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Hojatoleslam Muqtada al-Sadr (given name also spelled as Moqtada) (b. 1974?) is a young militant Iraqi Shi'a cleric, the son of the famous Shi'a cleric Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr. He is the de facto ruler of the Sadr City section of Baghdad and commands the loyalty of the al-Mahdi Army.

Family History

The elder al-Sadr, a well-respected figure throughout the Shi'a world, was murdered with two of his sons by the government of Saddam Hussein in February 1999 in Najaf, the power-center of the al-Sadr clan. An uncle was killed by the same regime in 1980.

As Muqtada al-Sadr lacks the religious education and degrees required by Shia doctrines, he does not claim the title of mujtahid (the equivalent of a senior religious scholar) or the authority to issue fatwas (religious edicts), consequently he bases his religious authority on his lineage alone.

Positions

Muqtada al-Sadr gained popularity among younger Iraqis following the toppling of the Hussein government by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, mostly owing to his status as his father's son, for he has no formal religious standing to interpret the Koran and relies for religious advice on an Iranian cleric exiled in Iraq, Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri. The al-Sadr faction are opposed by the al-Hakim family and their supporters.

Al-Sadr, a junior cleric, is believed to be building a messianic movement. . It is common belief that al-Sadr wishes to create an Islamic theocracy in Iraq, although al-Sadr himself has stated that he wishes to create an "Islamic democracy". In April of 2004 he initiated a revolt against the coalition of forces occupying Iraq, resulting in the issue of a warrant for his arrest.

Relation with Shi'i and Clerics

Al-Sadr commands strong support (especially in the Sadr City ghetto in Baghdad, formerly called Saddam City but renamed after his father). In June 2003 raised a militia (dubbed the "al-Mahdi Army") estimated to number several thousand. The name of the militia refers to the Mahdi, an imam who is said by Muslims to be due to appear in messianic form during the last days of the world. This militia has several times engaged in violent conflict with Coalition forces and has formed its own religious courts and prisons.

His relationship with other Shi'a clerics is tense and occasionally (allegedly) violent. He is rumored to be responsible for the assassination of Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei and several other prominent attacks, including the car bombing assassination of rival Shi'a leader Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim.

His dispute with al-Khoei originated when he demanded the keys to the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. The mosque contains the tomb of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and, according to Shi'a belief, heir to the Prophet's legacy. It is perhaps the most sacred Shi'a site, and also the source of a considerable amount of revenue. Al-Khoei refused to deal with al-Sadr, and instead escorted the custodian of the shrine, an extremely unpopular Baath loyalist named Haidar Raifee, from hiding back to his post at the mosque. According to witnesses, there they were confronted by an angry mob, who said they were there on orders of al-Sadr (and that he had instructed them not to kill within the mosque). The mob killed Raifee with bayonets and knives; al-Khoei was chased down and killed in an alley near the nearby headquarters of al-Sadr. Al-Sadr claims the murderers were not his followers and that he in fact sent men to save al-Khoei from the murderers, but he seemed unconcerned over the death. al-Kohei's close followers did not blame al-Sadr for the murder, but instead publicly blamed former Baath party members who also hated al-Khoei.

Relations with the most powerful cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, have also been tense. Al-Sistani's more conservative (but better respected) clerical leadership is often in conflict with the radical young al-Sadr. Additionally the murder of al-Khoei, the son of al-Sistani's mentor, may be a source of tension. The conflict is more about temporal than spiritual matters; al-Sistani controls donations from pilgrims and wealthy donors, which al-Sadr also apparently covets. His followers attempted to seize control of the al-Sistani-controlled holy sites in Karbala in October 2003 but were repulsed, with dozens of people killed and injured. Armed clashes between al-Sadr's al-Mahdi Army and al-Sistani's Badr Army have broken out with significant bloodshed resulting. However, Sistani has thusfar refused to publicly chastize Sadr for the spring uprising against the occupation, instead decreeing that both sides should avoid incitement to violence and condemning the coalition for its tactics.

See the 2003 Invasion of Iraq for more details about the spring, 2004 uprisings.

Opposition to the CPA

In the initial phases of the occupation, al-Sadr was vocally opposed to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) occupation and stated that he had more legitimacy than the Coalition-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). In September 2003, he declared a shadow government in opposition to the internationally recognized IGC currently governing Iraq. This initiative petered out, as it was opposed by both the CPA and al-Sistani's faction. There were several instances of skirmishes between his followers and the occupying forces in the Sadr City ghetto.

The CPA has on several occassions threatened to arrest al-Sadr, and in early April of 2004 announced a warrant for his arrest (see below).

Al-Hawza and Rebellion

At the end of March 2004, Coalition authorities in Iraq, shut down Sadr's newspaper, Al Hawza, on charges of inciting violence (as a side note, al-Hawza is also the name of a religious college in Najaf which was headed by his father). The Coalition authorities said false reporting, including articles that ascribed suicide bombings to Americans, could touch off violence.

Sadr responded by mobilizing many Shi'i followers to demonstrations protesting the closure of the newspaper; the demonstrations escalated throughout the week in number and militancy. On April 4 fighting broke out in Najaf, Sadr City and Basra. Sadr's al-Mahdi Army took over several points and attacked coalition soldiers, killing dozens and taking many casualties of its own in the process.

The US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer declared on April 5, 2004 that the militant cleric was an outlaw and that uprisings by the cleric and his followers would not tolerated. It emerged that some months earlier an Iraqi judge had issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr on charges relating to the murder of al-Khoei; this had apparently been kept secret for some time but was now announced publicly by Bremer. Several senior US politicans opined that the revolt could push back the date for the transfer of power to the IGC, set for June 30 of 2004.

Quotations

• "There is no use for demonstrations, as your enemy loves to terrify and suppress opinions, and despises peoples."
• "I ask you not to resort to demonstrations because they have become a losing card and we should seek other ways, terrorize your enemy, as we cannot remain silent over its violations."
• "Americans use sick soldiers to spread disease inside the Iraqi society."
• "he departure of Saddam was supposed to be followed by freedom and democracy. It is not desirable that a small devil will go to be followed by a larger devil. The mistake is not the departure of Saddam but what came after him in terms of despotism and terrorism."

See also

• U.S.-led occupation of Iraq
• Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr

External links

• Global Security analysis and biography
• Shadid, Anthony, "Militia unchallenged in raid on Gypsy village". The Washington Post, April 5, 2004.