| Revision as of 05:31, 22 March 2002 edit24.150.61.63 (talk)No edit summary← Previous edit | Revision as of 07:00, 23 March 2002 edit undo213.253.40.49 (talk) removed sentence to talkNext edit → | ||
| Line 4: | Line 4: | ||
| Unlike ] precautions, ] tends to be active; | Unlike ] precautions, ] tends to be active; | ||
| Countermeasures include monitoring statistics for patterns which suggest emerging epidemics; ensuring sufficient stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines or other medicines required to contain an outbreak; public health education and alertness; widespread use of sophisticated pathogen detectors. |
Countermeasures include monitoring statistics for patterns which suggest emerging epidemics; ensuring sufficient stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines or other medicines required to contain an outbreak; public health education and alertness; widespread use of sophisticated pathogen detectors. | ||
| Other preventative measures are unlikely to be effective or acceptable to the general population in peacetime. There could be general vaccination against biowarfare agents, but the public is unlikely to accept potentially harmful vaccines for such agents, which tend to be extinct or very rare in the wild. States do not currently routinely vaccinate against likely biowarfare agents. | Other preventative measures are unlikely to be effective or acceptable to the general population in peacetime. There could be general vaccination against biowarfare agents, but the public is unlikely to accept potentially harmful vaccines for such agents, which tend to be extinct or very rare in the wild. States do not currently routinely vaccinate against likely biowarfare agents. | ||
Revision as of 07:00, 23 March 2002
Biosecurity refers to any guarantee that persons maintain their personal health, habitable shelter and productive local agriculture even under active threat of biological warfare or epidemic disease.
Nation-states attempt to assure this by biodefense measures, and more sustainably by safe trade rules for biosafety, e.g. the Biosafety Protocol. These minimize exposure to alien organisms via trade or warfare. However, public vigilance and awareness of threats seems to be required, as there is no evidence that the threat is decreasing in any way. Most defense and medical agencies acknowledge that it is growing with the ever-larger number of individuals with knowledge of biological warfare.
Unlike biosafety precautions, biosecurity procotol tends to be active; Countermeasures include monitoring statistics for patterns which suggest emerging epidemics; ensuring sufficient stockpiles of the appropriate vaccines or other medicines required to contain an outbreak; public health education and alertness; widespread use of sophisticated pathogen detectors.
Other preventative measures are unlikely to be effective or acceptable to the general population in peacetime. There could be general vaccination against biowarfare agents, but the public is unlikely to accept potentially harmful vaccines for such agents, which tend to be extinct or very rare in the wild. States do not currently routinely vaccinate against likely biowarfare agents.
Gathering intelligence could theoretically prevent most attacks. However, in the case of an agent like smallpox, an attack could consist of a single individual with no apparent symptoms simply entering the country and walking around in population centers.