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The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Template:Lang-fa / Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, or Sepāh for short), often called Revolutionary Guards, is a branch of Iran's military, founded after the Iranian revolution to prevent internal dissident and military uprisings. The IRGC has 125,000 military personnel including ground, air and naval forces. It also controls the paramilitary Basij militia which has 90,000 active personnel, and in recent years has developed into a "multibillion-dollar business empire," and is reportedly the "third-wealthiest organization in Iran" after the National Iranian Oil Company and the Imam Reza Endowment.

Since its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its expanded social, political, military, and economic role under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration — especially during the 2009 presidential election and post-election suppression of protest — has led many analysts to argue that its political power has surpassed even that of the Shiite clerical system.

The Chief Commander of the Guardians is Mohammad Ali Jafari, who was preceded by Yahya Rahim Safavi.

Terminology

In Iran, due to the frequent use of referencing government organizations with one word names (that generally denotes their function) as opposed to acronyms or shortened versions, the entire general populace universally refer to the organization as Sepāh (Army). Although Artesh also means army as well, Sepāh has a connotation that is more security driven as opposed to Artesh, which is more militaristic, and henceforth, is used to refer to the general Armed Forces. However the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify to the organization generally use Sepāh e Pāsdārān (Army of Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear Pāsdārān e Enqelāb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply Pāsdārān (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well.

Because the Basij is the only part of the organization that is visible on a daily basis, and the ones that suppress internal unrest (i.e. Protests, civil disobedience, etc.), many Iranians also informally use the term to refer to the Revolutionary Guards as well.

Most foreign Governments and the English-speaking mass media usually use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards ("IRG") or simply the Revolutionary Guards. In the US media, the force is frequently referred to as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), although this force is rarely described as a "corps" by non-US media.

Organization

The force's main role is in national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also Iran's missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations. The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles.

The IRGC is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy, air force, intelligence, and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia, which has a potential strength of eleven million. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of the Iran's military, which is called Artesh (another Persian word for army).

History and Structure

The IRGC was formed in May 1979 as a force loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but later became a full military force alongside the army in the Iran–Iraq War. The force (at least in theory) only reports to the Supreme Leader, and does not report to the president.

Much of the internal structure within the organization remains unclear and is possibly subject to frequent change depending on the political situation within the country. As a result, the IRGC has vastly evolved from its original purpose. It was founded alongside the Regular Armed Forces to prevent a military coup during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but as internal opposition grew against the regime and the Iran-Iraq War during the 80's proving disastrous for the regular Armed forces, it was reorganized to protect the regime from external and internal forces while at the same time, exporting Islamic Movements to other countries as well. After the death of Khomeini however (and possible dissatisfaction with Khamenei), the IRGC began to take on its own control rather than taking orders directly from the Supreme Leader and began taking control over the country itself. Though it tolerated no dissident, it left suppressing it to the former Basij Militia, which was reorganized to combat internal unrest. It rarely cooperates with other government agencies, never discloses its operations and finances to oversight ministries, and is immune from prosecution in courts.

As the younger generation have taken control of the IRGC, the top echelons of power within the organization which consisted largely of protesters against the Shah's regime and clerics close to Ayatollah Khomeini have been replaced with veterans of the Iran-Iraq War. Because of this, the foundations of the IRGC have also changed, from being a force used to establish an Islamic State and imposing the control of the Supreme Leader, to a military force largely distrustful of outside influences and preventing external threats alongside exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution to other countries, which includes financing Hamas and Hezbollah. Because of the heavy losses sustained during the Iran-Iraq War (particularly the human wave attacks) which were largely blamed on formations and decisions made by Ayatollah's with no familiarity with combat strategies, the IRGC have apparently removed Clerics from most upper level military positions and replaced them with non-clerical commanders more familiar with modern day war tactics. The recent replacement of Radical conservatives in the IRGC leadership with moderate conservatives, particularly in regards of Mohammad Ali Jafari taking over from Yahya Rahim Safavi seems to confirm this.

Military Structure

The Revolutionary Guards have a rather unusual military tactic in regards to national defense. Although the regular armed forces are the primary force for defending against external threats and even mandated in the constitution, their command remains largely limited to the regional capitals, and air defense. Everything else, even the Navy, is mandated by the Revolutionary Guards. For example, should a foreign power attempt to attack Iran, the regular military would be used to combat the initial onslaught (such as border wars and air raids), while as the war progresses, the Revolutionary Guards would be used to prevent an advance and be used to combat military action within the country. This system was most likely adopted after the Iran-Iraq war, largely due to the failure of the regular armed forces being able to maintain superiority. The regular military is consisted of conscripts and aging commanders and is widely subject to desertion or failure to follow orders. The Revolutionary Guards however contain soldiers who are much more dedicated and trained than their army counterparts, and is able to offset this.

Basij

The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. The Basij are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics." Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and more famously morals policing and the suppression of dissident gatherings.

Quds Force

The elite Ghods (or Quds) Force, sometimes described as the successor to the Shah's Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000-5,000 in number. It is a special operations unit, handling activities abroad. The United States describes it as a terrorist organization that backs terrorists in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps

Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps is primarily responsible for the protection of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top officials of government. But as an elite, secretive force within the IRGC, its officers are entrusted with many other special assignments, including those in the area of weapons of mass of destruction and terrorist activities beyond Iran’'s borders.

Training

Most of the Iranian public are not readily permitted to join the IRGC and the current Membership either consists of war veterans or children of clerics and veterans who have been trained from birth to work for the organization. As the life of Islamic Republic has extended, much of the combatants do originate from the latter, while leadership comes from the former. Those who are raised from birth are from families affiliated with the IRGC and while they may live with the general population, they are generally on military bases and do not go to school with other Iranian Students. Their education comes either from military officers who provide technical information, and clerics who provide religious education. Nevertheless, their education does primarily consist of recognizing that "performing the Supreme Leader's wishes is similar obedience to God". They undergo this training until the age of 13-16 when they are put through weapons training and may be given assignments, after which they reach adulthood do they become ranking combatants. Most IRGC combatants are not affiliated with any political organization and are expected to serve until retirement.

In the regime's early years, the IRGC largely consisted of protesters and opponents of the former Shah's regime, but because of heavy losses during the war with Iraq and their poor military record, most of the early leadership have been removed, purged, or faded into obscurity.

Size

The IISS Military Balance 2007 says the IRGC has 125,000+ personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation. It estimates the IRGC Ground and Air Forces are 100,000 strong and is 'very lightly manned' in peacetime. It estimates there are up to 20 infantry divisions, some independent brigades, and one airborne brigade.

The IISS estimates the IRGC Naval Forces are 20,000 strong including 5,000 Marines in one brigade of three or four Marine Battalions., and are equipped with some coastal defence weapons (some HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker SSM batteries and some artillery batteries) and 50 patrol boats (including 10 Chinese Houdang fast attack craft). The IRGC air arm, says the IISS, controls Iran's strategic missile force and has an estimated one brigade of Shahab-1/2 with 12-18 launchers, and a Shahab-3 unit. The IISS says of the Shahab-3 unit 'estimated 1 battalion with estimated 6 single launchers each with estimated 4 Shahab-3 strategic IRBM.'

Senior commanders

• Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari (Commander-in-chief)
• Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Chief of the Joint Staff)
• Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Zahedi (Revolutionary Guards' Ground Forces)
• Brigadier General Hossein Salami (Revolutionary Guards' Air Force)
• Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi (Revolutionary Guards' Navy)
• Brigadier General Mohammadreza Naqdi (Commander-in-chief of the Mobilized Basij forces)
• Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani (Quds Force) General Soleimani was responsible for negotiating several accords between Iraqi political figures.
• Brigadier General Abdol-Ali Najafi (Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps)

Combat History

Iran–Iraq War

Lebanon Civil War

During the Lebanese Civil War, the IRGC allegedly sent troops to train fighters in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC's presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the Lebanese Forces, Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the PSP and Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to serve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.

Allegations of terrorism

Former CIA officer, Robert Baer, claims significant Pasdaran involvement in various terrorist activities ranging from the 1983 United States Embassy bombing in Beirut to the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airlines flight 422. Kidnapped U.S. citizens were allegedly held at Pasdaran's Shaykh Barracks in the Balabakk.

The 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires and the 1994 AMIA Bombing also in Buenos Aires, Argentina, for which the Argentinian government issued an arrest warrant for Imad Mugniyah of Hezbollah, have been linked to Iran. According to Robert Baer, Mugniyah was an IRGC operative, and close ties between IRGC and Hezbollah are described elsewhere in this article. According to Jeffery Goldberg, writing in the New Yorker, "It is believed that Mugniyah takes orders from the office of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, but that he reports to a man named Ghassem Soleimani, the chief of a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps called Al Quds, or the Jerusalem Force—the arm of the Iranian government responsible for sponsoring terror attacks on Israeli targets."

Destruction of Pan Am 103

Pasdarn has been alleged to have been involved in the destruction of Pan Am 103, and the CIA claimed that a telephone call had been received to that effect as early as 22 December 1988, a week before Lockerbie was announced as a bombing.

2006 Lebanon War

During the 2006 Lebanon War, the IRGC played a key role. Revolutionary Guards directed the firing of a missile on the Israeli Naval vessel INS Hanit, which killed four sailors. This vessel was responsible for bombing targets in Beirut. Revolutionary Guards also assisted Hezbollah in the firing of rockets into Israel. During the war, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border.

2006 plane crash

In January 2006, an IRGC Falcon crashed near Oroumieh. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders. Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander.

Possible attacks on Quds Force

On July 7, 2008, Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh wrote an article in the New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a Presidential Finding authorizing the CIA's Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the Quds Force, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and “high-value targets” in the President’s war on terror.

October 2009 Pishin bombing

In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni resistance group, Jundullah claimed this attack, although Jundallah, officially designated as a terrorist group by the US state department, is widely believed to be secretly financed by the US government and CIA.

Influence

Political

Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country's military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the "guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements" which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him. The IRGC grew stronger under President Ahmedinejad, and assumed formal command of the Basiji militia in early 2009.

Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.

As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have influence in Iran's political world. President Ahmadinejad joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans. Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran's Majlis in 2004 are also "Pásdárán". Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats. However, IRGC veteran status does not imply a single viewpoint.

In the days before the 2009 presidential election, the Revolutionary Guard warned against a "velvet revolution" and vowed to crush any attempt at one. Three weeks after the election the Guard's commander, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, "publicly acknowledged they had taken over the nation's security during the post-election unrest" and called this `a revival of the revolution,` in a press conference. Another Guard general Yadollah Javani, stated that there would be no middle ground in the dispute over the election results, there being only two currents -- "those who defend and support the revolution and the establishment, and those who are trying to topple it."

Several sources have commented on increased power of the Guard following the election, saying that "it appears that the military likely will become the strongest stakeholder" in Iran, that "many Iranians" fear "the outcome of the election was just a thinly-veiled military coup" by the Guard, or even that Iran has now become a "regular military security government" with only "a facade of a Shiite clerical system.”

On 5 July 2011 the head of the Guard (Mohammad Ali Jaffari) declared former president Mohammad Khatami unfit to return to Iranian politics. This vetting power was traditionally the purview of the Guardian Council, but two days later the highest judicial authority of Iran, (Sadegh Larijani) issued a statement in support of Jaffari saying “the responsibility of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards been based in the constitution ... " and includes all activities necessary for the “defense of Islam ..."

Economic activity

IRGC first expanded into commercial activity through informal social networking of veterans and former officials. IRGC officials confiscated assets of many refugees who had fled Iran after the fall of the Bani-sadr regime. It is now a vast conglomerate, controlling Iran’s missile batteries and nuclear program but also a multibillion-dollar business empire reaching almost all economic sectors. It is thought to control around a third of Iran's economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts.

The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction. IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects. As enforcers of cross border activities, the IRGC has maintained a monopoly on smuggling, arresting competitors and controlling the vast bulk of the Iranian alcohol, tobacco, opium, etc. industries. As enforcers of Iranian moral codes, the IRGC uses its power to control prostitution rackets as well. It runs laser eye-surgery clinics, makes cars, builds bridges and roads, develops gas and oil fields and controls black-market smuggling.

The following commercial entities have been named by the United States as owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders.

• Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC’s major engineering arm & one of Iran’s largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects worth over $7 billion in 2006.
• Oriental Oil Kish (oil and gas industry),
• Ghorb Nooh,
• Sahel Consultant Engineering,
• Ghorb-e Karbala,
• Sepasad Engineering Co., (excavation and tunnel construction).
• Omran Sahel,
• Hara Company (excavation and tunnel construction),
• Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem.
• Caisson Construction Company ( Foreign Branch, active in Venezuela)

In September 2009, the Government of Iran sold 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin), a group affiliated with the Guards, for the sum of $7.8 billion. This was the largest transaction on the Tehran Stock Exchange in history. IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran's naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.

The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency. The IRGC exerts informal, but real, influence over many such organizations including:

• Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation)
• Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs)

Controversy

From its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its part in suppressing dissent has led many analysts to describe the events surrounding the 12 June 2009 presidential election as a military coup, and the IRGC as an authoritarian military security government for which its Shiite clerical system is no more than a facade.

Since its establishment, IRGC has been involved in many economic and military activities among which some raised controversies. The organization has been accused of smuggling — including importing illegal alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and satellite dishes, into Iran via jetties not supervised by the Government. — training Hezbollah and Hamas fighters, and has been accused by the US government of being involved in the Iraq War.

In December 2009 evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy's body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran's militia groups in Iraq.

According to Geneive Abdo IRGC members were appointed "as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions" during the administration of president Ahmadinejad Appointments in 2009 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have given "hard-liners" in the guard "unprecedented power" and included "some of the most feared and brutal men in Iran."

See also

• Ali Movahedi-Kermani
• Ali-Reza Asgari
• Composite Index of National Capability
• Islamic Republic of Iran Army

References and notes

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1. IISS Military Balance 2006, Routledge for the IISS, London, 2006, p.187
2. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran, Columbia University Press, 2008 p.175-6
3. ^ Michael Slackman (2009-07-21). "Hard-Line Force Extends Grip Over a Splintered Iran". New York Times. Retrieved 2009-07-21.
4. Iran's Basij Force -- The Mainstay Of Domestic Security. January 15, 2009
5. Frykberg, MelL (2008-08-29). "Mideast Powers, Proxies and Paymasters Bluster and Rearm". Middle East Times. Retrieved 2008-08-29. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
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8. ^ GENEIVE ABDO (2009-10-07). "The Rise of the Iranian Dictatorship". Foreign Policy (magazine). Retrieved 2009-10-13.
9. Someone said, 'Lads, I think we're going to be executed' 7 April 2007
10. Brainroom Facts: Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Friday, March 23, 2007
11. Newsweek, (dead link)
12. Why Iran Seized the British Marines, By Howard Chua-Eoan/New York, Mar. 23, 2007
13. ^ http://www.janes.co.uk/defence/news/jwar/jwar060829_1_n.shtml
14. Janes international security news (dead link)
15. ICL - Iran - Constitution
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17. ^ Iran: New chief appointed for secretive military unit
18. IISS Military Balance 2006, Routledge for the IISS, London, 2007
19. See the Yahoo Groups TOE Group for an estimated Iranian ground force order of battle.
20. The IISS estimates the IRGC Naval Forces are 20,000 strong including 5,000 Marines (one brigade),
21. Mideast Powers, Proxies and Paymasters Bluster and Rearm
23. ^ http://www.khamenei.ir/EN/Message/detail.jsp?id=20060121A
24. Iran to hold large-scale naval war games
25. Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij Mobilisation Resistance Force
26. Iran Revolutionary Guards expect key changes in high command
27. frontline: terror and Tehran: inside Iran: the structure of power in Iran | PBS
28. Baer, Robert: See No Evil, Crown, New York (2002)
29. ibid, p. 131
30. ibid p. 81
31. Goldberg, Jeffrey: In the Party of God, 'New Yorker' October 28, 2002 on-line at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/10/28/021028fa_fact2?currentPage=all
32. Zeev Schiff Israel's War With Iran New York Times 2006
33. Iran’s top military commanders die in plane crash
34. Plane crash kills Iran commander
35. Hersh, Seymour (2008-07-07). "Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran". The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all.
36. "Iranian commanders assassinated"
37. "Profile: Iran's Revolutionary Guards"
38. http://en.wikipedia.org/Jundallah.
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40. ^ Iran's Revolutionary Guard acknowledges taking a bigger role in nation's security By Borzou Daragahi. July 6, 2009. accessed 9-July-2009
41. "18 of Iran's 21 new ministers hail from Revolutionary Guards, secret police". Iran Focus. 2005-08-14. Retrieved 2009-07-22.
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43. Iranian Revolutionary Guard won't tolerate 'velvet revolution' John Lyons, Tehran | June 12, 2009. accessed 9-July-2009
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51. Iran's Rev. Guard buys stake in Iran telecom September 27, 2009
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55. Iran's Revolutionary Guards: Showing who's boss
56. Iran's resilient opposition: The regime's ramparts are shaky
57. The Iran Agenda by Reese Erlich, Robert (FRW) Scheer
58. (Baer, R, See No Evil, 2002, Three Rivers Press, page 250)
59. Mark Mazzetti, "Striking Deep Into Israel, Hamas Employs an Upgraded Rocket Arsenal," New York Times, January 1, 2009.
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Further reading

• Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-970-3. (discusses U.S. military clashes with Iranian Revolutionary Guard during the Iran–Iraq War)
• Wehrey; et al. (2009). The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Santa Monica, Calif.: National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation. ISBN 9780833046208. {{cite book}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |author= (help) also available for free download in full or a brief summary

External links

Background

• The Rise of the Pasdaran, Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s - RAND Corporation

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Réalité-EU (2007-04-02)
• Ali Alfoneh The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008
• Pasdaran - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) GlobalSecurity.org
• Greg Bruno (2009-06-22) Iran's Revolutionary Guards Council on Foreign Relations

IRGC

• published by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian)
• Official media news outlet used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian)

General

• Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari (2004-12-13) Foxes in Iran's Henhouse, New York Times Op-Ed article about the growing IRGC role in Iran's power structure
• Steven R. Hurst, Associated Press (2007-01-24) U.S. Envoy: Iran Revolutionary Guards Ghods Force Director Detained IranFocus.com
• Yoshie (2007-11-20) Guardians of the Revolution Critical Montages Blog post
• David Ignatius (2008-04-17) A Blast Still Reverberating Washington Post Discussion of 1983 Beirut US Embassy bombing
• Iran Electoral Archive - Guardians of the Islamic Revolution

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