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:: What is not acceptable is to change the wording into some derivative of "the Dahiya strategy where the IDF attacks infrastructure hijacked by terrorists", as some other users were trying to do. That is clearly not how the doctrine is described by secondary sources. Only online opinion pieces have made this claim. The IDF spokespeople have described the doctrine quite clearly to the Jerusalem Post (secondary source). There is no need to rely on opinion pieces. ] (]) 13:16, 22 June 2011 (UTC) :: What is not acceptable is to change the wording into some derivative of "the Dahiya strategy where the IDF attacks infrastructure hijacked by terrorists", as some other users were trying to do. That is clearly not how the doctrine is described by secondary sources. Only online opinion pieces have made this claim. The IDF spokespeople have described the doctrine quite clearly to the Jerusalem Post (secondary source). There is no need to rely on opinion pieces. ] (]) 13:16, 22 June 2011 (UTC)
:::I am not going to fix it since I am not interested in edit warring. I have provided reasoning for a neutrality tag. So is the reason for removing the tag because it was "drive by" or because I did not edit the article? I asumed actually using the talk page would be a good thing but if you would rather I start editing 1//r is about to end s I can start making massive change. SO massive changes or the talk page? And restore the tag since the clock is ticking and I love AEs regarding battlefield mentality. Reverting, wikilawyering... whatever: There is a case. So how about instead of using the talk page to bicker about why the tag does not belog you actually address the issues already provided in my first comment. They are right there. They are clear. They are easy enough to address. What is the delay unless it is intentional? If you cannot allow a neutrality check tag I doubt I can edit this article anyways. ] (]) 04:57, 23 June 2011 (UTC)


== sources == == sources ==

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Attack on Civilian Population

The source material clearly indicate that the doctrine advocates targeting civilian populations yet some users, including Brewcrewer, seem to have repeatedly removed any such description, claiming that it is inconsistent with the sources and POV. Allow me to quote directly from the source, which in this case happens to be YNet, the online English version of Israel's most popular newspaper, Yediot Ahronot:

1 "Israel would use 'disproportionate' force to destroy Lebanese villages from which Hizbullah guerrillas fired rockets at its cities in any future war, an Israeli general said in remarks published on Friday." Link

2) "In practical terms, the Palestinians in Gaza are all Khaled Mashaal, the Lebanese are all Nasrallah, and the Iranians are all Ahmadinejad." Link

3) "What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases." Link

The third quotation is from a IDF Norther Command Chief and is cited in the Goldstone Report. Also, note the title of the second article which is "Israel finally realizes that Arabs should be accountable for their leaders’ acts". Also note that a "village" is not a "Civilian infrastructure" as Brewcrewer and others seem to suggest. It is a civilian population center. Hence the notion that civilian populations are deliberately targeted is completely consistent with the sources and does not suffer from POV bias.

Furthermore, references to Richard Falk's comments on this issue are regularly removed without explanation. Falk is a distinguished professor of international law at Princeton university with a significant level of involvement in this conflict. His analysis is certainly relevant to the topic.

If anyone feels differently, please discuss.

Poyani (talk) 13:57, 11 April 2011 (UTC)

None of these excerpts advocate targeting civilian populations. In addition, none of these excerpts are necessarily expositions of the Dahiya Doctrine. Your recent changes are OR. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 13:57, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
Even the name of the doctrine is from the YNet article I posted. It was YNet which termed the doctrine the "Dahiya Strategy". Every one of the sources listed explains that Israel will attack "villages". "Villages" are not "civilian infrastructure". "Villages" are population centers. If you want I can change "civilian population" to "population centers" as a compromise. But the notion that the doctrine implies that Israel will attack "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists" is ridiculous on several grounds.


1. A village is not a "civilian infrastructure". It is a civilian population center. Civilian infrastructure defines physical structures like bridges, dams, schools, roads, etc. None of the authoritative sources define the "Dahiya Doctrine" or "Dahiya Strategy" in this way.
2. The doctrine is named after the war between Israel and Hezbollah and the notion that Hezbollah are "terrorists" is a very controversial one. Only a handful of countries list Hezbollah as terrorists. Misplaced Pages refers to them as "a Shi'a Muslim militant group and political party" for this very reason.
Hence the description of the doctrine as attack against "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists" is factually inaccurate and totally represents a POV. Furthermore, there is absolutely no justification for removing Richard Falk's statement from the article. It is relevant and verifiable and the source is authoritative. I am going to revert back and change the mentioned part. Poyani (talk) 18:00, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
The article which defined the "Dahiya Doctrine" has the subtitle "Israel finally realizes that Arabs should be accountable for their leaders’ acts". I sincerely doubt that anyone would consider "Arabs" to be a "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists". The contents of the article make it clear that the doctrine is aimed at civilians, not "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists".
The Israeli general promoting the doctrine defined it as follows during an interview wity YNet:

What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases. This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved."

It is abundantly clear that he is not talking about roads, bridges, schools (civilian infrastructure) used by terrorists. He is talking about flattening villages (population centers). Poyani (talk) 18:02, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
The status quo definition of the Dahiya doctrine as a policy of targeting "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists" is simply the definition given in the Jerusalem Post article, which says: will continue to target civilian infrastructure that is used by terrorists. This is known in the IDF as the "Dahiya Doctrine".... The London op-ed and the Eizenkot quote neither contradict this straightforward definition nor support your proposed alternative definition. You are reading into the latter sources many things that they do not say, which is an exercise in OR. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 18:01, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
The Eizenkot quote which is quoted in a UN report and published by YNet (the secondary source which originally defined the "Dahiya Strategy") clearly does contradict the opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post which you are citing. Eizenkot said that "from our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases". One more time, I am going to address the issue which you seem to be avoiding. A village is not an "infrastructure" and Hezbollah are not universally accepted as "terrorists".
Also note that the opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post which you are citing contradicts itself in the very next sentence, and supports the Eizekot quotation. The full quote is "Still, the IDF does not plan on significantly changing the way it fights in future conflicts. On the contrary, it will continue to target civilian infrastructure that is used by terrorists. This is known in the IDF as the "Dahiya Doctrine," in reference to the neighborhood in Beirut that can only be accessed by card-carrying Hizbullah members. During the 2006 war, the IDF bombed large apartment buildings in the neighborhood since they were also used as Hizbullah command-and-control centers." Note that apartment buildings are not infrastructural buildings. They are residential buildings.
I am going to suggest another compromise. If you feel that the use of the term "population centers" is still OR, then how about we change it to "villages, towns and cities". "Villages" is the actual quote from the secondary source and towns and cities reflects the use of the doctrine during the Gaza War. I feel that this would be extremely POV and representing a pro-Israel bias since the purpose of the doctrine is to hold Arabs "accountable for their leaders’ acts", which very clearly is describing attacks against civilians. But if you are seriously concerned about OR, despite the fact that I am quoting the Israeli press I will compromise.
Otherwise, if you keep reverting, I think we should pursue arbitration. Poyani (talk) 19:44, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
A village being used to store munitions, and to launch rocket attacks, can be reasonably describes as "terrorist infrastructure". That Hezbollah are not universally accepted as "terrorists". has no relevance to Israeli policy which views them as such. I think arbitration would be a good idea, not the least in order to find out your true prior identity. Ruby Tuesday ALMWR (talk) 20:16, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
I agree that the universality of the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group is irrelevant. And, Poyani, since the notions you're reading into the Jpost article (which is not an opinion article) are by your own account contradicted by the article itself, perhaps you should avoid over-interpreting and just accept what the article says. There is also no contradiction between the Jpost definition and the Eizenkot quote (which is, BTW, not necessarily an exposition of the Dahiya doctrine): "villages" is general and "civilian infrastructure" is specific. Your original definition, "attack on civilian populations", is not supported by the sources, and neither are your new definitions. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 20:48, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
If the article is formed around "Israeli policy which views them as such", then that is a very classic example of POV. Note that your first statement regarding villages being "terrorist infrastructure" is totally irrelevant (aside from also being inaccurate - villages are not infrastructure). The article does not even refer to "terrorist infrastructure". It refers to "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists" based on one contradictory opinion piece by a non-notable author. At least 3 other reliable sources, define the doctrine as attacks against "villages". I wonder if you would accept the same rules of conduct and definitions to be applied to Hezbollah. That is, I wonder if you would accept that Israeli towns where military hardware, including munitions, are stored are legitimate targets of rocket attacks, and do not constitute attacks against "civilian populations".
In any case, I will try to come up with another compromise. The doctrine is certainly not attacks against "civilian infrastructure used by terrorists" but we can use the concept that it is an attack against infrastructure if you wish. I think the UN report on this subject talked about it extensively. I was just reading it and they make it seem like it is a deliberate attack against civilian infrastructure (often not used by terrorists) in order to punish the country. They quote many Israeli sources and provide references. It looks like it is the most authoritative source I will post under a new heading below. Poyani (talk) 14:54, 15 April 2011 (UTC)

Breaking it down

Let's go through the changes one by one, shall we? The proposed first sentence of the introduction reads:

The Dahiya doctrine refers to an Israeli Defense Forces military doctrine in which the army deliberately targets civilian population centers considered to be sympathetic or supportive of the enemy, as a means of establishing deterrence.

This is sourced to an Israeli opinion article. Another book source supporting this definition is Beware of small states: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (2010). See page 396: note that Eizenkot explicitly says "Harming the population is the only means of restraiing Nasrallah". Note too the author's commentary which supports the definition being proposed explicitly.

Anyone object to this proposed change to the introduction by Poyani? Are there objections to one or both of the sources? Any suggestions on how to incorporate some the edit? Tiamut 20:56, 14 April 2011 (UTC)

The proposed change replaces a long-standing, straightforward definition that is carefully taken from the best source currently used in the article. The proposed definition is not supported either by the London op-ed or the Hirst book (which are inferior sources in any case), and your tortuous straining to connect it with the sources serves to illustrate this fact. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 21:18, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
This is the best source in the article?. Its also an opinion piece in an Israeli newspaper. Not a very good source. David Hirst (journalist), the author of the book to which I linked above, is veteran Middle East correspondant and author of at least 4 books on the region. If you re-read what he wrote, you wil see that it can be paraphrased as in the edit being proposed. Would you like to suggest another wording that incorporates some of what he writes? Because the longstanding consensus text isn't doing it for me. The source is less than high quality and the use of the POV word terrorist without any attribution or qualification is unacceptable. Also, there should be some mention of the population being a target, as is clear from Eizenkot's words and the analysis provided by Hirst, among others. Tiamut 13:03, 15 April 2011 (UTC)
I think it is also important to note that the Jerusalem Post opinion article's definition of the Dahiya Doctrine is clearly contradictory. It defines it as an attack against "infrastructure" but then goes on to explain that the doctrine's first time use (against Dahiya) actually included attacks against apartment buildings. As I noted before, apartment buildings are not infrastructural buildings, they are residential buildings. The JP article is far from the best choice. Poyani (talk) 14:10, 15 April 2011 (UTC)
Agreed. I would add the article does not attribute Israeli definitions sourced to opinion editorials, but instead presents them in the first paragraph in Misplaced Pages's neutral voice. This is unacceptable. I like your proposed first paragraph, but am willing to entertain other options too, and am particularly interested in hearing on alternate proposals form those refusing your proposal. Tiamut 14:18, 15 April 2011 (UTC)
The Jerusalem Post article, which is not an opinion piece, deals directly with the Dahiya doctrine and is written by the military editor of the paper. The Hirst book deals with Lebanon and only mentions the Dahiya doctrine peripherally; and the book's own blurbs say that the author is partisan and reactionary. The JPost article is only contradictory according to your OR and bizarre interpretation of it. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 20:21, 20 April 2011 (UTC)
The YNet source is a secondary source which is superior according to WP:PRIMARY to the JPost article you are citing. The UN is also a far superior source than the JPost article you are citing. The JPost article is contradictory according to the wikipedia article for "apartment buildings", but that is irrelevant and besides the point. I also don't think we are here to pass judgments on authors, describing them as "partisan and reactionary". Herst book is not the only one which described the doctrine in this way. Norman Finkelstein's "This Time we went too far" also defines the "Dahiya Strategy" using quotation from Eizenkot. In the end, you are placing undue weight on the analysis of Yaakov Katz over the statements released by IDF official Eizenkot cited by several books, at least one UN report and news reports. The IDF has not defined the Dahiya Doctrine as targeting "terrorist infrastructure". Only Yaakov Katz has defined it in this way. The IDF commander has clearly defined it as targeting civilians. Poyani (talk) 15:57, 3 May 2011 (UTC)
It's hard to take your opinions on due weight seriously when you're implying that Norman Finkelstein is notable in this context. Finkelstein has no recognized expertise on the Israeli military and is simply a wingnut author. The IDF commander has not defined the Dahiya doctrine as targeting civilians; darned if I know where you got that from. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 16:47, 3 May 2011 (UTC)
Once again, we are not supposed to be passing judgments on authors here. It is actually hard to take your opinion regarding OR seriously when you keep dismissing legitimate authors like Herst and Finkelstein as "wingnuts" as a way of excluding their work. Finkelstein is described in wikipedia as a political scientist and author with expertise on the Israel-Palestine conflict. He has written a book specifically on the Gaza War and he addresses this issue there. The article currently does not define the doctrine as "targeting civilians". I changed it a while ago to "civilian infrastructure" after you objected to it. As for the issue of due weight, you misrepresented my argument. I argued that we have Yaakov Kats in JPost defining the doctrine as you have put it. We have one UN report, a YNET article (which is a secondary source), Finkelstein's book, Herst's book, and an IDF general defining it in a completely different way (as attacking civilian infrastructure as a means of inducing deterrence). And for the record, "wingnut" means "right-wing nut".Poyani (talk) 12:33, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Reliable Sources

I think all reasonable people can agree that the JP piece, which this article is quoting, is not a good authoritative source. First, it is an opinion piece. Second, it clearly contradicts itself. I don't see any value in using this source at all, considering that there are so many good authoritative secondary sources. The best in my opinion is "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict" which is has references and footnotes and is from a reliable source.

62. The tactics used by the Israeli armed forces in the Gaza offensive are consistent with previous practices, most recently during the Lebanon war in 2006. A concept known as the Dahiya doctrine emerged then, involving the application of disproportionate force and the causing of great damage and destruction to civilian property and infrastructure, and suffering to civilian populations. The Mission concludes from a review of the facts on the ground that it witnessed for itself that what was prescribed as the best strategy appears to have been precisely what was put into practice.

1194. In its operations in southern Lebanon in 2006, there emerged from Israeli military thinking a concept known as the Dahiya doctrine, as a result of the approach taken to the Beirut standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases. This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved.

1196. After the war in southern Lebanon in 2006, a number of senior former military figures appeared to develop the thinking that underlay the strategy set out by Gen. Eiskenot. In particular Major General (Ret.) Giora Eiland has argued that, in the event of another war with Hizbullah, the target must not be the defeat of Hizbullah but “the elimination of the Lebanese military, the destruction of the national infrastructure and intense suffering among the population… Serious damage to the Republic of Lebanon, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people are consequences that can influence Hizbollah’s behaviour more than anything else”.

1197. These thoughts, published in October 2008 were preceded by one month by the reflections of Col. (Ret.) Gabriel Siboni:

With an outbreak of hostilities, the IDF will need to act immediately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionate to the enemy's actions and the threat it poses. Such a response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes. The strike must be carried out as quickly as possible, and must prioritize damaging assets over seeking out each and every launcher. Punishment must be aimed at decision makers and the power elite… In Lebanon, attacks should both aim at Hizbollah’s military capabilities and should target economic interests and the centres of civilian power that support the organization. Moreover, the closer the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government, the more the elements of the Lebanese State infrastructure should be targeted. Such a response will create a lasting memory among … Lebanese decision makers, thereby increasing Israeli deterrence and reducing the likelihood of hostilities against Israel for an extended period. At the same time, it will force Syria, Hizbollah, and Lebanon to commit to lengthy and resource-intensive reconstruction programmes… This approach is applicable to the Gaza Strip as well. There, the IDF will be required to strike hard at Hamas and to refrain from the cat and mouse games of searching for Qassam rocket launchers. The IDF should not be expected to stop the rocket and missile fire against the Israeli home front through attacks on the launchers themselves, but by means of imposing a ceasefire on the enemy.

1198. General Eisenkot used the language quoted above while he was in active service in a senior command position and clarified that this was not a theoretical idea but an approved plan. Major General Eiland, though retired, was a man of considerable seniority. Colonel Siboni, while less senior than the other two, was nonetheless an experienced officer writing on his field of expertise in a publication regarded as serious.

1199. The Mission does not have to consider whether Israeli military officials were directly influenced by these writings. It is able to conclude from a review of the facts on the ground that it witnessed for itself that what is prescribed as the best strategy appears to have been precisely what was put into practice.

1304. The Mission recalls in this regard its analysis of the Israeli objectives and strategies during the military operations in chapter XVI. There the Mission referred to statements made by Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai on 6 January 2009: "It possible to destroy Gaza, so they will understand not to mess with us”. He added that “it is a great opportunity to demolish thousands of houses of all the terrorists, so they will think twice before they launch rockets”. The Mission also referred to the so-called Dahiya doctrine, which requires widespread destruction as a means of deterrence and seems to have been put into practice. These objectives and strategies should be kept in mind with regard to the following analysis.

Given this, I propose that we change the first sentence of the article to the following:

The Dahiya doctrine refers to an Israeli Defense Forces military doctrine in which the army deliberately targets civilian infrastructure, as a means of inducing suffering for the civilian population and establishing deterrence.

This definition is also consistant with other sources which state that according to the Dahiya doctrine, Israel is holding "Arabs accountable for their leaders acts" and that according to the doctrine "the Palestinians in Gaza are all Khaled Mashaal, the Lebanese are all Nasrallah, and the Iranians are all Ahmadinejad." Poyani (talk) 14:54, 15 April 2011 (UTC)

Okay I made changes according to this Poyani (talk) 20:50, 16 April 2011 (UTC)
The Jerusalem Post article is not an opinion piece, and it does not contradict itself but your original and bizarre interpretation of it. It is the best source in the article and the only one that provides a straightforward definition of the Dahiya doctrine. The Goldstone report, apart from the fact that it has been heavily criticized by analysts and its author has retracted its central conclusion regarding Israel, does not support the alternative definition that you are trying to push; your alternative definition is OR. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 20:28, 20 April 2011 (UTC)
The YNet article (which defines the strategy) and the UN report are clearly a better source then the Jerusalem Post article. For one thing the YNet article is a secondary source (quoting a IDF offical) whereas JPost piece is just the opinion of the writer with little expertise on the matter. There is no OR whatsoever. You have never even tried to demonstrate OR. It just seems like a charge repeated in bad faith. Poyani (talk) 17:53, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
I agree with JDE. The Ynet article is a 100% legit source and I second the OR concerns elaborated above. --brewcrewer (yada, yada) 22:09, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
Presumably, you meant to say that the Jerusalem Post article is a 100% legit source? Although, I would'nt argue with that, I agree with the position that the YNet articles better describe the doctrine, the Jerusalem Post article being very brief and lacking in detail. The criticism of the Goldstone report presented is non-neutral. Alan Dershowitz's criticisms have themselves been heavily criticised. What the Goldstone report says about the Dahiya doctrine can be readily sourced back to public statements made by IDF officers. Although I wouldn't have written the definition quite the way Poyani did, accusations of OR are unjustified as the basis of what she or he wrote can be seen to be well sourced. In my opinion, the replacement for Poyani's version is less neutral than what it replaced.
On an unrelated matter, something that seems a bit odd is that there is no link to Misplaced Pages's Dahieh article (also spelled Dahiyeh) within the current one.
    ←   ZScarpia   20:04, 23 April 2011 (UTC)
Brewcrewer. I think you are confused about the discussion between me and JDE. As ZScarpia noted, I am the one who is arguing that the YNet article is 100% legit. It is a secondary source. It interviews and quotes an IDF commander, and defines the "Dahiya Strategy". The same YNet article is cited in the UN report. JDE is claiming that the YNet article and the UN report are not legit and is instead using an opinion piece from JPost which only mentions the strategy in passing. The JPost article is neither a primary, nor secondary, nor tertiary source. It is not a news story (it is not reporting on any event) and it does not even specify or qualify its definition of the strategy. If you have a problem with the posted definition just fix it, instead of reverting to a previous version based on a very poor source. Poyani (talk) 14:05, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

It appears that Poyani and ZScarpia are continuing an attempt to push a definition of the subject which, as I have already noted without receiving a reply, is not supported by the cited source (the Goldstone report, which is itself problematic). Additionally, they took the opportunity to blanket revert a number of my unrelated additions to the article, with no talk page explanation whatsoever. Original research and blanket deletion of sourced material are simply unacceptable behavior, so I have no choice but to revert. Jalapenos do exist (talk) 19:06, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

BLP applies to talk pages, please refactor the above accordingly. nableezy - 16:53, 3 May 2011 (UTC)
I don't have time to write a proper answer, but note the following:
  • I may not have addressed a comment to you on the talk page, but I did address one to Brewcrewer, whose revert it was I was in turn reverting. That comment outlined the reasoning behind my actions.
  • You describe the Jerusalem Post article you have cited as the only one that provides a straightforward definition of the Dahiya doctrine. Simple, yes; straightforward, no. A definition which does not describe what distinguishes the thing being defined, as the Jerusalem Post article does not, fails to be a definition, let alone a straightforward one.
  • It is due to its appearance in the Goldstone report that the Dahiya doctrine is given so much attention and, therefore, it is what the Goldstone report says about the Dahiya doctrine, which is carefully sourced back to public statements made by IDF commanding officers, which is most worth describing, not what an insignificant, short and hygenised article in the Jerusalem Post has to say. (Richard Goldstone in an October 2009 PBS interview: We found evidence in statements made by present and former political and military leaders, who said, quite openly, that there's going to be a disproportionate attack. They said that if rockets are going to continue, we're going to hit back disproportionately. We're going to punish you for doing it. And that's not countenanced by the law of war.)
  • Neither Goldstone, the other inquiry members or the panellists responsible for writing the follow-up reports have indicated a wish to withdraw anything the Goldstone Report said about the Dahiya doctrine.
  • In the light of what was written in the initial follow-up reports, Goldstone indicated that, had that information been available at the time, the report named after him wouldn't have concluded that Israel had deliberately targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure during Operation Cast Lead (in the way, presumably, that they believed Israel had done in Lebanon). However, the writers of the follow-up reports have indicated that they believe that Goldstone misused the information contained therein in order to make his retraction. Also, the three other members of the original inquiry have also stated that they believe that their report should stand. (See, for instance: New Statesman, John Dugard article)
  • The Goldstone report was subject to heavy opposition by Israeli and pro-Israeli groups and individuals. As it happens, Goldstone also faced fierce opposition in South Africa, Rwanda and the Balkans, the other countries where he carried out human rights investigations. People in all of those places would probably describe the reports on their respective countries problematic too. But, those are just opinions, and, it looks to me, minority opinions at that.
  • Hopefully, you realise that, just as you find the Goldstone report problematic, others might find the announcements of figures such as Alan Dershowitz, which you introduced to the article, somewhat problematic too (see, for instance: )

Also, given that you stated above that Norman Finkelstein is a "wingnut author", hopefully you are able to discriminate between opinion and fact.

  • Editors here have an obligation to write neutrally, presenting the significant points of view in a balanced way. Tacking a couple of quotes from the anti-Goldstone campaign onto the end of a description of what the Goldstone report says looks to me more like a drive-by defecation than an attempt to write in a balanced way.
    ←   ZScarpia   02:39, 4 May 2011 (UTC) (extended: 17:51, 4 May 2011 (UTC))

The following article doesn't mention the Dahiya doctrine directly (meaning, I'm presenting it for information purposes), but it does discuss the last war in Lebanon, Operation Cast Lead, the Goldstone Report and the targeting of civilians: Richard Forer - Cutting through the confusion about Israel/Palestine, 21 June 2010.     ←   ZScarpia   22:30, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

POV

I was going to ignore it but if a POV check is out of the question then I am just going to say what is wrong:

  • It is hard to tell how it has been received in Israel. Are IDF commanders following through or are we just assuming they are based on biased sources. How widespread is it according to sources that have a reputation for being neutral?
  • One of the sources actually says why it is there. This isn't mentioned in the article. They feel there is good reason. Why is that left out?

Cptnono (talk) 06:55, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

You beat me to it. I was trying to add this -> The article has been POV tagged twice now. The reasons can be listed and discussed below to see whether a tag is necessary. Sean.hoyland - talk 06:58, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

WP:SOFIXIT. If you are unable to address issues through editing then you can tag the article. However, you made no attempt to edit the article. That isnt how things are supposed to work. nableezy - 13:07, 22 June 2011 (UTC)
If you guys want to expand the article, then I am in favour. Just go ahead and add the info you are talking about. I don't think the "why" is left out as Cptnono claims. It very clearly states that the policy is applied in order to achieve deterrence. It's in the very first sentence. If you want to expand that then go ahead.
What is not acceptable is to change the wording into some derivative of "the Dahiya strategy where the IDF attacks infrastructure hijacked by terrorists", as some other users were trying to do. That is clearly not how the doctrine is described by secondary sources. Only online opinion pieces have made this claim. The IDF spokespeople have described the doctrine quite clearly to the Jerusalem Post (secondary source). There is no need to rely on opinion pieces. Poyani (talk) 13:16, 22 June 2011 (UTC)
I am not going to fix it since I am not interested in edit warring. I have provided reasoning for a neutrality tag. So is the reason for removing the tag because it was "drive by" or because I did not edit the article? I asumed actually using the talk page would be a good thing but if you would rather I start editing 1//r is about to end s I can start making massive change. SO massive changes or the talk page? And restore the tag since the clock is ticking and I love AEs regarding battlefield mentality. Reverting, wikilawyering... whatever: There is a case. So how about instead of using the talk page to bicker about why the tag does not belog you actually address the issues already provided in my first comment. They are right there. They are clear. They are easy enough to address. What is the delay unless it is intentional? If you cannot allow a neutrality check tag I doubt I can edit this article anyways. Cptnono (talk) 04:57, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

sources

This article is cited by several academic sources as describing the Dahiya Doctrine, even though it doesn't use the name itself. An example of a source citing it is Eyal Weizman (2010). "Legislative Attack". Theory Culture Society. 27: 11–32.. Another is this. Zero 15:52, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

I don't think they are using INSS as a source for defining the Dahiya Doctrine. I think they are using it as a source with regards to the dis-proportionality of Israel's response. The source Bisharat cited for Dahiya was "Joseph Nasr, Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite Destruction, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNewsidUKTRE4923I020081003" which repeats exactly what this article says, namely "what happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on . . . We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases . . . This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved." Poyani (talk) 18:04, 22 June 2011 (UTC)
The paper of Weizman, after mentioning the 'Dahiya Doctrine' by name, says "The Institute for National Security Studies, a think-tank based in Tel Aviv University, articulated Israel’s possible response in the context of this doctrine" and then quotes from the INSS article. So it really does connect the two (rightly or wrongly). Zero 03:02, 23 June 2011 (UTC)
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