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The Iraq sanctions were a near-total financial and trade embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council on the nation of Iraq. They began August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, stayed largely in force until May 2003 (after Saddam Hussein's being forced from power), and certain portions including reparations to Kuwait persisting later and through the present.

The original stated purposes of the sanctions were to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to pay reparations and to disclose and eliminate any weapons of mass destruction.

Initially the UN Security Council imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq through by adopting and enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 661. After the end of the 1991 Gulf War, those sanctions were extended and elaborated on, including linkage to removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), by Resolution 687. The sanctions banned all trade and financial resources except for medicine and "in humanitarian circumstances" foodstuffs.

Estimates of excess civilian deaths during of the sanctions vary widely, but range from 100,000 to over 1.5 million.

Goals

The UN Resolutions had the express goals of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and extended-range ballistic missiles, prohibiting any support for terrorism, and forcing Iraq to pay war reparations and all foreign debt.

A non-express goal of the sanctions held by some was the removal of Saddam Hussein. It was openly stated in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, expressing a sense of the U.S. Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton, that U.S. policy was to "replace that regime" in Iraq, to force Hussein from power, an outcome not referenced in the resolutions. And in 1991, Paul Lewis wrote in the New York Times: "Ever since the trade embargo was imposed on Aug. 6, after the invasion of Kuwait, the United States has argued against any premature relaxation in the belief that by making life uncomfortable for the Iraqi people it will eventually encourage them to remove President Saddam Hussein from power." The economic sanctions failed to topple Saddam, and may have helped further entrench his rule.

American war policy architect Douglas J. Feith has argued that the sanctions diminished Iraq militarily, in terms of WMDs, and in its capacity for attacks against its neighbors as its supply lines were cut. In a 2004 Foreign Affairs journal article, the scholars George A. Lopez and David Cortright credit sanctions with: "Compelling Iraq to accept inspections and monitoring; winning concessions from Baghdad on political issue such as the border dispute with Kuwait; preventing the rebuilding of Iraqi defenses after the Persian Gulf War; and blocking the import of vital materials and technologies for producing weapons of mass destruction." Cortright and Lopez argue that "the much-maligned UN-enforced sanctions regime actually ... helped destroy Saddam Hussein's war machine and his capacity to produce weapons." Hussein told his FBI interrogator that Iraq's armaments "had been eliminated by the UN sanctions."

Administration

As described by the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following that country’s invasion of Kuwait. This sanctions included strict limits both on the items that could be imported into Iraq and on those that could be exported.

Limitations on Imports

The UN Sanctions Committee issue no complete list of items that could not be imported into Iraq. Instead, it evaluated applications for importing items to Iraq on an individual basis, according to UNSC Resolutions allowing only foodstuffs, medicines and products for essential civilian needs.

Persons wishing to deliver items to Iraq, whether in trade or for charitable donation, were required to apply for export licenses to the authorities of individual UN member states, who then sent the application to the Sanctions Committee. The Committee made its decision in secret, and any one Committee member could veto a permission without giving any reason. As a rule, anything that could have a conceivable military use was banned, such as computers, tractors and trousers, although Committee asserted its sole discretion in determining what is essential for every Iraqi and either permitting or denying any thing to the Iraqi population. If the Committee sent its approval, if granted, to the authorities of the country where the application came from, and that country may then inform the applicant who may then ship the items.

Limitations on Exports and the Oil For Food Programme

Limitations on Iraqi exports (chiefly oil) made it difficult to fund the import of goods into Iraq. Following the 1991 Gulf War, a United Nations inter-agency mission assessed that "the Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met." The Government of Iraq declined offers (in UNSRC resolutions 706 and 712) to enable Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to meet its people's needs. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council established the Oil for Food Programme via resolution 986 on 14 April 1995 as intended a "temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions...". Implementation of the Programme started in December 1996; its first shipment of supplies arrived in March 1997. The Programme was funded exclusively with the proceeds from Iraqi oil exports. At first, Iraq was permitted to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months, with two-thirds of that amount to be used to meet Iraq’s humanitarian needs. In 1998, the limit was raised to $5.26 billion every six months. In December 1999, the Security Council removed the limit on the amount of oil exported.

Allocation of Export Proceeds

Iraqi oil export proceeds were allocated as follows:

• 72% was allocated to the humanitarian Programme
• 25% was allocated to the Compensation Fund for war reparation payments
• 2.2% for United Nations administrative and operational costs
• 0.8% for the weapons inspection programme.

Of the 72% allocated to humanitarian purposes:

• 59% was earmarked for the contracting of supplies and equipment by the Government of Iraq for the 15 central and southern governorates.
• 13% for the three northern governorates, where the United Nations implemented the Programme on behalf of the Government of Iraq.

Enforcement of Sanctions

Enforcement of the sanctions was primarily by means of military force and legal sanctions. A Multinational Interception Force was organized and lead by the United States to intercept, inspect and possibly impound vessels, cargoes and crews suspected of carrying freight to or from Iraq. While the UN Sanctions Committee did not issue a complete list of items banned from import to Iraq, among the imports intercepted by the MIF were shipments of pencils, hubcaps and brassieres.

The legal side of sanctions were enforcement through actions brought by individual governments. In the United States, legal enforcement was handled by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). For example, in 2005 OFAC fined Voices in the Wilderness $20,000 for gifting medicine and other humanitarian supplies to Iraqis. In a similar case, OFAC is still attempting to collect (as of 2011) a $10,000 fine, plus interest, against Bert Sacks for bringing medicine to residents of Basra.

Effects on the Iraqi people during sanctions

High rates of malnutrition, lack of medical supplies, and diseases from lack of clean water were reported during sanctions; at least some of which results were anticipated in advance of the imposition of sanctions.

The modern Iraqi economy had been highly dependent on oil exports: In 1989, the oil sector comprised 61% of the GNP. A major drawback of this over-dependence has been the narrowing of the economic base during the last three decades, with the agricultural sector rapidly declining in the 1970s. So some claim that the post-1990 sanctions had a particularly devastating effect on Iraq’s economy and food security levels of the population.

Shortly after the sanctions were imposed, the Iraqi government developed a system of free food rations consisting of 1000 calories per person/day or 40% of the daily requirements, which an estimated 60% of the population relied on for a vital part of their sustenance. With the introduction of the Oil-for-Food Programme in 1997, this situation gradually improved. In May 2000 a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) survey noted that almost half the children under 5 years suffered from diarrhoea, in a country where the population is marked by its youth, with 45% being under 14 years of age in 2000. Power shortages, lack of spare parts and insufficient technical know-how lead to the breakdown of many modern facilities.

The overall literacy rate in Iraq had been 78% in 1977 and 87% for adult women by 1985, but declined rapidly since then. Between 1990 and 1998, over one fifth of Iraqi children stopped enrolling in school, consequently increasing the number of non-literates and losing all the gains made in the previous decade. The 1990s also saw a dramatic increase in child labor, from a virtually non-existent level in the 1980s. The per capita income in Iraq dropped from $3510 in 1989 to $450 in 1996, heavily influenced by the rapid devaluation of the Iraqi dinar.

Iraq had been one of the few countries in the Middle East that invested in women’s education. But this situation changed from the late eighties on with increasing militarisation and a declining economic situation. Consequently the economic hardships and war casualties in the last decades have increased the number of women-headed households and working women.

Researcher Richard Garfield estimated that "a minimum of 100,000 and a more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among young children from August 1991 through March 1998" from all causes including sanctions. Other estimates have ranged as low as 170,000 children. UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy said that

if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998. As a partial explanation, she pointed to a March statement of the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues which states: "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war."

Chlorine is commonly used to purify water, but because it can also be used to make poisonous chlorine gas, the sanctions regime included banning its manufacture under any conditions throughout Iraq and its import severely restricted. Department of Defense studies indicated a high likelihood that this would result in many civilian deaths. David Sole, of the Detroit Water & Sewerage Department, argued that because high rates of diseases from lack of clean water followed the Gulf War and sanctions, liquid chlorine should be sent to Iraq to disinfect water supplies.

Denis Halliday was appointed United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Baghdad, Iraq as of 1 September 1997, at the Assistant Secretary-General level. In October 1998 he resigned after a 34 year career with the UN in order to have the freedom to criticise the sanctions regime, saying "I don't want to administer a programme that satisfies the definition of genocide" However Sophie Boukhari a UNESCO Courier journalist reports that "Some legal experts are skeptical about or even against using such terminology." and quotes Mario Bettati (who invented the notion of "the right of humanitarian intervention") "People who talk like that don’t know anything about law. The embargo has certainly affected the Iraqi people badly, but that’s not at all a crime against humanity or genocide." and reports that William Bourdon the secretary-general of International Federation of Human Rights Leagues said "one of the key elements of a crime against humanity and of genocide is intent. The embargo wasn’t imposed because the United States and Britain wanted children to die. If you think so, you have to prove it."

Halliday's successor, Hans von Sponeck, subsequently also resigned in protest, calling the effects of the sanctions a "true human tragedy". Jutta Burghardt, head of the World Food Program in Iraq, followed them.

Estimates of deaths during sanctions

Estimates of excess deaths during sanctions vary depending on the source. The estimates vary due to differences in methodologies, and specific time-frames covered. A short listing of estimates follows:

• Unicef: 500,000 children (including sanctions, collateral effects of war). " hildren under 5 years of age are dying at more than twice the rate they were ten years ago."
• Former U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq Denis Halliday: "Two hundred thirty-nine thousand children 5 years old and under" as of 1998.
• Iraqi Baathist government: 1.5 million.
• Iraqi Cultural Minister Hammadi: 1.7 million (includes sanctions, bombs and other weapons, depleted uranium poisoning)
• "probably ... 170,000 children", Project on Defense Alternatives, "The Wages of War", 20. October 2003
• 350,000 excess deaths among children "even using conservative estimates", Slate Explainer, "Are 1 Million Children Dying in Iraq?", 9. October 2001.
• Economist Michael Spagat: "very likely to be than half a million children." He claims that these estimates are unable to isolate the effects of sanctions alone due to the lack of "anything resembling a controlled experiment".
• "Richard Garfield, a Columbia University nursing professor ... cited the figures 345,000-530,000 for the entire 1990-2002 period" for sanctions-related excess deaths.
• Zaidi, S. and Fawzi, M. C. S., The Lancet (1995, estimate withdrawn in 1997):567,000 children.
• Editor (then "associate editor and media columnist") Matt Welch, Reason Magazine, 2002: "It seems awfully hard not to conclude that the embargo on Iraq has ... contributed to more than 100,000 deaths since 1990."
• Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark: 1.5 million (includes sanctions, bombs and other weapons, depleted uranium poisoning).
• British Member of Parliament George Galloway: "a million Iraqis, most of them children."

Infant and child death rates

A May 25, 2000 BBC article reported that before Iraq sanctions were imposed by the UN in 1990, infant mortality had "fallen to 47 per 1,000 live births between 1984 and 1989. This compares to approximately 7 per 1,000 in the UK." The BBC article was reporting from a study of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, titled "Sanctions and childhood mortality in Iraq", that was published in the May 2000 Lancet medical journal. The study concluded that in southern and central Iraq, infant mortality rate between 1994 and 1999 had risen to 108 per 1,000. Child mortality rate, which refers to children between the age of one and five years, also drastically inclined from 56 to 131 per 1,000. In the autonomous northern region during the same period, infant mortality declined from 64 to 59 per 1000 and under-5 mortality fell from 80 to 72 per 1000, which was attributed to better food and resource allocation.

The Lancet publication was the result of two separate surveys by UNICEF between February and May 1999 in partnership with the local authorities and with technical support by the WHO. "The large sample sizes - nearly 24,000 households randomly selected from all governorates in the south and center of Iraq and 16,000 from the north - helped to ensure that the margin of error for child mortality in both surveys was low," UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy said.

In the spring of 2000 a U.S. Congressional letter demanding the lifting of the sanctions garnered 71 signatures, while House Democratic Whip David Bonior called the economic sanctions against Iraq "infanticide masquerading as policy."

Oil for Food

As the sanctions faced mounting criticism of its humanitarian impacts, several UN resolutions were introduced that allowed Iraq to trade its oil for goods such as food and medicines. The earliest of these resolutions were introduced in 1991.

UN Resolution 706 of 15 August 1991 was introduced to allow the sale of Iraqi oil in exchange for food. UN Resolution 712 of 19 September 1991 confirmed that Iraq could sell up to $1.6 billion US in oil to fund an Oil For Food program.

Iraq was in 1996 allowed under the UN Oil-for-Food Programme (under Security Council Resolution 986) to export $5.2 billion (USD) of oil every 6 months with which to purchase items needed to sustain the civilian population. After an initial refusal, Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in May 1996 for arrangements for the implementation of that resolution to be taken. The Oil-for-Food Programme started in October 1997, and the first shipments of food arrived in March 1998. Twenty-five percent of the proceeds were redirected to a Persian Gulf War reparations account,and three percent into United Nations programs related to Iraq. While the programme is creditted with improving the conditions of the population, Denis Halliday who oversaw the it believed it inadequate to compensate for the adverse humanitarian impacts of the sanctions.

The U.S. State Department criticized the Iraqi government for inadequately spending this money:

In a stinging letter issued recently, the United Nations has pointed out the extent of Saddam Hussein's callous disregard for the welfare of his own people. ... In the ... six-month phase of the program (June to December, 2000), Saddam Hussein's dereliction in providing for the Iraqi people and the nation's economy is laid bare.

During this period, US$7.8 billion were available to Iraq for purchases during this period, yet Iraq submitted purchase applications worth only US$4.26 billion - barely 54 percent of the amount available for purchases to help the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.

In 2004/5 the Programme became the subject of major media attention over corruption, as allegations surfaced such as that Iraq had systematically sold allocations of oil at below-market prices in return for some of the proceeds from the resale outside the scope of the programme; Multiple investigations implicated individuals and companies from dozens of countries were implicated. See Oil For Food Programme - Investigations.

Lifting of sanctions

Following the 2003 Iraq War, the sanctions regime were largely ended on May 22, 2003 (with certain exceptions related to arms and to oil revenue) by paragraph 10 of UN Security Council Resolution 1483.

Sanctions which gave the USA and UK control over Iraq's oil revenue were not removed until December 2010. Sanctions which require 5% of Iraq's oil and natural gas revenue to be paid to Kuwait as reparations for Saddam Hussain's invasion are still in effect.

Controversies

Culpability

Scholar Ramon Das, published in Human Rights Research Journal of the New Zealand Center for Public Law, examined each of the "most widely accepted ethical frameworks" in the context of violations of Iraqi human rights under the sanctions, finding that "primary responsibility rests with the UNSC " under these frameworks, including rights-utilitarianism, moral Kantianism, and consequentialism.

Regional-difference-grounded culpability debate

The Lancet and Unicef studies observed that child mortality decreased in the north and increased in the south/center between 1994 and 1999 but did not attempt to explain the disparity, or to apportion culpability: "Both the Government of Iraq and the U.N. Sanctions Committee should give priority to contracts for supplies that will have a direct impact on the well-being of children," UNICEF said. However, others did attempt to explain this disparity, or use this to apportion culpability.

• Michael Rubin argued that the Kurdish and the Iraqi governments handled Oil For Food aid differently, and that therefore the Iraqi government policy, rather than the Sanctions themsevles, should be held responsible for any negative effects. David Cortright said that Iraq must "share responsibility."
• Matt Welch and Anthony Arnove argued that the differences in results noted by authors such as Rubin (above) may have been because the sanctions were not the same in the two parts of Iraq, due to several sorts of regional differences: in the per capita money, in agriculture, in war damage to infrastructure and in the relative ease of evading sanctions due to differences in border porousity, and that therefore the differences in results do not free the sanctions from some culpability.

• A third side of this controversy is taken by economist Michael Spagat, who argued that there may not have been excess mortality greater than 500,000 in the areas controlled by the Iraq Government, because that government interfered with objective collection of statistics. Iraq denied UN requests to admit independent experts to assess living conditions. and that therefore there is nothing to be culpable about.

• Scholar Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies stated that "all infant and child mortality figures" came from uncredible Iraq agencies. Leitenberg concluded that any problems were "not due to the sanctions directly" but rather to how Iraq spent its money "under constrained circumstances" pointing particularly to "its WMD programs."

Arguments about the sanctions and the Iraq War

There is a controversy about the relationship between sanctions and the 2003 Iraq War. Some persons, such as Walter Russell Mead, accepted a large estimate of casualties due to sanctions, but argued that invading Iraq was better than continuing the sanctions regime, since "Each year of containment is a new Gulf War." Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his testimony to the Chilcot Inquiry, also argued that ending sanctions was one benefit of the war.

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, who called the sanctions "the most intrusive system of arms control in history", cited the breakdown of the sanctions as one cause or rationale for the Iraq war. While UN resolutions subsequent to the cessation of hostilities during the Persian Gulf War imposed several requisite responsibilities on Iraq for the removal of sanctions, the largest focus remained on the regime's development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and in particular its laggard participation in the UNSCOM-led disarmament process required of it. The goal of several western governments had been that the disruptive effects of war and sanction would lead to a critical situation in which Iraqis would in some way effect "regime change", a removal of Saddam Hussein and his closest allies from power.

Albright Interview

On May 12, 1996, Madeleine Albright (then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations) appeared on a 60 Minutes segment in which Lesley Stahl asked her "We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?" and Albright replied "we think the price is worth it." Albright wrote later that Saddam Hussein, not the sanctions, was to blame. She criticized Stahl's segment as "amount to Iraqi propaganda"; said that her question was a loaded question; wrote "I had fallen into a trap and said something I did not mean"; and regretted coming "across as cold-blooded and cruel". The segment won an Emmy Award. Albright's "non-denial" was taken by sanctions opponents as confirmation of a high number of sanctions related casualties.

Reactions to sanctions

There is evidence that the Iraqi government did not fully cooperate with the sanctions. For example, Hussein's son-in-law is heard speaking of concealing information from UN inspectors on audiotapes released in 2006. "I go back to the question of whether we should reveal everything or continue to be silent. Sir, since the meeting has taken this direction, I would say it is in our interest not to reveal." Hussein may have considered the many governments' displeasure with him, but particularly that of two veto-wielding UNSC members, the United States and United Kingdom (both of which took the hardest lines on Iraq), as a no-win situation and disincentive to cooperation in the process.

It has been alleged that UNSCOM had been infiltrated by British and American spies for purposes other than determining if Iraq possessed WMDs. Former inspector Scott Ritter was a prominent source of these charges. Former UNSCOM chief inspector David Kay said "the longer it continued, the more the intelligence agencies would, often for very legitimate reasons, decide that they had to use the access they got through cooperation with UNSCOM to carry out their missions.".

Saddam, who saw all this as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty, became less cooperative and more obstructive of UNSCOM activities as the years wore on, and refused access for several years beginning in August 1998. Ultimately Saddam condemned the US for enforcing the sanctions through the UN and demanded nothing less than unconditional lifting of all sanctions on its country, including the weapons sanctions. The US and UN refused to do so out of concern that Saddam's regime would rebuild its once-powerful military and renew its WMD programs with the trade revenues.

Douglas Feith reports that in 2001 "before the 9/11 attack, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell advocated diluting the multinational economic sanctions, in the hope that a weaker set of sanctions could win stronger and more sustained international support." Renewed pressure in 2002 led to the entry of UNMOVIC, which received some degree of cooperation but failed to declare Iraq's disarmament immediately prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for which it was withdrawn and became inactive in Iraq.

In the 2004 Osama bin Laden video, Osama Bin Laden cited retribution for the sanctions as one of the motivations for the September 11 attacks.

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External links and References

• Geoffrey Leslie Simons (1996). The scourging of Iraq: sanctions, law, and natural justice. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 9780312215194.
• "UNICEF : Questions and Answers for the Iraq child mortality surveys". Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI) Website - Unofficial publication. 16 Aug 1999. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
• U.S. Department of State, Released September 13, 1999 (updated 2/23/00), "Saddam Hussein's Iraq"
• David Edwards, Zmag, 3 March 2000, Interview with Denis Halliday
• Rubin, Michael (2001-06-07). "Sulaymaniyah Dispatch: Food Fight". The New Republic. Archived from the original on 2001-06-22.
• David Cortright, "A Hard Look at Iraq Sanctions". The Nation, November 2001.
• Welch, Matt (March 2002). "The Politics of Dead Children: Have sanctions against Iraq murdered millions?". Reason magazine.
• Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2003, "Iraq: U.N. Sanctions"
• The Daily Telegraph, 25 May 2003, "Saddam's parades of dead babies are exposed as a cynical charade"
• John Pilger, New Statesman, 4 October 2004, on why we ignored Iraq in the 1990s, and Impact of Iraq sanctions
• IRIN News, news agency of the UN OCHA agency, looks again at the figures (August 2005): IRAQ: Child mortality rates finally dropping
• In These Times, Christopher Hayes, March 6, 2006, "Were Sanctions Worth the Price?"
• Wright, Steven (2007). The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror. Ithaca Press. ISBN 978-0863723216.
• Gordon, Joy (2010). Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. Harvard. ISBN 978-0674035713.
• Spagat, Michael (2010 September). "Truth and death in Iraq under sanctions" (PDF). Significance (journal). {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
• How Thirteen Years of US-Imposed (sic) Economic Sanctions Devastated Iraq Before the 2003 Invasion - video report by Democracy Now!

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