Misplaced Pages

Talk:USB flash drive security: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 01:44, 29 September 2009 editSeanwong (talk | contribs)111 edits Added Accuracy← Previous edit Revision as of 08:16, 29 September 2009 edit undoNuwewsco (talk | contribs)1,265 edits AccuracyNext edit →
Line 12: Line 12:
The current article I see some assertions that are not referenced. I suggest a rolling list below The current article I see some assertions that are not referenced. I suggest a rolling list below



Check List
# Hardware v Software Encryption # Hardware v Software Encryption
The article claims that Hardware encryption has been "functionally" replaced by strong software encryption. I suggest that the author is using too low a bar for this judgement. Hardware and Software encryption may be equivalent from a cryptographic standpoint but from a "functional" or practical view hardware offers a device centric protection independent of the Operating or file system. The article claims that Hardware encryption has been "functionally" replaced by strong software encryption. I suggest that the author is using too low a bar for this judgement. Hardware and Software encryption may be equivalent from a cryptographic standpoint but from a "functional" or practical view hardware offers a device centric protection independent of the Operating or file system.
Line 20: Line 18:


:That's not true; the article doesn't mention any kind of "replacement" - it objectivly puts forward the two options: software and hardware.
:: Cold Boot Attack

Cold Boot Attack

Very recent research by a team at the highly respected Princeton1 University points to how a little known characteristic of DRAM memory can serve as a window of opportunity for a cold boot attack.
DRAM memory is used to store data while the system is running. After power is removed, all content is deleted in a gradual process that can take anywhere between a few seconds and up to a few minutes. If the chip is cooled by artificial means, the content can be retained for as long as 10 minutes.
This characteristic of DRAM memory enables a hacker to read the memory content by cutting power and then performing a cold boot with a malicious operating system. This is deadly for disk encryption products that rely on software means to store encryption keys. An attacker can cut power to the computer, then power it back up and boot a malicious operating system that copies the memory content. The attacker can then search through the captured memory content, find the master decryption keys and use them to start decrypting hard disk contents. To retain the content for a longer interval, the hacker can simply chill the DRAM chip before cutting power.
A hardware-based encryption system is not vulnerable to a cold boot attack since it does not use the host RAM to store the keys.


:This is pure FUD to promote hardware systems - if you check the facts, "cold boot" attacks require the relevant keys to be in-memory at the time the PC is switched off, and for someone to power it back on ''very'' shortly afterwards. The reality is that if the keyd are in memory, the drive is mounted, and someone can just read data straight off it anyway/ See the for more details.
:: Very recent research by a team at the highly respected Princeton1 University points to how a little known characteristic of DRAM memory can serve as a window of opportunity for a cold boot attack.
:Technically, it's true however, so I've added a bit to this effect. ] (]) 08:16, 29 September 2009 (UTC)
:: DRAM memory is used to store data while the system is running. After power is removed, all content is deleted in a gradual process that can take anywhere between a few seconds and up to a few minutes. If the chip is cooled by artificial means, the content can be retained for as long as 10 minutes.
:: This characteristic of DRAM memory enables a hacker to read the memory content by cutting power and then performing a cold boot with a malicious operating system. This is deadly for disk encryption products that rely on software means to store encryption keys. An attacker can cut power to the computer, then power it back up and boot a malicious operating system that copies the memory content. The attacker can then search through the captured memory content, find the master decryption keys and use them to start decrypting hard disk contents. To retain the content for a longer interval, the hacker can simply chill the DRAM chip before cutting power.
:: A hardware-based encryption system is not vulnerable to a cold boot attack since it does not use the host RAM to store the keys.

Revision as of 08:16, 29 September 2009

Articles for deletionThis article was nominated for deletion on 23 February 2009 (UTC). The result of the discussion was keep.
WikiProject iconComputing Start‑class Low‑importance
WikiProject iconThis article is within the scope of WikiProject Computing, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of computers, computing, and information technology on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.ComputingWikipedia:WikiProject ComputingTemplate:WikiProject ComputingComputing
StartThis article has been rated as Start-class on Misplaced Pages's content assessment scale.
LowThis article has been rated as Low-importance on the project's importance scale.
Taskforce icon
This article is supported by Computer hardware task force.

Cleanup

I placed a similar comment on User Talk:Techdoctor as well. Secure USB flash drives seem to be an interesting topic. However, as someone else already remarked, it reads like an essay or magazine article where the author tries to provide arguments to convince the reader. Maybe these arguments are from publications. There are a number of references, but it is not clear which reference makes what argument, and which arguments are your own opinion. The easiest way to deal with it is to use something like

  <ref></ref>

directly after each statement, and

  {{reflist}}

at the end of the article. Moreover, the article should start with a short definition of what a secure USB drive is, rather than with an argument, and this short definition can be worked out later in the article. - Han-Kwang (t) 08:09, 25 September 2008 (UTC)

Accuracy

The current article I see some assertions that are not referenced. I suggest a rolling list below

  1. Hardware v Software Encryption

The article claims that Hardware encryption has been "functionally" replaced by strong software encryption. I suggest that the author is using too low a bar for this judgement. Hardware and Software encryption may be equivalent from a cryptographic standpoint but from a "functional" or practical view hardware offers a device centric protection independent of the Operating or file system. here's an example where a software based solution would fail the text below comes from a SANdisk whitepaper I'm not putting this paper forward as first source as it is itself unreferenced but it indicates the issue.

That's not true; the article doesn't mention any kind of "replacement" - it objectivly puts forward the two options: software and hardware.

Cold Boot Attack

Very recent research by a team at the highly respected Princeton1 University points to how a little known characteristic of DRAM memory can serve as a window of opportunity for a cold boot attack. DRAM memory is used to store data while the system is running. After power is removed, all content is deleted in a gradual process that can take anywhere between a few seconds and up to a few minutes. If the chip is cooled by artificial means, the content can be retained for as long as 10 minutes. This characteristic of DRAM memory enables a hacker to read the memory content by cutting power and then performing a cold boot with a malicious operating system. This is deadly for disk encryption products that rely on software means to store encryption keys. An attacker can cut power to the computer, then power it back up and boot a malicious operating system that copies the memory content. The attacker can then search through the captured memory content, find the master decryption keys and use them to start decrypting hard disk contents. To retain the content for a longer interval, the hacker can simply chill the DRAM chip before cutting power. A hardware-based encryption system is not vulnerable to a cold boot attack since it does not use the host RAM to store the keys.

This is pure FUD to promote hardware systems - if you check the facts, "cold boot" attacks require the relevant keys to be in-memory at the time the PC is switched off, and for someone to power it back on very shortly afterwards. The reality is that if the keyd are in memory, the drive is mounted, and someone can just read data straight off it anyway/ See the FreeOTFE FAQ for more details.
Technically, it's true however, so I've added a bit to this effect. Nuwewsco (talk) 08:16, 29 September 2009 (UTC)
Categories: