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| '''Terror bombing''' is an emotive term used to describe aerial attacks made by a belligerent to break the morale of their enemy.<ref>Overy (2005), </ref> Use of the term to describe aerial attacks implies that the attacks are criminal attacks that fall outside the ],<ref>Myrdal (1977), </ref> or if within the laws of ware are nevertheless a moral crime.<ref>Axinn (2008), </ref> | |||
| '''Terror bombing''' is a strategy of deliberately bombing and/or ] ] targets in order to break the ] of the enemy, make its civilian population panic, bend the enemy's political leadership to the attacker's will, or to "punish" an enemy. | |||
| The aerial attacks described as terror bombing are often long range ] raids, although attacks against tactical targets which result in the deaths of civilians my also be described as such, or if the attacks involve fighters ] the my be labeled "terror attacks".<ref>Brower (1998), (mentions that Historian Ronald Shaffer describing ] which involved both bombing and strafing as a terror attack).</ref> | |||
| ==Legal framework== | |||
| {{main|Aerial area bombardment and international law}} | |||
| ===International law in 1945=== | |||
| International law relating to aerial area bombardment before and during ] rested primarily on the ], which constituted the basis for most of the laws of war at that time. These were the most relevant war-related international treaties because they were the last ratified before 1939 which specify the laws of war on aerial bombardment. The relevant sections of these treaties, dealing directly with the issue of bombardment, are "Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), October 18, 1907"{{ref|HagueIV}} and "Laws of War: | |||
| Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX), October 18, 1907"{{ref|HagueIX}}. It is significant that different sections of the treaty deal with bombardment of land by land (Hague IV) and of land by sea (Hague IX){{ref|nalogy}}. Hague IV, which reaffirmed and updated Hague II (1899),{{ref|HagueII}} contains the following clauses: | |||
| The German propaganda minister, ] frequently described attacks made on Germany by the ] (RAF) and the ] (USAAF) during their ]s as terror attacks. The Allied governments usually described their ] using other euphemism such as ] (RAF) or ] (USAAF), and for most of World War II the Allied news media did the same. However at a ] press conference on 16 February 1945, two days after the ], British Air Commodore ], replied to a question by one of the journalists that the primary target of the bombing had been on communications to prevent the Germans moving military supplies, and to stop movement in all directions if possible. He then added in an offhand remark that the raid also helped destroying "what is left of German morale." Howard Cowan, an ] war correspondent, subsequently filed a story about the Dresden raid. The military press censor at SHAEF made a mistake and allowed the Cowan cable to go out starting with "Allied air bosses have | |||
| :Article 25: The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited. | |||
| have made the long awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of great German population centres<!--sic in the source--> as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler's doom." There were follow-up newspaper editorials on the issue and a long time opponent of strategic bombing, Richard Stokes ], asked questions in the House of Commons on 6 March.<ref>Taylor (2005) pp. 413,414 p. 363</ref> | |||
| ==Notes== | |||
| :Article 26: The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities. | |||
| {{reflist}} | |||
| :Article 27: In ] and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible ] devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes. | |||
| :The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants. | |||
| In 1923, a draft convention promoted by the ] was proposed: ''The Hague Rules of Air Warfare'', December, 1922-February, 1923"{{ref|HagueAir}}. There are number of Articles therein which would have directly affected how nations used aerial bombardment and defended against it; these are Articles 18, 22, and 24. It was, however, never adopted in legally binding form{{ref|ICRC}}. | |||
| In response to a ] declaration against bombardment from the air{{ref|LON}}, a draft convention proposed in Amsterdam in 1938{{ref|ICRC-Amsterdam}} would have provided specific definitions of what constituted an "undefended" town, excessive civilian casualties, and appropriate warning. This draft convention made the qualifying standard for a locale to be considered "undefended" quite high - any military or anti-aircraft units within a defined radius qualifies a town as defended. This convention, like the 1923 draft, was not even close to being ratified when hostilities broke out in ] in 1939. While the two conventions offer a guideline to what the belligerent powers were considering before the war, neither document was legally binding. | |||
| After World War II, the judgment of the ]{{ref|Nuremberg1}} records the decision that, by 1939, those rules laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war. Under this post-war decision, a country did not have to have ratified the 1907 Hague conventions in order to be bound by them{{ref|Nuremberg-crimes}}. | |||
| The legality of the status of area bombardment during World War II rested on the language of the treaties of 1899 and 1907, from a time before large-scale aerial bombardment was even possible. In advance of the first Hague conference, ] circulated a proposal calling for a complete ban on bombardment from the air, subsequent negotiations resulted in a five-year ban. By the time of the second Hague conference in 1907, advances in both aircraft and ] technology made even another temporary ban ] to perceptions of national security. This left international law with language which, despite repeated diplomatic attempts, was not updated in the immediate run-up to the ]. | |||
| :"In examining these events in the light of ], it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property, as the Conventions then in force dealt only with the protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare, hospital ships, the laws and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war."{{ref|No-treaty}} | |||
| ===International law since 1945=== | |||
| In the post-war environment, a series of treaties governing the ] were adopted, starting in 1949. These ] would come into force, in no small part, because of the general reaction against the practices of the Second World War. | |||
| * ], Additional to the Geneva Conventions of ] ], and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. | |||
| * Nuclear weapons can be seen as a type of area bombardment weapon and it is not clear that their use is illegal {{ref|Legality_nuclear_weapons}}. | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| ==World War I== | |||
| The first large-scale aerial bombardment of civilians occurred during ]. On ], 1915, in which two German ]s dropped 24 fifty-kilogram ] bombs and ineffective three-kilogram ] on ], ], ], and the surrounding villages. In all, four people were killed, sixteen injured, and monetary damage was estimated at £7,740, although the public and media reaction were out of proportion to the death toll {reference}. | |||
| There were a further nineteen raids in 1915, in which 37 tons of bombs were dropped, killing 181 people and injuring 455. Raids continued in 1916. London was accidentally bombed in May, and in July the ] allowed raids directly against urban centres. There were 23 airship raids in 1916, in which 125 tons of ordnance were dropped, killing 293 people and injuring 691. Gradually, ] air defences improved, and Zeppelin losses mounted. In 1917 and 1918, there were only eleven Zeppelin raids against England, and the final raid occurred on August 5, 1918, which resulted in the death of KK ], commander of the German Naval Airship Department. By the end of the war, 51 raids had been undertaken, in which 5,806 bombs were dropped, killing 557 people and injuring 1,358. The Zeppelin raids were complemented by the ] bomber, which was the first bomber aircraft used for ]. It has been argued that the raids were effective far beyond material damage in diverting and hampering wartime production, diverting twelve squadrons and over 10,000 men to air defences. The calculations that were performed on the number of dead to the weight of bombs dropped had a profound effect on the attitude of the ] and population in the inter-war years, because as bombers became larger it was fully expected that deaths from aerial bombardment would approach those anticipated in the ] from the use of nuclear weapons. Adding to this was the fear that aerial chemical weapons might be used against civilian targets on a massive scale. The fear of aerial attack on such a scale was one of the fundamental driving forces of British ] in the 1930s. | |||
| ==Inter-war years== | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| * Theoretical developments in the use of Aerial Warfare | |||
| ** Area bombing ], ] | |||
| ** ] | |||
| * Use of aerial bombardment as part of French colonial policy | |||
| * Use of aerial bombardment by Italians in ] during the ] | |||
| * '''Use of aerial bombardment by ] in ] during the ]''' (notably, ], ], and Chungking) | |||
| ==='Air Control' in British colonial policy=== | |||
| As part of British colonial policy, Sir ] involved the RAF in policing of mandated areas of the Middle East. The techniques of 'Air Control', as it was called were developed in the ], around 1924. Air Control replaced the use of ground forces in effecting the restoration of order, particularly in distant areas.<ref>Hyde 1976, p. 90.</ref> Where before it would be necessary to send a column of troops through the countryside to the unrest with the problems of needing a long supply column and provoking tension in the areas they passed, aircraft were used. If law and order broke down a summons was issued to call those affected to appear at a court by a set date. The summons also spelt out the consequences of not obeying. If the summons was not obeyed the inhabitants of the village or fort would be informed of the date and time of the air raid that would follow; then the bombers would bomb on that time and date after the inhabitants had vacated the site. The elements of the system which included target marking and locating, as well as formation flying, was taken up by the Trenchardian school which included ], ], and ]. | |||
| In 1920 the RAF undertook attacks against Rebels in British Somaliland. The attacks were not indiscriminate and were aimed at the rebels forts and camps, "which were to be their primary targets".<ref name="hyde-91">Hyde 1976, p. 91.</ref> The strategy worked and the Mullahs were destroyed or overthrown in three weeks.<ref name="hyde-91"/> | |||
| In the ], the Kurds were amongst the first to learn that air war was indiscriminate in its victims.<ref name="mcdowall-180">McDowall, 2004. p. 180</ref> As a young Squadron Leader in the RAF, ] provided a description of an air campaign in Iraq in 1924: | |||
| <blockquote>"The Arab and Kurd... now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five machines.<ref name="mcdowall-180"/>"</blockquote> | |||
| To maximise the salutary yield of aerial bombing, said the man who was to be known in later life as "Bomber" Harris, it was essential that casualties should be of sufficient scale to produce "a real as opposed to a purely moral effect."<ref name="hindtbiq"> Frontline - India's National Magazine</ref> A colleague of Harris' in the Iraq operations of the 1920s had a rather more benign account of his experiences: | |||
| <blockquote>"Air control is a marvellous means of bringing these wild mountain tribes to heel. It is swift, economic and humane, as we always drop warning messages some hours before we start to 'lay eggs' on their villages, so that they can clear out... An eastern mind forgets quickly, and if he is not punished for his misdeeds straight away, he has forgotten all about them, and feels his punishment is not merited if delayed.<ref name="hindtbiq"/>"</blockquote> | |||
| In the 1930s, RAF bombings destroyed 1,365 out of 2,382 dwellings in 79 villages of the Barzani cultivators. The use of delay-action bombs, in violation of the 1907 ] and the 1914 British ''Manual of Military Law'', caused widespread civillian casulties.<ref name="mcdowall-180"/> | |||
| ===Spanish Civil War=== | |||
| During the ], 1936-39, the ] and ] both conducted aerial attacks against towns and cities. The ] was the foremost example, leading to the seminal painting of "]" by the artist ] showing all the horror and terror of such attacks. Many other cities were also bombed in this conflict, including ], Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, Zaragoza, Malaga, Bilbao, Alicante, and Valladolid. | |||
| ==World War II== | |||
| ] | |||
| ===Japanese use of terror raids in Asia=== | |||
| The ] frequently used ] aimed at non-military targets. The bombings were mostly done against Chinese cities such as ], ] and ], with around 5,000 raids from February 1938 to August 1943. <ref>Herbert Bix, ''Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan'', 2001</ref> | |||
| The bombing of ] and ], which began on 22 and ] ], called forth widespread protests culminating in a resolution by the Far Eastern Advisory Committee of the ]. ], the British Under-Secretary of State For Foreign Affairs, expressed his indignation in his own declaration. "Words cannot express the feelings of profound horror with which the news of these raids had been received by the whole civilized world. They are often directed against places far from the actual area of hostilities. The military objective, where it exists, seems to take a completely second place. The main object seems to be to inspire terror by the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians..." <ref>''The Illustrated London News, Marching to War 1933-1939'', Doubleday, 1989, p.135</ref> | |||
| ===German bombing and policy, 1939-1941=== | |||
| The Luftwaffe did not have a policy of terror bombing civilians as part of the doctrine prior to World War II and the Luftwaffe leadership specifically rejected the concept of terror bombing in the interwar period.<ref>Corum, 1995., p. 7</ref> | |||
| {{cquote|The vital industries and transportation centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidlines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries - and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale - was ruled as acceptable.|20px|20px| ]<ref>James Corum 1997, p. 240</ref>}} Standing instructions for the Luftwaffe at the start of the war forbade any entrance into Western airspace for combat aircraft, with the exception of reconnaissance missions, and strictly adhered to international laws of war.<ref>Poeppel-von Preußen-von Hase, 2000. p. 248.</ref> Terror attacks, and the initiation of an unrestricted air warfare were forbidden.<ref>Spetzler, 1956. p. 259</ref><ref>Planstudie 1939, Heft. I-III, BA-MA RL 2 II/1-3.</ref><ref>ObdL FüSt Ia Nr. 5375/39 g. Kdos. Chefsache, Entwurf, Weisung Nr. 2 für das X. Fliegerkorps vom 11. November 1939</ref><ref>ObdL FüSt Ia Nr. 5445/39 vom 16 Dezember 1939.</ref> Following the German invasion of Poland and subsequent declaration of war by the Western Allies, in Hitler's ''OKW Direktive Nr 2'' and Luftwaffe ''Direktive Nr 2'' made no mention of strategic bomber raids, while attacks upon enemy naval forces were permitted only if the enemy bombed Germany, with the exception in the German Bight, noting that "The guiding principle must be not to provoke the initiation of aerial warfare on the part of Germany"; by contrast, Göring's directive permitted restricted attacks upon warships anywhere, as well as upon troop transports at sea.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 190.</ref> | |||
| ====Poland==== | |||
| During the ] in 1939, the Luftwaffe extensively bombed several cities in ], devestating ] and ] (over 90% of structures destroyed) and ]. The Polish Air Force (]) also bombed ] on 1 September 1939{{clarify me|date=May 2009|reason=how extensively?}}.<ref>Willmott, 1991. p. 236</ref> Warsaw`s air bases and PZL aircraft factory was also the subject of bombing from September 2, 1939 before being declared a fortress by Polish military forces,<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 181.</ref> while subsequent attacks targeted bridges on the Vistula, communications around the city, precision night missions against munitions dumps using ] guidance and direct support of the Army in the southern suburbs by ] Stuka dive bombers.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 185.</ref> | |||
| On the 13 of September, following orders of the ''ObdL'' to launch a retaliatory attack on the ] for unspecified crimes committed against German soldiers, apprx. 200 bomber sorties were flown with 50:50 load of high explosives and incendiaries, setting the Ghetto ablaze.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 186.</ref> On 22 September ] requested: "Urgently request exploitation of last opportunity for large-scale experiment as devastation terror raid.....Every effort will be made to eradicate Warsaw completely".<ref>Hooton 2007, p. 92.</ref> His request was rejected.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 187.</ref> By then, Warsaw itself was a fortress garrisoned by some 150,000 men and therefore no longer an 'open city', so under the international rules of warfare it could be subjected to wholesale bombardment.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 187.</ref> To conserve the strength of the bomber units, the modern ] bombers were replaced by ] transports using "worse than primitive methods" for bombing. Due to prevailing strong winds they achieved poor accuracy, even causing some casualties to besieging German troops.<ref>Hooton 1994, p. 188.</ref> The Germans flew 1,150 sorties and dropped 560 tonnes of high explosive and 72 tonnes of incendiaries.<ref>Hooton 2007, p. 92.</ref> As result of this and previous bombings, 10 percent of the buildings in the city were destroyed, and 40,000 civilian casualties were inflicted.<ref>Hooton 2007, p. 92.</ref> On 14 September the French Air attaché in Warsaw reported to Paris that "... the German Air Force acted in accordance to the international laws of war and bombed only targets of military nature. Therefore, there is no reason for French retorsions."<ref>Der Prozess gegen die Hauptskriegsverbrecher vor der Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg. 14 November 1945 - 1 Oktober 1946. Volume 9. Nürnberg, 1947. p. 759.</ref>. However the Germans recognised and planned for an aerial assault before hostilities. Plans for "and the level of importance of aerial bombing of cities, even in an operational sense was illustrated by plans for the heavy bombing of Warsaw".{{clarify me|date=May 2009|reason=quotation is confusing}} Only the weather thwarted the Luftwaffe from carrying it out fully.<ref>Buckley 1999, p. 127.</ref> | |||
| ====Netherlands==== | |||
| On 14 May 1940, ] bombers were ordered to ] by its chief, ], in an effort to force the capitulation of the besieged city.<ref>Rutherford, Ward, ''Blitzkrieg 1940'', G.P.Putnam's Sons, NY, 1980, p.52.</ref> The controversial bombing targeted the center of the city, instead of providing direct tactical support for the hard-pressed German 22nd infantry division (under Lt. Gen. Sponeck, which had airlanded on May 10) in combat with Dutch forces northwest of the city, and in the eastern part of the city at the Meuse river bridge.<ref>Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, ''The Air War, 1939-1945'', Blandford Press, Poole, Dorset, UK, 1985, p.74.<</ref>> As negotiations for the surrender were in progress, an unsuccessful attempt was made to call off the assault. Nevertheless, 57 ]'s (out of 100) did drop 97 tons of bombs, and in the resulting fire {{convert|1.1|sqmi|km2}} of the city center was devastated, including 21 churches and 4 hospitals, and killing between 800-1000 civilians, wounding over 1,000, and making 78,000 homeless.<ref>Hooton Vol 2 2007, p. 52.</ref><ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 42</ref> International news agencies vastly exaggerated the events, portraying Rotterdam as a city mercilessly destroyed by terror bombing without regard to civilian life, with 30,000 dead lying under the ruins.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43</ref> Neither claim was true: the bombing was against well defined targets, in direct support of advancing German Army's operations.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43</ref> The Germans had threatened to bomb ] in the same fashion, the threat of a second such bombing was sufficient to force the surrender of the Netherlands to Nazi Germany.<ref>Maass, Walter B., ''The Netherlands at War: 1940-1945'', Abelard-Schuman, NY, 1970, pp. 38-40.</ref><ref>Kennett, Lee, ''A History of Strategic Bombing'', Charles Scribner's Sons, NY, 1982, p.112.</ref><ref>Boyne, Walter J., ''Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air'', Simon & Schuster, NY, 1994, p.61.</ref> | |||
| ====The Blitz==== | |||
| {{main|The Blitz}} | |||
| The ''Luftwaffe'' carried out intensive bombing of industrial cities and ports in the ], including ] and ], in a bombing campaign known in Britain as "]," from September, 1940 through May, 1941. ]'s No. 17 Directive, issued 1 August 1940 on the conduct of war against England specifically forbade ''Luftwaffe'' to conduct terror raids on its own initiative, and reserved the right of ordering terror attacks as means of reprisal for the ] himself,<ref>Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 122.</ref> despite the raids conducted by RAF ] against industries located in German cities since May 1940. This echoed ]'s general order issued on 30 June, 1940 on the the air war against the island fortress: | |||
| {{quote|The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population.<ref>Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 117.</ref>}} | |||
| After a succession of British raids on ] factories<ref>Taylor and Mayer 1974, p. 74.</ref>, and with his patience was exhausted, Hitler became infuriated; he ordered that the 'night piracy of the British' be countered by a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London.<ref>Smith&Creek, 2004. Volume II. p. 122</ref> In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that: | |||
| <blockquote>"The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break - and it will not be ] Germany!"<ref>Schmidt-Klingenberg, Michael. Spiegel Online</ref></blockquote> | |||
| Göring - at ]'s urging and with Hitler's support- turned to a massive assault on the British capital.<ref>Murray 1983, p. 52.</ref> On the night of 7 September, 318 bombers from the whole ] supported by eight other ''Kampfgruppen'', flew almost continous sorties against London, the dock area which was already in flames from earlier daylight attacks.<ref>Smith&Creek, 2004. Volume II. p. 122</ref> This all-out effort, directed at London's East End and the Thames docks, accorded well with ]'s theories and the German's own belief that ruthlessness could pay extra dividens. The attack of 7 September 1940 did not entirely step over the line into a clear terror bombing effort since its primary target was the London docks, but there was clearly an assumed hope of terrorizing the London population.<ref>Murray 1983, p. 52.</ref> | |||
| The Blitz continued into the winter 190-41. While some historians maintain that German air fleets targeted civilian areas, with the goal of destroying dwellings and inflicting casualties on British workers to disrupt production of military industry,<ref>Taylor & Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.</ref>, officially terror attacks were banned for the Luftwaffe.<ref>Hooton, 1997. p. 35</ref> The bombing killed thousands of civilians and caused temporary losses of production output. The Blitz failed to have the desired effect.<ref>Taylor & Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.</ref> | |||
| {{cquote|Although the plan adopted by the Luftwaffe early September had mentioned attacks on the population of large cities, detailed records of the raids made during the autumn and the winter of 1940-41 does not suggest that indiscriminate bombing of the civilians was intended. The points of aim selected were largely factories and docks. Other objectives specifically allotted to bomber-crews included the ] and the governmental quarter rounds ].|20px|20px| ]<ref>Collier, 1957. p. 261</ref>}} | |||
| Germany continued to bomb the UK throughout the war with varying intensity, long after any possible effect could be achieved, culminating in the 'vengeance' attacks by ]s and ]s. | |||
| ====Belgrade==== | |||
| In April 1941, during the ], Germany invaded ] after a new government in that nation repudiated its ties with Germany. Codenamed "]", Hitler ordered the destruction of ] specifically to punish Yugoslavia, carried out with 50 percent of the force dropping incendiaries and the other half dropping high explosives. Although Hitler`s orders were specific about the destruction of the city, they were replaced in the last moment for military, communications and logistical targets in the city by ''Generaloberst'' ] - the commander of the Luftwaffe formations that bombed Belgrade - and his staff.<ref>Diakow, 1964. pp. 33-44.</ref><ref>Luftflottenkommando 4, Führungsabteilung Ia op Nr. 1000/41. g. Kdos. vom 31 März 1940. BA-MA RI. 7/657, pp. 1-14</ref> In the survey prepared by the Luftwaffe ten days after the attack to assess the results obtained by the 218.5 tons dropped, the following targets are mentioned: the royal palace, the ministry of defence, military colleges, the main post office, the telegraph office, railway stations, powerplants and barracks.<ref>Spetzler&Veale, 1954. p. 274.</ref><ref>LC 7 II LC 7 Nr. 2550/40 geh. Vom 24. April 1941. Bericht über die Bomberwirkung in Belgrad. BA-MA RL 3/2157.</ref><ref>Lfl Kdo 4 FüAbt Ic vom 15. April 1941, Zusammenestellung der auf Belgrad abgeworfenen Bomben, BA-MA RL 3/2157</ref> The number of civilians killed in the ] is claimed to be 2,274<ref>Savich, Carl Serbianna</ref> and 12,000 injured<ref>Ciglic & Savic 2007, p. 59.</ref> ; other estimations claim as high as 17,000 killed and 50,000 wounded<ref>Murray 1983, p. 75.</ref><ref>Buckley 1999, p. 132.</ref>. | |||
| ===British bombing and policy prior to 1942=== | |||
| During most of 1940, RAF Bomber Command did not adopt "terror" bombing. Between May 1940 and July 1941 it focused on operational interdiction against oil and marshalling yards in France and Germany, fearing for German retaliation on British cities after the large scale destruction of Warsaw and Rotterdam.<ref>Pape 1996, p. 267</ref> The British Bombing Unit Survey records just 1% of its effort was expended on attacking German towns, while 25% was directed at Industry, 44% at military targets an 30% at "other" targets.<ref>Pape 1996, p. 268.</ref> | |||
| The first British bombs fell on a German city, Mönchengladblach, on the night of 11/12 May 1940, while Bomber Command was attempting to hit roads and railroads near the Dutch-German border.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43</ref> ] was attacked first on the 14/15, followed by ] on May 15, 1940.<ref>Jane`s, 1989. p. 34</ref> | |||
| Following the attack on Rotterdam, ] was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on May 15, 1940; the Air ministry authorized ] Charles Portal to conduct attacks on rail and communications targets only; to attack targets in the ], including ] plants and other civilian ] targets which aided the German war effort, such as ]s (which at night were self-illuminating).<ref>Hastings 1979, p. 6</ref><ref>Taylor ] Chapter "Call Me Meier", Page 111</ref> Bomber Command's strategic bombing campaign on Germany has thus begun.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 44</ref> | |||
| During May, ], ], ], ], ] and ] were also attacked for the first time by Bomber Command, while in June similar attacks were made on ], ], ] and ].<ref>Jane`s, 1989. p. 34</ref>{{Verify source|date=May 2009}} The number of German civilian casualties begun to mount: when on the night of 17/18 May 72 British bombers attacked industrial targets in Hamburg and Bremen, 47 were killed and 127 were wounded; the H.E. and 400 incendiaries dropped caused six large, one moderately large and 29 small fires.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 44-45</ref> As at the time Bomber Command lacked the necessary navigational and bombing technical background, the accuracy of the bombings during the night attacks was abysmal, and the bombs usually being scattered over a large area, causing an uproar in Germany. As a result, Hitler authorized the 'reprisal' bombing of targets on the British mainland nine days later<ref>Kennett, Lee, ''A History of Strategic Bombing'', Charles Scribners' Sons, NY, 1982, p.112</ref>. Actual Luftwaffe operations over England did not start for six weeks; but by then Hitler specifically forbade terror bombings, other than means of retaliation for Bomber Command bombing operations against German cities.<ref>Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 117.</ref><ref>Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 122.</ref> | |||
| Churchill began flirting with the idea of terror attacks soon after the ] has ended. On 5 July he wrote ] : "There's one thing that will bring back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon Nazi homeland."<ref>Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.</ref> On 20 July, Churchill suggested to bombing of Berlin on the 1 September.<ref>Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.</ref> That on the night of 24/25 August 1940 German bombers bombed London in error<ref>Smith&Creek, Volume II. p. 121</ref> came helpful to him<ref>Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.</ref>; the Prime Minister order a retaliatory attack on factories in Berlin. Hitler reacted promptly. He ordered German air attacks to be directed against British cities and towns, with London as the primary objective.<ref>Taylor and Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.</ref> ] had a significant influence on RAF Bomber Commands operations. His directive to the Command was to "pulverise the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depended".<ref>Biddle 2002, p. 186.</ref> In response to German attacks on British cities, Bomber Command was ordered to "retaliate with attacks on industrial targets in Berlin (25 August) ".<ref>Biddle 2002, p. 188.</ref> A "new bombing directive on 21 September 1940, continued to stress the disruption of Germany's oil supply as the long-term offensive policy".<ref>Biddle 2002, p. 188.</ref> | |||
| On 13 December, 1940, the British War Cabinet authorized a raid against a German city; there were no specific targets, the bombs were to be simply unladen onto the city centre. Crews were briefed before the mission that the objective of the mission was to "cause the most severe possible damage in the city centre".<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 68-69</ref> As a result, on the 17/18 December, Bomber Command raided the German city of ] with 134 bombers, using methods copied from the Luftwaffe, that were used over Coventry to mark targets for the bomber force: eight Wellington bombers flown by an experienced crews were dropping incendiaries. The attack was poorly executed, and the bombs scattered over a large area; though most of the incendiaries fell on residential areas, causing the death of 34 people, the damage done to industrial areas was negligible. In Germany, the attack contributed significantly to Bomber Command crew`s image as a ''Terrorfliger''.<ref>Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 68-69</ref> | |||
| ===British and American policy of terror bombing=== | |||
| ====Initial refusal to employ terror bombing==== | |||
| As World War II began in 1939, the president of the ] (then a ] power), ], issued a request to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to ] targets.<ref>President Franklin D. Roosevelt {{Self-published inline|date=May 2009}}, 1 September, 1939</ref> The ] and the ] agreed to abide by the request, which included the ] that "upon the understanding that these same ]fare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents".<ref>Taylor p. 105</ref> | |||
| At the start of the war, the United Kingdom had a ] of using aerial bombing only against military targets and against ] such as ] and railways which were of direct military importance. Whilst it was acknowledged that the aerial bombing of ] would cause ] casualties, the ] renounced the deliberate bombing of civilian ], outside of combat zones, as a military tactic.<ref>A.C. Grayling, ''Among the Dead Cities'' (Bloomsbury 2006), Page 24.</ref> | |||
| Like the Germans, the British abandoned daytime precision bombing of targets in the enemy's homeland. Initially, the RAF attempted night time precision bombing, but after the circulation of the ] in August 1941, the British government abandoned the policy of precision bombing for ] with the issuing of the ] to the RAF on ] 1942. | |||
| ====Change of strategic direction, February 1942==== | |||
| On 14 February 1942 ] took up the post of ] (AOC) of Bomber Command. The change in strategy was hotly debated inside the British military establishment, as it had a direct effect on the most effective use of the Britain's limited resources in waging war on Germany. Should the ] (RAF) be scaled back to allow more resources to go to the ] and ], or should the ] option be followed and expanded. It was decided to change the bombing policy from industrial assaults to the civilian population: | |||
| <blockquote>Consequent upon the enemy's adoption of a campaign of unrestricted air warfare, the Cabinet have authorised a bombing policy which includes the attack of enemy morale.<ref>Biddle 2002, p. 197.</ref></blockquote> | |||
| On on ] 1942 ], the British government's leading scientific adviser, sent to the ] ] a memorandum which after it had become accepted by the ] became known as the ] cabinet paper. Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, was asked by the Cabinet to look into the competing points of view. In his report, that was delivered on ] 1942, he concluded that: | |||
| {{quote|If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months’ continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale).<ref>Longmate 1983, p. 133</ref><ref>Copp, Terry; '''', originally published in the Legion Magazine September/October 1996</ref><ref></ref>}} | |||
| ====Area bombing offensives==== | |||
| Until the last month of the war in Europe the British did not abandon the policy of area bombardment — apart from a break during the summer of 1944 while RAF bomber command stopped the strategic bombing of Germany to concentrate on the tactical bombing of France to support the ] — although later directives put more emphasis on the bombing of strategic targets such as oil production and distribution facilities, area bombardment was not totally abandoned until the last month of the European war. The most effective way to dehouse the population was ] of city centres which inevitably caused many deaths to civilians. This was a deliberate attack on the moral of the enemy as it was believed by the British that in the words of Lord Cherwell in the dehousing paper that "Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed."<ref>Longmate 1983, p. 131</ref> | |||
| While politicians maintained the pretence that Bomber Command was attacking military and industrial targets, Arthur Harris was more honest, seeing no shame in attacking the German people and having no problem with describing the aim of his attacks on Berlin as being "to cause the heart of the German nation to stop beating".<ref name="lake1">Lake, Jon - ‘Bomber’ Harris, an enduring enigma. 2002, Osprey Publishing.</ref> When pressed to use a higher proportion of ], he argued the case for ], saying: | |||
| {{cquote|I do not agree with this policy. The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the ], to kill Boche and to terrify Boche.|20px|20px| ]<ref name="lake1"/>}} | |||
| ====The bombing of Dresden==== | |||
| {{main|Bombing of Dresden in World War II}} | |||
| ] | |||
| One of the most devastating raids of the European theatre was the ] of February 13-15, 1945, which started a ] and left the city in ruins and claimed between 25,000 and 40,000 lives.<ref>The consensus among historians is that the number killed was between slightly under 25,000 to a few thousand over 35,000. See | |||
| *Evans, Richard J. , [(i) Introduction. | |||
| *Addison, Paul. ''Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden'', p. 75. | |||
| *Taylor, Frederick. ''Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945'', p. 580. | |||
| *All three historians, Addison, Evans and Taylor, refer to: | |||
| *Bergander, Götz. ''Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen''. Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1977, who estimated a few thousand over 35,000. | |||
| *Reichert, Friedrich. "Verbrannt bis zur Unkenntlichkeit," in Dresden City Museum (ed.). ''Verbrannt bis zur Unkenntlichkeit. Die Zerstörung Dresdens 1945''. Altenburg, 1994, pp. 40-62, p. 58. — Richard Evans regards Reichert's figures as definitive.</ref>The raids were carried out under the pretext<ref name="Taylor-430">]{{clarifyme|date= May 2009|Which Taylor?}}, p. 430.</ref> of supporting the ] ] advance: the Soviets had requested the destruction of Dresden on 4 February 1945, at the ] conference, as well as the bombing of Berlin and ].<ref>Hastings 1979, p. 341.</ref> ] was already planned by Bomber Command in January 1945,<ref>Hinchliffe, 1996. p. 434.</ref> However, until the Soviet request was made it had been rejected.<ref>Taylor, 207–214</ref>{{Verify source|date=May 2009}} The attack was to be centered on the sports stadium, next to the city's medieval ''Altstadt'' (old town), with its congested, and highly combustible, timbered buildings;<ref name=De-Bruhl-209>De Bruhl (2006), pp. 209.</ref> the major industrial areas in the suburbs, which stretched for miles, were not targeted.<ref>McKee 1983, p. 62</ref> | |||
| Bomber Command issued the following briefing notes to its Squadrons: | |||
| <blockquote>Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance, and like any large city with multiplicity of telephone and rail facilities, is of major value for controlling the defence of that part of the front now threatened by Marshal Koniev's breakthrough. The intentions are to attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidently to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do.<ref>Hastings 1979, p. 342.</ref></blockquote> | |||
| Bomber Command, in the extended briefing note, acknowledged the presence of refugees and workers. Due to the presence large concentration of troops and administrative services displaced from elsewhere it was considered a target.<ref>Hastings 1979, p. 342.</ref> Commenting on this Alexander McKee stated that: "The standard whitewash gambit, both British and American, is to mention that Dresden contained targets X, Y and Z, and to let the innocent reader assume that these targets were attacked, whereas in fact the bombing plan totally omitted them and thus, except for one or two mere accidents, they escaped"<ref>McKee (1983), p.61.</ref> McKee further asserts, "The bomber commanders were not really interested in any purely military or economic targets, which was just as well, for they knew very little about Dresden; the RAF even lacked proper maps of the city. What they were looking for was a big built up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure"<ref>McKee (1983), p.63.</ref> ] rejects the common notion that the Dresden bombing was needless: | |||
| <blockquote>The argument, sometimes heard, that it was 'unnecessary' to bomb Dresden because the war was nearly over is absurd. That was a thought that could have reality only after the 7 May; in February it was an unfact, and what mattered above all else to most people was to end the war soon as possible by any and every means.<ref>Terraine 1985, p. 678.</ref></blockquote> | |||
| Following the bombing of Dresden, British Prime Minister ] stated in a top secret telegram: | |||
| {{quote|"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed." "...I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive."<ref name="Taylor-430">], p. 430.</ref><ref name= "Detlef-Siebert2001-08-01">, ], 2001-08-01, ] History, verified May 2009</ref>}} | |||
| It is estimated that Allied air force raids on the ] killed between 305,000 and 600,000 civilians of which about 80,000 were children<ref>Longmate 1983, p. 133</ref>. 3,700,000 dwellings were destroyed, of which 600,000 were in Berlin.<ref>Hastings 1979, p. 352.</ref> The primary objective of these attacks was to damage economic infrastructure to seriously weaken the enemy's ability to fight the war, in line with the doctrines of ]. Senior Allied commanders like ] and politicians also hoped, in the early years of the war, that the ] of the ] populations and governments could be so undermined by these tactics that they would sue for peace. However the resilience of Londoners under the Blitz, and the failures to break the morale of the Germans with the ] and the ], showed that this was unrealistic to all but the most ardent advocates of area bombardment, such as Arthur "Bomber" Harris.{{Fact|date=June 2008}} | |||
| ====German response==== | |||
| The Germans harboured similar unrealistic hopes for their ] and ] rockets. With only conventional warheads and limited to area targeting they did not make any difference to the military outcome. The ] government propaganda ministry made much of their use as reprisal weapons (''Vergeltungswaffen'') on the population of London in response to the Allied strategic bombing campaign waged against German cities. | |||
| ====The American offensives==== | |||
| The ] officially only bombed precision targets over Europe, but for example, when 316 ]es, of the ], bombed Dresden in a follow up raid at around noon on the 14 February 1945, because of cloud the later waves bombed using using ] for targeting.<ref name=Davis-504>Davis p.504</ref> The mix of bombs to be used on the Dresden raid was about 40% incendiaries, much closer to the RAF city busting mix than that usually used by the Americans in precision bombardments.<ref name=Taylor-366>Taylor p. 366. Taylor compares this 40% mix with the ] on February 3 where the ratio was 10% incendiaries</ref> This was quite a common mix when the USAF anticipated cloudy conditions over the target.<ref name=Davis-425-504>Davis pp. 425,504</ref> | |||
| In its attacks on Japan the USAAF abandoned its policy of precision bombing and used a mix of incendiaries and high explosives to burn Japanese cities to the ground. These tactics were used to devastating effect with many burnt out. The first raid using low-flying B-29s carrying ] to drop on Tokyo was on the night of February 24-25 1945 when 174 B-29s destroyed around one square mile (3 km²) of the city. Changing their tactics to expand the coverage and increase the damage, 279 B-29s raided on the night of March 9–10, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Approximately 16 square miles (41 km²) of the city were destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the resulting ], more than the immediate deaths of either ] or ].<ref>Dyson, Freeman Technology Review, November 1 2006, ]</ref> Another example is the ] on 17 March 1945, 331 B-29 bombers launched a firebombing attack against the city. Of the city's residents, 8,841 were confirmed to have been killed in the resulting ]s, which destroyed an area of three square miles and included 21% of Kobe's urban area. At the time, the city covered an area of <span style="white-space:nowrap">14 square miles (36 km²)</span>. More than 650,000 people had their homes destroyed, and the homes of another million people were damaged.{{Fact|date=March 2008}} | |||
| ] | |||
| The United States fire-bombing of Tokyo, Kobe, and other targets in Japan is a case in which contradictory conclusions have been made. American airmen such as General ] felt that changing from a relatively ineffective campaign of precision bombing carried out against industry to a much more successful firebombing campaign carried out against the general population was a reasonable way to interrupt Japanese industry. Such attacks damaged homes and light industry, leaving large numbers of workers homeless and jobless, reducing war output by half in Tokyo. On the other hand, many observers felt that the firebombing of civilians in densely-packed cities was inhumane. A military aide to General ] called the incendiary attacks "one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history."<ref>Rauch, Jonathan. The Atlantic, July/August, 2002</ref> | |||
| According to ]'s speech, the ] forced the Japanese Government into "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable"; and agreeing to unconditional surrender of their armed forces under the terms of the ].<ref></ref> <!-- Mention the *conventional* bombings of other Japanese cities, causing vaguely similar degree of destruction like the atomic bombs? --> | |||
| ==Aerial bombardments since World War II== | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| ===Vietnam=== | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| During the Vietnamese War the USAF increasingly resorted to 'box bombing', a form of carpet bombing in which the entire area within 'the box' (usually miles wide) is destroyed by fire. ] was also introduced at this time and many photos taken by journalists showed burning civilians covered in the napalm (a sticky substance). This included a famous picture of a ]. | |||
| ===Afghanistan=== | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet forces used helicopter gunships to destroy villages of suspected of supporting anti-Soviet resistance. | |||
| ===Collateral damage=== | |||
| {{Expand-section|date=May 2008}} | |||
| With modern ]s (or "smart bombs"), fewer casualties are caused among the civilian populations than with ]. This was demonstrated in the use of guided munitions before the ] in 2003, when ] ] spoke of '']'' bombings that he hoped would lead to an ]i surrender without the destruction of large areas of ]. Modern weapons still cause ] and a significant proportion of unguided bombs may still be used; for example in Iraq and Afghanistan it was around 30% {{Dead link|date=May 2009}}{{Dead link|date=May 2009}}. There are instances in recent conflicts of civilians being killed by airborne munitions, mostly by bombs missing their targets.<ref> BBC news, 22 February, 2001</ref> In the ], ] intended to bomb military, economic and political targets in ]. However, scores of civilians were killed and the Chinese embassy was accidentally hit in the bombings, leading to international protest.{{Fact|date=May 2009}} | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| ==Footnotes== | |||
| {{Reflist|2}} | |||
| ==References== | ==References== | ||
| *Axinn, Sidney (2008). A Moral Military'',Temple University Press, ISBN 1592139582, 9781592139583 | |||
| {{refbegin}} | |||
| *Brower, Charles F. (1998). ''World War II in Europe: the final year'', Roosevelt Study Center,, Palgrave Macmillan,ISBN 0312211333, 9780312211332 | |||
| * Biddle, Tami-Davis. (2002). ''Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945''. Princeton University. ISBN 0-691-12010-2 | |||
| *Myrdal, Alva (1977). ''The game of disarmament'' Manchester University Press ND, ISBN 0719006937, 9780719006937. | |||
| * De Bruhl, Marshall (2006). ''Firestorm: Allied Airpower and the Destruction of Dresden''. Random House. | |||
| *Overy, R. J. (2005). ''The air war, 1939-1945'', Brassey's, ISBN 1574887165, 9781574887167. | |||
| * Buckley, John. (1999). ''Air Power in the Age of Total War''. UCL Press London. ISBN 1-85728-589-1 | |||
| *Taylor, Frederick (2005). ''Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945''. London: Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-7084-1. | |||
| * Copp, Terry. (September/October 1996). '''' , originally published in the ] | |||
| * Collier, Basil. ''The Defence of the United Kingdom.'' HMSO, 1957. ISBN T003192434 | |||
| * Corum, James. (2007). ''The Luftwaffe: The Operational Air War, 1918-1940''. University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0-7006-0836-2 | |||
| * Ciglic, Boris and Dragan Savic. (2007). ''Dornier Do 17 - The Yugoslav Story: Operational Record 1937-1947''. Belgrade: Jeroplan Books. ISBN 978-8-69097270-8. | |||
| * Smith, J. Richard and Creek, Eddie J. (2004). ''Kampflieger. Vol. 2.: Bombers of the Luftwaffe July 1940 - December 1941.'' Classic Publications. ISBN 978-1903223437 | |||
| * Davis, Richard D. (2006). '''' Air University Press. | |||
| * Deist, Wilhelm. Boog, Horst, Maier, Klaus Autbert. Rahn, Werner. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. (2001). ''Germany and the Second World War''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198228882 | |||
| * Gómez, Javier Guisández (1998). , International Review of the Red Cross no 323, p.347-363 | |||
| * Grayling, A.C. (2006). ''Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan''. Walker & Company. ISBN 978-0802714718 | |||
| * Hastings, Max (1979). ''RAF Bomber Command''. Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-39204-2 | |||
| * Hinchcliffe, Peter (1996) ''The other battle : Luftwaffe night aces versus Bomber Command.'' Airlife Publishing, ISBN 9781853105470 | |||
| * Hooton, E.R (1994). ''Phoenix Triumphant; The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe''. London: Arms & Armour Press. ISBN 1 86019 964 X | |||
| * Hooton, E.R (1997). ''Eagle in Flames; The Fall of the Luftwaffe''. London: Arms & Armour Press. ISBN 1 86019 995 X | |||
| * Hooton, E.R (2007). ''Luftwaffe at War; Gathering Storm 1933-39: Volume 1''. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-71-7. | |||
| * Hooton, E.R (2007). ''Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West: Volume 2''. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6. | |||
| * Hyde, Montgomery. (1976) ''British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939''. Heinemann, London. ISBN 434 47983 7 | |||
| * Jane`s (1989). ''All the World's Aircraft 1940/41/42/43/44/45.'' London, Random House, ISBN 1 85170 199 0 | |||
| * Longmate, Norman. (1983). ''The Bombers: The RAF offensive against Germany 1939-1945'', Hutchinson. ISBN 0091515807 | |||
| * McDowall, David. (2004). ''A modern history of the Kurds.'' I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9781850434160 | |||
| * McKee, Alexander (1983). ''Dresden 1945: The Devil's Tinderbox'', Granada. | |||
| * Murray, Willamson. (1983). ''Strategy for defeat. The Luftwaffe 1935-1945''. Air Power Research Institute. ISBN 9780160021602 | |||
| * Pape, Robert. (1996). ''Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War''. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0801483110 | |||
| * Poeppel, Hans and Prinz von Preußen, Wilhelm-Karl and von Hase, Karl-Günther. (2000) ''Die Soldaten der Wehrmacht.'' Herbig Verlag. ISBN 978-3776620573 | |||
| * Rousseau, Charles. (1983). ''Le droit des conflits armés'', Editions Pedone, Paris, {{OCLC|301642731}} | |||
| * Spaight. James M. (1944). G. Bles. {{ASIN|B0007IVW7K}} (Spaight was Principal Assistant Secretary of the UK Air Ministry) | |||
| * Terraine, John. ''The Right of the Line''. Sceptre Books. 1985. ISBN 0-340-41919-4 | |||
| * Taylor, Frederick (2005). ''Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945''. London: Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-7084-1 | |||
| * Taylor, A.J.P. and S.L. Mayer, eds. (1974). ''A History Of World War Two''. London: Octopus Books. ISBN 0-70640-399-1. | |||
| * Taylor, Frederick. (2004). ''Dresden: Tuesday, 13 February, 1945''. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-000676-5 | |||
| * Willmott, H.P. (1991). ''The Great Crusade.'' Free Press, 1991. ISBN-10: 0029347165 ISBN-13: 978-0029347164 | |||
| * Wood, Derek and Dempster, Derek. (1990). ''The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power'', London: Tri-Service Press, third revised edition. ISBN 1-854-88027-6. | |||
| {{refend}} | |||
| ] | ] | ||
Revision as of 07:58, 17 May 2009
Terror bombing is an emotive term used to describe aerial attacks made by a belligerent to break the morale of their enemy. Use of the term to describe aerial attacks implies that the attacks are criminal attacks that fall outside the law of war, or if within the laws of ware are nevertheless a moral crime.
The aerial attacks described as terror bombing are often long range strategic bombing raids, although attacks against tactical targets which result in the deaths of civilians my also be described as such, or if the attacks involve fighters strafing the my be labeled "terror attacks".
The German propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels frequently described attacks made on Germany by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) during their strategic bombing campaigns as terror attacks. The Allied governments usually described their attacks on cities using other euphemism such as area bombing (RAF) or precision bombing (USAAF), and for most of World War II the Allied news media did the same. However at a SHAEF press conference on 16 February 1945, two days after the Bombing of Dresden, British Air Commodore Colin McKay Grierson, replied to a question by one of the journalists that the primary target of the bombing had been on communications to prevent the Germans moving military supplies, and to stop movement in all directions if possible. He then added in an offhand remark that the raid also helped destroying "what is left of German morale." Howard Cowan, an Associated Press war correspondent, subsequently filed a story about the Dresden raid. The military press censor at SHAEF made a mistake and allowed the Cowan cable to go out starting with "Allied air bosses have have made the long awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of great German population centres as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler's doom." There were follow-up newspaper editorials on the issue and a long time opponent of strategic bombing, Richard Stokes MP, asked questions in the House of Commons on 6 March.
Notes
- Overy (2005), p. 119
- Myrdal (1977), p. 252
- Axinn (2008), p. 73
- Brower (1998), p. 108 (mentions that Historian Ronald Shaffer describing Operation Clarion which involved both bombing and strafing as a terror attack).
- Taylor (2005) pp. 413,414 p. 363
References
- Axinn, Sidney (2008). A Moral Military,Temple University Press, ISBN 1592139582, 9781592139583
- Brower, Charles F. (1998). World War II in Europe: the final year, Roosevelt Study Center,, Palgrave Macmillan,ISBN 0312211333, 9780312211332
- Myrdal, Alva (1977). The game of disarmament Manchester University Press ND, ISBN 0719006937, 9780719006937.
- Overy, R. J. (2005). The air war, 1939-1945, Brassey's, ISBN 1574887165, 9781574887167.
- Taylor, Frederick (2005). Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945. London: Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-7084-1.