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{{about|the theory of congestion pricing and its use with airports, public transport and utilities, roads, waterways and other sectors|congestion pricing as applied to road traffic specifically|Road pricing}} {{about|the theory of congestion pricing and its use with airports, public transport and utilities, roads, waterways and elsewhere|congestion pricing as applied to road traffic specifically|Road pricing}}
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Revision as of 08:09, 21 April 2012

This article is about the theory of congestion pricing and its use with airports, public transport and utilities, roads, waterways and elsewhere. For congestion pricing as applied to road traffic specifically, see Road pricing.
London Heathrow Airport, one of the world's most congested airports.
Typical traffic congestion in an urban freeway. Shown here I-80 Eastshore Freeway, Berkeley, United States.

Congestion pricing or congestion charges is a system of surcharging users of a transport network in periods of peak demand to reduce traffic congestion. Examples include some toll-like road pricing fees, and higher peak charges for utilities, public transport and slots in canals and airports. This variable pricing strategy regulates demand, making it possible to manage congestion without increasing supply. Market economics theory, which encompasses the congestion pricing concept, postulates that users will be forced to pay for the negative externalities they create, making them conscious of the costs they impose upon each other when consuming during the peak demand, and more aware of their impact on the environment.

The application on urban roads is currently limited to a small number of cities, including London, Stockholm, Singapore, and Milan, as well as a few smaller towns. Four general types of systems are in use; a cordon area around a city center, with charges for passing the cordon line; area wide congestion pricing, which charges for being inside an area; a city center toll ring, with toll collection surrounding the city; and corridor or single facility congestion pricing, where access to a lane or a facility is priced.

Implementation of congestion pricing has reduced congestion in urban areas, but has also sparked criticism and public discontent. Critics maintain that congestion pricing is not equitable, places an economic burden on neighboring communities, has a negative effect on retail businesses and on economic activity in general, and is just another tax.

A survey of economic literature on the subject, however, finds that most economists agree that some form of road pricing to reduce congestion is economically viable, although there is disagreement on what form road pricing should take. Economists disagree over how to set tolls, how to cover common costs, what to do with any excess revenues, whether and how “losers” from tolling previously free roads should be compensated, and whether to privatize highways. Also, concerns regarding fossil fuel supply and urban transport high emissions of greenhouse gases in the context of climate change have renewed interest in congestion pricing, as it is considered one of the demand-side mechanisms that may reduce oil consumption.

Theory

Economic rationale for moving from untolled equilibrium to congestion pricing equilibrium.

Congestion pricing is a concept from market economics regarding the use of pricing mechanisms to charge the users of public goods for the negative externalities generated by the peak demand in excess of available supply. Its economic rationale is that, at a price of zero, demand exceeds supply, causing a shortage, and that the shortage should be corrected by charging the equilibrium price rather than shifting it down by increasing the supply. Usually this means increasing prices during certain periods of time or at the places where congestion occurs; or introducing a new usage tax or charge when peak demand exceeds available supply in the case of a tax-funded public good provided free at the point of usage.

According to the economic theory behind congestion pricing, the objective of this policy is the use of the price mechanism to make users more aware of the costs that they impose upon one another when consuming during the peak demand, and that they should pay for the additional congestion they create, thus encouraging the redistribution of the demand in space or in time, or shifting it to the consumption of a substitute public good; for example, switching from private transport to public transport.

This pricing mechanism has been used in several public utilities and public services for setting higher prices during congested periods, as a means to better manage the demand for the service, and whether to avoid expensive new investments just to satisfy peak demand, or because is not economically or financially feasible to provide additional capacity to the service. Congestion pricing has been widely used by telephone and electric utilities, metros, railways and autobus services, and has been proposed for charging internet access. It also has been extensively studied and advocated by mainstream transport economists for ports, waterways, airports and road pricing, though actual implementation is rather limited due to the controversial issues subject to debate regarding this policy, particularly for urban roads, such as undesirable distribution effects, the disposition of the revenues raised, and the social and political acceptability of the congestion charge.

Congestion pricing is one of a number of alternative demand side (as opposed to supply side) strategies offered by economists to address traffic congestion. Congestion is considered a negative externality by economists. An externality occurs when a transaction causes costs or benefits to a third party, often, although not necessarily, from the use of a public good. For example, if manufacturing or transportation cause air pollution imposing costs on others when making use of public air. Congestion pricing is an efficiency pricing strategy that requires the users to pay more for that public good, thus increasing the welfare gain or net benefit for society.

Nobel-laureate William Vickrey is considered by some to be the father of congestion pricing, as he first proposed it for the New York City Subway system in 1952. In the road transportation arena these theories were extended by Maurice Allais, Gabriel Roth who was instrumental in the first designs and upon whose World Bank recommendation the first system was put in place in Singapore, and Reuben Smeed, the deputy director of the Transport and Road Research Laboratory whose ideas presented in his report to the British government were rejected by successive governments since the 1960s.

The transport economics rationale for implementing congestion pricing on roads, described as "one policy response to the problem of congestion", was summarized in a testimony to the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee in 2003: "congestion is considered to arise from the mispricing of a good; namely, highway capacity at a specific place and time. The quantity supplied (measured in lane-miles) is less than the quantity demanded at what is essentially a price of zero. If a good or service is provided free of charge, people tend to demand more of it – and use it more wastefully – than they would if they had to pay a price that reflected its cost. Hence, congestion pricing is premised on a basic economic concept: charge a price in order to allocate a scarce resource to its most valuable use, as evidenced by users' willingness to pay for the resource".

Sectors

Airports

New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, one the world's busiest

Many airports are facing extreme congestion, runway capacity being the scarcest resource. Congestion pricing schemes have been proposed to mitigate this problem, including slot auctions, such as with the Panama Canal, but implementation has been piecemeal. The first scheme was started in 1968 when higher landing fees for peak-hour use by aircraft with 25 seats or less at Newark, Kennedy, and LaGuardia airports in New York City. As a result of the higher charges, general aviation activity during peak periods decreased by 30%. These fees were applied until deregulation of the industry, but higher fees for general aviation were kept to discourage this type of operations at New York's busiest airports. In 1988 a higher landing fee for smaller aircraft at Boston's Logan Airport was adopted; with much of the general aviation abandoned Logan for secondary airports. In both US cases the pricing scheme was challenged in court. In the case of Boston, the judge ruled in favor of general aviation users due to lack of alternative airports. In the case of New York, the judge dismissed the case because "the fee was a justified means of relieving congestion".

Congestion pricing has also been implemented for scheduled airline services. The British Airports Authority (BAA) has been a pioneer in implementing congestion pricing for all types of commercial aviation. In 1972 implemented the first peak pricing policy, with surcharges varying depending on the season and time of the day, and by 1976 raised these peak charges. London-Heathrow had seven pricing structures between 1976 and 1984. In this case it was the US carriers that went to international arbitration in 1988 and won their case.

In 1991, the Athens Airport charged a 25% higher landing fee for those aircraft arriving between 11:00 and 17:00 during the high tourism season during summer. Hong Kong charges an additional flat fee to the basic weight charge. In 1991–92 peak pricing at London's main airports Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted was implemented; airlines were charged different landing fees for peak and off-peak operations depending on the weight of aircraft. For example, in the case of a Boeing 757, the peak landing fee was about 2.5 times higher than the off-peak fee in all three airports. For a Boeing 747 the differential was even higher, as the old 747 carries a higher noise charge. Though related to runway congestion, the main objective of these peak charges at the major British airports was to raise revenue for investment.

Roads

Electronic Road Pricing Gantry at North Bridge Road, Singapore
At Old Street, street markings and a sign (inset) with the white-on-red C alert drivers to the congestion charge, London.
FasTrak HOT lanes at 91 Express Lanes, at Orange County, California.
Main article: Road pricing

Practical implementations of road congestion pricing are found almost exclusively in urban areas, because traffic congestion is common in and around city centers. Autoroute A1 in Northern France is one of the few cases of congestion pricing implemented outside of urban areas. This is an expressway connecting Paris to Lille, and since 1992 congestion prices have been applied during weekends with the objective of spreading demand on the trip back to Paris on Sunday afternoons and evenings. As congestion pricing has been increasing worldwide, the schemes implemented have been classified into four different types: cordon area around a city center; area wide congestion pricing; city center toll ring; and corridor or single facility congestion pricing.

The implementation of congestion pricing for urban road travel has been subject of debate and controversy; issues have included issues of inequality, economic burden on neighboring communities, the effect on retail businesses and the economic activity in general, and a perception that it is primarily an additional tax. It has been noted that not all will be able to afford to pay the charge and that this policy is likely to privilege the middle-class and rich. and Small et al.,

Cordon area and area wide

Cordon area congestion pricing is a fee or tax paid by users to enter a restricted area, usually within a city center, as part of a demand management strategy to relieve traffic congestion within that area. The economic rationale for this pricing scheme is based on the externalities or social costs of road transport, such as air pollution, noise, traffic accidents, environmental and urban deterioration, and the extra costs and delays imposed by traffic congestion upon other drivers when additional users enter a congested road.

The first implementation of such a scheme was Singapore Area Licensing Scheme in 1975, together with a comprehensive package of road pricing measures, stringent car ownership rules and improvements in mass transit. Thanks to technological advances in electronic toll collection, electronic detection, and video surveillance technology, collecting congestion fees has become easier. Singapore upgraded its system in 1998, and similar pricing schemes were implemented in Rome in 2001, London in 2003 with extensions in 2007; Stockholm in 2006, as seven month trial, and then on a permanent basis. In January 2008 Milan began a one-year trial program called Ecopass, charging low emission standard vehicles and exempting cleaner and alternative fuel vehicles. The Ecopass program was extended until December 31, 2011, and on January 16, 2012 was replaced by Area C, a trial program that converted the scheme from a pollution-charge to a congestion charge.

Initial reports from the cities that have implemented congestion pricing schemes show traffic volume reductions from 10% to 30%, as well as reduced air pollution.

Urban corridors and toll rings

Congestion pricing has also been implemented in urban freeways. Between 2004 and 2005, Santiago de Chile implemented the first 100% non-stop urban toll for concessioned freeways passing through a downtown area, charging by the distance traveled. Congestion pricing is used since 2007 during rush hours in order to maintain reasonable speeds within the city's core with the aim of keeping a minimum level of service for their customers.

Norway pioneered with implementation of electronic urban tolling in the main corridors of Norway's three major cities: Bergen (1986), Oslo (1990), and Trondheim (1991). In the case of Bergen it is impossible to enter the central area by car without using a toll road, so that the effect is similar to a congestion charge. Though initially intended only to raised revenues to finance road infrastructure, the urban toll ring at Oslo created an unintended congestion pricing effect, as traffic decreased around 5%. Also the Trondheim Toll Scheme has congestion pricing effects, as charges vary by time of the day. Norwegian authorities have been considering the use of congestion charges, as the legal basis were approved by Parliament in 2001 and finally came into force in October 2011 after provisions to the law was approved.

Single facilities

Congestion pricing in the form of variable tolls by time-of-the-day have also been implemented in bridges and tunnels providing access to the central business districts of several major cities. In most cases there was a toll already in existence.

The first of this kind of specific schemes allowed users of low or single-occupancy vehicles to use a high-occupancy vehicle lanes (HOV) if they pay a toll. This scheme is known as high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, and it has been introduced mainly in the United States and Canada. The first practical implementations was California's private toll 91 Express Lanes, in Orange County in 1995, followed in 1996 by Interstate 15 in San Diego.

In March 2001, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey implemented a discount on regular toll fees during off-peak hours for those vehicles paying electronically with an EZ Pass. These discount toll was implemented at several tunnels and bridges connecting New York City and New Jersey, including the George Washington Bridge, Lincoln Tunnel, and Holland Tunnel, and at some other bridges administrated by PANYNJ. Since March 2008, qualified low-emission automobiles with a fuel economy of at least 45 miles per gallon are eligible to receive a Port Authority Green Pass, which allows for a 50% discount during off-peak hours as compared to the regular full toll.

In January 2009, variable tolls were implemented at Sydney Harbour Bridge, two weeks after upgrading to 100% free-flow electronic toll collection. In July 2010 congestion tolls were implemented at the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge.

Waterways

Panama Canal Transit Booking System and Transit Slot Auction

The Panama Canal has a limited capacity determined by operational times and cycles of the existing locks and further constrained by the current trend towards larger (close to Panamax-sized) vessels transiting the canal which take more transit time within the locks and navigational channels, and the need for permanent periodical maintenance works due to the aging canal, which forces periodical shutdowns of this waterway. On the other hand, demand is growing due to the rapid growth of international trade. Also many users require a guarantee of certain level of service. Despite the gains which have been made in efficiency, the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) estimates that the canal will reach its maximum sustainable capacity between 2009 and 2012. The long-term solution for the congestion problems is the expansion of the canal through a third set of locks. Work started in 2007 and will finish by 2014. The third set of locks will allow transit of larger, Post-Panamax ships, which have a greater cargo capacity than the current locks are capable of handling.

A Panamax ship in transit through the Miraflores locks, Panama Canal

Considering the high operational costs of the vessels (containerships have daily operational costs of approximately US$40,000), the long queues that occur during the high season (sometimes up to a seven-day delay), and the high value of some of the cargo transported through the canal, the ACP implemented a congestion pricing scheme to allow a better management of the scarce capacity available and to increase the level of service offered to the shipping companies. The scheme gives users two choices: (1) transit by order of arrival on a first-come first-served basis, as the canal historically has operated; or (2) booked service for a fee—a congestion charge.

The booked service allows two options of fees. The Transit Booking System, available online, allowing customers who do not want to wait in queue to pay an additional 15% over the regular tolls, guaranteeing a specific day for transit and crossing the canal in 18 hours or less. ACP sells 24 of these daily slots up to 365 days in advance. The second choice is high priority transit. Since 2006, ACP has available a 25th slot, sold through the Transit Slot Auction to the highest bidder. The main customers of the Transit Booking System are cruise ships, containerships, vehicle carriers, and non-containerized cargo vessels.

The highest toll for high priority passage paid through the Transit Slot Auction was US$220,300 charged on a tanker, bypassing a 90-ship queue awaiting for the end of maintenance works on the Gatun locks, thus avoiding a 7-day delay. The normal fee would have been just US$13,430. The average regular toll is around US$54,000.

See also

References

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  2. Sperling, Daniel and Deborah Gordon (2009). Two billion cars: driving toward sustainability. Oxford University Press, New York. pp. 42–43. ISBN 978-0-19-537664-7.
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  29. R. Doganis op. cit. pp. 95–96
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  31. Small, Kenneth A.; José A. Gomez-Ibañez (1998). Road Pricing for Congestion Management: The Transition from Theory to Policy. The University of California Transportation Center, University of California at Berkeley. p. 227.
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  36. Small, Kenneth A.; Verhoef, Erik T. (2007). The Economics of Urban Transportation. Routledge, England. p. 148. ISBN 978-0-415-28515-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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External links

Videos

Bibliography

  • Tsekeris, T.; Voß, S., Theodore; Voß, Stefan (2009). "Design and evaluation of road pricing: State-of-the-art and methodological advances". Netnomics. 10: 5–52. doi:10.1007/s11066-008-9024-z. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11066-008-9024-z.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Richardson, Harry W; Chang-Hee Christine Bae (editors) (2008). Road Congestion Pricing In Europe: Implications for the United States. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA. ISBN 978-1-84720-380-9. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Small, Kenneth A.; Verhoef, Erik T. (2007). The Economics of Urban Transportation. Routledge, New York. ISBN 978-0-415-28515-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Button, Kenneth J. (1993). Transport Economics 2nd Edition. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, London. ISBN 978-1-85278-523-9.
  • Cervero, Robert (1998). The Transit Metropolis. Island Press, Washington, D.C. Chapter 6. ISBN 1-55963-591-6.
  • Doganis, R. (1992). The Airport Business. Routledge, London. ISBN 978-0-415-08117-7.
  • McDonald, J.F.; d'Ouville, Edmond L.; and Louie Nan Liu (1999). Economics of Urban Highway Congestion and Pricing (Transportation Research, Economics and Policy Volume 9). Springer, New York. ISBN 978-0-7923-8631-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Walters, A. A. (1968). The Economics of Road User Charges. World Bank Staff Occasional Papers Number Five, Washington, D.C. ISBN 978-0-8018-0653-7.
  • Smeed, R.J. (1964). Road pricing: the economic and technical possibilities. HMSO.

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