems, and any other preservation methods as needed;
3. Spare parts and unique equipment such as the 16-inch (410 mm) gun barrels and projectiles be preserved in adequate numbers to support Iowa and Wisconsin, if reactivated;
4. The Navy must prepare plans for the rapid reactivation of Iowa and Wisconsin should they be returned to the Navy in the event of a national emergency.

These four conditions closely mirror the original three conditions that the Nation Defense Authorization Act of 1996 laid out for the maintenance of Iowa and Wisconsin while they were in the Mothball Fleet.

Recent developments

Prior to the cancellation of the DD(X) destroyer program it seemed unlikely that the above four conditions would have impeded the current plan to turn Iowa and Wisconsin into museum ships because the Navy had expected a sufficient number of DD(X) destroyers to be ready to help fill the NSFS gap by 2018 at the earliest; however, the July 2008 decision by the Navy to cancel the DD(X) program would leave the Navy without a ship class capable of replacing the two battleships removed from the Naval Vessel Register in March 2006. Although unlikely, the cancellation of the DD(X) destroyer program may result in a reinstatement of Iowa and Wisconsin to the Naval Vessel Register; by law, the Navy is required to maintain two battleships on the register until the navy certifies that it has within its fleet the operation NSFS capability that can meet or exceed the amount provided by the battleships, and with the Extended Range Guided Munitions program already cancelled in March 2008 and DD(X) destroyer program essentially cancelled in July 2008 the Navy does not appear to have met its needed criteria for battleship removal.

Notes

1. Government Accountability Office, Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plans and Costs (NSIAD-99-91).
2. ^ Government Accountability Office. Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support (GAO-05-39R).
3. Holland, W. J. (2004). The Navy. China: Barnes & Noble, Inc., by arrangement with Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, Inc. pp. page 184. ISBN 076076218X. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
4. ^ "BB-61 IOWA-class (Specifications)". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 2006-11-26.
5. Johnston, Ian & McAuley, Rob (2002). The Battleships. London: Channel 4 Books (an imprint of Pan Macmillian, LTD). pp. page 183. ISBN 0752261886. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
6. Naval Historical Center. "Iowa". DANFS.
7. Naval Historical Center. "New Jersey". DANFS.
8. Naval Historical Center. "Missouri". DANFS.
9. Naval Historical Center. "Wisconsin". DANFS.
10. ^ 104th Congress, House of Representatives. National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. p. 237. Accessed 17 December 2006.
11. "Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of 1999 (Subtitle B-Naval Vessels and Shipyards)" (pdf). 105th Congress, United States Senate and House of Representatives. pp. pp. 200–201. Retrieved 2007-03-12. {{cite web}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
12. ^ "National Defense Authorization Act of 2007" (pdf). pp. pp. 193–194. Retrieved 2007-03-12. {{cite web}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
13. ^ Matthews, William (2007-03-25). "Navy ends ERGM funding". Navy Times. Retrieved 2008-04-23.
14. ^ Government Accountability Office, Evaluation of the Navy’s 1999 Naval Surface Fire Support Assessment (NSAID-99-225).
15. "National Defense Authorization Act of 2007" (pdf) pp. 69–70. Retrieved on 2008-08-01.
16. ^ Cavas, Christopher P. (2008-07-24). "DDG 1000 program will end at 2 ships". Navy Times. Retrieved 2008-07-27.
17. The Navy has stated that it may ask for construction of a third Zumwalt-class destroyer, but has not specified when or if it will exercise such an option. Cavas, Christopher P. (2008-07-24). "DDG 1000 program will end at 2 ships". Navy Times. Retrieved 2008-07-27.
18. Labs, Eric J. (2008-07-31). "The Navy's Surface Combatant Programs" (pdf). Congressional Budget Office. pp. pp. 3–9. Retrieved 2008-08-02. {{cite web}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
19. ^ Ewing, Philip (2008-08-01). "Navy:No Need to Add DDG 1000s After All". defense news. Army Times Publishing Company. Retrieved 2008-08-06. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
20. Program Executive Office, Ships (2007-05-27). "DDG 1000 (subsection: What is DDG 1000?)". United States Navy. Retrieved 2007-06-24.
21. Novak, Robert (2005-12-06). "Losing the battleships". CNN.com. Retrieved 2008-07-25.
22. Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supports the Navy's modernization efforts to deliver a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class battleships. See: Government Accountability Office. Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support.
23. Blazar, Ernest (1996-07-29). "New debate resurrects old one; critics say cancel arsenal ship, bring back battleships". Navy Times.
24. "Navy proposes destroyer with long-range guns". USA Today. 2005-08-15.
25. Welch, Shawn A. (2007-05-17). "Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap" (PDF). United States Army. Retrieved 2008-04-23.
26. This number is based on 1999 estimate with a 4% annual inflation rate. See: Government Accountability Office. Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support.
27. The U.S. Navy reported in the April 1987 edition of All Hands that the original cost of bringing the battleships back in the 1980s was $110 million per ship, but the actual cost after modernization and recommissioning was $455 million. See: Bureau of Naval Personnel, "Back on the battle line".
28. The U.S. Navy reported in the April 1987 edition of All Hands that while battleships have larger crews than other vessels the level of training required and the criticality of that training were less than that required of a crew aboard an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. See: Bureau of Naval Personnel, "Back on the battle line".
29. ^ 109th Congress, House of Representatives. Report 109–452. National Defense Authorization Act of 2007. p. 68. Accessed 26 November 2006

• Naval artillery