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Hu Jintao (pinyin: Hú Jǐntāo, pronounced ; born 21 December 1942) is the President of the People's Republic of China. He was the leader of the fourth generation of leadership of the Communist Party of China. He was General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 2002 to 2012 and Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC from 2004 to 2012. His current term as President ends in March 2013.

Hu has been involved in the Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as Party secretary for Guizhou province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later First secretary of the Party Central Secretariat and Vice-President under former leader Jiang Zemin. Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the leadership represented China's transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, more pragmatic technocrats.

During his term in office, Hu reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and has been conservative with political reforms. Along with his colleague, Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth and development that cemented China as a major world power. He sought to improve socio-economic equality domestically through the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to build a "Socialist Harmonious Society" that was prosperous and free of social conflict. Meanwhile, Hu kept a tight lid on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. In foreign policy, Hu advocated for "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft power in international relations and a business-oriented approach to diplomacy. Through Hu's tenure, China's influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing regions has increased.

Hu possesses a low-key and reserved leadership style, and is reportedly a firm believer in consensus-based rule. These traits have made Hu a rather bland figure in the public eye, embodying the focus in Chinese politics on technocratic competence rather than personality.

In 15 November 2012, Hu relinquished the titles the General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and was succeeded by Xi Jinping.

Early life

Hu Jintao was born in Taizhou, Jiangsu province on 21 December 1942. He grew up in Taizhou, and completed his primary education and secondary education there. After his high school education, he went to the department of hydraulic engineering, Tsinghua University at the capital city, Beijing.

His branch of the family migrated from Jixi County, Anhui to Taizhou during his grandfather's generation. Though his father owned a small tea trading business in Taizhou, the family was relatively poor. His mother was a teacher and died when he was seven, and he was raised by an aunt. Hu's father was later denounced during the Cultural Revolution, an event that (together with his relatively humble origins) apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently tried to clear his father's name.

Hu was a gifted student in Taizhou High School, excelling in activities such as singing and dancing. In 1964, while still a student at Beijing's Tsinghua University, Hu joined the Communist Party of China (CPC), before the Cultural Revolution. He was the chairman of the Tsinghua Student Union at that time. He graduated in hydraulic engineering in 1965. At Tsinghua, Hu met a fellow student, Liu Yongqing, now his wife.

In 1968, Hu volunteered for his service in Gansu and worked on the construction of Liujiaxia Hydroelectric Station while also managing Party affairs for the local branch of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau, as an engineer.

Early political career

In 1973, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping implemented the "Four Transformations" program, which aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized." In response to this nation-wide search for young party members, Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (Gansu's governor) discovered Hu Jintao and promoted him several ranks to the position of deputy head of the commission. Another protégé of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time.

In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of the All-China Youth Federation. His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. With the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a bright future in the party. At Song Ping's suggestion, in 1982 central Party authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the Central Party School. Soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was CPC General Secretary then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's company.

Party Committee Secretary of Guizhou

In 1985, Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary of Communist Party of China. Hu attempted to improve the economy of the backwater province, and reputedly visited all of its eighty-six counties. While in Guizhou, Hu was careful to follow Beijing's directives and had a reputation of being "airtight"; he rarely would offer his views on policy matters in public. While Hu was generally seen as an official with integrity and honesty, some locals preferred his predecessor Zhu Houze. In 1987, Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.

Tenure in Tibet

The exit of his patron Hu Yaobang from the political scene was initially seen as unfavourable towards Hu Jintao. He drew criticism from party elders for failing to criticize the ousted reformer. In 1988, Hu was transferred to become Party Regional Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the restive area's number-one figure, while also taking on the role of Political Commissar of the local People's Liberation Army units. A number of Tibetans have long been opposed to government policy in the region and unrest and ethnic conflict were brewing, particularly anti-Han Chinese sentiments amongst local well-placed Tibetans. Minor clashes had been occurring since 1987, and when the scale of unrest grew, Hu responded with the deployment of some 1,700 People's Armed Police into Lhasa in February 1989 in an attempt to warn against further disturbance. Increased clashes culminated in serious rioting in Lhasa's core on 5 March 1989, five days before the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. What occurred after is a matter of dispute: rioters accused the police of shooting them arbitrarily, and the police claiming that they had acted in self-defense. In addition, there was speculation that Hu delayed his orders to clamp down on the protesters until late into the evening, when the police chief was forced to act because the situation was spiraling out of control. The protesters were suppressed early into the next day, and Hu asked Beijing to declare martial law on 8 March.

Hu's role in the demonstrations and rioting on March 5 was never made clear. While it is general protocol that Hu must have at least implicitly approved the use of force against protesters, whether he actually gave orders throughout March 5 is a matter of debate. In addition, John Tkacik cites that Hu had been coordinating with the Chengdu Military Region for troops to be on full alert as the situation progressed. Some diplomatic analysts linked what they saw as Hu's brutal use of force to the suppression of activists and students at in Tiananmen Square, which took place a mere three months later. Whether Hu provided "inspiration" for the PLA on June 4 is a matter of debate, but it was clear that Hu's actions in Lhasa earned him unprecedented attention in the upper echelons of party power, including "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping. When tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, Hu was one of the first regional leaders to declare his support for the central authorities. Hu experienced high-altitude sickness in June 1990, and returned to Beijing, but remained in his position for another two years, during which Hu achieved little. But his departure to Beijing was seen as a means to return to the centrefold of Chinese politics, which led to some doubts as to whether or not he was as ill as he had claimed.

Candidacy

Before the opening of the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the Party's senior leaders, including Deng and Chen Yun, were to select candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee to ensure a smooth transition of power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, etc.) to third-generation Communist Party of China leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi etc.). Deng also proposed that they should consider another candidate for a further future transition, preferably someone under fifty to represent the next generation of leaders. Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result, shortly before his 50th birthday, Hu Jintao became the youngest member of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, and the second youngest PSC member ever since the CPC took power in 1949.

In 1992, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the CPC. Although Hu was considered heir apparent to Jiang, he always took great care to ensure that Jiang be at the center of the spotlight. In late 1998, Hu promoted Jiang's unpopular movement of the "Three Stresses" – "stress study, stress politics, and stress healthy trends" – giving speeches to promote it. In 2001, he publicized Jiang's Three Represents theory, which Jiang hoped to place himself on the same level as other Marxist theoreticians. In 1998, Hu became Vice-President of China, and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs. Hu became China's leading voice during the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

At the helm

Since taking over as General Secretary of the Central Committee at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up a Socialist Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies. They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the green gross domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas, therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced great resistance.

SARS crisis

The first crisis of Hu's leadership happened during the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, widely perceived as Hu's protégé.

Succession of Jiang Zemin

On 15 November 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang. Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down from the powerful General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger fourth generation of leadership, there was speculation that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not associated with Jiang's influential Shanghai clique, to which six out of the nine members of the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked. However, later developments show that many of its members have shifted their positions. Zeng Qinghong, for example, moved from a disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two factions. In 2003, Jiang was also re-elected to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, a post from which Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes as "paramount leader", thus retaining military power.

Western observers attribute a sense of caution to Hu's philosophies, citing China's recent history of fallen heirs. Deng Xiaoping appointed three party General Secretaries, all designed to be successors, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of them, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won Deng's continued, although ambiguous backing and was the only General Secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended.

Although many believe Hu was originally hand-picked by Deng as the youngest member of China's top leadership and a leading candidate to succeed Jiang, he had exercised a great deal of political skills between 1992 and 2002 to consolidate his position, and eventually emerged as Jiang's heir apparent in his own right. Hu also benefited from the slow but progressive institutionalization of power succession within the Party, something his predecessors lacked entirely. Since the early 1980s, the People's Republic of China has been marked by progressive institutionalization and rule by consensus, and moved away from the Maoist authoritarian model. Although a western-style legal institution and rule of law remain to be put in place, Hu's power succession was conducted in a fairly orderly and civil manner, which was unprecedented in Communist China's history. This trend is expected to continue and an institutionalized mechanism of power transition is expected to emerge, first perhaps within the Party. In fact, it has been one of the Party's stated major goals to create an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent informal rule and a cult of personality.

The rivalry between Jiang and Hu after Jiang stepped down from his posts was, arguably, an inevitable product of China's tradition of succession. Some analysts argue that although Jiang has consolidated power by the time he retired, his ideological stature within the Communist Party remains shaky at best, thus Jiang had to buy time to ensure that his ideological legacy such as the Three Represents, is enshrined in China's socialism doctrine. Jiang resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his last official post. Since then Hu has officially taken on the three institutions in the People's Republic of China where power lie, the party, the state, as well as the military, thus informally, has become the paramount leader.

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao inherited a China wrought with internal social, political and environmental problems. One of the biggest challenges Hu faces is the large wealth disparity between the Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a degree which wreaked havoc on communist rule. Furthermore, the cronyism and corruption plaguing China's civil service, military, educational, judicial and medical systems sought to destroy the country bit by bit. In the beginning of 2006, however, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Shames" movement in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. China's increasingly fragile environment has caused massive urban pollution, sandstorms and the destruction of vast tracts of habitable land. Hu has been presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist sentiment.

At the 17th CPC National Congress, Hu was re-elected as General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission on 22 October 2007. At the 11th National People's Congress, Hu was re-elected as President on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission.

Newsweek named Hu the second most powerful person in the world referring to him as "the man behind the wheel of the world's most supercharged economy." Forbes also named him the second most powerful person in the world. Hu was named the 2010 World's Most Powerful Person by Forbes Magazine. Hu has been listed four times (2008, 2007, 2005 & 2004) on the Time 100 annual list of most influential people.

Political positions

Scientific Perspective and Socialist Harmonious Society

Political observers indicate that Hu has distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his leadership is summarized by three slogans — a "Socialist Harmonious Society" domestically and "Peaceful Development" internationally, the former aided by the Scientific Development Concept, which seeks integrated sets of solutions to arrays of economic, environmental and social problems, and recognizes, in inner circles, a need for cautious and gradual political reforms. The Scientific Development doctrine has been written into the Communist Party and State Constitutions in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The role of the Party has changed, as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and implemented by Jiang Zemin, from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Hu continues the Party’s modernization, calling for both "Advancement" of the Party and its increasing transparency in governance.

What emerges from these philosophies, in the view of Hu, is a country with systematic approach to national structure and development that combines dynamic economic growth, a free market energized by a vigorous "nonpublic" (i.e., private) sector, heavy-handed political and media control, personal but not political freedoms, concern for the welfare of all citizens, cultural enlightenment, and a synergistic approach to diverse social issues (the Scientific Development Perspective) that lead, in Hu’s vision, to a "Socialist Harmonious Society". In the view of the Chinese government, these philosophies, which has created a new "China Model" of governance, serves as a legitimate alternative to the West's "Democracy Model", particularly for developing countries. In Hu’s words, "A Socialist Harmonious Society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality." Such a society, he says, will give full scope to people's talent and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge an ever closer relationship between the people and government. Hu has even emphasized the potential of religious communities to contribute to economic and social development under the banner of “Building a Harmonious Society.”

Western criticism of Hu, particularly regarding human rights, exposes his hypersensitivity to social stability but does not lay as much emphasis on his fresh commitment to address China’s multi-faceted social problems. Hu’s pragmatic, non-ideological agenda has two core values—maintaining social stability to further economic development and sustaining Chinese culture to enrich national sovereignty. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many events that are traditionally seen as communist extravagances, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore the Chinese leadership under Hu has also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on GDP growth and toward a definition which includes social equality and environment effects.

In 2004, Hu gave an unprecedented showing and ordered all cadres from the five major power functions to stop the tradition of going to the Beidaihe seaside retreat for their annual summer meeting which, before, was commonly seen as a gathering of ruling elites from both current and elder cadres to decide China's destiny, and also an unnecessary waste of public funds. The move was seen by the Chinese public as symbolic of Hu's attitude towards corruption.

In June 2007, Hu gave an important speech at the Central Party School that was indicative of his position of power and his guiding philosophies. In the speech Hu used a very populist tone to appeal to ordinary Chinese, making serious note of the recent challenges China has been facing, especially with regards to income disparity. In addition, Hu noted the need for "increased democracy" in the country.

Media control

Despite initial expectations that Hu was a "closet liberal", Hu has shown a fairly hard-line approach to liberalization of the media.

The media has been given greater latitude in reporting many topics of popular concern, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as into malpractices at the local level. The government has also been responsive to criticism of its media policy, for example in response to the SARS epidemic, and in regard to public commemorations of popular, but deposed, former leader Zhao Ziyang.

Hu has been very cautious with regards to the Internet, choosing to censor politically sensitive material to a degree more strict than the Jiang era. In February 2007, Hu embarked on further domestic media controls that restricted primetime TV series to "morally correct" content—he objected to lowbrow programming including some reality shows—on all Chinese TV stations, and listed "20 forbidden areas" of coverage on news reporting.

Taiwan

Early in his presidency, Hu faced an independence-supporting counterpart in then ROC president Chen Shui-bian. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus. Chen Shui-bian and his party had continued to express an ultimate goal of de jure Taiwanese independence, and made statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to Chinese reunification as an ultimate goal. While Hu gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his 17 May Statement, where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remains firm in its position that the PRC will not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare de jure independence from China.

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics. Hu's government has conducted a no-contact policy with Taiwan due to Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalizing "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the Kuomintang (KMT), its erstwhile foe in the Chinese Civil War, and still a major party in Taiwan. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the conclusion of World War II.

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang under Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in Taiwan, and a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Thereafter Hu immediately turned to a more 'soft' diplomatic approach and opened the way to a thaw in relations between the two sides. A series of historic meetings between the CPC and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao met with Taiwan's Vice President-elect Vincent Siew in the latter's role as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus – that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.". Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence; Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization.

In addition to the party-to-party dialogue, de facto governmental dialogue took place via the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agreed that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with then US President George W. Bush, in which he became the first Chinese leader to officially recognize the 1992 Consensus. After several months of negotiations, in December 2008, the two sides agreed on the resumption of the Three Links, i.e., a re-opening of mail, trade, and direct air links between the two sides. Relations have been cordial since between the two sides, and trade increased immensely, culminating in the signing of the preferential trade agreement ECFA in 2010.

Moral guidance

In response to the great number of social problems in China, in March 2006, Hu Jintao released the "Eight Honors and Eight Shames" as a set of moral codes to be followed by the Chinese people, and emphasized the need to spread the message to youth. Alternatively known as the "Eight Honors and Disgraces", it contained eight poetic lines which summarized what a good citizen should regard as an honor and what to regard as a shame. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the perceived increasing lack of morality in China after Chinese economic reforms brought in a generation of Chinese predominantly concerned with earning money and power in an increasingly frail social fabric.

It has become a norm for Chinese communist leaders to make their own contributions to Marxist theory. Whether this is Hu's contribution to Marxist theory is debatable, but its general reception with the Chinese public has been moderate. Its promotion, however, is visible almost everywhere: in classroom posters, banners on the street, and electronic display boards for the preparation of the 2008 Olympics, and World Expo 2010 in Shanghai. The codes differ from the ideologies of his predecessors, namely, Jiang's Three Represents, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Mao Zedong Thought in that the focus, for the first time, has been shifted to codifying moral standards as opposed to setting social or economic goals.

Legacy

Most external observers agree that Hu presided over a decade of consistent economic growth, led China through the storm of the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, and increased China's international stature immensely. The Hu Administration is also credited with modernizing China's infrastructure, the launch of China's first manned spaceprobe, and the success of two international events: the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. In addition, Hu's "soft approach" to Taiwan, coinciding with the election of a Kuomintang government in Taipei, was credited for having improved relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Trade and contact between the two sides increased significantly during Hu's tenure. In addition, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao's populist policies have resulted in the elimination of agricultural taxes for farmers, more flexible policies towards migrant workers living in cities, more balanced development between the coastal regions and the hinterlands, enforcing minimum wage in cities and the promotion of sustainable and affordable housing developments. Generally speaking, these policies have been well received by the Chinese public.

In foreign policy, Hu's critics say that his government has been overly aggressive in asserting its new power, overestimated its reach, and raised the ire and apprehension of various neighbours, including Southeast Asian countries, India, and Japan. Such policies are also said to be provocative towards the United States. Domestic critics, including the country's elites, intellectuals, and particularly dissidents, point to various shortcomings of the Hu administration and his failure in implementing his signature "Socialist Harmonious Society" policy. They cite, for example, that China's internal security budget has exceeded its military budget during Hu's tenure as protests and other 'mass incidents' continued to increase across the country. China's gini coefficient has climbed to 0.47 by 2010, indicating a potentially unsustainable gap between the rich and the poor. The Hu administration's inability to rein in the wealth gap and its renewed emphasis increasing the role of state-owned enterprises in the economy led some economists to believe that Hu's administration missed a critical opportunity for reform and structural adjustment.

Hu's tough-on-corruption policies have seen mixed results. While there have been some attempts at increasing transparency in the expenditures of official organs and bureaucrats, the downfall of Railways Minister Liu Zhijun and Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai served as a reminder of unresolved issues of corruption within the political elite. In his own departing speech at the 18th Party Congress, Hu emphasized the potentially devastating effects corruption would have on the party and the country if it were left unchecked. Moreover, the Hu Administration's insistence on censorship and the curtailing of freedom of speech has drawn many critics from human rights organizations and Western governments, while artists and writers inside the country chided the Hu Administration's increased restrictions on cultural expressions. Although in the early years of his tenure Hu attempted to pioneer a form of "intraparty democracy" that called for greater participation from lower-ranked members to determine policy and select the leadership, there has been little evidence of meaningful changes to the party's governing structure and decision-making process.

Due to the increasingly consensus-based decision making process of the Chinese leadership, there is debate on how much power Hu held personally to effect change. Some credit Hu for being an effective mediator in a system increasingly affected by special interests and political factionalism. Hu also gained accolades for stepping down as military chief in favour of his successor Xi Jinping at the same time as relinquishing his position as General Secretary. This was seen as a message to the establishment and Jiang Zemin that elders should retire according to protocol and avoid meddling in the affairs of their successors.

Personal life

Hu is married to Liu Yongqing, whom he met at Tsinghua University when they were studying there. They have two children together, Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing. Unlike Wen Jiabao, the Premier, he has never granted a public one-on-one interview as of 2007. He has been noted for his liking for table tennis and ballroom dancing. Hu is also said to possess a photographic memory that became evident in his high school days.

Notes

1. Luard, Tim (11 January 2005). "BBC:China's Leader shows his stripes. 11 January 2005". BBC News. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
2. ^ "Kuhn, Robert Lawrence: Hu's Political Philosophies" (PDF). Esnips.com. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
3. World Savvy Monitor: China and the World - A foreign policy overview
4. Elegant, Simon (4 October 2007). "In China, Hu is the Man to See". TIME. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
5. Brown, Kerry. "Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012". Retrieved 19 August 2011.
6. Havely, Joe (19 October 2007). "Getting to know Hu". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 7 April 2009.
7. "临夏旅游" (Linxia Tourism), published by Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture Tourist Board, 2003. 146 pages. No ISBN. Pages 26-27.
8. Nathan, Andrew J. (March 2003). China's new rulers: the secret files. New York: The New York Review of Books. p. 79. ISBN I-59017-072-5. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
9. Nathan & Gilley, p. 40
10. "Hu Jintao". People's Daily. Retrieved 16 April 2010.
11. Ewing, Richard Daniel (20 March 2003). "Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary". The China Quarterly. 173. Cambridge University Press: 17–34. Retrieved 16 April 2010.Full article
12. Nathan & Gilley, p. 42
13. Sisci, Francesco (9 November 2005). "Democracy with Chinese characteristics". Asia Times Online.
14. ^ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap (2006). Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era. ME Sharpe. p. 7. ISBN 0-7656-1773-0.
15. Lam, 8
16. ^ Tkacik, John (29 April 2002). "Who's Hu? Assessing China's Heir Apparent: Hu Jintao". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 2 June 2010.
17. Lam, 9
18. Lam, p. 9
19. Willy Lam accounts for Hu's actions on March 5 as a potential case of his high-level political cunning and shrewdness, see Lam, p9.
20. Nathan & Gilley, pp.42-43
21. Nathan & Gilley, p. 84
22. Wu, Zhong (7 February 2007). "Power in China: Through a glass, darkly". Asia Times Online. Retrieved 16 May 2008.
23. "Hu Jintao reelected Chinese president", Xinhua (China Daily), 15 March 2008.
24. "The NEWSWEEK 50: Chinese President Hu Jintao". Newsweek. 5 January 2009. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
25. Noer, Michael; Perlroth, Nicole (11 November 2009). "The World's Most Powerful People". Forbes.com. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
26. Perlroth, Nicole (3 November 2010). "The Most Powerful People On Earth". Forbes. Retrieved 4 November 2010.
27. "China". Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Retrieved 14 December 2011. See drop-down essay on "An Era of Opening"
28. Sisci, Francesco (5 April 2005). "Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows". Asia Times Online. Retrieved 15 May 2008.
29. Zhong, Wu (29 March 2005). "KMT makes China return in historic trip to ease tensions". The Standard. Retrieved 16 May 2008. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
30. Sisci, Francesco (28 June 2006). "Hu Jintao and the new China". Asia Times Online. Retrieved 15 May 2008.
31. "Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet". Xinhuanet. 27 March 2008. Retrieved 15 May 2008.
32. "Hu Jintao regarding "The eight honors and eight shames"" (in Chinese). sohu.com (千龙网). 20 March 2006. Retrieved 16 May 2008.
33. ^ Li, Cheng (20 December 2011). "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?". Jamestown Foundation: China Brief. 11 (23). Retrieved 2 January 2012. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
34. "America in the Asia-Pacific: We're back". The Economist. 19 November 2011. Retrieved 2 January 2012.
35. ^ Wines, Michael (17 July 2012). "As China Talks of Change, Fear Rises on the Risks". New York Times. Retrieved 18 July 2012.
36. Johnson, Ian; Keith Bradshear (8 November 2012). "On Way Out, China's Leader Offers Praise for the Status Quo". The New York Times. Retrieved 16 November 2012.
37. The Australian: Hu's secret weapon: harmony
38. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/11.stm
39. http://asianhistory.about.com/od/profilesofasianleaders/p/HuJinTaoProfile.htm
40. "Asia-Pacific | Profile: Hu Jintao". BBC News. 16 September 2004. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
41. Willy Wo-Lap Lam. (2006). Chinese politics in the Hu Jintao era: new leaders, new challenges. M.E. Sharpe. p. 5.

References

• Nathan, Andrew J. (March 2003). China's new rulers: the secret files. New York: The New York Review of Books. ISBN I-59017-072-5. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• "Taiwan." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition. 12 Aug. 2008. APA style: Taiwan. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 12 August 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition

External links

• Hu Jintao (ChinaVitae.com)
• Hu Jintao calls for upholding Marxism (Xinhua)
• Hu Jintao's political philosophies and policies by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn
• China's leader shows his stripes 2005 BBC article arguing Hu more hardline than he initially appeared
• Requiem for Reform? Zhao Ziyang's vision of political change in China dims as Hu Jintao hardens the Party line (Time Asia)

Articles related to Hu Jintao

v t e Paramount leaders of the People's Republic of China General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (Core 1) Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping (Core 2) Jiang Zemin (Core 3) Hu Jintao Xi Jinping (Core 4) Xia → Shang → Zhou → Qin → Han → 3 Kingdoms → Jìn / 16 Kingdoms → S. Dynasties / N. Dynasties → Sui → Tang → 5 Dynasties & 10 Kingdoms → Liao / Song / W. Xia / Jīn → Yuan → Ming → Qing → ROC / PRC v t e Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Leader Chen Duxiu (1921–1927) Xiang Zhongfa (1928–1931) Bo Gu (1931–1935) Zhang Wentian (1935–1943) Mao Zedong (1943–1976) Hua Guofeng (1976–1981) Hu Yaobang (1981–1987) Zhao Ziyang (1987–1989) Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) Hu Jintao (2002–2012) Xi Jinping (2012–present) Decision-making bodies General Secretary Politburo (Standing Committee) Secretariat Central Military Commission Departments Organization Department Publicity Department United Front Work Department International Department Social Work Department Political and Legal Affairs Commission Directly administered General Office Office of the General Secretary Central Guard Bureau Central Guard Unit Secrecy Office Cryptography Office Central Archives Policy Research Office Commissions for co-ordination Auditing Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Comprehensively Law-Based Governance Financial Financial and Economic Affairs Foreign Affairs Cyberspace Affairs Office National Security Science and Technology Spiritual Civilization Institutional Organization Office Secrecy Office Dispatched institutions for co-ordination Working Committee of Central and State Organs Central Financial Work Commission Hong Kong Work Committee Macau Work Committee Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong Leading groups Cryptography Work Office Education Rural Work Inspection Work Military Reform Propaganda, Ideology and Culture Taiwan Office Hong Kong and Macau Office Others Central Party School Chinese Academy of Governance Institute of Party History and Literature People's Daily Qiushi Guangming Daily Executive Leadership Academies Pudong Yan'an Jinggangshan National Congress 1st (1921) 2nd (1922) 3rd (1923) 4th (1925) 5th (1927) 6th (1928) 7th (1945) 8th (1956) 9th (1969) 10th (1973) 11th (1977) 12th (1982) 13th (1987) 14th (1992) 15th (1997) 16th (2002) 17th (2007) 18th (2012) 19th (2017) 20th (2022) Leadership sittings Elected by the Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee 4th: 1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Politburo 3rd: 1923–1925 4th: 1925–1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Military Commission 7th: 1945–1949 & 1954–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Approved by the Central Committee Secretariat 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1980–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 CCDI Standing Committee 7th 1949–1956 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1978–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 CCDI Secretary Zhu De (1949–55) Dong Biwu (1955–68) Chen Yun (1978–87) Qiao Shi (1987–92) Wei Jianxing (1992–2002) Wu Guanzheng (2002–07) He Guoqiang (2007–12) Wang Qishan (2012–17) Zhao Leji (2017–22) Li Xi (2022–) Others Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Secretary General of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Elected by National Congress Central Committee 1st: 1921–1922 2nd: 1922–1923 3rd: 1923–1925 4th: 1925–1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Discipline Inspection 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1933 & 1933–1945 7th: 1949–1955 & 1955–1956 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1978–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2022 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Wider organisation People's Liberation Army People's Armed Police Militia (China) Communist Youth League of China Young Pioneers of China United front (China) People's organization Ideologies Marxism–Leninism Mao Zedong Thought Socialism with Chinese characteristics Deng Xiaoping Theory Three Represents Scientific Outlook on Development Xi Jinping Thought Groupings Shanghai clique Tuanpai Tsinghua clique Eight Elders Crown Prince Party Fujian clique New Zhijiang Army Xishan Society Gang of Four 28 Bolsheviks Related articles Shuanggui Neoauthoritarianism List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party Longest-serving members of the Politburo Standing Committee Emblem of the Chinese Communist Party Category v t e 17th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (2007–2012) Standing Committee Hu Jintao (General Secretary) Wu Bangguo Wen Jiabao Jia Qinglin Li Changchun Xi Jinping Li Keqiang He Guoqiang Zhou Yongkang Other members in surname stroke order Wang Gang Wang Lequan Wang Zhaoguo Wang Qishan Hui Liangyu Liu Qi Liu Yunshan Liu Yandong ♀ Li Yuanchao Wang Yang Zhang Gaoli Zhang Dejiang Yu Zhengsheng Xu Caihou Guo Boxiong Bo Xilai (expelled 2012) 7th→8th→9th→10th→11th→12th→13th→14th→15th→16th→17th→18th→19th→20th v t e 16th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (2002–2007) Standing Committee Hu Jintao (General Secretary) Wu Bangguo Wen Jiabao Jia Qinglin Zeng Qinghong Huang Ju (died 2007) Wu Guanzheng Li Changchun Luo Gan Other members in surname stroke order Wang Lequan Wang Zhaoguo Hui Liangyu Liu Qi Liu Yunshan Wu Yi Zhang Lichang Zhang Dejiang Chen Liangyu (expelled 2006) Zhou Yongkang Yu Zhengsheng He Guoqiang Guo Boxiong Cao Gangchuan Zeng Peiyan Alternate member Wang Gang 7th→8th→9th→10th→11th→12th→13th→14th→15th→16th→17th→18th→19th→20th v t e State representative of the People's Republic of China President Vice President Common Program (1949–1954) CPG Chairman Mao Zedong 1954 Constitution (1954–1975) Chairperson Mao Zedong Liu Shaoqi Song Qingling & Dong Biwu (co-acting) Dong Biwu (acting) 1975 & 1978 Constitutions (1975–1982) NPCSC Chairperson Zhu De Song Qingling (acting) Ye Jianying 1982 Constitution (1982–present) President Li Xiannian Yang Shangkun Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping v t e Chairmen of the Central Military Commission CCP Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping PRC Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping v t e 15th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (1997–2002) Standing Committee Jiang Zemin (General Secretary) Li Peng Zhu Rongji Li Ruihuan Hu Jintao Wei Jianxing Li Lanqing Other members in surname stroke order Ding Guangen Tian Jiyun Li Changchun Li Tieying Wu Bangguo Wu Guanzheng Chi Haotian Zhang Wannian Luo Gan Jiang Chunyun Jia Qinglin Qian Qichen Huang Ju Wen Jiabao Xie Fei (died 1999) Alternate members Zeng Qinghong Wu Yi 7th→8th→9th→10th→11th→12th→13th→14th→15th→16th→17th→18th→19th→20th v t e 14th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (1992–1997) Standing Committee Jiang Zemin (General Secretary) Li Peng Qiao Shi Li Ruihuan Zhu Rongji Liu Huaqing Hu Jintao Other members in surname stroke order Ding Guangen Tian Jiyun Li Lanqing Li Tieying Yang Baibing Wu Bangguo Zou Jiahua Chen Xitong (expelled 1995) Jiang Chunyun Qian Qichen Wei Jianxing Xie Fei Tan Shaowen (died 1993) → Huang Ju (added 1994) Alternate members Wen Jiabao Wang Hanbin 7th→8th→9th→10th→11th→12th→13th→14th→15th→16th→17th→18th→19th→20th v t e Secretaries of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party 8th Secretariat (1956–1969) Deng Xiaoping Huang Kecheng Kang Sheng Li Fuchun Li Xiannian Li Xuefeng Liu Ningyi Lu Dingyi Luo Ruiqing Peng Zhen Tan Zheng Tan Zhenlin Tao Zhu Wang Jiaxiang Xie Fuzhi Ye Jianying Hu Qiaomu (alternate) Liu Lantao (alternate) Yang Shangkun (alternate) 11th Secretariat (1980–1982) Wan Li Wang Renzhong Fang Yi Gu Mu Song Renqiong Yu Qiuli Yang Dezhi Hu Qiaomu Hu Yaobang Yao Yilin Peng Chong Xi Zhongxun 12th Secretariat (1982–1987) Wan Li Xi Zhongxun Deng Liqun Yang Yong Yu Qiuli Gu Mu Chen Pixian Hu Qili Yao Yilin Qiao Shi Tian Jiyun Li Peng Hao Jianxiu Wang Zhaoguo 13th Secretariat (1987–1992) Hu Qili Qiao Shi Rui Xingwen Yan Mingfu Li Ruihuan Ding Guangen Yang Baibing Wen Jiabao (alternate) 14th Secretariat (1992–1997) Hu Jintao Ding Guangen Wei Jianxing Wen Jiabao Ren Jianxin 15th Secretariat (1997–2002) Hu Jintao Wei Jianxing Ding Guangen Luo Gan Wen Jiabao Zeng Qinghong Wu Bangguo Jiang Chunyun 16th Secretariat (2002–2007) Zeng Qinghong Liu Yunshan Zhou Yongkang He Guoqiang Wang Gang Xu Caihou He Yong 17th Secretariat (2007–2012) Xi Jinping Liu Yunshan Li Yuanchao He Yong Ling Jihua Wang Huning 18th Secretariat (2012–2017) Liu Yunshan Liu Qibao Zhao Leji Li Zhanshu Du Qinglin Zhao Hongzhu Yang Jing 19th Secretariat (2017–2022) Wang Huning Ding Xuexiang Yang Xiaodu Chen Xi Guo Shengkun Huang Kunming You Quan 20th Secretariat (2022–2027) Cai Qi Shi Taifeng Li Ganjie Li Shulei Chen Wenqing Liu Jinguo Wang Xiaohong v t e Vice presidents of the People's Republic of China Common Program (1949–54) Co-serving: Zhu De Liu Shaoqi Soong Ching-ling Zhang Lan Li Jishen Gao Gang 1954 Constitution (1954–75) Zhu De Co-serving: Song Qingling & Dong Biwu 1982 Constitution (1982–present) Ulanhu Wang Zhen Rong Yiren Hu Jintao Zeng Qinghong Xi Jinping Li Yuanchao Wang Qishan Han Zheng v t e Political leaders of Guizhou since 1949 Party committee secretaries Su Zhenhua Zhou Lin Li Dazhang Jia Qiyun Li Zaihe Lan Yinong Lu Ruilin Ma Li Chi Biqing Zhu Houze Hu Jintao Liu Zhengwei Liu Fangren Qian Yunlu Shi Zongyuan Li Zhanshu Zhao Kezhi Chen Min'er Sun Zhigang Shen Yiqin ♀ Xu Lin Congress chairpersons Xu Jiansheng Wu Shi Zhang Yuhuan Liu Zhengwei Liu Yulin Wang Zhaowen Liu Fangren Qian Yunlu Shi Zongyuan Li Zhanshu Zhao Kezhi Chen Min'er Sun Zhigang Shen Yiqin ♀ Xu Lin Governors Yang Yong Zhou Lin Li Li Li Zaihe Lan Yinong Lu Ruilin Ma Li Su Gang Wang Zhaowen Chen Shineng Wu Yixia Qian Yunlu Shi Xiushi Lin Shusen Zhao Kezhi Chen Min'er Sun Zhigang Shen Yiqin ♀ Li Bingjun Conference chairpersons Chen Zenggu Shen Yunpu Xu Jiansheng Miao Chunting Li Baohua Chi Biqing Miao Chunting Long Zhiyi Wang Siqi Sun Gan Huang Yao Wang Zhengfu Wang Fuyu Liu Xiaokai Zhao Yongqing v t e Political leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party committee secretaries Zhang Guohua Fan Ming Zhang Jingwu Zhang Guohua Ren Rong Yin Fatang Wu Jinghua Hu Jintao Chen Kuiyuan Guo Jinlong Yang Chuantang Zhang Qingli Chen Quanguo Wu Yingjie Wang Junzheng Congress chairpersons Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme Yang Dongsheng Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme Raidi Legqog Qiangba Puncog Padma Choling Losang Jamcan Government chairpersons Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama (Preparatory Committee) Choekyi Gyaltsen, 10th Panchen Lama (Preparatory Committee, acting) Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (People's Committee) Zeng Yongya (Revolutionary Committee) Ren Rong (Revolutionary Committee) Sanggyai Yexe Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme Dorje Tseten Doje Cering Gyaincain Norbu Legqog Qiangba Puncog Padma Choling Losang Jamcan Che Dalha Yan Jinhai Garma Cedain Conference chairpersons Tan Guansan Zhang Guohua Ren Rong Yin Fatang Yangling Dorje Raidi Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai v t e Leaders of the G20 Ghazouani / Faki Milei Albanese Lula Trudeau Xi Costa / von der Leyen Macron Scholz Modi Prabowo Meloni Ishiba Sheinbaum Putin Salman Ramaphosa Choi (acting) Erdoğan Starmer Biden v t e BRICS Membership  Brazil  Russia  India  China  South Africa  Egypt  Ethiopia  Iran  United Arab Emirates  Indonesia Summits Yekaterinburg 2009 Brasília 2010 Sanya 2011 New Delhi 2012 Durban 2013 Fortaleza 2014 Ufa 2015 Goa 2016 Xiamen 2017 Johannesburg 2018 Brasília 2019 Saint Petersburg 2020 New Delhi 2021 Beijing 2022 Johannesburg 2023 Kazan 2024 TBD 2025 Bilateral relations Brazil–China Brazil–India Brazil–Russia Brazil–South Africa China–India China–Russia China–South Africa India–Russia India–South Africa Russia–South Africa Leaders Lula Putin Modi Xi Ramaphosa Sisi Ahmed Pezeshkian Al Nahyan Prabowo Sports BRICS U-17 Football Cup 2016 Goa 2018 Johannesburg BRICS Games 2024 Kazan Athletics Badminton Gymnastics Related BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement BRICS Cable BRICS Universities League New Development Bank BRICS PAY v t e Leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  Albanese  Bolkiah  Trudeau  Boric  Xi  Lee  Prabowo  Ishiba  Choi (acting)  Anwar  Sheinbaum  Luxon  Marape  Boluarte  Marcos  Putin  Wong  Lai (Envoy: Lin)  Paetongtarn  Biden  Cường President is a non-participant; Taiwan is represented as Chinese Taipei.

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