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Revision as of 22:41, 23 January 2006

The subject of this article is controversial and content may be in dispute. When updating the article, be bold, but not reckless. Feel free to try to improve the article, but don't take it personally if your changes are reversed; instead, come here to the talk page to discuss them. Content must be written from a neutral point of view. Include citations when adding content and consider tagging or removing unsourced information.

It is suggested that new readers of this "talk page" read the archived discussion below. It is likely that an issue of concern has already been discussed. As a result, a would-be poster can save the Wikipedian community time and effort spent on otherwise rehashing an issue if this responsbility is undertaken. Please remember that this isn't the place to vent our spleens in condemnation or gush praise for Falungong itself as much as it is to comment on the actual article content. We don't want a puff piece for Falungong or Li Hongzhi, neither do we want to demonise them. If we have an objectively neutral, factual article one hopes the truth will speak for itself, however we may subjectively perceive it. Archived discussion:

• /archive1, 1 April 2003 - 29 May 2005
• /Archive2, 29 May 2005 to 30 July 2005
• /Archive3, 31 July 2005 to 20 January 2006

Money and Government

I realize this is a controversial topic, so before anything I would like to suggest that I don't get dismissed as a staunch CPC propagandist, or anything of that sort. I am somewhat surprised at how much the article covers, but think certain sections definitely need improvement. I lived in China during the time of the crackdown, I've read the article and I've found a few things not being mentioned. For one, it is mentioned in Falun Dafa, the book, that society has a "Falun", just like the body, and increasing instability (and things to the like) contribute to the abnormal function of such a societal Falun, and thus needs "purification". Thus we need to answer the question of whether this is enough to support that Li Hongzhi himself had certain political ambitions, not taking in account what the average Falun Gong practictioner thinks about politics.

Second, I thought it was interesting that Falun Gong's spread in China was described in a few sentences, and somehow Falun Gong ended up with 70 million practitioners by 1999. While not dismissing Falun Gong as any kind of evil cult, my personal experience suggested to me that it was not as pure as it claimed, either. In China, I was approached in 1998, while taking a morning jog, by several people in a park, who led me to a Falun Gong stand nearby with a big banner and a bunch of printed material. The guy asked me to buy the book Falun Dafa, and after politely declining he said he'd "lend" it to me at no cost, as long as I came and returned it to them later. I took the book home, and lost interest after reading about Li's numerous Buddha-related abilities, and a few of his principles. When I decided to return the book, the people in the park dissapeared, and to my knowledge never came back.

Many of my friends had similar experiences, and some were forced into purchasing some kind of a practicing carpet (I'm not an expert on Falun Gong, so I don't know what this thing is, it'd help if someone could explain) that's apparently crucial to the spinning of the Falun. Some of these friends then began advertising other Falun Gong related products to me, to all of which, I declined. I later found out that this was basically a money-making scheme for a larger organization, as these people worked for higher authorities. In the Falun Gong video tape that was circulating at the time, I watched a part where Li claimed he was the re-incarnation of the Buddha, following which was a lengthy 60-minute presentation when he droned on in monotone about various moral principles, and correct methods of practicing movements.

I guess my personal stories aside, what I'm trying to get at is that the spread of Falun Gong on Mainland China was done in a fairly forced and unconventional manner, especially after 1997, and much focus was shifted from the original spiritual content to economic oppurtunity (similar to Chuanxiao). Furthermore, although CPC propaganda vilifies Falun Gong as an evil cult in black and white, it would not be unfair to say that Falun Gong had political intentions. Li Hongzhi, the leader, shifting positions to fit whatever situation suited him best, cannot be fairly seen as a legitimate religious (or even spiritual) leader, but rather unfairly used the combination of China's poor human rights record, and the sympathy of the west at the time to continue spreading his word. I wish to make some changes into the article, but to my ability right now I cannot decide on which ones will be the most appropriate. Please reply,

Colipon+(T) 20:28, 20 January 2006 (UTC)

While not having much personal experience with Falun Gong, I know it was one of several "Gong" (i.e. spiritual exercises) which were all the rage in China in the early 90's. Each of them had this "master" who usually claimed to have some kind of special abilities - Li Hongzhi's miracle healing etc. Another one that was quite influential in some parts was Xiang Gong, literrally fragrant exercise, which claimed to make you smell very nice after doing their exercises, and cure cancer etc.

The government started disapproving of these things only after they realised the demonstrated organisational abilities of these groups, most famously (or notoriously) Falun Gong's protest surrounding the Zhongnan Hai compound in Beijing.

The way I see it, it's one man's opportunistic money making scheme hijacked by people with political motives.

--Sumple

I might write a longer comment when I have time, but first of all, I'd like to correct some misunderstandings.

There is nothing about a "societal Falun" anywhere in Falun Dafa's books. Period. You can read through all of the lectures (excluding the politically motivated fabrications that are also passed around), and I'll mail you a banana if you really find anything like that. And there are no special carpets related to spinning of any Falun; I really don't know what kind of people you've encountered, but obviously they've been trying to rip someone off.

Second, I've never seen people who are more reluctant to accept money or donations than Falun Gong practitioners. True, some may sell videos or books for a few bucks. So? All the material is free anyway, and anybody can download it from their webpages.

Third, it doesn't matter what the practitioners believe. Maybe they're wrong, maybe they're right. It's not really up to them or any government to decide. What we're talking about here is a brutal persecution that violates international treaties and China's constitution. Be it allegations of political instability, anti-communism, or whatever - nothing can justify what's happening in China's labor camps. The practitioners have a fundamental right to believe in what they want, and the fact is, many of them indeed have good experiences of Falun Gong's effect on themselves, so why shouldn't they investigate the practice further, especially when they don't have to pay anybody for doing that?

Fourth, I'm not saying that conspiracies don't exist in the world. But it's also a tendency of the human mind to see them where there aren't any. In addition, the Falun Gong issue is a question of epistemological power. Who has the right to define what is true and what is false or "superstitious"? For instance, I'm not asking you to believe that Buddhas and Daos actually exist, or that man can cultivate into a higher being through xiulian, and so on, but is it up to a government to stop people from exploring whatever they deem worthy, be it "superstitions" or "pseudo-science" or whatever? Is there a transcendent world or not? Who can deny that man is fundamentally a homo religiosus, and everybody assumes a metaphysical relation to the world, regardless of whether they are aware of its axioms or not? ---Olaf Stephanos 01:06, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

Alright. Let's clear up a few obvious misunderstandings first. I had never called Falun Gong a conspiracy, nor have I stated it is "false" or "superstitious". Let me tell you that I am not big into philosophy, but your contention about epistomological power unfairly categorized the issue as deeply philosophical and religious. I.e. you've missed my point. The Falun Gong, mind you, is a complicated issue that reflects more on Chinese sociological situations at the time than the philosophical nature of a person's belief system. Its economic intentions, although still subject to debate, are realistic. My friend, it is a shame that you can only hear and see the stories from a western perspective, allowing your emphathetic mind to assume that the Falun Gong is simply another case of the CCP's horrendous persecution on specific groups.

China doesn't have the best human rights record, this part I will not contend further. However, it is imporant to realize that while a lot of the CCP's media information regarding Falun Gong has been unmistakably biased, some of it has validity. There are a few basic reasons that I reached this conclusion. You have to realize the 80's and early 90's was a time when the Mainland Chinese population began exploring new economic solutions in a new market-oriented economy. Many services and other perviously unconventional money-making methods became commonplace. This period marked an important social change, as China progressed away from old rigid barriers of Maoist thought. Such a period was harsh to handle for some, who lacked direction in a new capitalist world with little guidance. Many people lost their jobs in SOE's, and had difficulty searching for a new method of income. Some people were simply not ready for the dog-eat-dog society of fierce competition. As such, they were forced to seek for something new to rely on. With less political restrictions, groups involving spiritual and religious beliefs saw the oppurtunity to revive some old Chinese traditions resented during Mao's rule.

That's where Falun Gong comes in. It began as a Qi-Gong related organization, and gained some popular support because many people at the time needed something spiritual to fall back on; for many years previous, this had been the Communist Party. Now people realized the Communist Party is not perfect, is not all-knowing, is not god. Li Hongzhi, quite proficient in economics, and being articulate, saw his rise to become the leader of this group. Later, he separated his Falun Gong from Qi Gong because of organizational issues. Leading his group of followers, Falun Gong's growth in the mainland from 1995 was almost phenomenal, and Li Hongzhi saw the chance for further development. I do not think it is fair to say that he ever had deeply-rooted political ambitions, but think the situation at the time forced him into believing that he could be a political force. After all, he saw that he could unite people. But the power to unite did not come naturally. In order to make his words a high authority, he made various claims about his personal special abilities, and I saw videoclips where he was portrayed in an almost god-like fashion. As far as I know, Li Hongzhi only began to inflate his own image after the growth of Falun Gong, after 1996 (i.e. previously he had never claimed he had special abilities, he just said he was an adept Qi Gong practitioner).

Li Hongzhi's ways could be almost seen as oppurtunistic, both economically and politically, and never let go of possible gain. Long before the government crackdown in 1999, many reputed newspapers, and even Qi Gong practitioners had called Falun Gong a total distortion of Qi Gong, mixed in with many religious and even scientific principles. The books Falun Dafa and Zhuan Falun received many critical reviews. It was written with colloquial and sometimes incorrect grammar, and experts, including those professing the Buddhist and Daoist religions, found many principles to be terribly inconsistent and contradictory. One of the more famous ones appeared on Bright Daily in June 1996, publicly denouncing Falun Gong in an editorial, another appeared on the locally popular TV program Beijing Express, a program of talk-show nature. None of these events were political, or related to the CCP. They acted as a form of criticism, serving no intention to bring down the movement as a whole. Many Falun Gong practitioners, after watching the program, went to the BTV station to protest, forcing the resignation of the show's host. Then, in Tianjin, after another critical piece from a professor published on a Reader's Digest-type magazine, thousands of practitioners basically sat there and practiced Gong for over ten hours in protest.

The organizational potentional of the group gave Li Hongzhi the will to organize further mass-sitting protests. No one doubts today that the Zhongnanhai mass-sitting in 1999 was the direct result of Li Hongzhi's directions. Perhaps he believed that by sending a message to the Communist government, they can reach an agreement on the peaceful future development of Falun Gong. Li never went to Beijing, but a few of his subordinates went and negotiated with Premier Zhu Rongji, head of China's government, who only accepted the negotiations very reluctantly. It was too late to quell Li's ambitions for more demands, directly with the Premier. Although it is only of a speculative nature, but the politburo meeting after was deemed to have deeply divided President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu on an ideological basis. Jiang gave the final word on the crackdown.

So while you're seeing the western view that Falun Gong (or perhaps more so Li Hongzhi) is legitimate with good intentions, then you should probably look again. I agree with you the crackdown was in no way consistent with the Agreements China had signed onto, and are easily classified as human rights abuses. But at the same time, I urge you to realize that Falun Gong had a complicated background that neither the communist government nor the west has a just view on. This is exactly why writing this article is very difficult. I look for your feeback if I should insert some of the paragraphs I typed above into the article.

Colipon+(T) 06:34, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

I think Olaf is being irresponsible when he makes generalisations like "there's nobody who's more reluctant to accept donations" etc. While I don't dispute that some Falun Gong practitioners, perhaps the majority, are simply devout followers of the sect and are being persecuted for their beliefs, it is undeniable that a significant proportion are in it for personal gain, be it immigrant visas, money, or simply power.

--Sumple 22:26, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

To Colipon: I understand the points you are making. I just disagree on certain key questions. I'm reasonably familiar with the sociological analyses on the Falun Gong issue; it's not that Westerners cannot understand the huge political and economical changes that have taken place in China during the last twenty years. My point is, I think that a lot of the analyses are reductionist, and they're simply attempts to explain the unprecedented popularity of Falun Gong by making allegations of the Chinese people's (more or less "irrational") mass behaviour or desperate seek for a replacement ideology. As if the substance in Falun Gong was not the reason why millions of people changed their previous qigong practices into FG, but, instead, the phenomenon was manipulated by a spellbinding charismatic leader who could provide people with answers to their psychological needs. I know, that's the usual explanation, and to a lot of sects and cults it applies quite well. But regarding the Falun Gong issue, I think a lot of people err just because of this prejudice. This is a much, much more complicated matter. Mind you, I acknowledge that you didn't say it's black-and-white.

I'd like to point out that Falun Gong was really considered by many as the best qigong system based on their own empirical experiences. The system was nominated twice as the "star qigong" in Beijing's Asian Health Expo, and the division from Qigong Research Society occurred only after the Society wanted to commercialise Falun Gong in 1995. Think about how much money Mr. Li could've gained if he'd wanted. Now, qigong is not aerobics, it's not like a new Jane Fonda fitness video that gets good ratings just because of a good-looking famous hostess. You cannot invent an exquisite qigong practice just by making up some silly movements, or making people wave their hands this or that way. You probably know that the Chinese state is researching qigong-related matters and these ancient traditions, and we're still on the borders of what is commonly accepted as "reality" in the current Western scientific paradigm. Even the Chinese medicine and Western medicine are still quite far away from each other in their theories of the human body. What if there exist other ways of knowing - of acquiring valid data about the universe - than most of us are familiar with? This is what I mean by epistemological power.

So it could be said that Falun Gong has some validity to it, like maybe it's the most efficient qigong there is - I don't have to take a public stance here - even if you disagree with some of its content, e.g. the claims about divine beings, or man becoming a Buddha through cultivation, or the existence of supernormal powers, or Mr. Li having reached supreme enlightenment himself, or whatnot. But these claims didn't surface in the later stages - many of them were already present in the introductory text when it was published in 1993. At that time there were only a few hundred thousand practitioners in China. The exponential growth really started only after Zhuan Falun was published in 1995. Besides, Falun Gong practitioners come from all social strata. They may be sociology professors like yourself, nuclear physicists (like a friend of mine), or maybe peasants and shoemakers. Why do you think even academic people are doing it? I'd say the phenomenology of Falun Gong cultivation experiences is what has drawn them to practice, and no sociological reductions can penetrate into why they feel like doing it, and why they think it's a "genuine thing", so to say.

About the appeal outside Zhongnanhai - well, we're living in the Internet era, and you know how easily people connect with each other when they share common interests. At the time of the April 20, 1999 appeal there were more than 100,000 practitioners in Beijing alone, and only about 10,000 people gathered at the Central Appeal Office. You don't need any "leaders" to mobilize such a thing; when people send e-mails to each other, or publish something on a website, multitudes of people are reached in a very short period of time. Besides, the state had already proven its hostility towards practitioners by beating up and arresting some of them, and a lot of people were deeply concerned about this issue. Just think about the anti-war demonstrations all around the world immediately before the U.S. waged the Iraq War - millions of people participated. Likewise, the Falun Gong appeal was a reaction from the civil society, which is undoubtedly something that shocked the leaders of an authoritarian state. And maybe they were fearful of an uprising like the Taiping rebellion or the White Lotus Society. But to me it's obvious that Falun Gong is entirely dissimilar, and these seven years of persecution have shown us that the practitioners' resistance has been entirely nonviolent. The superficial form of people gathering together and sharing similar metaphysical assumptions doesn't mean that they're about to revolt, or that they're following a dangerous "mastermind" (like the Communist Party insists) who can direct them like a twisted puppeteer. What if Falun Dafa cultivation is really the autonomous Will of its practitioners, and they just want to become inherently good beings for the sake of goodness alone?

I've previously stated that denying the rationality of a group of people is the classic propaganda tool. It justifies seizing their sovereignty over their own bodies, so the oppressor assumes the role of a "doctor" or "psychiatrist" who administers a cure "for their own good". This is just what the CPC is doing.

I'd also like to thank you for your accomplished commentary. It's always a pleasure to discuss with people who are genuinely interested and open-minded.

To Sumple: there are so many Falun Gong practitioners that their only common denominator is just the practice itself. The illusion of a "group hegemony" is one of the chief mistakes that you can make. Do you think that "genuine" practitioners approve of people presenting themselves as practitioners to obtain a visa or otherwise exploiting the persecution? Don't you think they are at least as concerned as you are about these cases? ---Olaf Stephanos 22:45, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

More on the Self-Immolation

In the latest archived discussion, there were some points mentioned about the 2001 TianAnMen Square Self-Immolation incident. One was a time delayed of sending Liu SiYing, an alleged member of FLG and one of the self-immolators, from the Square to a Hospital. The other was a report from a National Taiwan University Speech Processing Lab mentioning that Wang JinDong, another alleged FLG member and self-immolator, was different between interviews.

I've been looking on these claims since these, if correct, are quite solid.

First. These reports were initially reported from from Uphold Justice, AKA WOIPFG. According to their website, the time delay of Liu was reported from a inside source of the hospital. And they mentioned that they would report and publicize the source to appropriate authorities. Anonymous sources means that this information has weaker validity. I hope to see this issue solved in the near future. (The report was done in 2003, it has been 3 years and no authority seemed to have been asked by UpholdJustice.org)

The NTU report. I don't know if there is an English version, but I've checked the Chinese version and there is something strange of the report. First I don't see any actual documentary of it. All of the websites mentioning it are transcripts. Note that FLG often publishes its awards with the original document (like those "State FLG Week".) This might be trivial but then the actual report is even more curious.

In the report, the researcher used the interviewer's sound in 3 videos as a standard although the reporter wasn't proved to be the same in all of them. This might be considered trivial. However, in the same report the interviewer's recordings were mentioned to be "too short" to be sufficient. The time intervals were between 3 seconds and 30 seconds. When they test on Wang JinDong's sound, the one they mention to be different, has an interval of 6 seconds. How they overcome a "short" time interval and provide such a result raises high doubt on the validity.

I've mailed the director of the lab to ask about this (and some technical questions) and haven't recieved any results yet. He did mention that the experiment was carried out by one of his students. Yet he also mentioned that he didn't know the details.

I suspect that UpholdJustice.org is sort of inflating the actual level of this report. And also due to the language used on the website, I don't believe it is quite objective Yenchin 20:01, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

You have good points. I wish some major international organisations would've continued the investigation further. After all, WOIPFG and other related NGOs are low-budget organisations that rely entirely on voluntary workers. It's not easy to face the dubious accusations of one of the most influental and largest countries in the world. Apparently, not many people realize how important the self-immolation incident has been in CPC's crusade against Falun Gong. According to an Epoch Times article, "the recorded number of Falun Gong adherents tortured to death in the first 18 months of the regime's violent crackdown would nearly triple in the next 12", i.e. after the Tiananmen tragedy.

This is one of the reasons why I really feel sad when people insist that Falun Gong practitioners are to blame, and that their deconstruction of the incident is not perfect. People who have absolutely nothing in common with some crazy fanatics or impostors - regardless of who they really were - are still lumped together in a big messy pile of "cult suiciders" and having to bear the consequences of deeply instigated hatred. And when the event in itself has so many question marks upon it, and nobody's putting in money or political pressure to start a legitimate investigation, what can you do but hope for people to think with their hearts? ---Olaf Stephanos 22:41, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

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