Misplaced Pages

Stalin's ten blows: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 01:38, 8 October 2008 editMrg3105 (talk | contribs)15,276 edits →The offensives: ]← Previous edit Revision as of 02:08, 8 October 2008 edit undoMrg3105 (talk | contribs)15,276 edits →History of the expression: original documentNext edit →
Line 4: Line 4:


==History of the expression== ==History of the expression==
The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from ] in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" ({{lang-ru|«27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции»}}) during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies. The term was coined more as a reflection of the "cult of personality" that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the ], but evolved after 1944, and at times had been called the "'''Year of twelve victories'''," counting the ] and ] to further enhance Stalin's role in the Soviet part in the victory over the Axis. In the list of ten presented below, these are not included; they are considered part of the ]. This categorization is most commonly used.<ref name="Willmott368">Willmott 1989, p. 368</ref> The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from ] in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" ({{lang-ru|«27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции»}}) during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies.<ref>27-я ГОДОВЩИНА ВЕЛИКОЙ ОКТЯБРЬСКОЙ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ Доклад Председателя Государственного Комитета Обороны на торжественном заседании Московского Совета депутатов трудящихся с партийными и общественными организациями г. Москвы 6 ноября 1944 года</ref> The term was coined more as a reflection of the "cult of personality" that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the ], but evolved after 1944, and at times had been called the "'''Year of twelve victories'''," counting the ] and ] to further enhance Stalin's role in the Soviet part in the victory over the Axis. In the list of ten presented below, these are not included; they are considered part of the ]. This categorization is most commonly used.<ref name="Willmott368">Willmott 1989, p. 368</ref>


After the ] of the ] at ], the Soviet ] and the ] later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of ], which funnelled all new men and materials to the ], to meet the expected ], issued on 3 November, 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 216</ref> Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdraws, trading space for time, this proved to be false.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 217</ref> This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.<ref name="Digest330">Wright 1989, p. 330</ref> After the ] of the ] at ], the Soviet ] and the ] later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of ], which funnelled all new men and materials to the ], to meet the expected ], issued on 3 November, 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 216</ref> Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdraws, trading space for time, this proved to be false.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 217</ref> This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.<ref name="Digest330">Wright 1989, p. 330</ref>

Revision as of 02:08, 8 October 2008

Soviet gains, mid-1943 to end of 1944.

Stalin's ten victories, Stalin's ten blows, or ten victories of the Red Army is a Soviet term for ten successful strategic offensives conducted by the Red Army in 1944. These offensives destroyed a large portion of Axis forces, and lead to the surrender of a number of Germany's more minor allies. The term is primarily used by Soviet historians and is less well known in Western histories.

History of the expression

The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from Joseph Stalin in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" (Template:Lang-ru) during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies. The term was coined more as a reflection of the "cult of personality" that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the Stavka, but evolved after 1944, and at times had been called the "Year of twelve victories," counting the Belgrade Offensive and Debrecen Offensive to further enhance Stalin's role in the Soviet part in the victory over the Axis. In the list of ten presented below, these are not included; they are considered part of the Jassy-Kishinev Strategic Offensive. This categorization is most commonly used.

After the collapse of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Soviet counter-offensives and the Battle of Kursk later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of Furher Directive 51, which funnelled all new men and materials to the Western Front, to meet the expected Allied Invasion, issued on 3 November, 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin. Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdraws, trading space for time, this proved to be false. This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.

The term was discontinued in use after Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin following his death.

Comparison of German and Soviet forces, January 1944.
Soviet Axis
Personnel 6.5 million 4.3 million
Tanks 5600 2300
Field Guns 90000 54000
Aircraft 8800 3000

The offensives

  1. Lifting of the Leningrad blockade (14 January - 1 March, 1944). This, the second chronologically of the offensives, fully relieved the siege of Leningrad, which had started on August 30, 1941. Although the Germans resisted fiercely at first, having had years to prepare defensive rings including pillboxes and minefields around Leningrad, once the initial defenses were broken Soviet forces easily reached Estonia. It was conducted by the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front.
  2. Liberation of Ukraine (24 January 1944 - 17 February 1944) by the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts as part of the Dnepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive (24 December, 1943 - 17 April, 1944). This offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, 1943, the first chronologically of the 1944 offensives. It involved the clearing of Axis forces from Ukraine. It also resulted in the isolation of the German-controlled Crimea. It involved the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, and the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.
  3. Liberation of Odessa (26 March 1944 - 14 April 1944) which begun the third blow, and the Liberation of Crimea (8 April - 12 May, 1944) which completed it. The third offensive cleared the Crimea of German and Romanian forces, and recaptured Sevastapol. After Adolf Hitler refused to allow Axis forces to evacuate, believing that retention of the Crimea was vital to maintaining Turkish neutrality. Once the Red Army attacked over the Perekop Isthmus, it quickly drove the German and Romanian forces back to Sevastopol, which surrendered on 8 May. Although Hitler had finally given permission for evacuation, the majority of soldiers surrendered and went into captivity. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the Romanian forces, this battle was a major factor in their surrender. It was conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front.
  4. Liberation of Karelia (9 June - 9 August, 1944). This offensive against Finland recaptured the Karelian Isthmus and Vyborg. After having reached the 1940 border, the Soviet forces stopped voluntarily. It was successful in territorial gains, but due to Finnish fortifications, and German reinforcements was not as great a success as hoped by the Stavka. However, it was an cause of the eventual Finnish surrender on 19 September. It was carried out by the Leningrad Front and the Karelian Front.
  5. Belorussian operation (22 June - 29 August, 1944). Started exactly three years after the invasion of the Soviet Union, and named after Pyotr Bagration, a Russian general during the Napoleonic Wars, this drove the last remaining German forces from Soviet lands, recapturing all of Belarus. It resulted in the almost complete destruction of the German Army Group Center, and was undoubtedly one of Germany's worst defeats of the war. It is sometimes known as "The destruction of Army Group Center." Soviet forces advanced past the Bobruisk-Mogilev-Vitebsk line, and nearly reached Warsaw before stopping. Almost 30 German divisions were encircled near Minsk, and the prewar border of East Prussia was reached. The Lublin–Brest Offensive is considered part of this operation. It was conducted by the 1st Baltic Front, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.
  6. Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive (13 July - 29 August, 1944). This offensive to the south of and concurrent to Operation Bagration advanced through Poland and past the Bug River. Although it made little progress at first, eventually it became successful, capturing Brody, Lvov, and Sandomierz. It was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front.
  7. Forcing out of the war of Romania and Bulgaria (19 August - 14 October, 1944). These began with the Iasi-Kishinev Offensive from 20 August to 29 August, and included the abortive East Carpathian Strategic Offensive Operation. These offensives, in the Balkans, was targeted at German and Romanian formations in Army Group South Ukraine. About 15 or 16 German divisions were encircled with several Romanian divisions.These operations, which continued into October, directly caused the capitulation of Romania and Bulgaria. It decimated the formations of Army Group South Ukraine, and continued the advance deep into Romania. It was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.
  8. Liberation of Estonia and Latvia, and exit of Finland from the war (14 September - 20 November, 1944). Recapturing the Baltic, including most of Latvia and Estonia, this offensive isolated the Courland Pocket, where 30 divisions of Army Group North were cut off from Army Group Center till the end of the war in Europe. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Baltic Fronts, along with the Leningrad Front carried out this attack.
  9. Final liberation of Ukraine (8 September 1944 - 28 September 1944)and destruction of the Budapest group of Axis forces (20 October, 1944 - 13 February 1945), and the Liberation of Belgrade (14 September 1944 - 24 November 1944). These, the final of the successful 1944 offensives, resulted in the capture of Budapest, on 13 February 1945. Budapest was surrounded by Soviet forces on 26 December, 1944, and, after brutal street fighting, fell. It was conducted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. The three offensives were regarded, and planned as a single continuous strategic advance that was also imbued with great political significance due to the participation of the Yugoslav communist forces in its final phase.
  10. Removal of threat from German forces to Soviet northern shipping port of Murmansk (7 October - 29 October, 1944). This, the first and only large-scale Arctic military operation started after German forces did not evacuate from Finnish territory by 15 September, as dictated in the terms of the Moscow Armistice. It involved Soviet forces chasing retreating Germans into Norway, and was very successful for the Soviet Union. It led to the occupation of the nickel mines in Pechenga, which had been producing metal vital for the German war effort. It was conducted primarily by the Karelian Front, with assistance from Soviet naval forces.

Notes

  1. 27-я ГОДОВЩИНА ВЕЛИКОЙ ОКТЯБРЬСКОЙ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ Доклад Председателя Государственного Комитета Обороны на торжественном заседании Московского Совета депутатов трудящихся с партийными и общественными организациями г. Москвы 6 ноября 1944 года
  2. Willmott 1989, p. 368
  3. Ziemke 1968, p. 216
  4. Ziemke 1968, p. 217
  5. ^ Wright 1989, p. 330
  6. Willmott 1989, p. 369 - 371
  7. Werth 1964, p. 764
  8. Willmott 1989, p. 372 - 374
  9. ^ Werth 1964, p. 775
  10. Wright 1989 , p. 334
  11. Wright 1989, p. 343
  12. The wartime codename of the operation, Operation Bagration, was not used in the speech
  13. Wright 1989, p. 336
  14. ^ Wright 1989, p. 338
  15. Wright 1989, p. 341
  16. Willmott, p. 391
  17. ^ Willmott 1989, p. 387

References

  • Wright, Michael. (1989). The World at Arms: The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN 0895773333.
  • Werth, Alexander. (1964). Russia At War: 1941 - 1945. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.
  • Willmott, H.P. (1989). The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. New York: The Free Press. ISBN 0-02-934715-7.
  • Ziemke, Earl (1968). Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington, DC: The U.S. Army Center of Military History. ISBN 1410204146.

Recommended reading

  • Beshanov, V., Stalin's ten blows, Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.)
  • Yemelyanov, Yu., Stalin's ten blows: triumph of the generalissimo, Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (Емельянов Ю. Десять сталинских ударов. Триумф генералиссимуса — М.: Эксмо, 2006. ISBN 5-699-18353-1)
Categories: