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What the article needs- suggestions

So far, I think the article's new structure and info is a lot better than before, thanks to the additions from Pomeranz. But there are some things I believe the article needs now.

• a reliance on sources other than Pomeranz; almost 80 percent of citations are from Pomeranz. Perhaps another academic source.
• Data on the effect of the Great Divergence. There is no per capita income data that shows how effective the Great Divergence was in increasing incomes.

I think with these two problems out of the way, we will have effectively complete coverage of the topic. I will try to get sources on this data, but note I will be working less on this article as I am starting a new project, Chinese Economic Reform. I will also have less time to contribute to wiki as I have to study for SAT, driver ed, etc soon.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:29, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

I think the Conditions/Causes/Effects division makes sense, though there is some overlap between the first two. The Ideologies section is probably superfluous, especially as there are so many mentions of mercantilism and laissez faire throughout the article. Coverage of Pomeranz's rivals would be welcome. It is curious that there is so much reliance on Murray Rothbard, who hardly represents the mainstream of economic thought. Kanguole 16:05, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

I agree that the ideologies section is superflous. As to use of Rothbard, whatever one thinks of his economic philosophy (a radical extension of classical liberalism), his work on economic history is relatively undisputed. I think few economists would dispute the effects of mercantilism on the European economy (Even Ultra-left Keynesian Krugman was angry at being called a mercantilist). What is needed now is per capita income statistics and a rival source to Pomeranz. Oh ya, and I think the templates should be removed as now we have reached an agreement on the treatment of the "Qing theory" (merging it to a cause section). Revert me and post on this talk page if you think that is wrong.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:59, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

It's getting better, with most of the problems now confined to the state intervention section, including the case for an "interventionist" Qing, and of course the "Qing theory".

Every government intervenes in the economy to some extent; if you focus only on Qing interventions you can paint a picture of increased intervention, but it won't be inaccurate. Yes, the Qing licensed rich merchants and placed some restrictions on them, but they also lightened the burden of the state on everyone by running a more efficient administration, cutting the tax burden (including the land tax that had forced so many families to give up their farms and become tenants in the late Ming), abolishing the corvée labour system and avoiding regulating markets (except for salt). Yes, they banned overseas trade in the late 17th century, but so did the Ming in part of the 15th and 16th, and there was more overseas trade in the 18th century than the Ming had. They encouraged people to migrate to the periphery, and the Ming encouraged people to move back to the north. And so on.

We still lack a good source focussed on this theory. I'm starting to think that the laissez faire Ming/interventionist Qing twist on the theory is your own (given your enthusiasm for Rothbard and the way laissez faire/intervention/mercantilism has spread through the article). I just don't think everything (or anything) is that simple. Sure, mercantilism was harmful and liberalism helped, but no-one (except Rothbard?) seems to be suggesting that any amount of government inactivity was going to modernize a pre-industrial economy without a lot of other factors, most of which are poorly understood. Kanguole 13:06, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

Really, Kanguole? If this is my own theory, how come there are four Chinese sources exactly affirming this? As I have stated previously, there are four academic sources, including one academic paper written by a university professor addressing this topic. Just because they happen to be in Chinese, a language which you can understand, doesn't mean they're useless. In terms of academic, the Consensus is that the Qing were much more interventionist than the Ming; this is stated explicitly by the Cambrige history of China, who calls Ming a "Government that by modern and premodern standards taxed very lightly and left its wealth in the hands of the people" and the Qing "interventionist". As for the mercantilism/classical liberalism question, I would grant that mercantilism was probably more harmful than the Qing interventions (not including the earlier massacres, ban on trade, etc). The question is not whether Qing intervened at all, but what the interventions were; I doubt anybody, from ultra-left keynesian to anarcho-capitalist, would think banning mining/foreign trade is a good thing. True, the government cannot by itself cause a industrial revolution, but it sure can prevent one if it wanted (what would have happened if England banned coal?), so its policies are an important factor. Even Pomeranz recognized this and mentions Qing's policies regarding coal as a factor hampering their use.In fact, Pomeranz devotes an entire chapter to government interventions in his book to analyze the effect of this factor; this can show how important it is.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:27, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

I didn't say the theory that the Qing had held China back, I said the emphasis on interventionism vs laissez faire.

On which page does the Cambridge History use the word "interventionist"? And I thought we'd established that mining was not banned, and that foreign trade was banned only in the late 17th century (but flourished in the 18th). Clearly the dispute is unresolved. Kanguole 15:21, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

The article states that that mining and foreign trade was restricted, not banned (as in no new mines). Isn't interventionism versus laissez faire the whole crux of this dispute; (that's the whole thing the Qing is blamed for, banning mines from being opened with enough capital, restricting foreign trade, etc. As to the interventionist claim, I think that is the academic consensus; the theory that Qing had held China back specifically blames the interventions such as banning mines.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:35, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

On which page does the Cambridge History call the Qing "interventionist"? Kanguole 22:57, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

It says clearly on page 592 that: "Contradictory as the Ch’ing state’s means were to achieve its purposes, the early emperors and their officials, motivated by Confucian ideology and fearful of the same developments that had toppled the Ming, intervened in the market economy." On page 591, it says: "Even so, the center continually tried to intervene in the market economy to win the allegiance of the people, prevent local power holders from becoming too wealthy and influential, and ensure social order." I think that's pretty clear statement that they were interventionist. Teeninvestor (talk) 17:09, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

I didn't think they'd say "interventionist": it's a bit too simplistic and one-sided for the overall picture they present.

So they say the Qing intervened, as most governments do. But again your quotes are selective. (Do you have access to the full book, or are you working from the Google Books limited preview?) Between those two quotes, they set out the interventions they are referring to: (1) reduced the burden of the state on the people, (2) centralized control of taxation, and (3) "selectively discouraged certain wealthy people from using the market". The first two are not, I think, the kind of interventions you're accusing them of. On the first, Myers and Wang say

Instead of merely extracting taxes for enriching the political center, Qing rulers declared that "wealth should be amassed in the hands of the people". To that end, the inhibited political center enhanced people's incentives to participate in the market. One such incentive was for the state to avoid regulating prices and instead encouraging market forces to operate freely.

They go on (p595) to describe how the Qing reduced tax burdens in comparison with the Ming, and lightened the Ming labour conscription system, finally abolishing it in the early 18th century. If one were to select these quotes instead of yours, the Qing would sound like beacons of liberalism. But one must consider the whole complex picture that they present. And when you do that, there's no case for presenting the Qing as a new era of intervention.

Indeed Pomeranz does devote a whole chapter to markets and governments, but it is striking that that chapter makes no mention at all of these things that you claim are so significant, except for a brief remark that the late C17 trade ban had no lasting effect on the growth of trade. In an earlier chapter he mentions the policy of giving Jiangnan coal mining licences to the poor instead of the rich, but ends by saying it's unlikely this made any difference in the long run, though it can hardly have helped. These few scattered mentions of one side of the story do not rate selection in an encyclopedia article on the Great Divergence. Kanguole 15:23, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
I see Pomeranz does mention the salt monopoly and the Canton trade, in order to contrast with the extensive European monopolies. Kanguole 10:38, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Right, Kanguole: Right before that quote about enhancing the political center, the book talks extensively and repeatedly about how Qing intervened. In addition, they also talked about, right after your quotes about how "liberal" the Qing is, how they understood "the correctness of monopoly prileveges". And Kanguole, When you talk about Qing's "reduction on the burden of the people", you're being contradicted by all th academic evidence. The labor conscripton system was already abolished during the single whip reform by Zhang Juzheng and even earlier under Later Han(though that was restored); this is mentioned in the cambridge history of China. It was restored and used extensively and then briefly abolished by the Qing after the wars were over; hardly a "reduction". As to taxes, Ming land taxes were increased dramatically during the fall of the Ming Dynasty and then later reduced by the Qing after peace was restored; again, as with the labor conscription system, the authors' talk about the reduction in tax burden is in comparison with the situation at the end of the Ming, not with the Ming in general; remember by the end of the Ming only 30% of the population was even registered and pyaing taxes.

As to Pomeranz's apparent neglect of these factors, it appears that many sources disagree with him; indeed Xu's source is a direct response to Pomeranz.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:08, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

They are indeed comparing with the late Ming, but not the war period, and they do refer to the "Ming labor conscription system". But my aim was not to claim the Qing were particularly enlightened, just that Myers and Wang give a nuanced account. Kanguole 15:02, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

It's very clear that the Ming abolished the labor conscription system in Zhang Juzheng's single whip reform. This is attested by every scholar on the topic, from pro-Qing to anti-Qing. If Myers and wang did indeed state that, they're simply wrong; read the article on Zhang Juzheng and Single whip reform for details. Some scholars think that under the Later Han, another laissez faire dynasty, labor conscription was also abolished, but they're not sure. From any point of view, abolition of labor conscription was there way before the Qing.Teeninvestor (talk) 02:33, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Regarding this edit, it is well known that some Qing emperors persecuted authors they believed were challenging their rule, but what science did they suppress? Also, "suppression of free thought" appears to be overstating the case, given the flourishing Chinese literature of the period. Kanguole 14:50, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

It is well known that many texts, such as the Tian Gong Kan Wu were burned. While Chinese literature did flourish somewhat, Wenzhiyu destroyed many, many texts for simply making minor references to Qing rule; The number of Wenzhiyu recorded in the history books is 70 to 80, with over 100 deaths in many cases (Ming history case, etc).Teeninvestor (talk) 16:59, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

That literary inquisitions took place under the Qing is not being disputed. The issue is to what extent they suppressed scientific endeavour and "free thought". Nev1 (talk) 17:19, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Are you going to argue that Wenzhiyu did not suppress "free thought"? For heaven's sake, people were being killed by the hundreds because they compiled a history of the Ming that referred to Manchus as "tribes". As to the scientific part, it is well known that many Ming-era science texts were also suppressed and are now only available outside China. For example, the "Tian Gong Kai Wu", which was a summary of scientific inventions during the Ming period.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:29, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

In my own opinion literary inquisitions hindered freedom of speech, but that's subtly different to freedom of thought. Is that explicitly what the source says, or your own spin on it? The target of literary inquisitions were mostly historical texts and poetry, anyone who was considered to have explicitly or implicitly criticised the Qing. That scientific texts were caught up in this would seem incidental. Nev1 (talk) 17:37, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Xu mentioned specifically an example of suppressing new scientific theories in which Kangxi executed a man because he believed the brain was the center of thought, rather than the heart as believed by the majority of the doctors and scholars. You think science thrives in that climate? The text used specifically is "freedom of thought".Teeninvestor (talk) 17:46, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Nice quote, but how does it relate to the Great Divergence? Remember that it was a socio-economic phenomenon. Nev1 (talk) 17:49, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Cited as an example of the suppression of new science. I assure you that England would not have had the industrial revolution if Newton had been executed because he believed in gravity.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:50, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

That's a remarkable insight into the Industrial Revolution, but contrary to popular belief Newton's theory of gravitation had little to do with the development of steam engines, or canals, or the factory system. Unless you're trying to say it would have put off other scientists, but really your point isn't clear. Now can we have an example of the suppression of scientific endeavour related to the Great Divergence please. Nev1 (talk) 17:53, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Are you trying to argue that this wouldn't put off other scientists? This is only one of many of Xu's examples (along with the earlier example of Tian Gong Kan Wu being suppressed); his argument was that scientific endeauver can't thrive in such an environment. Ruthless suppression of all non-orthodox thought that deviates a little from the state line encourages free thought and inquiry a lot, right? That's exactly why the Cultural revolution and Great Purge were hotbeds of scientific advances, right?

So can we have a quote from Pomeranz so we actually know what his view is or must you continue to filibuster? Nev1 (talk) 18:16, 25 July 2010 (UTC

I don't think Pomeranz addressed this (why'd you even mention him)? This is mainly an argument of Xu and the other sources.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:21, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Xu then, or whatever source you're using (it wasn't clear as you didn't bother adding a source when you made the edit). Nev1 (talk) 18:25, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Why would I add Xu? He's already a source. Here is the quote(s)

"无数历史事实证明，纵然只是为了经济和科学技术的发展，也得有人的思想言论自由，而建立在扼杀思想言论自由基础上的经济繁荣和国力强盛是不可能持久的，更不用说有无思想言论自由乃是一个是否把人当人看的问题了。然而，在明朝的统治下，是言论自由的多少问题；而在清朝的统治下，则是言论自由的有无问题。" Effectively, he is arguing that the Qing's suppression of freedom of speech and thought hampered scientific advances.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:30, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

I don't want to know what he is effectively saying, I want to know what he is saying. Could you please provide a translation. Nev1 (talk) 18:32, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

"As many historical incidences have proved, freedom of speech and thought is essential for economic and technological advances. A national prosperity built on suppression of freedom of thought and speech cannot last; and this is not addressing the issue of whether having these freedoms are essential rights of man. While under Ming's rule the question of freedom of speech was how much of these freedoms citizens should have, under the Qing, the very existence of freedom of speech were in question."Teeninvestor (talk) 18:36, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Is that it? No details, no examples, just an allusion that the Qing didn't allow freedom of speech? Nev1 (talk) 18:40, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

obviously not. He then lists many many examples, such as the brain example, Ming history case, etc. Do you think I pulled the examples I used above out of nowhere?Teeninvestor (talk) 18:42, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

No, but getting a straight answer from you is like pulling teeth. Nev1 (talk) 18:43, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Who ordered the burning of the Tian Gong Kan Wu? Kanguole 11:57, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

Update

The reliance on Pomeranz is not as bad as I thought. Out of 87 citations, 35 are from non-Pomeranz sources. Considering Pomeranz's importance on the topic, this is not necessarily unwarranted.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:38, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

4 more citations have been added from Hobson.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:38, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Structure

On second thoughts, the division between causes and effects requires interpretive judgements in order to decide where to place a particular item, with various authors disagreeing. This is related to the dispute over when the divergence happened. The article is also curiously terse on what actually happened in Europe.

I think a chronological organization would avoid the need for judgement in placing items, though there would still be the question of relevance. Kanguole 09:27, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Can you please clarify? I think it is universally agreed that the biggest era of the divergence is in the 19th century. Even Maddison et al simply believes that Europe grew at a faster rate and was ahead by 1500 (however, Maddison did not have access to the current research on agricultural productivity in China, but let's ignore that; he also estimated per capita income doubled during Mao, a gross exaggeration that would thrown his premodern estimates off by a lot (I am inclined to think the opposite happened)), but the era of the greatest divergence was in the 1800's. My biggest concern is the lack of data currently in the 1800's to show how Europe lept ahead; I have added Bairoch's estimates; hopefully this will help.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:56, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Qing theory (again)

In this edit, Teeninvestor is again spreading the "Qing theory" through the article. This is the theory that policies of the Qing Dynasty somehow contributed to the Great Divergence, not by causing industrialization in Britain, but by preventing it in China. It is currently assembled in the article from an assortment of references to parts of publications of varying quality, mostly dealing with other topics. We do not have a quality reference for the theory itself—it should be removed. Kanguole 07:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

sigh; What is this, Kanguole?

1. Xu, Suming (2005), 1 The Great Divergence from a humanist perspective: Why was Jiangnan not England?, Tianjin Social Science, http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/7656 1

Don't tell me this is not a quality source expositing the Qing theory; I think an academic paper published on the topic of the Great Divergence is enough. Indeed, Xu's source is a direct response to Pomeranz, along with nearly fifty other essays by other Chinese academics. And besides, the edit is on the direction of policies, not on the effect. I don't think you will find one historian that would agree the Qing was more laissez faire than the Ming. To argue that is absurd. Even Myers and Wang, which you use your support your position, rejected that argument (in fact, they specifically said Qing understood the "advantages" of monopoly power and repeatedly stated that the center was intervening into the market economy). And please don't go through the labor conscription argument again, see Zhang Juzheng. There is overwhelming consensus on the direction of policies during the Qing. Tell me, Kanguole, when did the Ming monopolize foreign trade, ban mining, restrict commercial agriculture and regulate the number of merchants in marketplaces? There is overwhelming consensus that Qing's policies are intereventionist. What is disputed is whether they are harmful or not.Teeninvestor (talk) 13:01, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I'm not claiming the Qing were more laissez faire than the Ming. I am disagreeing with your claim that there is scholarly consensus that the Qing took China in the opposite direction. (Do you see the difference?) We've been over Myers and Wang: they mention some interventions, but they also mention reductions in the burden of the state and summarize Qing actions as "contradictory"; they do not support your claim, so it cannot be said to have consensus.

I see mentions of this theory continue to spread, without any improvement in the referencing. What would you say is the best authority that you've come across (in any language) on the Qing theory of the Great Divergence? Kanguole 14:45, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I would say Xu's exposition is the most complete one on this theory (there are others, but not WP:RS); as it is an academic paper written in response to Pomeranz, it definitely fits WP:RS (and its topic is the Qing theory). The essence of Xu's argument is that Qing's suppression of science and restrictions on industry and commerce made China's economy stagnant. As to Myers and Wang, although they did not explicitly say "Qing was more interventionist than the Ming", but they mentioned an entire list of interventions, and repeatedly stated that the government intervened into the economy. I don't think there is a single scholar that would question that Ming's tax burden was lower than Qing; the reduction on the tax burden is in reference to the war era. This contrasts with the treatment of the Ming in Cambridge history of China, which describes them as laissez faire. And this is not counting the other sources which describe the Qing as more interventionist. Teeninvestor (talk) 14:52, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

OK, if Xu Sumin's article is the best account, perhaps you'd be kind enough to tell us about the author's expertise, rate the periodical in which it was published, and provide your translation of the abstract?

Thank you for taking back your claim that Myers and Wang explicitly called the Qing "interventionist". Myers and Wang say they are referring to the late Ming, not the war period, and they say the Qing taxes were lower, so that's more than a single scholar. Your account of the Ming volume seems to be similarly selective, and I don't think they make a comparison with the Qing there, do they? Kanguole 15:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Myers and Wang compare the Qing with the Ming, and their account does not support your statement "policies shifted in the opposite direction in China". Since the statement thus lacks scholarly consensus, I am removing it from the lead. Kanguole 08:51, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Neither does, I don't think. Do you really need my translation, Kanguole? I was under the impression you knew Chinese. The periodical, Tianjin Social Science, is one of the major social science publications of Chinese academia, and is rated as "heavy-point" by the Chinese government, signifying its major status. Indeed, many of the responses to Pomeranz's theory was published in that periodical. Here is the website. 1. As to Xu Suming, he is a professor whose main focus is on philosophy and social science during the late Ming-Qing transition. He is a major academic and the department head of social science at Wuhan and Hubei universities. He also seems to hold a position in Nanjing University's social science department.Teeninvestor (talk) 15:53, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I'd certainly be interested in a translation. I am concerned that you are reluctant to do so, and have several times been uncooperative in this situation. Nev1 (talk) 16:13, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I would certainly do a translation if necessary, but my previous beliefs was that Kanguole was knowledgable of Chinese. If that belief is wrong I will provide the necessary translation- Nev1, I've already provided a partial translation of Xu's thesis above.Teeninvestor (talk) 16:15, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I am aware you provided a translation above Teeninvestor, but only after being asked multiple times. This isn't the only time you've beaten around the bush providing sources or translations. It is certainly not conducive to people wanting to work with you. Nev1 (talk) 17:22, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

That's completely false, Nev1. I provided after you asked one time. Your repeated statements that somehow I have been "uncooperative" are completely false. Look at the previous conversation; when did I not give you a reference or translation right after you asked for it? please stop making these false statements. Statements like these are false 1 and not the way for editors to cooperate or behave.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:42, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Kid, you can lecture me on what is and is not constructive behaviour when you learn to respond promptly and reasonably to people's requests. I have asked you several times for translations, so it's obvious I can't read Chinese. Providing a quote in Chinese without a translation was either careless, obtuse, or deliberately uncooperative. Nev1 (talk) 17:54, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

The quote was provided at 18:30 and the translation at 18:36. That's pretty fast.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:58, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Not my point, but getting back to what Kanguole said, can we have a translation of the abstract please? Nev1 (talk) 18:03, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Original text:

衡量社会发展水平的根本尺度是人的自由程度，经济、政治、道德的尺度都只有从属于人的自由的尺度才有意义。“为什么江南不是英国”，乃是由于晚明江南人民所具有的自由权利几乎被清王朝完全剥夺；“为什么英国不是江南”，亦绝非彭慕兰所说的偶然因素所能解释，而是人权、科学、民主三大因素共同促成的必然结果。无论是彭慕兰的偶然因素决定论还是弗兰克所运用的史学方法，都只是见物不见人的所谓纯化了的经济学方法。也许，只有一种富有深度的、以现实的人和人的实践为出发点的、综合一切社会因素的“人学史观”，能够帮助我们走出外因论和偶然论的误区，把史学研究建立在更为深广的历史视野的基础上。 Translation (rough; some Chinese is hard to translate):

The proper way to measure the development of a society is through the degree of freedom a human has. Politics, economics, and ethics have value only when they are within the reach of human freedom. "Why Jiangnan wasn't England", is because the rights and freedoms of late Ming citizens were almost all completely stripped away by the Qing. "Why England isn't Jiangnan", cannot be explained by Pomeranz's random factors, and is because of the three factors of human liberties, science, and democracy. Both the random factors thesis that Pomeranz proposes or the historical method Frank proposes, are purely economic methods that does not taken into account the human factor. Only a "humanist view of history" based on reality and human nature, can help us reject the wrong thesis of random chance and external causes, and let historical research be built on a more broad base.

Teeninvestor (talk) 20:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Hardly an economic historian, is he? Although there is some overlap (the focus on Qing suppression), this is quite different from the theory you've been putting into the article: he has no interest in economics, while you haven't mentioned the European scientific revolution. Kanguole 09:40, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually, he devotes an entire section of his paper to the economic changes in late Ming and how they died out during Qing, as well as the English scientific revolution (which he asserts could only develop out of an increasingly classical liberal influence). His theory is that the late Ming economic boom was not driven by inflow of silver, and notes many momentous changes such as the emergence of large private enterprises, foreign commerce, a great increase in urban population, etc. Indeed there are whole pages devoted to this. Then he examines the relative decline under Qing (indeed Xu directly refutes Pomeranz's point about coal and land by noting that there were coal mines near the Yangtze and extra land in Manchuria, but the Qing government did not allow them to be used.)Teeninvestor (talk) 14:20, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

He is clearly outside of his field, a social historian complaining that the economists won't listen to him. (And why would they?) Kanguole 11:26, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

Strange you would say that, since the economists are publishing on the same journal as him. He also refers to a great number of the economic arguments on the topic by the way; if you read the paper, he is by no means uninformed on the arguments used. His main thesis is that the economists ignored changes in institutions(specifically, science and industry cant develop under a regime that would execute a man for thinking the brain is the center of thought and ban mines and foreign trade). And I'm not sure Pomeranz is an "economist"; maybe an economic historian; these 2 professions can be different you know.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:04, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

I am not even sure this is relevant to the topic. Who says that if Qing had been more expansionist, the Great Divergence would not have taken place? I would say chances are that there would have been even more of a race for the colonies, and perhaps more unity among the European powers because of the external threat, so that an even greater leap in a shorter time might have occurred. This is just speculation of course, but it is speculation inherent in the claim that Qing laissez faire somehow contributed to the European leap forward. The whole what ifs would seem more appropriately placed to me in the Qing Dynasty article. --dab (𒁳) 16:55, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Uh, please check the sources and talk page. You don't seem to be understanding the dispute here. The dispute is whether or not include a theory, very popular in China, that the destruction and interventionist policies imposed by the Manchus after their conquest was responsible for China falling behind the west after the prosperous Song and Ming.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:26, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

A fragment for possible reuse

I am rewritting world-system theory, and I found the following fragment, although unreferenced, possibly of use to this article. Feel free to use it (or not). I find it useful as an extenion of a nice argument from here, criticizing the term "rise of the West" as inappropriate, because )according to this argument) it wasn't the West that has risen - it was the East that fell. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 19:14, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

Europe only prospered when Asian economy was in its contracting phase of long-term economic cycle and Europe had access to virtually free silver and gold from the Americas. There was no European miracle, Europe simply had geographical advantage in the discovery of Americas. This contracting phase is now coming to an end and the center is moving back to Asia. In a joint critique, Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Samin attacked the empirical data of this argument.

This was originally presented as the view of Andre Gunder Frank. Kanguole 19:29, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

Second GAN?

I want to gather the main contributors' opinion on whether this article is ready for a second GAN or not, and if not, what needs to be done. In my view, the article's two major problems, overreliance on Pomeranz and lack of information in the effects section, has been solved. We now have info on per capita income growth and productivity due to the great divergence in the effect section, and the percentage of pomeranz citations has gone down from nearly 70% to less than half. The article is a lot better than the first GAN under the students now, I believe.Teeninvestor (talk) 19:28, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

Looks better. Some thoughts: 1) "Conditions in pre-Great Divergence cores" section is missing information on the Middle East (Janet Abu-Lughod's book comes to mind). 2) Discussion of Japan is interesting, but was it a core? I thought it wasn't really involved in trade till recently... 3) About "Timing". My readings, influenced by the world-system literature (Wallerstein, Lughod) suggest that it was the "long 16th century" that was the time of GD, not the 18th (by which time the modern world-system was well established). I am of course receptive to arguments about other time periods, but is it really ok to suggest - as the current section does - that 18th is the more popular variant, and previous terms are less popular? On that note, the sentence in "Terminology and definition" (Pomeranz argues that the period of most rapid divergence was during the 19th century) - as in "why P.'s view/date is the only one mentioned there"? 4) Regarding File:Maddison GDP per capita 1500-1950.svg I'd like to see a line for "Europe, aggregated" --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 20:32, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

The source does not include aggregate data for Europe, though it does include a West European average. But what would that illustrate? The current selection shows substantial variation within Europe, which is part of the story. Kanguole 23:59, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

If we are using "Europe" as the unit of analysis, we need to have numbers for it. Speaking of Europe and then using data only for individual European countries seems like a fallacy to me. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 23:20, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Then the flaw lies in using "Europe" as the unit of analysis, doesn't it? But few of these authors seem to treat Europe as a whole. Kanguole 23:46, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Is it really a flaw, and is it really rare? The very term European miracle and the surrounding discussion suggests otherwise. World-system perspective, for example, does suggest that we should not look at nation-states, but at wider concepts (regions, or world-systems). In the context of GD I do agree that we should compare Europe (well, perhaps Western Europe, or some selection of countries) to other regions, not individual countries (unless we want to make a point about them). For me, GD existed not when one of the European countries became more powerful than China, but earlier, when a bunch of them did. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 14:14, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

Piotrus, its pretty clear from data on agricultural productivity done by historians such as Allen, Needham and Pomeranz that Chinese incomes per capita exceeded all of Europe and even Britain until the 19th century. European agriculture (75% of all premodern economies) was quite backwards til the adoption of Chinese agriculutral technology such as iron plows and heavy hoeing in the 18th century. This can be seen from Allen's study, in which European productivity lags far behind China until a rapid catchup in the 18th century.Teeninvestor (talk) 02:10, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Frankly, agricultural production is not very convincing to me. Many places outside Europe were more efficient in something for quite some time; depending on the definition of something, they never lost their edge in it. That doesn't change the fact that around 16th century, Europe started disrupting and taking over various trade flows worldwide, something rest of the world (China included) never cared to do.Europe was more efficient at certain things, in particular, in projecting its force, or the will to power. When a region decided to try to take over the world, and was able to do so - Great Divergence started. Now, mind you, this is my reading of the world-system theory; nonetheless, I think this is a point to be mentioned somewhere in the article (and of course, don't cite me - cite Wallerstein and his colleagues). --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 23:20, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Well, Piotrus, I'm sure the world systems theory is mentioned somewhere in the article, but I will note to you that agriculture made up 80% of all premodern economies; so if Europe was backwards in that respect to China, its GDP per capita would definitely be lower (it would be like being inferior in aeronautics, steel, computers, petroleum, textiles and all industries today). Without advanced agriculture, there is no base or market for proto-industrialization, let alone industrailization. Regarding world-systems theory, I think you overexaggrate the effect of international trade pre-19th century, which while substantial probably never made up more than 5% of GDP even in countries like Holland or Britain. And even in terms of international trade, I believe China's volume of international trade was probably not inferior to Europe til the 19th century; keep in mind that North American silver was flowing there repeatedly. And even if that was the case, if European agricultural productivity was much lower the wealth of the people would still be less.Teeninvestor (talk) 20:08, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

I'm not sure the article's stable enough, and there still seems to be some uncertainty. I think these two edits require more justification that is provided in the edit summaries. Nev1 (talk) 22:43, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

That section had Toynbee (1976, posthumous) saying a fall in the 18th century, Allen (2009) saying a marginal fall and Pomeranz (2000) a modest rise and not stagnant. Result: Pomeranz is trimmed (even though this is part of his argument), Allen's view is made stronger and Toynbee set beside him. I would say Pomeranz's view should be kept, but attributed to him. Toynbee was a generalist, and quite a while ago; he's the one who should be removed. Since Allen says of his figures "I find no significant evidence of falling productivity in the next to centuries" (typo in original), and speaks of "static labour productivity", the qualification should be restored. I have reverted and deleted the Toynbee claim. Kanguole 00:49, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

I think the article is still incomplete. It has rather little on the GD itself, being more about theories of what caused it, and those are mostly Pomeranz's. He has many rivals, and the standard view is also far from dead. Kanguole 00:57, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Well, I think we have good info on the per capita incomes divergence from Bairoch. And as to the traditional view, I think that is noted in all the sections about the theories of the great divergence, which Pomeranz argues against. The latest research by Allen et al gives strong support to Pomeranz's thesis, and this is not counting Needham's earlier research regarding this. So in a way we have covered the standard view more or less.And to be honest I think any reader searching up GD would want to know what caused it rather than what happened (that's covered under industrial revolution).Teeninvestor (talk) 02:10, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Allen supports Pomeranz's comparison on English and Jiangnan income and productivity in the late 18th century, but not Pomeranz's thesis: "If the findings of this paper generalize to China and Europe as a whole, the 'great divergence' in income did, indeed, occur in the nineteenth century, but its roots extend back centuries. Europe, in this scenario, was behind China in 1600 but was on a trajectory that was accelerating rapidly. China's trajectory was not advancing. The paths may have crossed around 1800 when incomes and agricultural productivity were similar, but the European rocket had taken off two centuries before, and the sources of Europe's advance after 1800 must be sought in that earlier ascent." Kanguole 23:25, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Maybe change that? I thought Pomeranz's thesis was simply that Europe and China were comparable in the early 19th century. This thesis stands even if Europe's income was growing since 1600 (since it was starting from a very low base, the middle ages). Example, China's GDP has grown massively since the Maoist despotism, but this doesn't mean that China and the US are experiencing a "great divergence" which has its roots since late 70's!Teeninvestor (talk) 14:09, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

I thought we were comparing the traditional view of the Great Divergence with Pomeranz's view. Kanguole 14:49, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

I was replying to your reference about Allen disagreeing with Pomeranz. My view is that they are comparable. The standard view is that European productivity exceeded China by 1500, a view that has been exploded in recent research.Teeninvestor (talk) 19:55, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

Vandalism

This article has come under attack from the IP vandal 81.229.148.118, a sock puppet of banned User:Tosses who abused sockpockets to push his extreme and eccentric POV on China and Jewish people-related articles. He may be using other IP's as well. Please revert all of his edits without hesitation (especially his vandalism towards the information about China), though constructive edits from other IP's are welcome. Teeninvestor (talk) 18:13, 7 August 2010 (UTC)

Liang reference on Ming iron

This reference was apparently published in the early 1960s, focusses mainly on the early 14th century, and the cited statement seems to be from an article in the People's Daily from November 1958. The 1989 study of Huang Qichen (cited by Pomeranz) is likely to be vastly more reliable. In general, much more care is required in using articles from the China Economic History website. Kanguole 11:34, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

That website is used for mostly the papers on it, lol. Are you sure this reference is published in the early 1960's?Teeninvestor (talk) 12:42, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

Nevermind the reference to west Germany confirms it for me. Teeninvestor (talk) 12:29, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

Vandalism

This vandal above has repeateldy removed material due to his extreme POV views aiming at distorting the article. If you continue this behaviour, your IP will be blocked from wikipedia. If you wish to actually have any information on the article's top, please read the scholarly sources on the article- it's available online.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:13, 7 August 2010 (UTC)

Pomeranz on coal

Please quote the passage in which Pomeranz specifically says government regulations during 18th century were a factor in the declining use of coal. Kanguole 17:00, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

See the talk page archives. It's absurd that you're even trying to contest this.Teeninvestor (talk) 22:20, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

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