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==Background== ==Background==


A ] statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), provided that when lawsuit was commenced, the plaintiff could ask a judge to ]] any ] that the defendant owned. The attachment impaired the plaintiff's ownership rights in the property, such as by making it impossible to sell or mortgage the property. The attachment would be based solely on the plaintiff's submitting an affidavit asserting probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. There was no requirement that prior notice of the attachment be provided to the defendant, that any hearing be held before the property was attached, that the property have anything to do with the subject-matter of the lawsuit, or that any unusual or extraordinary circumstances be shown. A ] statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), provided that when lawsuit was commenced, the plaintiff could ask a judge to ] any ] that the defendant owned. The attachment impaired the plaintiff's ownership rights in the property, such as by making it impossible to sell or mortgage the property. The attachment would be based solely on the plaintiff's submitting an affidavit asserting probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. There was no requirement that prior notice of the attachment be provided to the defendant, that any hearing be held before the property was attached, that the property have anything to do with the subject-matter of the lawsuit, or that any unusual or extraordinary circumstances be shown.


In 1988, John F. DiGiovanni sued Brian K. Doehr for ] in ]. DiGiovanni moved for Doehr's real property to be attached, submitting a five-sentence affidavit opining that there was a good basis for his claim. The judge ordered the attachment. DiGiovanni received no notice of the proceedings until after the sheriff had levied the attachment. The notice advised Doehr that he could request a post-attachment hearing if he wished. In 1988, John F. DiGiovanni sued Brian K. Doehr for ] in ]. DiGiovanni moved for Doehr's real property to be attached, submitting a five-sentence affidavit opining that there was a good basis for his claim. The judge ordered the attachment. DiGiovanni received no notice of the proceedings until after the sheriff had levied the attachment. The notice advised Doehr that he could request a post-attachment hearing if he wished.

Revision as of 19:49, 8 June 2013

1991 United States Supreme Court case
Connecticut v. Doehr
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 7, 1991
Decided June 6, 1991
Full case nameConnecticut v. Brian K. Doehr
Citations501 U.S. 1 (more)111 S.Ct. 2105; 115 L.Ed.2d 1
Case history
PriorCertiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Holding
A state law authorizing the prejudgment attachment of a defendant's real property at the outset of a lawsuit, without notice to the defendant or a hearing and without any showing of extraordinary circumstances, violates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter
ConcurrenceRehnquist, joined by Blackmun
ConcurrenceScalia

Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of a defendant's real property upon the filing of an action, without prior notice or hearing, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, and without a requirement that the plaintiff post a bond, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Background

A Connecticut statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), provided that when lawsuit was commenced, the plaintiff could ask a judge to attach any real property that the defendant owned. The attachment impaired the plaintiff's ownership rights in the property, such as by making it impossible to sell or mortgage the property. The attachment would be based solely on the plaintiff's submitting an affidavit asserting probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. There was no requirement that prior notice of the attachment be provided to the defendant, that any hearing be held before the property was attached, that the property have anything to do with the subject-matter of the lawsuit, or that any unusual or extraordinary circumstances be shown.

In 1988, John F. DiGiovanni sued Brian K. Doehr for assault and battery in Connecticut Superior Court. DiGiovanni moved for Doehr's real property to be attached, submitting a five-sentence affidavit opining that there was a good basis for his claim. The judge ordered the attachment. DiGiovanni received no notice of the proceedings until after the sheriff had levied the attachment. The notice advised Doehr that he could request a post-attachment hearing if he wished.

Doehr filed a federal complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, contending that the Connecticut pre-judgment attachment procedure violated his constitutional right to due process. The District Court upheld the statute, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was unconstitutional because it authorized ex parte attachments without a showing of extraordinary circumstances and without a hearing.

The State of Connecticut and DiGiovanni sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court was unanimous as to the result of the case and portions of the opinion, but not the entire opinion.

The Court concluded that the constitutionality of the Connecticut prejudgment attachment procedure must be judged by the balancing test for due process claims described in Mathews v. Eldridge. The court concluded that the Connecticut law created too great a risk of erroneous deprivation of property to survive scrutiny under Mathews.

In a final portion of his opinion which spoke only for a plurality of the Court, Justice White also asserted that due process also required that a plaintiff obtaining an attachment must post a bond or other security for the damages the defendant might suffer in the event the attachment and underlying lawsuit proved to be unjustified. Justices Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined this portion of White's opinion.

Rehnquist concurrence

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment and portions of its opinion. Rehnquist agreed that the Connecticut attachment statute failed to satisfy due process, but he objected to what he described as the majority opinion's "lengthy disquisition as to what combination of safeguards are required to satisfy Due Process in hypothetical cases not before the Court." Justice Harry Blackmun joined Rehnquist's opinion.

Scalia concurrence

Justice Antonin Scalia filed a one-paragraph concurrence opining that because the Connecticut pre-judgment attachment procedure was "unknown at common law," it must be evaluated in light of the balancing test for due process that the Court set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge and failed that test.

See also

Further reading

  • Alquist, E. A. (1993). "Balancing the Checklist: Connecticut's Legislative Response to Connecticut v. Doehr". Connecticut Law Review. 26: 721. ISSN 0010-6151. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help)
  • Beale, L. (1993). "Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values: The Sniadach Tetrad Revisited". Cornell Law Review. 79: 1603. ISSN 0010-8847. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help)
  • Levy, J. G. (1992). "Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process: A Closer Look after Connecticut v. Doehr". Maryland Law Review. 51: 1054. ISSN 0025-4282. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help)

External links

  • 501 U.S. 1 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.


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