Unified Task Force: Difference between revisions

Browse history interactively ← Previous edit Next edit →Content deleted Content addedVisual WikitextInline

Revision as of 16:55, 24 July 2009 editSherurcij (talk \| contribs)Autopatrolled, Pending changes reviewers36,146 edits rvt bad-faith removal of four PD images showing troops in Somalia← Previous edit		Revision as of 16:59, 24 July 2009 edit undoMiddayexpress (talk \| contribs)109,244 edits Undid revision 303963313 by Sherurcij (talk)dishones appraisal of situation by bad faith editorNext edit →
Line 2:		Line 2:
	{{Infobox Military Conflict		{{Infobox Military Conflict
	\|conflict=War in Somalia		\|conflict=War in Somalia
			\|image=
	\|image=]
			\|caption=
	\|caption=US Army troops from the ] are shown conducting a nighttime sweep for weapons in the small Somali village of Afgooye. 30 January 1993
	\|partof=the ]		\|partof=the ]
	\|date=9 December 1992 - 4 May 1993		\|date=December 9, 1992 - May 4, 1993
	\|place=]		\|place=]
	\|casus=		\|casus=
Line 30:		Line 30:
	{{Campaignbox Somali Civil War}}		{{Campaignbox Somali Civil War}}
	{{FixBunching\|end}}		{{FixBunching\|end}}

	'''Unified Task Force (UNITAF)''' was a ] led, ] sanctioned multinational force which operated in ~~the~~ ] from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. A United States initiative (code-named "Operation Restore Hope"), UNITAF was charged with carrying out ]: to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half ~~of the ]~~.		'''Unified Task Force (UNITAF)''' was a ] led, ] sanctioned multinational force which operated in ] from 5 December 1992 to May 4, 1993. A United States initiative (code-named "Operation Restore Hope"), UNITAF was charged with carrying out ]: to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of Somalia.

	UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance to ],<ref name=THE-FINAL-CALL></ref> and is regarded as a success.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm \| title = Operation Restore Hope \| accessdate = 2008 - 01 - 15 }}</ref>		UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance to ],<ref name=THE-FINAL-CALL></ref> and is regarded as a success.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm \| title = Operation Restore Hope \| accessdate = 2008 - 01 - 15 }}</ref>
Line 38:		Line 39:

	Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to worsen. Factions were splintering into smaller factions, and then splintered again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, looting and extortion.<ref name=UNDP/> Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty-stricken refugees were starving to death every day.		Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to worsen. Factions were splintering into smaller factions, and then splintered again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, looting and extortion.<ref name=UNDP/> Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty-stricken refugees were starving to death every day.

	By November, General ] had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peacekeepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.<ref>United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.</ref>		By November, General ] had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peacekeepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.<ref>United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.</ref>

	In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration, ] ] presented several options to the ]. Diplomatic avenues having proved largely fruitless, he recommended that a significant show of force was required to bring the armed groups to heel. Chapter VII of the ] allows for "action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Boutros-Ghali believed the time had come for employing this clause and moving on from peacekeeping.<ref>United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/29 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, page 6.</ref> Significantly, this invocation of Chapter VII waived the need for consent on the part of the state of Somalia; effectively the first time the UN Secretariat had endorsed such an act.		In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration, ] ] presented several options to the ]. Diplomatic avenues having proved largely fruitless, he recommended that a significant show of force was required to bring the armed groups to heel. Chapter VII of the ] allows for "action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Boutros-Ghali believed the time had come for employing this clause and moving on from peacekeeping.<ref>United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/29 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, page 6.</ref> Significantly, this invocation of Chapter VII waived the need for consent on the part of the state of Somalia; effectively the first time the UN Secretariat had endorsed such an act.

	f
	However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such action would be difficult to apply under the mandate for UNOSOM. Moreover, he realised that solving Somalia’s problems would require such a large deployment that the UN Secretariat did not have the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended that a large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states but authorised by the Security Council to carry out operations in Somalia. The goal of this deployment was “to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building”.<ref name=UNDP/>		However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such action would be difficult to apply under the mandate for UNOSOM. Moreover, he realised that solving Somalia’s problems would require such a large deployment that the UN Secretariat did not have the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended that a large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states but authorised by the Security Council to carry out operations in Somalia. The goal of this deployment was “to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building”.<ref name=UNDP/>

Line 47:		Line 49:

	==U.S. involvement==		==U.S. involvement==
			] (left) visiting ] to witness first hand the efforts of Task Force Somalia that was in direct support of Operation Restore Hope.]]
	] soldier during a raid in Mogadishu]]
	Prior to Resolution 794, the ] had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment".<ref></ref> Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992, and they welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia.<ref>Security Council Resolution 794</ref> President ] responded to this by initiating ] on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794.<ref>Bush, George H., Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, 4/12/92</ref>		Prior to Resolution 794, the ] had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment".<ref></ref> Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992, and they welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia.<ref>Security Council Resolution 794</ref> President ] responded to this by initiating ] on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794.<ref>Bush, George H., Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, 4/12/92</ref>
	CIA Paramilitary Officer Larry Freedman from their ] was the first casualty of the ]. He had been inserted prior to the US invasion on a special reconnaissance mission. Freedman was a former Army ] operator and Special Forces soldier and had served in every conflict that America was involved in both officially and unofficially since Vietnam. Freedman was awarded the ] for ''extraordinary heroism''. <ref>http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lnfreedman.htm</ref>		CIA Paramilitary Officer Larry Freedman from their ] was the first casualty of the conflict in Somalia. He had been inserted prior to the US invasion on a special reconnaissance mission. Freedman was a former Army ] operator and Special Forces soldier and had served in every conflict that America was involved in both officially and unofficially since Vietnam. Freedman was awarded the ] for ''extraordinary heroism''. <ref>http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lnfreedman.htm</ref>

	The first elements of UNITAF landed on the beaches of Somalia amid a media circus on 9 December 1992.		The first elements of UNITAF landed on the beaches of Somalia amid a media circus on 9 December 1992.

	==Composition of UNITAF==		==Composition of UNITAF==
	] soldiers north of Mogadishu]]
	The vast bulk of UNITAF's total personnel strength was provided by the United States (Some 25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel). Other countries that contributed to UNITAF were ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], the ] and ].<ref name=THE-FINAL-CALL />		The vast bulk of UNITAF's total personnel strength was provided by the United States (Some 25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel). Other countries that contributed to UNITAF were ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], the ] and ].<ref name=THE-FINAL-CALL />

Line 60:		Line 61:

	==Operation==		==Operation==
	The operation began in the early hours of 8 December 1992, when elements of the 8th ] Battalion (Airborne) attached to the ] (MEU) conducted leaflet drops over the capital city of ]. Early on December 9, the MEU performed an ] into the city of Mogadishu.		The operation began in the early hours of December 8, 1992, when elements of the 8th ] Battalion (Airborne) attached to the ] (MEU) conducted leaflet drops over the capital city of ]. Early on December 9, the MEU performed an ] into the city of Mogadishu.

	The MEUSOC's ], ] (2/9), performed simultaneous raids on the Port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu International Airport, establishing a foothold for additional incoming troops. Echo and Golf Company assaulted the airport by ] and ], while Fox Company secured the port with an economy of force rubber boat raid. The 1st Marine Division's Air Contingency Battalion (ACB), ], arrived soon after the airport was secured. Elements of BLT 2/9 and 1/7 went on to secure the airport in ], the port city of ], and the city of Bardera. Air support was provided by the combined helicopter units of ] and ].		The MEUSOC's ], ] (2/9), performed simultaneous raids on the Port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu International Airport, establishing a foothold for additional incoming troops. Echo and Golf Company assaulted the airport by ] and ], while Fox Company secured the port with an economy of force rubber boat raid. The 1st Marine Division's Air Contingency Battalion (ACB), ], arrived soon after the airport was secured. Elements of BLT 2/9 and 1/7 went on to secure the airport in ], the port city of ], and the city of Bardera. Air support was provided by the combined helicopter units of ] and ].

	Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the ] and it resulted in the ] signed on 27 March 1993.{{Fact\|date=April 2008}} The conference, however had little result as the civil war continued afterwards.		Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the ] and it resulted in the ] signed on March 27, 1993.{{Fact\|date=April 2008}} The conference, however had little result as the civil war continued afterwards.

	==Results==		==Results==
			] soldiers onboard an ] (APC) on hand for the dedication of a well, which was part of the relief effort.]]
	] Fiat 6614 escorting a UN convoy]]
	As UNITAF's mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid, the operation was regarded as a success.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm \| title = Operation Restore Hope \| accessdate = 2007 - 12 - 02 }}</ref>		As UNITAF's mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid, the operation was regarded as a success.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm \| title = Operation Restore Hope \| accessdate = 2007 - 12 - 02 }}</ref>

Line 74:		Line 75:
	One day prior to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the ] passed ], which marked the transfer of power from UNITAF to ], a United Nations led force. The major change in policy that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II entailed is that the new mandate included the responsibility of ] on the multinational force.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2mandate.html \| title = United Nations Operation in Somalia 2 \| accessdate = 2007 - 12 - 02 }}</ref>		One day prior to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the ] passed ], which marked the transfer of power from UNITAF to ], a United Nations led force. The major change in policy that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II entailed is that the new mandate included the responsibility of ] on the multinational force.<ref>{{cite web \| url = http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2mandate.html \| title = United Nations Operation in Somalia 2 \| accessdate = 2007 - 12 - 02 }}</ref>

	On 3 May 1993, UNOSOM II officially assumed command, and on 4 May 1993 it assumed responsibility for the operations.		On May 3, 1993, UNOSOM II officially assumed command, and on May 4, 1993 it assumed responsibility for the operations.

	Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.		Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

	==The transition of UNITAF==		==The transition of UNITAF==

	]
	UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body. Once a secure environment had been restored, the suspended UNOSOM mission would be revived, albeit in a much more robust form. On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established and there was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.<ref> UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I, UN Dept of Peacekeeping</ref>		UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body. Once a secure environment had been restored, the suspended UNOSOM mission would be revived, albeit in a much more robust form. On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established and there was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.<ref> UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I, UN Dept of Peacekeeping</ref>

Line 110:		Line 111:

	== For Further Reading ==		== For Further Reading ==
	“Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operations Restore ~~Hope.”~~		“Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operations Restore Hope”
	Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos.		Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos
	''Armed Forces & Society'', Jul 1995; vol. 21: pp. 615-637.		Armed Forces & Society, Jul 1995; vol. 21: pp. 615-637
	http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/21/4/615		http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/21/4/615

Revision as of 16:59, 24 July 2009

Template:FixBunching

War in Somalia

Part of the Somali Civil War

Date	December 9, 1992 - May 4, 1993
Location	Somalia
Result	Multinational success (see Results)

Belligerents

United Nations

Various Somali factions

Commanders and leaders

George H. W. Bush

Bill Clinton

Boutros Boutros Ghali

Mohamed Farrah Aidid

Casualties and losses

n/a
US: 43 killed, 153 wounded
Australia: 1 killed, 3 wounded

n/a

Template:FixBunching

Somali Civil War

v t e Somali Rebellion
Somaliland War of Independence Isaaq genocide Mogadishu riots of July 1989 Eastern Exit

v t e United Nations Intervention in Somalia (1992–1995)
UNOSOM I Provide Relief UNITAF / Restore Hope Deliverance Somalia affair UNOSOM II Pakistani Peacekeepers UN killings of protestors Abdi House raid Checkpoint Pasta Gothic Serpent Black Hawk Down United Shield

Consolidation Period (1995-2006)

v t e Rise of the Islamic Courts Union
Mogadishu Baidoa

War in Somalia (2006–2009)

Timeline

Battles

Somali civil war
(2009–present)

Timeline

Operations and battles

2009
- S Mogadishu
- Mogadishu
- C Somalia
- Wabho
- Kismayo
2010
2011
- Lower Juba
- Gedo
- Elwaq
- Linda Nchi
- Deynile
- Beledweyne
2012
- Yurkud
- Kismayo
2013
- Bulo Marer
2014
- Operation Indian Ocean
- Galgala
2015
- Baure
- Leego
- Janale
2016
- El Adde
- Qandala
2017
- Kulbiyow
- Barii
- Af Urur
- Golweyn
- November 2017
2018
- Bulo Marer
- Gandarshe
2020
- Camp Simba
- Shabeelow
2021
2022
- Ethiopia
- Bal'ad
- Runirgod
2023
2024

Major attacks

Template:FixBunching

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a United States led, United Nations sanctioned multinational force which operated in Somalia from 5 December 1992 to May 4, 1993. A United States initiative (code-named "Operation Restore Hope"), UNITAF was charged with carrying out United Nations Security Council Resolution 794: to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of Somalia.

UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and is regarded as a success.

Background

Faced with a humanitarian disaster in Somalia, exacerbated by a complete breakdown in civil order, the United Nations had created the UNOSOM I mission in April 1992. However, the complete intransigence of the local warlords operating in Somalia and their rivalries with each other meant that UNOSOM I could not be performed. The mission never reached its mandated strength.

Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to worsen. Factions were splintering into smaller factions, and then splintered again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, looting and extortion. Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty-stricken refugees were starving to death every day.

By November, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peacekeepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.

In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented several options to the Security Council. Diplomatic avenues having proved largely fruitless, he recommended that a significant show of force was required to bring the armed groups to heel. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows for "action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Boutros-Ghali believed the time had come for employing this clause and moving on from peacekeeping. Significantly, this invocation of Chapter VII waived the need for consent on the part of the state of Somalia; effectively the first time the UN Secretariat had endorsed such an act.

However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such action would be difficult to apply under the mandate for UNOSOM. Moreover, he realised that solving Somalia’s problems would require such a large deployment that the UN Secretariat did not have the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended that a large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states but authorised by the Security Council to carry out operations in Somalia. The goal of this deployment was “to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building”.

Following this recommendation, on 3 December 1992 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794, authorising the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The Security Council urged the Secretary-General and member states to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved.

U.S. involvement

Prior to Resolution 794, the United States had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment". Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992, and they welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia. President George H. W. Bush responded to this by initiating Operation Restore Hope on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794. CIA Paramilitary Officer Larry Freedman from their Special Activities Division was the first casualty of the conflict in Somalia. He had been inserted prior to the US invasion on a special reconnaissance mission. Freedman was a former Army Delta Force operator and Special Forces soldier and had served in every conflict that America was involved in both officially and unofficially since Vietnam. Freedman was awarded the Intelligence Star for extraordinary heroism.

The first elements of UNITAF landed on the beaches of Somalia amid a media circus on 9 December 1992.

Composition of UNITAF

The vast bulk of UNITAF's total personnel strength was provided by the United States (Some 25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel). Other countries that contributed to UNITAF were Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

The national contingents were co-ordinated and overseen by U.S. Central Command, however, the relationship between CentCom and the contributing nations varied. There were a few diplomatic and command confrontations over the methods and mandates employed by some contingents. For example, the Italian contingent was accused of bribing local militias to maintain peace, whilst the French Foreign Legion troops were accused of over-vigorous use of force in disarming militiamen.

Operation

The operation began in the early hours of December 8, 1992, when elements of the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted leaflet drops over the capital city of Mogadishu. Early on December 9, the MEU performed an amphibious assault into the city of Mogadishu.

The MEUSOC's ground combat element, 2nd Battalion 9th Marines (2/9), performed simultaneous raids on the Port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu International Airport, establishing a foothold for additional incoming troops. Echo and Golf Company assaulted the airport by helicopter and Amphibious Assault Vehicles, while Fox Company secured the port with an economy of force rubber boat raid. The 1st Marine Division's Air Contingency Battalion (ACB), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, arrived soon after the airport was secured. Elements of BLT 2/9 and 1/7 went on to secure the airport in Baidoa, the port city of Kismayo, and the city of Bardera. Air support was provided by the combined helicopter units of HMLA-267 and HMM-164.

Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia and it resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement signed on March 27, 1993. The conference, however had little result as the civil war continued afterwards.

Results

As UNITAF's mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid, the operation was regarded as a success.

United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali determined that the presence of UNITAF troops had a "positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance."

One day prior to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the United Nations Security Council passed United Nations Resolution 814, which marked the transfer of power from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, a United Nations led force. The major change in policy that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II entailed is that the new mandate included the responsibility of nation-building on the multinational force.

On May 3, 1993, UNOSOM II officially assumed command, and on May 4, 1993 it assumed responsibility for the operations.

Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

The transition of UNITAF

UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body. Once a secure environment had been restored, the suspended UNOSOM mission would be revived, albeit in a much more robust form. On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established and there was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.

The Secretary-General concluded therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State.

UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in Resolution 837 on 26 March 1993 and formally took over operations in Somalia when UNITAF was dissolved on 4 May 1993.

Notes

Canada: 1 killed "United Nations Operation in Somalia UNSOM 1992". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 2009-05-31. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^ United Nations Operation In Somalia I - (Unosom I)
"Operation Restore Hope". Retrieved 2008 - 01 - 15. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
^ UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I, UN Dept of Peacekeeping
United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.
United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/29 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, page 6.
United Nations, Security Council Council resolution 794 (1992), 24/4/92, para. 3
Security Council resolutions - 1992
Security Council Resolution 794
Bush, George H., Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, 4/12/92
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lnfreedman.htm
Patman, R.G., 2001, ‘Beyond ‘the Mogadishu Line’: Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol, 12, No. 1, p. 69
"Operation Restore Hope". Retrieved 2007 - 12 - 02. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
"United Nations Operation in Somalia I". Retrieved 2007 - 12 - 02. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
"United Nations Operation in Somalia 2". Retrieved 2007 - 12 - 02. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I, UN Dept of Peacekeeping

External links

v t e Armed conflicts involving the Armed Forces of the United States
Listed chronologically
Domestic	Shays' Rebellion Whiskey Rebellion Fries's Rebellion 1811 German Coast uprising Turner's Rebellion Mormon War Dorr Rebellion Bleeding Kansas Utah War Harpers Ferry raid American Civil War New York City draft riots American Indian Wars Brooks–Baxter War Battle of Liberty Place Range War Hamburg riot Lincoln County War Johnson County War Coal Creek War Homestead strike Pullman Strike Colorado Coalfield War Red Summer Battle of Blair Mountain Tulsa riot Bonus Army Puerto Rican revolts Ole Miss riot of 1962 1960s ghetto rebellions 1969 Greensboro uprising Kent State shootings 1992 Los Angeles riots 2020 racial unrest 2021 U.S. Capitol attack
Foreign	American Revolutionary War American–Algerian War (1785–1795) Quasi-War First Barbary War War of 1812 Second Barbary War First Sumatran expedition Second Sumatran expedition Ivory Coast expedition Mexican–American War First Fiji expedition Second Opium War Second Fiji expedition Formosa Expedition Korean Expedition Spanish–American War Philippine–American War Boxer Rebellion Banana Wars Border War World War I Russian Civil War World War II Korean War Bay of Pigs Invasion Vietnam War Dominican Civil War Invasion of Grenada Lebanese Civil War Invasion of Panama Gulf War Somali Civil War Intervention in Haiti Bosnian War Kosovo War War in Afghanistan Iraq War War in North-West Pakistan First Libyan Civil War War against the Islamic State Iraq Syria Cameroon Libya Yemeni civil war
Related	Conflicts in the U.S. Wars involving the U.S. Timeline of U.S. military operations Length of U.S. participation in major wars Territorial evolution Military history History of the Central Intelligence Agency Casualties of war Peace movement List of anti-war organizations Conscientious objector Cold War War on terror War crimes

For Further Reading

“Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operations Restore Hope” Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos Armed Forces & Society, Jul 1995; vol. 21: pp. 615-637 http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/21/4/615

Categories: