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{{Infobox Treaty | {{Infobox Treaty | ||
|name = Treaty of Versailles | |name = Treaty of Versailles | ||
|long_name = Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany |
|long_name = Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany | ||
|image = Treaty of Versailles, English version.jpg | |image = Treaty of Versailles, English version.jpg | ||
|image_width = 180px | |image_width = 180px | ||
Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
|type = | |type = | ||
|date_drafted = | |date_drafted = | ||
|date_signed = 28 June 1919 |
|date_signed = 28 June 1919 | ||
|location_signed = |
|location_signed = ], ], France | ||
|date_sealed = | |date_sealed = | ||
|date_effective = 10 January 1920 |
|date_effective = 10 January 1920 | ||
|condition_effective = ] by Germany and three Principal Allied Powers. |
|condition_effective = ] by Germany and three Principal Allied Powers. | ||
|date_expiration = | |date_expiration = | ||
|signatories = Central Powers<br/> | |signatories = Central Powers<br/> | ||
{{flag|Weimar Republic|name=German Reich}}<hr/> | |||
<!-- While the German Reich is the correct name for the period and historians refer to the German Government of this period as the Weimar Republic, the treaty refers to the nation as Germany and thus so does the article here. --> | |||
{{flag|Weimar Republic|name=Germany}}<ref name=tovpre/><hr/> | |||
Allied Powers<br/> | Allied Powers<br/> | ||
{{flagicon|France}} ]<br/> | |||
<!-- The following are in the order as presented in the preamble of the treaty, and are named as such too. Any reordering or rewording, without consensus, will be reverted. --> | |||
{{flag| |
{{flag|British Empire}}<br/> | ||
{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Italy}}<br/> | |||
{{flag|British Empire}}<ref name=tovpre/><br/> | |||
{{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}<br/> | |||
{{flagicon|France}} ]<ref name=tovpre/><br/> | |||
{{flag|United States|1912}}<br/> | |||
{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Italy}}<ref name=tovpre/><br/> | |||
{{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}<ref name=tovpre/><br/> | |||
{{Collapsible list | title = Others | {{Collapsible list | title = Others | ||
|{{flag|Belgium}} |
|{{flag|Belgium}} | ||
|{{flag|Bolivia}} |
|{{flag|Bolivia}} | ||
|{{flag|Brazil|1889}} |
|{{flag|Brazil|1889}} | ||
|{{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|1912}} ] |
|{{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|1912}} ] | ||
|{{flag|Cuba}} |
|{{flag|Cuba}} | ||
|{{flagicon|Czechoslovakia}} ] | |||
|{{flag|Ecuador}}<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flag|Ecuador}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Greece|old}} ]<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flagicon|Greece|old}} ] | |||
|{{flag|Guatemala}}<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flag| |
|{{flag|Guatemala}} | ||
|{{flag|Haiti|civil}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Kingdom of Hejaz|1917}} ]<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Hejaz|1917}} | |||
|{{flag|Honduras}}<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flag| |
|{{flag|Honduras}} | ||
|{{flag| |
|{{flag|Liberia}} | ||
|{{flag| |
|{{flag|Nicaragua}} | ||
|{{flag| |
|{{flag|Panama}} | ||
|{{flag|Peru|1825}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Poland}} ] <ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flagicon|Poland}} ] | |||
|{{flag|Portugal}}<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flag|Portugal}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} ]<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Romania}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Kingdom of Yugoslavia}} ]<ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flag|Thailand|name=Siam}} | |{{flag|Thailand|name=Siam}} | ||
|{{flag|Uruguay}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Czechoslovakia}} ] and <ref name=tovpre/> | |||
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Yugoslavia}} | |||
|{{flagicon|Uruguay}} ]<ref name=tovpre/>}}<hr/> | |||
|As part of the British Empire: | |||
|{{flag|Australia}} | |||
|{{flagcountry|Canada|1868}} | |||
|{{flagcountry|Union of South Africa|1912}} | |||
|{{flagcountry|British Raj}} | |||
|{{flag|New Zealand}}}}<hr/> | |||
|parties = | |parties = | ||
|depositor = French Government |
|depositor = French Government | ||
|languages = ] |
|languages = ], ] | ||
|website = | |website = | ||
|wikisource = Treaty of Versailles}} | |wikisource = Treaty of Versailles}} | ||
The '''Treaty of |
The '''Treaty of Versailles''' (French: ''Traité de Versailles'') was one of the ] at the end of ]. It ended the ] between ] and ]. It was signed on 28 June 1919, exactly five years after the ]. The other ] on the German side of World War I were dealt with in separate treaties.<ref>] with Austria; ] with Bulgaria; ] with Hungary; ] with the Ottoman Empire; {{cite book|editor1-last=Davis|editor1-first =Robert T.|title=U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security: Chronology and Index for the 20th Century|publisher=Praeger Security International|location=Santa Barbara, California|volume=1|year= 2010|page=|isbn=978-0-313-38385-4}}</ref> Although the ], signed on 11 November 1918, ended the actual fighting, it took six months of negotiations at the ] to conclude the peace treaty. The treaty was registered by the Secretariat of the ] on 21 October 1919, and was printed in ''The League of Nations ]''. | ||
Of the many provisions in the treaty, one of the most important and controversial required "Germany accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war (the other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles). This article, ], later became known as the War Guilt clause. The treaty forced Germany to disarm, make substantial territorial ], and pay ] to certain countries that had formed the Entente powers. It liberated numerous nationalities in Central Europe from oppressive German rule. In 1921 the total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion Marks (then $31.4 billion or £6.6 billion, roughly equivalent to US $442 billion or UK £284 billion in {{CURRENTYEAR}}). At the time economists, notably ] predicted that the treaty was too harsh—a "]", and said the figure was excessive and counterproductive. However, many historians have judged the reparation figure to be lenient, a sum that was designed to look imposing but was in fact not, that had little impact on the German economy and analyzed the treaty as a whole to be quite restrained and not as harsh as it could have been.<ref>Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," ''Central European History'' (1978) 11#3 pp. 231-255 </ref> | |||
Of the many provisions of the treaty, the main required Germany to disarm, limit her military forces, make territorial ], and to pay ] to various countries effected by Germany's actions during the war. The treaty also called for the creation of the ]. ] was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It required "Germany accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war. Germans saw this clause as taking full responsibility for the cause of the war, and the article later became known as the 'war guilt clause'. The result, of competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors, was a compromise that left none contented. The treaty neither pacified, conciliated, permanently weakened, or reconciled Germany and caused massive resentment. The problems that arose from the treaty, and attempts to stabilize Europe led to the ], which improved relations between Germany and the other European Powers, and the renegotiation of the reparation payments resulting in the ], the ], and finally their abolishment at the ]. | |||
The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left none contented: Germany was not ] or conciliated, nor permanently weakened. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to the ], which improved relations between Germany and the other European Powers, and the renegotiation of the reparation system resulting in the ], the ], and finally the postponement of reparations at the ]. The reparations were finally paid off by Germany after World War II. | |||
Contemporary opinion on the treaty varied from it being too harsh to too lenient. Germans saw the treaty as assigning them responsibility for the entire war and worked hard to undermine this perceived error. Historians, from the 1920s to present, have demonstrated that guilt for the war was not attached to Article 231, and that the clause, which was also included in the treaties signed by Germany's allies '']'', was purely a prerequisite to allow a legal basis to be laid out for the reparation payments that were to be made. Critics of the reparations considered them too harsh, counterproductive, damaging to the German economy, and a "]". However, historical consensus considers the reparations to be largely chimerical (designed to look imposing to mislead the public), which were well within Germany's ability to pay, and that had little direct impact on the German economy. Furthermore, historians have highlighted that Germany received substantial aid, via loans, to make payment and that in the end only paid a fraction of the total sum with the cost of repairs and pensions being shifted to the victors of the war rather than Germany. On the overall impact of the treaty, the opinion of historians is mixed. It is recognized that the treaty caused massive resentment and was unfair in places, however the treaty is generally considered to have been much less harsh than perceived and when placed in context and compared with the ], which Germany imposed upon Soviet Russia in early 1918, the Treaty of Versailles is viewed as being extremely lenient. Regardless of whether the treaty was fair or not, over the following years it was systematically destroyed by the victors and defeated alike due to a lack of unified will amongst the victors to enforce it and from the Germans avoiding the conditions of the treaty and their obligations. In assessing the long term impact of the treaty, historians have determined that the rise of ] and the ] were not inevitable consequences of the treaty and likewise neither was the ]. Finally, historians have demonstrated that a myth was fostered, by German propaganda, during the ] that the treaty was unduly harsh and that this myth is still commonly held today by the public and remains the key lesson taught in school textbooks. | |||
==Background== | |||
] | |||
In 1914, the ] broke out. For the next four years fighting waged across ], the ], ] and ] resulting in most of the world being dragged into the war.<ref>Simkins, Jukes, Hickey, p. 9</ref> In 1917, the ] was rocked by ] that brought about the collapse of the Imperial Government and the rise of the ] led by ].<ref name=Bell19>Bell, p. 19</ref> | |||
On 8 January 1918, the ] ] issued a statement known as the ].<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 429</ref> This statement called for a diplomatic end to the war, international disarmament, the withdrawal of ] forces from the lands they had occupied up until this point, the creation of a ], the redrawing of Europe's borders along ethnic lines, and the formation of a ] to afford "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike".<ref>]</ref> Wilson's ideals resulted him being awarded the 1919 ],<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1919/# |title= The Nobel Peace Prize 1919 |accessdate=5/29/2013|author=Nobelprize.org|}}</ref> and ultimately resulted in the Germans attempting to broker a peace based on these points.<ref>Boyer, p. 526</ref> | |||
After ] on the ], the ] signed the ] with the ] on 3 March 1918. This treaty forced Russia to yield sovereignty of ] and the ] to Germany, recognize the independence of the ], pay six billion ] in ] among many other stipulations.<ref>Simkins, Jukes, Hickey, p. 265</ref> The German "imposition of harsh terms on Russia ... just two months after the announcement of the Fourteen Points seemed ... to demonstrate that German had no right to demand or expect leniency."<ref name=Tucker2005a902>Tucker (2005a), p. 902</ref> | |||
In the autumn of 1918, the ] collapsed, and the various ethnic groups of the empire rose up to establish their own successor states and gain full independence.<ref>Beller, pp. 182-95</ref> In Germany, the rate of desertion within the military increased<ref>Bessel, pp.47–8</ref> as did civilian strikes.<ref>Hardach, pp. 183-4</ref> On the ], the ] had launched the ] that decisively defeated the German military.<ref>Simkins, p. 71</ref> During this period, the ], unwilling to be sent on a suicidal climatic battle, ] resulting in further uprisings across Germany.<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 638</ref> This coupled with rising civilian social tension and defeat of the military, resulted in the ]<ref>Schmitt, p. 101</ref> and the German Government attempting to broker a peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points.<ref name=Schmitt102>Schmitt, p. 102</ref> ], with German forces still in ] and ] and before allied forces had entered German territory.<ref name=Weinberg8>Weinberg, p. 8</ref> | |||
In late 1918, a Polish Government was formed and an independent Poland proclaimed. In December, Poles launched ] within the German ]. Fighting lasted until February when an armistice was signed leaving the area in Polish hands, but technically still German.<ref name=Frucht24>Frucht, p. 24</ref> In late 1918, Allied troops entered Germany and initiated the ].<ref>Martel (1999), p. 18</ref> The defeat of the Central Powers resulted in the ]. The conference aimed to establish peace between the war's belligerents and establish the post-war world. The Treaty of Versailles formed part of the conference, and dealt solely with Germany.<ref>Osmanczyk, p. 1898</ref> The treaty, along with the others that were signed during the Paris Peace Conference, were each named after the suburb of Paris they were signed in.<ref name=Schmitt103>Schmitt, p. 103</ref> | |||
==Negotiations== | ==Negotiations== | ||
Negotiations between the Allied powers started on 18 January in the Salle de l'Horloge at the ], on the ] in Paris. Initially, 70 delegates of 27 nations participated in the negotiations.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lentin |first=Antony|title=Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George and the Pre-history of Appeasement|year=1985| publisher=Routledge|location=|language=|isbn=978-0-416-41130-0|page=84|origyear=1984}}</ref> Having been defeated, Germany, ], and ] were excluded from the negotiations. ] was also excluded because it had negotiated a ] with Germany in 1918{{citation needed|date=November 2012}}, in which Germany gained a large fraction of Russia's land and ]. The treaty's terms were extremely harsh, as the negotiators at Versailles later pointed out. | |||
] at the ]]] | |||
Until March 1919, the most important role for negotiating the extremely complex and difficult terms of the peace fell to the regular meetings of the "Council of Ten", which comprised the heads of government and foreign ministers of the five major victors (the ], ], the ], ], and ]). As this unusual body proved too unwieldy and formal for effective decision-making, Japan and—for most of the remaining conference—the foreign ministers left the main meetings, so that only the "Big Four" remained.<ref>Alan Sharp, "The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919", 1991.</ref> After his territorial claims to Fiume (today ]) were rejected, ], ] left the negotiations and only returned to sign in June. | |||
Historian ] comments that the British "favored a neutral site like ], ]" for the peace negotiations to take place at, however the French wanted to hold the conference in ], a position the Americans supported.<ref name=Powell140>Powell, p. 140</ref> | |||
The final conditions were determined by the leaders of the "Big Three" nations: British Prime Minister ], French Prime Minister ], and American President ]. | |||
] | |||
Even with this smaller group it was difficult to decide on a common position because their aims conflicted with one another. | |||
Negotiations between the Allied powers started on 18 January 1919, in the Salle de l'Horloge at the ], on the ] in Paris.<ref>Slavicek, p. 37</ref> Initially, 70 delegates of 26 nations participated in the negotiations.<ref>Phillips, p. 152</ref> Representatives from the ] were not invited, due to their early withdrawal from the war.<ref name=Weinberg12>Weinberg, p. 12</ref> ] highlights that "the tradition of peace conferences was that belligerents met on terms of equality", however as the Allies were at odds with each other, they did not invite Germany thus avoiding a German delegation attempting to play one country off against the other and unfairly influencing the proceedings.<ref name=Schmitt103/> ] declares a German delegation was only invited to "sign the Treaty ... without comment"<ref name=Davies133>Davies, p. 133</ref> although as historian P.M.H. Bell points out "the whole object of winning the war was to impose upon Germany terms which she would never accept voluntarily".<ref name=Bell21>Bell, p. 21</ref> | |||
It rapidly became evident that the major powers would make most of the decisions. After some debate, it was decided that a 'Council of Ten', comprising the heads of government and foreign ministers of the five major victors (the ], ], the ], ], and the ]), would meet in private sessions to negotiate the terms of the peace. The minor powers would attend "a weekly Plenary Conference, during which treaty-related issues would be discussed in a general forum". These members "were also given the opportunity to form commissions that were entrusted with studying and making recommendations regarding various aspects of the peace settlement". Over fifty committees and commissions were founded "whose findings on a host of issues formed the basis for most of the provisions that found their way into the treaties".<ref>Slavicek, pp. 40-1</ref><ref name=Venzon439>Venzon, p. 439</ref> The 'Council of Ten' "proved too cumbersome for any real progress" and in late March was replaced. The foreign ministers "continued to meet in a separate body", known as the 'Council of Five', to discuss "less important matters" while the heads of state from America, Britain, France, and Italy, dubbed the 'Council of Four', met in informal meetings to debate the major issues.<ref name=Venzon439/> Temporarily, the 'Council of Four' became the 'Big Three' when the ] left the conference.<ref name=Lentin(2012)22>Lentin (2012), p. 22</ref> | |||
===Overall Allied aims === | |||
] (left) and General ] (right) stand with Kaiser ] (center).|alt=Three men stand studying a map on a table.]] | |||
], the French ], is quoted as saying "if only we could get rid of Germany, there would be peace in Europe."<ref name=Lentin(2012)24>Lentin (2012), p. 24</ref> However, historian ] comments that regardless "of even the harshest terms proposed ... the continued existence of a German state, however truncated or restricted, was taken for granted by all" despite ] or their ].<ref name=Weinberg9>Weinberg, p. 9</ref> Wilson commented "We do not wish to destroy Germany and we could not do so if we wished." The British position on the future of Germany was that it should remain to be "a political counterweight to France and to resume her prewar role as Britain's chief trading partner."<ref name=Lentin(2012)24/> | |||
Weinberg further notes that Germany was viewed, as a result of the long and bitter war and the number of nations needed to defeat her, as "extraordinarily dangerous to the welfare, even existence, of other" European nations.<ref name=Weinberg8/> As a result, the victors sought to break 'Prussian militarism' by dissolving the ], which was "the brain and nerve center of the army". With Germany disarmed and her general staff dissolved, this would "render possible the initiation of a ]".<ref name=Bell20>Bell, p. 20</ref> To further this goal and due to an universal conviction among the victors "that Germany had misgoverned its colonies", it was believed "it would be dangerous to restore the colonies because Germany might try to raise troops in the colonies to offset the reduction imposed upon it"<ref name=Schmitt106>Schmitt, p. 106</ref> Due to Germany's invasion of Belgium, and ], coupled with the ] brought about the want to "limit German power in the future" so other nations could survive.<ref name=Weinberg9/> | |||
Professor Ian Beckett sums up the goals of the three main powers: The French wanted "a punitive settlement", the British were after international stability, and the Americans desired "to create a better world based on principles of internationalism, democracy and self-determination."<ref>Simkins, p. 72</ref> Marc Trachtenberg disagrees. He states "it is important, if the true flavour of the period is to be grasped, that ideas be taken for what they were - that the integrity of conceptual structures be respected as historical reality." He argues that Wilson is made out to be a hero who did not want a punitive settlement "until he was 'bamboozled' by the Europeans". Trachtenberg highlights that Wilson had punitive goals in mind and that it is also too simple to claim the French worked "singlemindedly .. for a harsh, Carthaginian peace."<ref>Trachtenberg, p. 503</ref> Overall, however, it was "hoped that a just and lasting peace would be concluded, that the war which won would be the last war."<ref name=Schmitt106/> | |||
===French aims=== | ===French aims=== | ||
As the only major allied power sharing a land border with Germany, France was chiefly concerned with weakening Germany as much as possible. The French ] ] described France's position best by telling Wilson: “America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not even Napoleon himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not.” <ref>{{cite book|last=Keylor|first=William R.|title=The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919.|year=1998|publisher=Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin|isbn=0-669-41711-4.|page=34|url=http://www.h-france.net/vol1reviews/blatt2.html}}</ref> Clemenceau wished to bring the French border to the ] or to create a ] in ] but this demand was not met by the treaty. Instead France obtained the demilitarization of the Rhineland, a ] and promises of Anglo-American support in case of a new German aggression, but the United States did not ratify the treaty.<ref>]</ref> | |||
No other country "had suffered more at the hands of the Reich ... than France". France suffered 1.3 million soldiers killed – "fully one out of four French men ages 18-30" – along with 400,000 civilians. France "lost a significantly higher percentage of its prewar population than any other nation in the conflict, including Russia." In addition, the country had "also sustained considerable more physical damage than any other nation".<ref>Slavicek, p. 41</ref> German troops ], including "France's most industrialized region and the source of most of its coal and iron ore, the Northeast. ... Adding insult to injury, during the final days of the war" mines had been flooded, and railroads, bridges, and factories destroyed. Twice, within the space of fifty years, ].<ref name=Slavicek43>Slavicek, p. 43</ref> Therefore, Georges Clemenceau's primary objective "was above all to ensure the future security of France against Germany, which he was sure would be intent on revenge".<ref>Lentin (2012), p. 21</ref> Additional goals included weakening Germany economically, militarily, territorially<ref name=Slavicek43/> and to make France "Europe's leading steel producer".<ref>Brown, p. 187</ref> Clemenceau described France's position best by telling Wilson: "America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not even ] himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not".<ref>Keylor, p. 43</ref> | |||
Keynes argued, | |||
] | |||
{{quote|So far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be remedied for generations.<ref>John Maynard Keynes, ''The Economic Consequences of the Peace'' (Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920) p. 34</ref>}} | |||
France, which suffered ] and the ] among allies, was adamant on the payment of reparations. The failure of the ] to pay reparations led to the ] by French and Belgian forces. | |||
Originating with a proposal from Marshal ], the French wanted "a strategic frontier on the ]". Only a frontier on the Rhine "could protect France from a repetition of 1870 and 1914" and offset the various weaknesses of France when compared to Germany.<ref>Lentin (1992), p. 28</ref> This position was adamantly rejected by the American and British representatives, and it took two months of negotiations for the French to back down and accept an alternative. The British pledged that they would provide an "immediate alliance" with France if Germany attacked again, and Woodrow Wilson "agreed to put to the ] a similar proposal". As Clemenceau held personal doubts if the annexation of the ] would actually benefit France and recognized that France had survived due to an alliance, he could not afford to alienate himself from his allies. He had proclaimed to the ] in December 1918, that his primarily goal was to maintain an alliance with both countries. Consequently, Clemenceau agreed to the offer, under the provision that the Rhineland would be occupied by France for 15 years (negotiated down by the Anglo-Americans from 30 years), and that Germany would accept the Rhineland as a ].<ref>Lentin (1992), pp. 28-32</ref> In the long run the American Senate never ratified these decisions,<ref>Lentin (1992), p. 31</ref> and historian Anthony Lentin argues that when the terms were put to the Germans, they "were maximum demands which might be reduced, but could not be augmented".<ref>Lentin (1992), p. 32</ref> | |||
In addition, France wanted to impose "heavy reparations on Germany" for two reasons: to make Germany pay for the damage caused during the war, and to weaken Germany for the considerable future.<ref name=Slavicek43/> To further weaken Germany and to "compensate for the hundreds of French mines and factories destroyed during the war", France wanted the "iron ore and coal-rich Saar Valley" to be annexed to France.<ref>Slavicek, pp. 43-44</ref> Despite this goal, at one point the "French were willing to accept a considerably more moderate figure than the Americans would concede" and Clemenceau ... was the only one of the Big Three willing to discuss the question of Germany's capacity to pay directly with the German delegation before the final settlement was drafted." During April and May 1919, the French and Germans held private talks "in which stressed France's willingness to work out mutually acceptable arrangements on issues like reparation, reconstruction and industrial collaboration."<ref>Trachtenberg, p. 499</ref> | |||
France, along with the British Dominions and Belgium, "were thoroughly opposed" to the concept of mandates and favored outright annexation of Germany's ex-colonies.<ref name=Schmitt106/> Economist ] argued that "the policy of France" was "to set the clock back and undo what ... progress ... Germany had accomplished."<ref name=Keynes34>Keynes, p.34</ref> Lentin counters this point by noting that Clemenceau "was too much a realist to argue for" such a position, yet he "sought 'physical guarantees' to prevent yet another invasion".<ref name=Lentin(2012)24/> Keynes continued his argument stating by arguing for the annexation of territory, France would be able to curtail the German population and economy. "If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be remedied for generations."<ref name=Keynes34/> | |||
===British aims=== | ===British aims=== | ||
{{Further|Heavenly Twins (Sumner and Cunliffe)}} | |||
] | |||
], an American delegate at the Paris Peace Conference and who later resigned his position in protest of Wilson, stated that the British went to the conference with a number of secret aims that were not admitted publically. They were "the destruction of the German Navy, the confiscation of the German merchant marine, the elimination of Germany as an economic rival, the extraction of all possible indemnities from Germany, the annexation of German East Africa ... the Cameroons, the annexation of all German colonies in the Pacific south of the Equator." Bullitt concluded, post-treaty, that "all of these secret war aims ... were achieved in one form or another by the Treaty of Versailles."<ref>Denson, pp. 470-1</ref> | |||
] ] was a ], who was reelected at the end of 1918.<ref>Haigh, p. 295</ref> One of the party slogans, during the election, was "squeeze the German lemon 'til the pips squeak"<ref name=Slavicek44>Slavicek, p. 44</ref> and the general public were not in favor of a "soft peace" as reflected in the British press at the time. The general public opinion was that there should be a "just peace", but one that "would leave Germany powerless to repeat the aggression of 1914 and a peace which would compel it to pay for the damage" although those of a "liberal and advanced opinion" instead shared Wilson's ideals of a peace of reconciliation.<ref name=Schmitt102/> | |||
In private, however, Lloyd George opposed the ] of the public<ref name=Slavicek44/> and attempted to steer "a middle course between Clemenceau's demands and Wilson's Fourteen Points" as he "recognized that at some time in the future, Europe would have to reconcile with Germany."<ref name=Brezina21>Brezina, p. 21</ref> While he supported imposing reparations on Germany, he did not want to do so under terms that would cripple the German economy as this would have a knock on effect across Europe. Furthermore, he wanted Germany to recover so they would remain a viable economic power, and a major trading partner.<ref name=Slavicek44/><ref name=Brezina21/> In arguing that Britain's war pensions and widows allowances should be included in the German reparation sum, this "ensured that a substantial share would go to the British Empire".<ref>Yearwood, p. 127</ref> | |||
The future security of Britain and the ] were also key points Lloyd George attempted to address.<ref name=Slavicek44/> As Britain and France were old rivals, "Lloyd George intended to thwart France's attempt to establish itself as the dominant European Power."<ref name=Brezina21/> A non-crippled Germany would be able to act as a buffer to the French and a deterrent to "Bolshevik Russia", thus maintaining the balance of power "in which no single nation ... able to dominate". This policy, it was believed, was in the best interests of British national security and European peace.<ref name=Slavicek44/> Furthermore, Lloyd George wanted to neutralize the German navy so that he ] "would once again be the greatest naval power in the world."<ref name=Brezina21/> | |||
Britain had suffered little land devastation during the war and Prime Minister ] supported reparations to a lesser extent than the French. Britain began to look on a restored Germany as an important trading partner and worried about the effect of reparations on the British economy.<ref name="David Thomson 1970, p. 605">David Thomson, ''Europe Since Napoleon''. Penguin Books. 1970, p. 605.</ref> | |||
The German colonial empire was to be dissolved, "preferably ceding some of its territorial possessions to Britain",<ref name=Brezina21/> yet Lloyd George was an sincere advocate "of the principle of mandates" and wanted to place the German colonies "under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations." However, this position was strongly opposed by the ]s of ], ] and ].<ref name=Schmitt106/> | |||
===American aims=== | ===American aims=== | ||
{{Main|Fourteen Points}} | {{Main|Fourteen Points}} | ||
Before the end of the war, ] ] put forward his ], which represented the liberal position at the Conference and helped shape world opinion. Wilson was concerned with rebuilding the European economy, encouraging self-determination, promoting free trade, creating appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, creating a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace. He opposed harsh treatment of Germany but was outmaneuvered by Britain and France, He brought along top intellectuals as advisors, but his refusal to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation made his efforts partisan and risked political defeat at home.<ref>John Milton Cooper, ''Woodrow Wilson: A Biography'' (2011) pp 454-505</ref> | |||
] | |||
==Content== | |||
Jim Powell calls Wilson, the "weakest of the major players at Versailles". He notes that ] and the ] ] both advised Wilson, who was not a skilled negotiator, not to attend and instead send a representative "who had not been authorized to depart form the Fourteen Points" thereby the Americans could "maintain a strong negotiating position". Instead, Wilson "insisted on going ... because it was his dream ... to play on a world stage".<ref name=Powell140/> ] furthers this point, arguing that "Wilson ventured into matters far beyond his understanding".<ref>Cobbs-Hoffman, p. 177</ref> In November 1918, the ] won the Senate election by a slim margin. Wilson, ], refused to take any Republican senators with him thus encountered opposition "when the treaty came before the Senate".<ref name=Powell140/> Schmitt notes that Wilson was essentially powerless and "the Republican opposition ... Wilson's opponents at Paris ... that he did not have the support of the American people."<ref name=Schmitt103/> | |||
===Impositions on Germany=== | |||
Schmitt argues that the American were in "favor of a moderate peace, a peace of reconciliation, or as called it, 'a peace without victory,' by which he meant a peace without the punishment which victory sometimes induces governments to inflict."<ref name=Schmitt102/> Powell takes a more cynical point of view. He comments that Wilson posed "as a generous peacemaker while letting Clemenceau do the dirty work for revenge they both wanted."<ref>Powell, p. 149</ref> Lentin goes further. He notes "by March 1919" Wilson had concluded "Germany deserved a hard, deterrent peace in view of her 'very great offence against civilization' and that the League of Nations would iron out injustices."<ref name=Lentin201226>Lentin (2012), p. 26</ref> Marc Trachtenberg comments "Wilson had, of course, spoken of a 'peace without victory' ... but this was prior to America's entry into the war, and wartime speeches make it abundantly clear that after April 1917 he had ruled out the idea of a peace among equals, a compromise peace, a negotiated peace ... . The Germans were the aggressors, their leaders ... were the embodiment of evil. One could not compromise with evil ... . Indeed these wartime speeches bristle with contempt for the very notion of a compromised settlement."<ref>Trachtenberg, p. 490</ref> Daniel Smith observes that "the Fourteen Points were 'a bold psychological move' that boosted American and Allied morale and weakened to some degree the will and temper of the Central Powers. However, though 'sufficiently vague and idealistic for war propaganda purposes,' ... Versailles would prove them 'inadequate for peacemaking'"<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 430</ref> | |||
====Penalties==== | |||
The first priority, and "most important goal" of Wilson, "was the establishment of an international peacekeeping organization, or ]." It was believed that such a body would "bring an end to all war", provide a forum to discuss adjustments or hammer out any flaws within the various treaties of the Paris Peace Conference, and deal with any future problems arising in Europe due to the end of the war and the rise of new states.<ref>Slavicek, p. 48</ref><ref name=Brezina21/> Keynes comments "It was commonly believed ... that the President had thought out ... a comprehensive scheme not only for the League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual Treaty of Peace. But in fact the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever ... ."<ref>Powell, p. 147</ref> | |||
*Article 227 charges the former German Emperor, ], with "supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties", and that Allied and Associated Powers would "request ... the Government of the Netherlands surrender to them of the ex- Emperor in order that he may be put on trial."<ref>Treaty of Versailles, Article 227</ref> | |||
*Articles 228–230 of treaty note the right of the "Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals" people believe to have committed war crimes and compelled Germany to "furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility." The treaty also ensured that in all cases, the accused would have the right to choose their own consul.<ref>Treaty of Versailles, Article 228-230</ref> | |||
*] (the so-called "War Guilt Clause") stated Germany accepted responsibility for "all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."<ref>Treaty of Versailles, Article 231</ref> Similar wording was used in the treaties signed by the other Central Powers, having them accept responsibility for the damage they and their allies caused.{{#tag:ref|Article 117 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye: "... Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her Allies".<ref>http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_Saint-Germain-en-Laye/Part_VIII#Article_177</ref> Article 161 of the Treaty of Trianon: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Hungary accepts the responsibility of Hungary and her allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies."<ref>http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_Trianon/Part_VIII#Article_161</ref> Article 121 of the Treaty Areas of Neuilly-sur-Seine: "Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation".<ref>http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_II_-_PART_VII,_REPARATION,_ARTICLES_121_-_176</ref> Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres: "Turkey recognises that by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied Powers she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make complete reparation."<ref>http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres/Part_VIII</ref>|group=nb}} | |||
====Occupation of the Rhineland==== | |||
In regards to the German colonial empire, Alan Sharp notes that the victors "simply wanted to annex the territories their troops had wrestled from the enemy" yet "to Wilson ... outright annexation constituted a clear violation of the fundamental principles of justice and human rights that he believed must underpin any truly equitable and lasting peace settlement." Wilson favored the native people having "the right of self-determination" and the major powers – under League of Nation oversight – would take control of these regions via ]. The major powers "would act as a disinterested trustee over the region, promoting the welfare of its inhabitants in a variety of ways" until they were able to govern themselves. Sharp notes that "the mandate plan had prejudicial overtones in its assumption that the colonies' indigenous populations could not be entrusted with self-rule without first being tutored".<ref>Slavicek, pp. 46-7</ref> In spite of this position, to ensure that Japan did not refuse to join the League of Nations, Wilson was in favor of turning over ] to Japan rather than return the area to China.<ref name=Slavicek65>Slavicek, p. 65</ref> | |||
As a guarantee of compliance by Germany, Part XIV of the Treaty provided that the ] would be occupied by Allied troops for a period of 15 years.<ref>], ] at Wikisource.</ref> | |||
====Military restrictions==== | |||
==Treaty content== | |||
Part V of the treaty begins with the preamble, | |||
{{Further2|]}} | |||
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."<ref>], ] at Wikisource.</ref> | |||
], ''Reichspostminister'' ], Justice Minister Dr. ], Foreign Minister ], Prussian State President ], and financial advisor Dr. ]|alt=Six men stand, behind a table, posed for a photograph.]] | |||
*German armed forces will number no more than 100,000 troops, and conscription will be abolished. | |||
*Enlisted men will be retained for at least 12 years; officers to be retained for at least 25 years. | |||
*German naval forces will be limited to 15,000 men, six battleships (no more than 10,000 tons displacement each), six cruisers (no more than 6,000 tons displacement each), 12 destroyers (no more than 800 tons displacement each) and 12 torpedo boats (no more than 200 tons displacement each). No submarines are to be included.{{clarify|date=March 2012|reason=Which unit? Metric/tonnes or long tons?}} | |||
*The import and export of weapons is prohibited. | |||
*Poison gas, armed aircraft, tanks and armoured cars are prohibited. | |||
*Blockades on ships are prohibited. | |||
*Restrictions on the manufacture of machine guns (e.g. the ]) and rifles (e.g. ] rifles). | |||
*German armed forces were prohibited from entering or fortifying any part of German territory west of the Rhine or within 50 kilometres east of the Rhine. | |||
] signs the Treaty of Versailles in the ], with the various Allied delegations sitting and standing in front of him.|alt=Numerous men stand and sit around a long table, while the man sitting in the foreground signs a document.]] | |||
Schmitt notes that "the treaties were drafted by hundreds of persons. Each man did his own little job and then the pieces were glued together by a few big shots, who did not fully sense the enormity of the demands".<ref name=Schmitt108>Schmitt, p. 108</ref> Lentin comments that the "whole package of terms was approved unamended by the Big Three without adequate co-ordination or review ... . No one had read them in full let alone discussed their cumulative effect." Lloyd George "admitted that he only received a complete copy at the last moment" and Wilson commented "I hope that during the rest of my I will have enough time to read this whole volume".<ref name=Lentin(2012)22/> | |||
The allies declared that if the German Government did not sign the treaty, the war would be resumed. This caused the collapse of the government who were unwilling to sign the treaty, and the establishment of a new one. ], the new ], sent a telegram stating his intention to sign the treaty if certain articles were withdrawn from the treaty, including articles 227, 230, and 231.{{#tag:ref|See the Reparations section.|group=nb}} The allied response was "the time for discussion is past" and announced that Germany either accept the treaty as it stood or allied forces would cross the Rhine within 24-hours. On 23 June, Bauer sent a second telegram to inform Clemenceau that a German delegation would arrive shortly to sign the treaty.<ref>Slavicek, p. 73</ref> | |||
On 28 June 1919, the fifth anniversary of the ], which provided the immediate spark for war, the peace treaty was signed.<ref name=Slavicek114/> The treaty dealt with numerous issues ranging from war crimes,<ref>]</ref> the prohibition on the merging of ] with Germany unless with the consent of the League of Nations,<ref>]</ref> the freedom of navigation on major European rivers,<ref name=TOVPartXII>]</ref> to the returning of a ] to the king of ].<ref>]</ref> The major points are discussed below. | |||
===Treaty requirements=== | |||
====Territorial changes==== | ====Territorial changes==== | ||
By the time the First World War broke out, Germany - as a single state - had only been in existence for 43 years following its ].<ref>Scheck, pp. 9-26</ref> The treaty stripped Germany of 25,000 square miles of territory and 7 million people. It also required Germany to give up the gains made via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and grant true independence to the protectorate states that had been established.<ref name=Truitt114>Truitt, p. 114</ref> | |||
[[File:German losses after WWI.svg|thumb|Germany after Versailles: | [[File:German losses after WWI.svg|thumb|Germany after Versailles: | ||
{{legend|#ddefd0|Administered by the ]}} | {{legend|#ddefd0|Administered by the ]}} | ||
{{legend|#ffffcf|Annexed |
{{legend|#ffffcf|Annexed by neighbouring countries}} | ||
{{legend|#f6d3a9|]}} |
{{legend|#f6d3a9|]}}]] | ||
Germany′s borders in 1919 had been established nearly 50 years earlier, at ]. Territory and cities in the region had changed hands repeatedly for centuries, including at various times being owned by the ], ], ], and ]. However, Germany laid claim to lands and cities that it viewed as historically "Germanic" centuries before Germany′s establishment as a country in 1871. Other countries disputed Germany′s claim to this territory. In the peace treaty, Germany agreed to return disputed lands and cities to various countries. | |||
In ], Germany was required to recognize Belgian sovereignty over the "contested territory ]", and cede control of the ] area. Within six months of the transfer, Belgium was required conduct a plebiscite on whether the citizens of the region wanted to remain under Belgian sovereignty or return to German control, communicate the results to the League of Nations and abide by the League's decision.<ref>]</ref> "As compensation for the destruction of" French coal-mines, Germany was to cede the output of the ] coalmines to France and ] to the League of Nations for fifteen years. At the end of that period, a plebiscite would be held to establish "the sovereignty under which" the citizens of the territory "desire to be placed".<ref>]</ref> "Recognizing the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871", the treaty "restored" the territory of ] to France reverting the outcome of ] and the ].<ref>]</ref> The issue of ] was to resolved via referendum to held at a future date.<ref name=Peckham107>Peckham, p. 107</ref> | |||
Germany was compelled to yield control of ], and would also lose a number of European territories. Most of the province of ] would be ceded to the restored ], thereby granting it access to the ] via the "]" which Prussia had ] in the ]. This turned ] into an ], separated from mainland Germany. | |||
In ], Germany was to recognize the "complete independence of the Czecho-Slovak State" and to cede over portions of the province of ].<ref>]</ref> Likewise, Germany had to recognize the independence of Poland and renounce "all rights and title over the territory". Portions of Upper Silesia were to be ceded to Poland, with the future of the rest of the territory to be decided via plebiscite. "On the conclusion of the voting" a report would be drawn up and the final border fixed with regard "to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality."<ref>]</ref> The province of Posen (now Poznan), which had come under Polish control during the ],<ref name=Frucht24/> was also to be ceded to Poland.<ref>Martin, p. lii</ref> The area of ], based on historical and ethnic grounds, was transferred to Poland so that the new state could have access to the sea. This area would become known as the ].<ref>Boemeke, p. 325</ref> The sovereignty of southern section of ] was to be decided via plebiscite<ref>]</ref> while the East Prussian ] – due to it laying astride the rail line between Warsaw and Danzig – was transferred to Poland outright without any plebiscite being required.<ref>Ingrao, p. 261</ref> In total, {{convert|51800|km²|abbr=off}} of territory was granted to Poland at the expense of Germany.<ref name=Brezina34>Brezina, p. 34</ref> ] was to be ceded to the Allied and Associated powers, for them to decide the territory's future fate.<ref>]</ref> Germany was to cede the city of Danzig and its surrounding area, including the delta of the ] on the ], to the League of Nations to establish the ].<ref>]</ref> | |||
*] and much of ]—both originally ]-speaking territories—were part of ], having been annexed by France′s King ], who desired the ] as a "natural border". After approximately 200 years of ] rule, Alsace and the German-speaking part of Lorraine were ceded to Germany in 1871 under the ]. In 1919, both regions were returned to France. | |||
Article 119 of the treaty required "Germany renounce all rights, titles and privileges" over her former colonies while Article 22 required that these territories would be turned into mandates entrusted to member nations to tutor and develop the regions.<ref>]</ref> The former German African colonies of ] and ] (Cameroon) were transferred to France as mandates.<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 437</ref> ] and ], were allocated to Belgium as mandates,<ref name=Benians658>Benians, p. 658</ref> while ] went to South Africa as a mandate, and the United Kingdom obtained ] as a mandate.<ref name=Tucker2005a1224>Tucker (2005a), p. 1224</ref> As compensation for the German invasion of Portugal's African empire, Portugal was granted the ], a sliver of German East Africa in northern ].<ref>Roberts, p. 496</ref> Article 156 of the treaty transferred German concessions in ], China, to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to ].<ref>]</ref> Furthermore, Japan was granted all German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator as mandates, while those south were granted as mandates to Australia with the exception of ], which was assigned to New Zealand as a mandate.<ref name=Benians658/> | |||
*] was returned to ] following a ] on February 14, 1920 (area {{convert|3,984|km²|abbr=on}}, 163,600 inhabitants (1920)). Central Schleswig, including the city of ], opted to remain German in a separate referendum on 14 March 1920. | |||
*Most of the Prussian provinces of ] (now Poznan) and of ] which Prussia had annexed in the ] (1772–1795) were ceded to Poland (area {{convert|53,800|km²|abbr=on}}, 4,224,000 inhabitants (1931)) without a ]. Most of the Province of Posen had already come under Polish control during the ] of 1918–1919. | |||
*The ] of ] was transferred to ] (area {{convert|316|km²|abbr=on}} or {{convert|333|km²|abbr=on}}, 49,000 inhabitants) without a plebiscite. | |||
*The eastern part of Upper Silesia was assigned to Poland, as in the ] inhabitants of about 45% of communities voted for this (with general results of 717,122 votes being cast for Germany and 483,514 for Poland). | |||
*The area of ] was given to ]. An opportunity was given to the population to "protest" against the transfer by signing a register, which gathered few signatures. The ] railway was also transferred to Belgium. | |||
*The area of ] in East Prussia, an important railway junction on the ]–] route, was transferred to Poland without a plebiscite (area {{convert|492|km²|abbr=on}}).<ref>{{cite book|author1=Charles Ingrao|author2=Franz A.J. Szabo|title=The Germans and East|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=IHAcEB8jh1AC&pg=PA262|year=2007|publisher=Purdue University Press|page=262}}</ref> | |||
*The northern part of ] known as the "Memelland" or ] was placed under the control of France and was later annexed by ].<ref>{{cite book|author=Ralph Wilde|title=International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Jny2BlhT0egC&pg=PA111|year=2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|page=111}}</ref> | |||
*From the eastern part of ] and the southern part of East Prussia, after the ] a small area was ceded to Poland. | |||
*The ] was to be ] for 15 years, after which a plebiscite between France and Germany was to decide to which country it would belong. During this time, coal would be sent to France. The region was then called the ''Saargebiet'' (German: "Saar Area") and was formed from southern parts of the German ] and western parts of the ]n ] under the "Saar statute" of the Versailles Treaty of 28. 6. 1919 (Article 45–50).<ref>{{cite book|author1=Manfred F. Boemeke|author2=Gerald D. Feldman|author3=Elisabeth Glaser|title=The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=zqj-oHp4KsgC&pg=PA302|year=1998|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=302}}</ref> | |||
*The strategically important port of ] with the delta of the Vistula River on the Baltic Sea was separated from Germany as the ] (Free City of Danzig). | |||
*] (see ]) was forbidden from integrating with/into ]. | |||
*In article 22, German colonies were made trusteeships under the control of Belgium, Great Britain, and certain British Dominions, France, and Japan.<ref>{{cite book|author=Ruth Henig|title=Versailles and After, 1919-1933|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=WYIE4pNry2sC&pg=PA17|year=2013|publisher=Routledge|page=17}}</ref> | |||
*In Africa, Britain and France divided ] (Cameroons) and ]. Belgium gained ] in northwestern ], Britain obtained by far the greater landmass of this colony, thus gaining the "missing link" in the chain of British possessions stretching from South Africa to Egypt (Cape to Cairo), Portugal received the ], a sliver of German East Africa. ] was mandated to the Union of South Africa.<ref>German South West Africa was the only African colony designated as a Class C mandate, meaning that the indigenous population was judged incapable of even limited self-government and the colony to be administered under the laws of the mandatory as an integral portion of its territory</ref> | |||
*In the Pacific, Japan gained Germany’s islands north of the equator (the ], the ], the ], the ]) and ] in China. ] was assigned to New Zealand; ], the ] and ]<ref>Australia in effective control, formally together with Britain and New Zealand</ref> to Australia as mandatory.<ref>Louis (1967), p. 117-130</ref> | |||
==== |
====Shandong problem==== | ||
{{Main|Shandong Problem}} | |||
] | |||
Article 156 of the treaty transferred German concessions in ], China, to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to ]. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations and a cultural movement known as the ] and influenced China not to sign the treaty. China declared the end of its war against Germany in September 1919 and ]. | |||
The treaty was "both comprehensive and complex" in regards to the restrictions placed upon the ]. The treaty was "formulated to restrict the German army so that Germany would not be capable of conducting any offensive actions"<ref>Shuster, p. 74</ref> and "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations".<ref>]</ref> | |||
The treaty required Germany to demobilize, and reduce her armed forces so that by 31 March 1920, and thereafter, the army would compose no more than 100,000 men (including officers and administration personnel) within a maximum of seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The treaty also laid out how these divisions and support units were to be organized. The general staff was to be dissolved and not reformed.<ref>]</ref> The number of military schools, used to train officers, was to be limited to three: "one school per arm". Conscription was to be abolished. ] men and ] were to be retained for at least 12 years, and ]s for at least 25 years with officers who had left the service being forbidden to attend military exercises. To prevent Germany from building up a large cadre of trained men, the number of men allowed to leave before the completion of their service was to be regulated.<ref>]</ref> Civilian staff supporting the army were to be downsized and the police force reduced to its pre-war size to "only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population". Furthermore, ] forces were forbidden.<ref>]</ref> | |||
] | |||
The fleet was allowed to retain six ]s, but was not allowed to exceed this figure. The fleet could not exceed six ] (not exceeding {{convert|6000|lt|t|adj=off}}), twelve ] (not exceeding {{convert|800|lt|t|adj=off}}) and twelve ] (not exceeding {{convert|200|lt|t|adj=off}}) and was forbidden from having submarines.<ref>]</ref> The manpower of the navy was not to exceed 15,000 men. This figure included "the manning of the fleet, coast defenses, signal stations, administration and other land services ... including officers and men of all grades and corps". In addition the officer and warrant officer strength was not allowed to exceed 1,500 men.<ref>]</ref> In addition, Germany had to surrender eight ], eight light cruisers, forty-two destroyers, and fifty torpedo boats - not already in Allied hands - so that they could be decommissioned. Likewise, thirty-two ] were to be disarmed and converted to merchant use.<ref>]</ref> | |||
Germany was to disarm and dismantle all fortifications west of the Rhine, and {{convert|50|km|mi|abbr=off}} east of the river. Future construction was forbidden. The Rhineland was to be a ] with the German army forbidden to enter.<ref>]</ref> Likewise, all military related structures and fortifications on the islands of ] and ] were to be destroyed.<ref>]</ref> Germany was prohibited from ], restricted on what weapons and the number the German army could stockpile and use, was prohibited from the manufacture or stockpile of ], ], ], and military aircraft.<ref>]</ref> | |||
====Reparations==== | ====Reparations==== | ||
{{Main|World War I reparations}} | {{Main|World War I reparations}} | ||
Article 232 of the treaty noted Germany would pay "compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency". Article 233 notes that the level of compensation to be paid would "be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission". The total sum of war reparations demanded from Germany—around 226 billion ]—was decided by an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission. | |||
] stated Germany accepted responsibility for "all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."<ref>]</ref>{{#tag:ref|Similar wording was used in the treaties signed by the other defeated nations of the Central Powers, having them accept responsibility for the damage they and their allies had caused during the war. Article 117 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye: "... Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her Allies".<ref>]</ref> Article 161 of the Treaty of Trianon: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Hungary accepts the responsibility of Hungary and her allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies."<ref>]</ref> Article 121 of the Treaty Areas of Neuilly-sur-Seine: "Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation".<ref>]</ref> Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres: "Turkey recognises that by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied Powers she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make complete reparation."<ref>]</ref>|group=nb}} The following articles note that Germany will compensate the Allied powers "for all the damage done to the civilian population ... and to their property during the" war. It goes on to state that a 'Reparation Commission' will be established in 1921 to "consider the resources and capacity of Germany", give the "German Government a just opportunity to be heard", and decide on the overall level of reparations Germany will pay. In the interim period, the treaty required Germany to pay "the equivalent of" 20 billion gold marks ($5 billion)<ref name=Martel2010156>Martel (2010), p. 156</ref> via whatever method Germany could, either "gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise". This sum would also be used to pay for the Allied occupation and go towards food and raw materials to supply Germany.<ref>]</ref> | |||
In January 1921, the total sum due was decided by an ] and was set at 132 billion ]. This figure was divided into three categories. The A Bonds amounted to 12 billion gold marks and the B bonds a further 38 billion marks, which equated to around 12.5 billion dollars "an amount smaller than what Germany had recently offered to pay"<ref name="Marks, p. 237">Marks, p. 237</ref> Class C bonds amounted for the remaining two-thirds of the total figure and were deliberately designed to be chimerical". "Their primary function was to mislead public opinion in the receiver countries into believing that the 132-billion mark figure was being maintained."<ref name="Marks, p. 237"/> Therefore, the sum Class C bonds "amounted to indefinite postponement".<ref>Bell, p. 23</ref> Germany was only obliged to pay the Class A and B bonds.<ref name="in JSTOR">Sally. Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," ''Central European History'' (1978) 11#3 pp 231-55 </ref> The actual total payout from 1920 to 1931 (when payments were suspended indefinitely) was 20 billion ]s, worth about 5 billion US dollars or one billion British pounds. Of this amount, 12.5 billion was cash that came mostly from loans from New York bankers. The rest was goods like coal and chemicals, or from assets like railway equipment. The total amount of reparations was fixed in 1921 on the basis of the German capacity to pay, not on the basis of Allied claims. The highly publicized rhetoric of 1919 about paying for all the damages and all the veterans' benefits was irrelevant to the total, but it did affect how the recipients spent their share. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were also supposed to pay some reparations but they were so impoverished that they in fact paid very little. Germany was the only country rich enough to pay anything; it owed reparations chiefly to France, Britain, Italy and Belgium; the US received $100 million.<ref name="in JSTOR"/> Historian Stephen Shucker notes how the overall payment amounts to "a unilateral transfer equal to a startling 5.3 percent of German national income for 1919-31."<ref>Martel, p. 43</ref> | |||
====Guarantees==== | |||
], Germany.|alt=Map of northwest Europe showing France, Germany and the Low Countries. The Yellow area highlights the Rhineland of Germany.]] | |||
In 1932, due to international agreement at the ] Germany stopped paying reparations. In 2010, Germany finished paying off loans that had been taken out during the 1920s to aid in making reparation payments.<ref>http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html</ref> | |||
To ensure that Germany abided by the treaty, the Rhineland "together with the bridgeheads" east of the River Rhine, were to be occupied by Allied troops "for a period of fifteen years".<ref>]</ref> If by that point Germany had not initiated any acts of unprovoked aggression, then a staged withdrawal would take place. First, after five years, "the bridgehead at ] and the territories north of a line running along the Ruhr" would be evacuated. After ten years, the bridgehead at ] and all territories to the north would be evacuated. Finally, after fifteen years, all remaining forces would be withdrawn. However, if Germany was to act belligerent the occupation forces would remain for as long as needed.<ref>]</ref> If, following the withdrawal of forces, Germany rescinded on the obligations imposed upon her by the treaty, then the above areas would "be reoccupied immediately".<ref>]</ref> | |||
===The creation of international organizations=== | ===The creation of international organizations=== | ||
Part I of the treaty was the ] which provided for the creation of the ], an organization intended to arbitrate international disputes and thereby avoid future wars.<ref>], ] at Wikisource.</ref> Part XIII organized the establishment of the ], to promote "the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the prevention of unemployment; the provision of an adequate living wage; the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provision for old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own; recognition of the principle of freedom of association; the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures"<ref>], ] at Wikisource.</ref> Further international commissions were to be set up, according to Part XII, to administer control over the ], the ], the ] (Russstrom-Memel-Niemen) and the ] rivers.<ref>], ] at Wikisource.</ref> | |||
===Other=== | |||
Part I of the treaty was the ], which provided for the creation of the League of Nations, an organization intended to arbitrate international disputes and thereby avoid future wars.<ref>]</ref> Furthermore, Part XIII organized the establishment of the ], to promote "the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the prevention of unemployment; the provision of an adequate living wage; the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provision for old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own; recognition of the principle of freedom of association; the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures".<ref>]</ref> The treaty also called for the signatories, "who have not yet signed, or who have signed but not yet ratified" the ] to now "bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay".<ref>]</ref> | |||
{{expand section|more specific provisions|date=April 2012}} | |||
The Treaty contained many other provisions (economic issues, transportation, etc.). One of the provisions was the following: | |||
:Article 246 states "Within six months ... Germany will restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II." and that "Germany will hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the ] which was removed from the Protectorate of ] and taken to Germany.<ref>Treaty of Versailles, Article 246</ref> | |||
==Reaction to the treaty== | |||
===Among the allies=== | |||
==Reactions== | |||
The signing of the treaty was met with roars from approval, singing and dancing from a crowd waiting outside the Palace of Versailles. Paris was the scene of celebration as people rejoiced the official end of the war.<ref>Slavicek, p. 75</ref> However, Georges Clemenceau "endured bitter attacks by the ]" once the treaty was signed.<ref name=Tucker(1999)191>Tucker (1999), p. 191</ref> He even conceded that he too was dissatisfied with the overall treaty. Historian Norrin Ripsman claims that Clemenceau's compromises over the Rhine resulted in his defeat during the January 1920 presidential elections,<ref>Ripsman, p. 110</ref> however, ] notes that the political situation in France was much more complicated than that and "most observers" had "expected" Clemenceau to win.<ref name=Tucker(1999)191/> As a result of France not being able to annex the Rhineland and for "what he regarded as ... Clemenceau's trading away French security in order to please the United States and Britain", Marshal Foch declared "This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 426</ref> Overall, French politicians criticized the treaty for "being too lenient"<ref name=Schmitt104>Schmitt, p. 104</ref> although ] resented it for just the opposite. "As late as August 1939" some "still began their remarks on foreign affairs with a ritual condemnation of the Treaty".<ref name=Bell22>Bell, p. 22</ref> | |||
===Among the allies=== | |||
], a diplomat among the British delegation, wrote in his diary "are we making a good peace?" and remained unconvinced by the treaty.<ref name=Lentin201226/> General ], a member of the ] delegation at the peace conference, wrote to Lloyd-George (prior to the signing of the treaty) to state he believed the treaty to be unstable<ref>Bell, p. 26</ref> and declared "Are we in our sober senses or suffering from shellshock? What has become of Wilson's 14 points?" He would go on to plead "For the sake of the future", the Germans "should not be made to sign at the point of the bayonet" and called for radical changes to the treaty. When Smuts finally signed the treaty, he issued a statement condemning the treaty and regretting that the promises of "a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty". Lord ] also declared that many within the Foreign Office were disappointed by the treaty.<ref name=Lentin201226/> However, Lloyd George and his private secretary ], a politician who had "been involved in top level decision making in the United Kingdom for several years"<ref>Lovin, p. 9</ref> both believed in the treaty although they also felt that "France was going to keep Europe in constant turmoil over the enforcement" of the treaty.<ref>Lovin, p. 96</ref> | |||
====Britain==== | |||
] | |||
British officials at the conference declared French policy to be "greedy" and vindictive, with ] later announcing, after Hitler's ] in 1936, that he was "pleased" that the Treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".{{sfn|Stevenson|1998|p=}} | |||
====France==== | |||
The treaty was "received with widespread approval" in the United Kingdom, and the "average Englishman ... thought Germany got only what it deserved".<ref name=Schmitt104/> As German complaints mounted "it soon came to be thought" that the treaty was "not morally binding".<ref name=Bell22/> Schmitt notes it was "only much later that the idea grew up that the five treaties of Paris had been conceived in iniquity and deserved to be revised or forgotten"<ref name=Schmitt104/> while Louise Slavicek states that John Maynard Keynes best-selling ''The Economic Consequences of Peace'' – "accurate or not" – did much to sway public opinion against the treaty.<ref name=Slavicek77>Slavicek, p. 77</ref> Writing in 1919, Keynes argued that the reparation figures were too high in relation to the actual damage done, that Germany would not have the capacity to pay, and that if the figures were not revised it would place "an impossible strain on the German economy" and would render impossible, the reconstruction of the European economy.<ref name=Bell23>Bell, p. 23</ref> The perception that a ] had been handed out to Germany "engendered ... a sense of guilt that sapped the will" of the British "to uphold a treaty felt to be unjust."<ref name=Lentin201227>Lentin (2012), p. 27</ref> By 1921, the British reaction had changed to feeling that the Germans were being unfairly treated by the Poles. Lloyd George "clearly felt that the Poles had overdone it. Upper Silesia had belonged to Germany for the last 200 years, he stated in the ]; the Poles had no right at all to claim more than what the Versailles Treaty had granted them." Lloyd George's stance was taken up by the German press who ran the headline "Lloyd George against the rape of Upper Silesia." Lloyd George was supported by the British Empire. Jan Smuts described Poland as "a historical failure" and the Australian W.M. Hughes thought it "monstrous to put Germans under Polish rule."<ref>Görtemaker, p. 37</ref> | |||
France signed the Treaty and was active in the League. Clemenceau had failed to achieve all of the demands of the French people, and he was voted out of office in the elections of January 1920. French ] ]—who felt the restrictions on Germany were too lenient—declared (quite accurately), "This is not Peace. It is an ]."<ref>R. Henig, Versailles and After: 1919–1933 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 52.</ref> | |||
====United States==== | |||
Edward House recorded in his diary "I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months ... Looking at the conference in retrospect there is much to approve and much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way for doing it." He continues "To those who were saying that the Treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is always to create new troubles ... While I should have preferred a difference peace, I doubt whether it could have been made, for the ingredients for such a peace as I would have had were lacking at Paris." He concludes his thoughts "And yet I wish we had taken the other road, even if it were less smooth, both now and afterward, than the one we took. We would at least have gone in the right direction and if those who follow us had made it impossible to go the full length of the journey planned, the responsibility would have rested with them and not with us."<ref>Stanley, p. 26</ref> | |||
After the Versailles conference Wilson claimed that "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!"<ref>President Woodrow Wilson speaking on the League of Nations to a luncheon audience in Portland OR. 66th Cong., 1st sess. Senate Documents: Addresses of President Wilson (May-November 1919), vol.11, no. 120, p.206.</ref> | |||
The Republican Party—led by ]—controlled the U.S. Senate after the election of 1918, but the Senators were divided into multiple positions on the Versailles question. It proved possible to build a majority coalition, but impossible to build a two-thirds coalition that was needed to pass a treaty.<ref>Thomas A. Bailey, ''Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal'' (1945)</ref> | |||
In the United States, as seen via the press at the time, there was general approved of the treaty.<ref name=Schmitt104/> In September 1919, while speaking on the League of Nations to a luncheon audience in Portland, Woodrow Wilson concluded his speech stating people could now say "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!"<ref>Wilson, p. 3, 201-5, 206</ref> However, Wilson's perceived pro-British attitude and "failure to speak out" about ] "alienated" Irish-American support for Wilson and the League of Nations. "Other ethnic groups, especially the Italians and the Germans, annoyed with Wilson for other reasons, lent editorial support to" the Irish.<ref>Duff, pp. 594, 598</ref> Furthermore, "many Americans were disillusioned with the sacrifices of World War I and were determined not to repeat what they saw as a mistake" and the public took on an isolationist tone during the 1920s. "Reflecting the conservative internationalist perspective" ] attacked the treaty and proposed amendments "designed to defeat the purpose of U.S. membership in the League." Lodge wanted to be able to trade with Europe, but not be entangled in "alliances or political commitments that would involve the United States in the inevitable next 'European war'".<ref name=Schmitz5>Schmitz, p. 5</ref> Most of the Democratic senators supported the ratification of the treaty, however there was strong opposition from the Republican Party. The Republicans were divided into groups on the issue, the most strongly opposed were known as the ]. The irreconcilables opposition ranged from ] views such as the "treaty as an imperialist document that strengthened British power", general ], ] the International Labor Organization would create a "socialistic supergovernment", to racist opposition on the grounds that the inclusion of nations such as ] and ] would create "a colored league of nations".<ref>Goldberg, p. 23</ref> Opposition to ] was a primary theme for the Republican party. As Wilson was unwilling to compromise with his critics or his supporters, who urged for concessions, support collapsed resulting in the Senate refusing to ratify the treaty or America's role in the League of Nations.<ref>Goldberg, pp. 23-5</ref> Bell comments that "having done so much to win the war and shape the peace treaties that followed" America withdrew back across the Atlantic "not into 'isolation' ... but into an indifference towards the European balance of power which came only too naturally to a people who found the phrase itself distasteful."<ref>Bell, pp. 25-6</ref> | |||
An angry bloc of 12–18 "]", mostly Republicans but also representatives of the Irish and German Democrats, fiercely opposed the Treaty. One block of Democrats strongly supported the Versailles Treaty, even with reservations added by Lodge. A second group of Democrats supported the Treaty but followed Wilson in opposing any amendments or reservations. The largest bloc—led by Senator Lodge—<ref>William C. Widenor, ''Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy'' (1980)</ref> comprised a majority of the Republicans. They wanted a treaty with reservations, especially on Article X, which involved the power of the League of Nations to make war without a vote by the U.S. Congress.<ref>Ralph A. Stone, ''The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations'' (1970)</ref> All of the Irreconcilables were bitter enemies of President Wilson, and he launched a nationwide speaking tour in the summer of 1919 to refute them. However, Wilson collapsed midway with a serious stroke that effectively ruined his leadership skills.<ref>John Milton Cooper, Jr. ''Woodrow Wilson: A Biography'' (2009) ch 22-23</ref> | |||
The Chinese ] by the allocation of Shantung to Japan, that they refused to sign the treaty.<ref name=Slavicek65/> ], who later became the first leader of the ], saw the treaty as a "national humiliation" for ].<ref>Elleman, p. 17</ref> Bruce Elleman argues that the treatment of China resulted in closer ] and the communist party becoming more popular in China than western democracy.<ref>Elleman, p. 18</ref> | |||
The closest the Treaty came to passage was on November 19, 1919, as Lodge and his Republicans formed a coalition with the pro-Treaty Democrats, and were close to a two-thirds majority for a Treaty with reservations, but Wilson rejected this compromise and enough Democrats followed his lead to permanently end the chances for ratification. | |||
On the whole, there was a prevailing sense of criticism towards the treaty among the population of the victors. The treaty was "criticized at the time and for the next twenty years for its harshness, its economic errors, and its inherent instability".<ref name=Bell19/> Yet, at the same time, the "widely perceived" problems of the treaty were "thought to be not beyond remedy". There was faith in the League of Nations, and it was hoped that it or a revival "of something like the nineteenth-century ']', an informal grouping of the great powers" could solve Europe's problems.<ref>Bell, p. 35</ref> | |||
Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the ]s were intensely opposed to the Treaty, saying it favored the British.<ref>{{cite journal |first=John B. |last=Duff |title=The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans |journal=] |volume=55 |issue=3 |year=1968 |pages=582–598 |jstor=1891015 }}</ref> | |||
===In Germany=== | |||
].|alt=Thousands of people gather in front of a building.]] | |||
After Wilson's successor ] continued American opposition to the League of Nations, Congress passed the ] bringing a formal end to hostilities between the U.S. and the ]. It was signed into law by Harding on July 21, 1921.<ref>{{Cite journal|doi=10.1017/S0034670500023706|last=Wimer|first=Kurt|last2=Wimer|first2= Sarah|title=The Harding Administration, the League of Nations, and the Separate Peace Treaty| journal=The Review of Politics|volume=29|issue=1|year=1967|pages=13–24|jstor=1405810|publisher= Cambridge University Press}}</ref> | |||
Across Germany, the treaty was met with widespread outcry.<ref name=Schmitt104/> Flags were lowered to ] and demonstrations took place.<ref>Slavicek, pp. 75-6</ref> Germans claimed that their country had been treated unfairly by the treaty, believed that the victors of the war were acting in spite against them, that the treaty was too harsh and contradicted the Fourteen Points – on the basis of which Germany had surrendered, and disagreed with the methods of how the treaty had been formulated. The treaty was seen as a dictated peace, and was later referred to as the ].<ref>Schmitt, pp. 103-4</ref><ref>Bell, pp. 20-1</ref> Revision of the treaty "became a major objective of every German political party".<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 1600</ref> The German peace delegation, and those who "espoused Wilsonian views", were "bitterly attacked for having betrayed the German nation". These attacks were not just verbal or political. ], "a leading delegate at Paris", was the target of several assassination attempts and was eventually "murdered by right-wing extremists in August 1921."<ref>Henig, p. 1931</ref> | |||
The ] was signed in Berlin on {{date|25 August 1921}}, the ] was signed in Vienna on {{date|24 August 1921}}, and the ] was signed in Budapest on {{date|29 August 1921}}. | |||
On 7 May, prior to the signing of the treaty, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau – "with the big treaty still lying unopened before him" – declared "The demand is made that we shall acknowledge that we alone are guilty of having caused the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie".<ref name=Craig141>Craig, p. 141</ref> This position deepened once the treaty had been signed. Article 231, the so called 'war guilt' clause, "aroused deep resentment in Germany, where it was thought that equal (or greater) responsibility for the outbreak of the war could be found in the actions of other countries". German historians worked hard to "undermine the validity of this clause" and in doing so "found a ready acceptance among 'revisionist' writers in France, Britain, and the USA."<ref name=Bell21/> Sally Marks comments that "German politicians and propagandists fulminated endlessly about 'unilateral war guilt', convincing many who had not read the treaties of their injustice on this point".<ref name=Marks232>Marks, p. 232</ref> | |||
=====House's views===== | |||
Additional resentment came from the perceived unfair treatment received in regards to ethnic Germans outside of Germany's borders. National self-determination was "at the heart of the peacemaking" and while there was polls showing "overwhelming majorities" within the ] and Austria wanting to merge with Germany, this was firmly forbidden.<ref name=Bell20/><ref name=Lentin201226/> The view held was that "the self-determination granted to others was denied to fellow-Germans".<ref name=Lentin201226/> "More traumatic" was the revival of Poland and the granting of "substantial portions" of Prussian land to the new Polish state.<ref name=Weinberg14>Weinberg, p. 14</ref> | |||
Wilson's former friend ], present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919: | |||
<blockquote>I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris.<ref>{{dead link|date=July 2011}}.</ref></blockquote> | |||
With Germany having not been invaded and German soldiers still based in France at the end of the war, the German High Command and right wing politicians claimed that Germany had not been defeated on the field of battle but rather by left wing politicians and the collapse of the home front. This position gave rise to the ].<ref name=Weinberg8/><ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 1322</ref> With time, the list of those perceived to have betrayed Germany increased to include ], ], and ].<ref>Tucker (2005b), pp. 1716-7</ref> | |||
== |
===In Germany=== | ||
{{See also|Stab-in-the-back legend}} | |||
{{further|Aftermath of World War I}} | |||
], ''Reichspostminister'' ], Justice Minister Dr. ], Foreign Minister ], Prussian State President ], and financial advisor Dr. ].]] | |||
===Territorial changes=== | |||
On April 29, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister ] arrived in Versailles. On May 7, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "]", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We know the full brunt of hate that confronts us here. You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie."<ref>Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Ranzau when faced with the conditions on 7 May: "Wir kennen die Wucht des Hasses, die uns hier entgegentritt. Es wird von uns verlangt, daß wir uns als die allein Schuldigen am Krieg bekennen; ein solches Bekenntnis wäre in meinem Munde eine Lüge". 2008 School Projekt Heinrich-Heine-Gesamtschule, Düsseldorf http://www.fkoester.de/kursbuch/unterrichtsmaterial/13_2_74.html</ref> Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour",<ref>2008 School Projekt Heinrich-Heine-Gesamtschule, Düsseldorf http://www.fkoester.de/kursbuch/unterrichtsmaterial/13_2_74.html</ref> soon afterward withdrawing from the proceedings of peace conference. | |||
Robert Peckham notes that the issue of Schleswig-Holstein "was premised on a gross simplification of the region's history". ] presented two options: choose between Denmark or Germany. Peckham asserts that "Versailles ignored any possibility of there being a third way: the kind of compact represented by the Swiss Federation; a bilingual or even trilingual Schleswig-Holsteinian state" or other options such as "a Schleswigian state in a loose confederation with Denmark or Germany, or an autonomous region under the protection of the League of Nations." In early 1920, a referendum was held in Schleswig. The "northern, Danish-speaking part, voted for Denmark, while the southern, German speaking part voted for Germany" resulting in the territory being split between both countries. "Holstein remained German without a referendum".<ref name=Peckham107/> | |||
Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty—particularly the provision that blamed Germany for starting the war—as an insult to the nation's honor. They referred to the treaty as "the '']''" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Germany′s first democratically elected ], ], resigned rather than sign the treaty. In a passionate speech before the National Assembly on March 21, 1919, he called the treaty a "murderous plan" and exclaimed, | |||
On 11 July 1920, the ] was held. There was a 90 per cent turn out with 99.3 per cent of the population wishing to remain with Germany. Historian Richard Blanke comments that "no other contested ethnic group has ever, under un-coerced conditions, issued so one-sided a statement of its national preference".<ref> Ingrao, p. 262</ref> However, Richard Debo disagrees. He notes that "both Berlin and Warsaw believed the ] had influenced the East Prussian plebiscites. Poland appeared so close to collapse that even Polish voters had cast their ballots for Germany".<ref name=Debo335>Debo, p. 335</ref> | |||
{{quote|Which hand, trying to put us in chains like these, would not wither? The treaty is unacceptable.<ref>Lauteinann, Geschichten in Quellen Bd. 6, S. 129.</ref>}} | |||
Following plebiscites in Eupen, Malmedy, and Prussian Moresnet, the League of Nations allotted these territories to Belgium on 20 September 1920. Over the next two years a Boundary Commission conducted work, completing its assignment on 6 November 1922. On 15 December 1923, the German Government recognized the new border between the two countries.<ref>Martin, p. xiii</ref> | |||
After Scheidemann′s resignation, a new coalition government was formed under ]. ] ] knew that Germany was in an impossible position. As detested as the treaty was, he feared that the government was not in a position to reject it. With this in mind, he asked ] ] if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies decided to renew hostilities, which he believed would be very likely if Germany refused to sign. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff, ]—concluded the army′s position was untenable. However, rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener cable the army′s recommendation to the government. Upon receiving this, the new government recommended signing the treaty. The ] voted in favour of signing the treaty by 237 to 138, with five abstentions. Foreign minister ] and colonial minister ] traveled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on June 28, 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on July 9 by a vote of 209 to 116.<ref>{{cite book|author=Koppel S. Pinson|title=Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization| edition=13th printing|year=1964|publisher=Macmillan|location=New York|page=397 f|isbn=0-88133-434-0}}</ref> | |||
] | |||
].]] | |||
Conservatives, nationalists and ex-military leaders condemned the peace and democratic Weimar politicians, socialists, ], and ] were viewed by them with suspicion, due to their supposed extra-national loyalties.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} It was rumored that the Jews had not supported the war and had played a role in selling out Germany to its enemies. Those who seemed to benefit from a weakened Germany, and the newly formed Weimar Republic, were regarded as having "stabbed Germany in the back" on the ], by either opposing German ], instigating unrest and strikes in the critical military industries or profiteering.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} These theories were given credence by the fact that when Germany surrendered in November 1918, its armies were still on French and Belgian territory. Furthermore, on the ], Germany had already won the war against Russia and concluded the ]. In the West, Germany had seemed to have come close to winning the war with the ] earlier in 1918.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} Its failure was blamed on strikes in the arms industry at a critical moment of the offensive, leaving soldiers with an inadequate supply of ]. The strikes were regarded by nationalists as having been instigated by traitors, with the Jews taking most of the blame.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} | |||
The transfer of the ], of Silesia, to Czechoslovakia was completed on 3 February 1921.<ref>Martin, p. xii</ref> | |||
==Violations== | |||
Between 1919 and 1921 violence broke out between Poles and Germans within the province of Upper Silesia. ] took place as Germany and Poland fought for control of the region.<ref name=Ther123>Ther, p. 123</ref><ref name=Bartov490>Bartov, p. 490</ref> While German and Polish Silesians fought one another, German and Polish troops – who had little or no connection to the region – intervened "in the name of the 'national interest'". Philipp Ther comments that "the major cause of the violence, then, was the choice not to demobilize troops who had fought in World War I, not a nationalist mobilization of the population in Upper Silesia".<ref name=Bartov490/> In March 1921, the ] was conducted by an Inter-allied Commission of Britain, France, and Italy, who were also governing the area following the implantation of the Treaty of Versailles. While there had been violence in the region, "the election itself took place without incident" and close to 60 per cent of the population voted to remain with Germany.<ref name=Bullivant4344>Bullivant, pp. 43-4</ref> Following the vote, the League of Nations debated how the resulted "should be applied", if the entire area should be transferred to Germany or the area split in regards to how individual sections of the area had voted. While the debate was underway, "the Poles invaded the territory" effecting the final outcome.<ref name=AC9>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 9</ref> In 1922, Upper Silesia was partitioned by the League of Nations. The northwestern section (]) of the district remained with Germany while the southeastern part (]) was transferred to Poland.<ref name=Ther123/> Blanke observes "given that the electorate was at least 60% Polish-speaking, this means that about one 'Pole' in three voted for Germany". He further notes that "most Polish observers and historians" have concluded that the outcome of plebiscite was due to "unfair German advantages of incumbency and socio-economic position" and have also alleged "coercion of various kinds even in the face of an allied occupation regime" occurred, and that Germany granted votes to those "who had been born in Upper Silesia but no longer resided there". Blanke concludes that despite these protests "there is plenty of other evidence, including Reichstag election results both before and after 1921 and the large-scale emigration of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians to Germany after 1945, that their identification with Germany in 1921 was neither exceptional nor temporary". He further notes "here was a large population of Germans and Poles – not coincidentally, of the same Catholic religion – that not only shared the same living space but also came in many cases to see themselves as members of the same national community".<ref name=Bullivant4344/> Prince ], the Polish ], alleged that Soviet Russia "appeared to be intentionally delaying negotiations" to end the Polish-Soviet War "with the object of influencing the Upper Silesian plebiscite".<ref name=Debo335/> Once the region was partitioned, both "Germany and Poland attempted to 'cleanse' their shares of Upper Silesia" via oppression resulting in Germans migrating to Germany and Poles migrating to Poland. Despite the oppression and migration, Opole Silesia "remained ethnically mixed."<ref name=Ther123/> | |||
{{unreferenced section|date=June 2011}} | |||
The German economy was so weak that only a small percentage of reparations was paid in hard currency.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} Nonetheless, even the payment of this small percentage of the original reparations (132 billion ]) still placed a significant burden on the German economy.{{Citation needed|date=January 2012}} Although the causes of the devastating ] are complex and disputed, Germans blamed the near-collapse of their economy on the Treaty, and some economists estimated that the reparations accounted for as much as one-third of the hyper-inflation.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} | |||
In March 1921, French and Belgian troops occupied Duisburg, which formed part of the demilitarized Rhineland, according to the Treaty of Versailles. In January 1923, French and Belgian forces occupied the rest of the Ruhr area as a reprisal after Germany failed to fulfill reparation payments demanded by the Versailles Treaty. The German government answered with "passive resistance", which meant that coal miners and railway workers refused to obey any instructions by the occupation forces. Production and transportation came to a standstill, but the financial consequences contributed to German hyperinflation and completely ruined public finances in Germany. Consequently, passive resistance was called off in late 1923. The end of passive resistance in the Ruhr allowed Germany to undertake a currency reform and to negotiate the ], which led to the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr Area in 1925. | |||
Memel remained under the authority of the League of Nations, with a French military garrison, until January 1923.<ref name=Steiner75>Steiner, p. 75</ref> On 9 January 1923, ].<ref name=Lemkin198>Lemkin, p. 198</ref> The French garrison withdrew, and in February 1923, the Allies agreed to attach "Memel as an autonomous territory to Lithuania".<ref name=Steiner75/> On 8 May 1924, after negotiations between the Lithuanian Government and the ], and action taken by the League of Nations, the annexation of the territory was ratified.<ref name=Lemkin198/> In exchange, "Lithuania accepted the ], a power-sharing arrangement to protect non-Lithuanians in the territory and its autonomous status. ... Overall responsibility for the territory remained with the great powers", however, the League of Nations "preferred to have Memel disputes between Germans and Lithuanians settled locally, and until 1929 they mostly were, due to the determination of the German Chancellor, ], to make the Memel Statute and its power-sharing arrangement succeed." Until 1929, this arrangement worked and both countries "agreed to enhance their economic linkages while working around their differences" and the League of Nations "served during this period largely as a check against German-Lithuanian failure to reach solutions".<ref name=Steiner75/> | |||
Some significant violations (or avoidances) of the provisions of the Treaty were: | |||
*In 1919, the dissolution of the General Staff appeared to happen; however, the core of the General Staff was hidden within another organization, the ], where it rewrote all ''Heer'' (Army) and '']'' (Air Force) doctrinal and training materials based on the experience of World War I.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} | |||
*On April 16, 1922, representatives of the governments of Germany and the Soviet Union signed the ] at ]. The treaty re-established diplomatic relations, renounced financial claims on each other and pledged future cooperation. | |||
*In 1932, the German government announced it would no longer adhere to the treaty's military limitations, citing the Allies' violation of the treaty by failing to initiate military limitations on themselves as called for in the preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles.{{fact|date=July 2013}} | |||
*In March 1935, under the government of ], Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by introducing compulsory military conscription in Germany and rebuilding the armed forces. This included a new Navy ('']''), the first full armored divisions ('']''), and an Air Force ('']''). | |||
*In June 1935, Great Britain effectively withdrew from the treaty with the signing of the ]. | |||
*In March 1936, Germany violated the treaty by reoccupying the demilitarized zone in the ]. | |||
*In March 1938, Germany violated the treaty by annexing Austria in the ]. | |||
*In September 1938, Germany, with the ] of France, Britain, and Italy, violated the Treaty by annexing the ] from Czechoslovakia. | |||
*In March 1939, Germany violated the treaty by occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia. | |||
*On 1 September 1939, Germany violated the treaty by invading ], thus initiating ] in Europe. | |||
==Historical assessments== | |||
On 13 January 1935, a plebiscite was held within the Saar region. 528,105 votes were cast, with 477,119 votes being in favor of union with Germany – 90 per cent of the valid ballot. 46,613 votes were cast for the status quo, and only 2,124 for union with France. The region was returned to Germany on 1 March 1935. Frank Russell notes that the Saar inhabitants "were not terrorized at the polls" and concludes that the "totalitarian German regime was not distasteful to most of the Saar inhabitants and that they preferred it even to an efficient, economical, and benevolent international rule." When the outcome of the vote became known, 4,100 (including 800 refugees who had previously fled Germany) residents fled over the border into France.<ref>Russell, pp. 103-6</ref> | |||
According to ], since the opening of French archives, most commentators have remarked on French restraint and reasonableness at the conference, though Stevenson notes that "he jury is still out", and that "there have been signs that the pendulum of judgement is swinging back the other way."{{sfn|Stevenson|1998|p=}} | |||
In his book '']'', ] referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "]", a misguided attempt to destroy Germany on behalf of French ], rather than to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out in President ]'s ], which Germany had accepted at the armistice. He stated: "I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible."<ref name="consequences1">{{gutenberg|no=15776|name=The Economic Consequences of the Peace ''by ]'}}</ref> Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and used in his passionate book arguments that he and others (including some US officials) had used at Paris.<ref>{{cite book |last=Markwell |first=Donald |year=2006 |title=John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> He believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay, and that these would produce drastic instability.<ref>{{cite book |last=Keynes |year=1919 |title=The Economic Consequences of the Peace |location=Ch VI. |quote=The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling.}}</ref> | |||
===Reparations=== | |||
French economist ] disputed that analysis. During the 1940s, Mantoux wrote a posthumously published book titled ''The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes'' in an attempt to rebut Keynes' claims. More recently economists have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small army saved it so much money it could afford the reparations payments.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Max |last=Hantke |first2=Mark |last2=Spoerer |title=The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924–9 |journal=Economic History Review |year=2010 |volume=63 |issue=4 |pages=849–864 |url=http://www.ekh.lu.se/ehes/paper/Spoerer_Lund.pdf }}</ref> | |||
] | |||
More recently, it has been argued (for instance by historian ] in his book "A World At Arms"<ref>Reynolds, David. (February 20, 1994). Review of: "A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II," by Gerhard L. Weinberg. New York: Cambridge University Press.</ref>) that the treaty was in fact quite advantageous to Germany. The Bismarckian Reich was maintained as a political unit instead of being broken up, and Germany largely escaped post-war military occupation (in contrast to the situation following World War II.) In a 1995 essay, Weinberg noted that with the disappearance of ] and with ] withdrawn from Europe, that Germany was now the dominant power in ].<ref>Weinberg, Gerhard ''Germany, Hitler and World War II'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 page 16.</ref> | |||
Between the signing of the treaty and the establishment of the ], in 1921, Germany "paid less than 8 billion marks" - out of the 20 billion required - mostly in the form of "credit for transferred state properties". Marks notes this "was considered reparations, as it was fully consumed by prior charges, notably occupation costs and the expense of provisioning Germany." However, eventually the figure of 8 billion was recognized as reparation payments and subtracted from the overall reparation figure.<ref name=Marks233/> In January 1921, the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission established the reparation figure Germany had to pay. The figure was set at 132 billion marks, divided into three categories. The first category, 'A Bonds', amounted to 12 billion gold marks. The second category, 'B Bonds', amounted to a further 38 billion marks. The final category, 'C Bond's, contained the remaining two thirds of the total sum. However, as historian and reparation expert Sally Marks notes, "Allied experts knew that Germany could not pay" the entire sum. Thus, the third category was "deliberately designed to be chimerical" and its "primary function was to mislead public opinion ... into believing the" total sum "was being maintained."<ref name=Marks237>Marks, p. 237</ref> Bell notes that the 'C Bonds' essentially "amounted to indefinite postponement" of that figure.<ref name=Bell23/> The combined total of the 'A' and 'B' Bonds, which were genuine, "represented the actual Allied assessment of German capacity to pay" and "therefore ... represented the total German reparations" figure. Therefore, Germany was only required to pay 50 billion marks (12.5 billion dollars), "an amount smaller than what Germany had ... offered to pay".<ref name=Marks237/> Furthermore, Germany did not have to pay this entire figure in cash. While there was to be periodic cash payments, the gold value of material shipments were to be credited against the total sum. These material shipments included coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceutical drugs, livestock, agricultural machines, construction material, and factory machinery. Helping to restore the Library of Louvain was credited towards the overall reparation sum, as did some of the territorial changes imposed upon Germany by the treaty.<ref>Marks, pp. 223-234</ref> The payment scheme called for Germany to pay "$250 million within twenty-five days and then $500 million annually, plus 26 percent of the value of all German exports." In addition the German Government was to issue bonds, "at 5 percent interest", and "establish a ] of 1 percent" to support the payment of reparations.<ref name=Martel2010156/> The highly publicized rhetoric about paying for all the damages and all the veterans' benefits was irrelevant to the total, but it did affect how the recipients spent their share. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were also supposed to pay reparations. However, they were so impoverished following the war that they in fact paid very little before their debts were written off. Germany was the only defeated country with a healthy economy and able to pay.<ref>Marks, pp. 234-5</ref> | |||
The British military historian ] claimed that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he claimed, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with the ] that Germany had imposed on a defeated Russia in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion Marks.<ref>Correlli Barnett, ''The Collapse of British Power'' (London: Pan, 2002), p. 392.</ref> Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany′s economy had been restored to its pre-war status. | |||
On 26 December 1922, the Reparation Commission "declared Germany in default on timber deliveries." Marks highlights that the quota of timber Germany had to fulfill was "based upon a German offer" and "contrary to historical myth, the timber default was massive". She also notes that there was no "Allied dispute about the causes of the default" as all agreed that it had been caused by "German governmental bad faith."<ref>Marks, p. 240</ref> In January 1923, the German Government defaulted on coal deliveries for "the thirty-fourth in thirty-six months" despite "several downward quota revisions, especially after Germany lost the Silesian coal fields."<ref>Marks, p. 241</ref> Despite British objections, French, Belgian, and Italian engineers - accompanied by small contingents of French and Belgian troops - entered the Ruhr on 9 January 1923.<ref>Marks, p. 243</ref> This initiated the Franco-Belgian ] with the goal of forcing Germany to resume reparation payments. The French saw this as an opportunity to either make Germany continue paying or inflict serious damage upon the German economy.<ref>Bell, pp. 24-5</ref> Later in the year, on the initiative of the British, a committee (containing American, Belgian, British, French, Germany, and Italian experts) was formed to consider "from a purely technical standpoint" how to balance the German budget, stabilize the German economy, and set an achievable level of reparations. The committee was chaired by, the American banker and ], ]. The recommendations of the committee became known as the ] and were accepted during 1924. The plan called for the withdrawal of French troops from the Ruhr (which the French agreed to), a German bank independent of the German Government with a ruling body that was at least 50 per cent non-German, and plans to stabilize the German currency. The Dawes Plan "left the total unchanged", but organized a new scheme of payments. Within the first year of the plan taking effect, Germany would have to pay 1,000 million marks rising to 2,500 million marks per year by the fifth year following the acceptance of the plan. To help make payments, a Reparation Agency was established. It contained Allied representatives to organize the payment of reparations. To facilitate the Dawes Plan, a loan of 800 million marks was to be raised (over 50 per cent coming from the United States, 25 per cent from Britain, and the rest from other European countries) to back the German currency and to aid in reparation payments.<ref>Bell, pp. 37-8</ref> For the establishment of the plan and for contributing to "reducing the tension between Germany and France" Charles Dawes received the Nobel Peace Prize for 1925. <ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1925/dawes-facts.html|title=The Nobel Peace Prize 1925: Charles G. Dawes - Facts|accessdate=|author=Nobelprize.org|}}</ref> | |||
Barnett also claims that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany′s eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former ] fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by ] and ], and the newly restored ] was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by ] and ], both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the Treaty "much enhanced" German power.<ref>Barnett, p. 316.</ref> Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again.<ref>Barnett, p. 318.</ref> By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".<ref>Barnett, p. 319.</ref> | |||
In February 1929, a new committee was formed to reexamine the reparation situation. Chaired by ], the committee presented its findings in June and in May 1930 the ] was accepted and put into effect. It called for the end of "foreign surveillance of German finances", the withdrawal of the Reparations Agency, a 25 per cent reduction in the level of reparations<ref name=Bell38>Bell, p. 38</ref> to a total sum of 26,350 million dollars<ref>Backhaus, p. 70</ref> and a new scheme of payments that were to be completed by 1988: "the first mention of a final date."<ref name=Bell38/> In 1932, the ] "cancelled reparations altogether".<ref name=Martel1999,p.43>Martel (1999), p. 43</ref> By this point Germany had paid 20.598 billon gold marks in reparations.<ref name=Marks233>Marks, p. 233</ref> With the rise of ], all bonds and loans that had been issued and taken out during the 1920s and early 1930s were cancelled. ] notes "refusing to pay doesn't make an agreement null and void. The bonds, the agreement, still exist." Thus, following the ], at the ] in 1953, Germany agreed to resume payment on the money borrowed. On 3 October 2010, Germany made the final payment on these bonds.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html |title=Why Did World War I Just End? |last1=Suddath|first1=Claire||date=4 October 2010 |website=Time World|publisher=] |accessdate=1 July 2013}}</ref> | |||
The British historian of modern Germany, ], wrote that during the war the German ] was committed to an ] program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them.<ref name="Evans, Richard page 107">Evans, Richard ''In Hitler's Shadow'', New York: Panatheon 1989 page 107.</ref> Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles.<ref name="Evans, Richard page 107"/> Evans further noted that the parties of the ], namely the the ''']''' (SPD), the ] ''']''' (DDP) and the ] ''']''', were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to claim as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equaled opposition to the ].<ref name="Evans, Richard page 107"/> Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was the ] of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" of ] and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations".<ref name="Evans, Richard page 107"/> | |||
===The Rhineland and Ruhr=== | |||
Ewa Thompson points out that the Treaty allowed numerous nations in ] and Eastern Europe to liberate themselves from oppressive German rule, a fact that is often neglected by Western historiography, more interested in understanding the German point of view. In nations that found themselves free as the result of the Treaty; such as ] or ], it is seen as symbol of recognition of wrongs committed against small nations by their much larger aggressive neighbors<ref>The Surrogate Hegemon in Polish Postcolonial Discourse Ewa Thompson, Rice University</ref>. | |||
] | |||
Regardless of modern strategic or economic analysis, resentment caused by the treaty sowed fertile psychological ground for the eventual rise of the ]. The German historian ] wrote that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during the ], and though not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany.<ref name="Peukert, Detlev page 278">Peukert, Detlev ''The Weimar Republic'', New York: Hill & Wang, 1992 page 278.</ref> Rather, Peukert argued that it was widely believed in Germany that Versailles was a totally unreasonable treaty, and it was this "perception" rather than the "reality" of the Versailles treaty that mattered.<ref name="Peukert, Detlev page 278"/> Peukert noted that because of the "]" created in Germany during World War I when for a time it appeared that Germany was on the verge of conquering all of Europe, any peace treaty the ] imposed on the defeated '']'' were bound to create a nationalist backlash, and there was nothing the Allies could have done to avoid that backlash.<ref name="Peukert, Detlev page 278"/> Having noted that much, Peukert commented that the policy of ] with the Western powers that ] carried out between 1923 and 1929 were constructive policies that might have allowed Germany to play a more positive role in Europe, and that it was not true that German democracy was doomed to die in 1919 because of Versailles.<ref name="Peukert, Detlev page 278"/> Finally, Peukert argued that it was the Great Depression and the turn to a nationalist policy of ] within Germany at the same time that finished off the Weimar Republic, not the Treaty of Versailles.<ref name="Peukert, Detlev page 278"/> | |||
Following the end of the war, the ] entered the Rhineland with 200,000 men to enforce the terms of the armistice. In June 1919, following the signing of the treaty, the Third Army was deactivated.<ref>Baker, p. 21</ref> The American occupation force was steadily scaled down. By 1920, 15,000 men remained. In the final months of Woodrow Wilson's presidency, he successfully reduced the American garrison to 6,500 men before President ] was inaugurated.<ref>Pawley, p. 84</ref> On 7 January 1923, in response to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr,<ref name=Mommsen129>Mommsen, p. 129</ref> the US senate passed legislation to withdraw to the remaining force.<ref>Pawley, p. 87</ref> On 24 January, the American garrison started their withdrawal from the Rhineland, with the final troops leaving in early February.<ref>Nelson, p. 251-2</ref> The British, likewise, disapproved of the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr.<ref name=Mommsen129/> Withdrawing the British garrison was considered, but was found to be unwise. It was deemed that as long as the British army "remained on the Rhine it could act as a check on the French" and stop the French from carrying out their policy "of establishing an autonomous Rhineland Republic."<ref>Pawley, p. 94</ref> | |||
French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of Germans in the ] and in ] were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented.<ref name="Cartier">La Seconde Guerre mondiale, Raymond Cartier, Paris, Larousse Paris Match, 1965, quoted in: {{cite news|author=Pater Lothar Groppe|title=Die "Jagd auf Deutsche" im Osten: Die Verfolgung begann nicht erst mit dem "Bromberger Blutsonntag" vor 50 Jahren|url=http://www.webarchiv-server.de/pin/archiv04/3504paz38.htm|work=Preußische Allgemeine Zeitung / 28. August 2004|date=2004-08-28|accessdate= 2010-09-22|language=German|quote='Von 1.058.000 Deutschen, die noch 1921 in Posen und Westpreußen lebten', ist bei Cartier zu lesen, 'waren bis 1926 unter polnischem Druck 758.867 abgewandert. Nach weiterer Drangsal wurde das volksdeutsche Bevölkerungselement vom Warschauer Innenministerium am 15. Juli 1939 auf weniger als 300.000 Menschen geschätzt.'}}</ref> Cartier asserts that, out of 1,058,000 Germans in Posen-West Prussia in 1921, 758,867 fled their homelands within five years due to Polish harassment.<ref name="Cartier"/> In 1926, the Polish Ministry of the Interior estimated the remaining number of Germans at fewer than 300,000.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} These sharpening ethnic conflicts would lead to public demands to reattach the annexed territory in 1938 and become a pretext for Hitler′s annexations of ] and parts of ].<ref name= "Cartier"/> | |||
At a conference held in ] in August 1929 to further discuss the Young Plan, Chancellor Gustav Stresemann and his French counterpart ] negotiated the early withdrawal of Allied forces from the Rhineland.<ref>Mommsen, p. 273</ref> Briand, who became known as the 'apostle of peace' agreed on an early withdrawal and gave Stresemann his assurance that the French army would vacate the Rhineland no later than 30 June 1930.<ref>Pawley, pp. 151-2</ref> On 30 June 1930, after speeches and the lowering of flags, the final remnants of the Anglo-French-Belgian occupation force withdrew from Germany.<ref>Pawley, pp. 181-2</ref> | |||
=== The Locarno Treaties=== | |||
] | |||
On 16 October 1925, on the initiative of the British Foreign Minister ], a meeting was held at the Swiss town of ] between Belgian, British, French, German, and Italian representatives. The outcome of this meeting became know as the ], which were signed on 1 December in London, United Kingdom. The German Government accepted her current western borders, as set out by the Treaty of Versailles, and also accepted the Rhineland as a demilitarized zone. What had "previously regarded as only part of the ''diktat'' of Versailles" was now "freely accepted" by the German Government during the Locarno conference.<ref name=Bell36>Bell, p. 36</ref> Italy and the United Kingdom were the guarantees of this agreement and the border, "in effect protecting France and Germany from attack by each other".<ref name=Martel155>Martel (2010), p. 155</ref> Chamberlain called the Locarno Treaty "the real dividing-line between the years of war and the years of peace".<ref name=Bell36/> Stresemann observed that "Locarno may be interpreted as signifying that the States of Europe at last realize that they cannot go on making war upon each other without being involved in common ruin".<ref name=Martel155/> As well as the treaty, the German and French foreign ministers – Stresemann and Briand – had started to develop a strong relationship "perhaps amounting to friendship".<ref name=Bell36/> For their efforts in attempting to foster reconciliation between Germany and France, Chamberlain, Briand, and Stresemann were all awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.<ref name=Martel155/> | |||
The Locarno Treaties "marked the rehabilitation of Germany as a full member of the international community" and German joined the League of Nations in 1926.<ref name=Martel155/> The treaty was accompanied by additional agreements. A Franco-German committee aimed to mend relations between French and German Catholics. Industrialists from Belgian, France, Germany, and ] signed an agreement in September 1926 to create an iron and steel cartel regulating annual production and its division among the four countries. German signed a series of treaties with Czechoslovakia, France, and Poland "laying down that certain types of disputes between the signatories should be submitted to outside arbitration." France signed "treaties of mutual guarantee" with Czechoslovakia and Poland with the intention to counter the "obvious gap left by Locarno, which was that it concerned only Western Europe."<ref name=Bell37>Bell, p. 37</ref> | |||
===Violations of the treaty=== | |||
====1920-33==== | |||
During 1920, ] - the head of the army - "re-established a clandestine general staff system."<ref>Zaloga, p. 13</ref> In March of the same year, 18,000 German troops entered the Rhineland to "quell possible communist unrest" and in doing so violated the demilitarized zone. French troops therefore extended their occupation zone further into Germany until the German troops withdrew. In violation of the disarmament clauses of the treaty, German military and government officials "deliberately planned systematic violations of the effectives clauses of the treaty" such as actively avoiding to meet disarmament deadlines, refusing Allied officials access to military facilities (who had the right to view such facilities to ensure the Germans were compiling with the disarmament protocols), continuing "illegal ] production" and keeping "hidden weapon caches".<ref>Shuster, p. 112, 114</ref> As nothing within the treaty forbade German companies from producing war material outside of Germany, German companies moved abroad to continue weapons manufacturing for Germany. Factories were established in the ], ], and ]. The Swedish arms company ], was bought out by Krupp and in 1921 German troops were sent to Sweden to test weapons.<ref name=Shuster116>Shuster, p. 116</ref> | |||
] (second from left) with ], ] and ] of the Russian delegation at Rapallo.|alt=Five men stand around a table.]] | |||
During the ], an economic conference held in Italy in 1922, representatives from the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union signed the ] on 16 April. The treaty re-established full diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, renounced compensation for war damages, renounced all claims – national or private – against one another, set favorable terms for trade, and stated both countries would supply each other's economic requirements.<ref>Fisher, p. 168</ref> While the Soviet Government denied that there was any secret military clauses to the treaty, the signing of the treaty resulted in "increasing contact, secret in nature, between Soviet and German military and industrial interests."<ref>Fisher, p. 171</ref> Historian P.M.H Bell comments this allowed "Germany to develop weapons in the USSR".<ref>Bell, p. 133</ref> In breach of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany established three secret training areas inside the Soviet Union: one for aviation, chemical, and tank warfare. At these facilities, the German military were able to experiment "with advanced war techniques" and train their military personnel.<ref>Tucker (2005a), p. 967</ref> | |||
In 1923, the British newspaper ] published two articles claiming Germany had "personnel, clothing, and armaments for 800,000 men and was transferring army staff to civilian positions." It also warned of the "danger of the military nature" of the German police force, and claimed Germany was "attempting to establish an army based on the historic ]".<ref>Shuster, p. 120</ref>{{#tag:ref|The warning about the German police would later prove true. On 8 March 1936, 22,700 armed policemen were incorporated into the army as 21 new infantry battalions.<ref name=Bell234>Bell, p. 234</ref>|group=nb}} | |||
In 1925, with "the end of the Allied disarmament operations" in sight, German companies "drafted plans for tanks and artillery". In January 1927, following the withdrawal of the ], "Krupp increased illegal production of artillery and armor plate". ] later claimed he had duped the Allies throughout the 1920s and prepared the German military for the future.<ref name=Shuster116/> Throughout the 1920s, Germany sold weapons to China. In 1925, over half of the weapons China imported were from Germany worth a total of 13 million Reichsmarks.<ref>Kirby, p. 25</ref> By 1936, arms deliveries to China had increased to 23,748,000 Reichmarks and the following year 82,788,604.<ref>Kirby, p. 220</ref> | |||
Throughout the 1920s and up until 1933, the Weimar Government funded "secret rearmament programmes" that was "camouflaged in the budget". These "'X-budgets', never exceeded 10 per cent of the ordinary (and disclosed) military budget.<ref>Hantke, p. 852</ref> Furthermore, despite the treaty conditions "volunteers were rapidly passed through the army", creating a large trained cadre, and paramilitary organizations were encouraged and fostered alongside the "illegal militarization of the police". Non-commissioned officers were not limited by the treaty, therefore they "were accordingly increased out of all proportion to the needs of a small army" in accordance with von Seeckt's "aim of building up a military elite".<ref>Mowat, p. 235</ref> | |||
During December 1931, the German military finalized a second rearmament plan, calling for the spending of 480 million Reichsmarks over the course of five years. A 'billion Reichsmark programme' "set out the extra spending on industrial inferstructure required to keep" an enlarged military "permanently in the field." However, since the plan "required no expansion of the peacetime strength of the Reichswehr" these spending plans "remained at least formally within the terms of Versailles." On 7 November 1932, the ] ] authorized the Umbau Plan. This plan, an outright breech of the treaty, "called for the creation of a standing army of 21 divisions based around a cadre of 147,000 professional soldiers and a substantial militia". Towards the end of the year at the ], Germany withdrew from the talks in a bid to force France and the United Kingdom to accept German equality of status.<ref>Tooze, p. 26</ref> In response, the United Kingdom attempted to get Germany to return with the promise of "equality of rights in armaments in a system which would provide security of all nations" and later proposed "an increase in the German Army from 100,000 to 200,000, while the French Army would be reduced." Further negotiations resulted in the agreement "that Germany should have an air force half the size of the French." Bell comments that while the British Government already knew Germany was rearming, "public respectability was thus conferred on the idea of German rearmament".<ref>Bell, p. 229</ref> By 1933, Franco-German relations were deteriorating, the ] broke up in disorder and the "spirit of Locarno fizzled out."<ref>Bell, p. 161</ref> | |||
] | |||
====Nazi era==== | |||
Adolf Hitler became Chancellor on 30 January 1933 and established a dictatorship. In June 1935, Germany reintroduced conscription, officially re-formed the air force (now known as the ]), and signed the ], which allowed "Germany to expand her surface fleet to 35 per cent of the size of the ]. All "clear violations of the Versailles Treaty."<ref name=Corrigan68/> On 7 March 1936, German troops ]. While most troops were deployed along the east bank of the Rhine, several battalions moved towards Germany's western borders.<ref>Bell, pp. 233-4</ref>{{#tag:ref|Bell notes that Hitler, and later commentators, remarked had the French invaded Germany in response to the German move into the Rhineland, German troops would have been forced to withdraw. Bell highlights "close examination ... reveals a different picture". Six German divisions eventually moved into the Rhineland, and beyond them were 24 infantry and 3 panzer divisions in the process of training and forming. The leading German battalions had been "instructed to co-operate with the existing frontier troops and conduct a fighting retreat, using prepared obstacles to obstruct" any French advance. Then, the main German defense would be made along the River Rhine. Bell comments "Hitler would simply have allowed the French to occupy the whole zone, which included part of the Ruhr industrial area on the east bank of the Rhine; or that German troops would passively abandon territory they had just entered with much flourish and display". Bell highlights that the German official history – the "]" also supports this assertion.<ref name=Bell234/>|group=nb}} In further violation of the Treaty of Versailles, on 11 March 1938, the Government of the Republic of Austria was taken over by German nominees "as a result of pressure from Berlin". The following day, German troops crossed the border. On 13 March, Hitler "announced the ]."<ref>Bell, p. 254</ref> On 23 March 1939, Germany annexed Memel from Lithuania.<ref>Bell, p. 281</ref> | |||
==Historical assessment== | |||
===Popular perception=== | |||
Writing in 1940, Rene Albrecht-Carrie comments that the "assumption ... is often made that the Versailles settlement is the source and fount of the world's subsequent troubles". He continues "This conclusion would seem to be the result of a simple syllogism running somewhat like this: the World War was fought essentially for the purpose of establishing an orderly community of nations ... and the primary purpose of the peace was to bring about such a result; now it is clear that such a happy state of affairs has not come into existence; ergo, the war itself was a futile waste and the peace settlements were bad."<ref> Albrecht-Carrie, p. 1</ref> | |||
Sally Marks, writing in 1978, remarks that German reparations are "an excruciatingly tangled thicket into which only a few intrepid explorers have ventured." Thus, "understandably, most students of twentieth century history have preferred to sidestep the perils of travel on territory of extreme financial complexity and, as a consequence, a number of misconcetions about the history of German reparations remain in circulation". She concludes that the "myths about reparations ... still adorn studies of the Weimar Republic and interwar history".<ref>Marks, p. 231</ref> This view is furthered by Diane B. Kunz, writing in 1998, who notes that "even though historians have successfully refuted the myth of war guilt and the view that reparations were an intolerable burden these ideas rapidly became accepted wisdom and remain so now" and as a result "most people "''know''" that the Versailles treaty helped precipitate World War II and they "''know''" that reparations were wrong."<ref>Boemeke, pp. 523-4</ref> | |||
Historian ] comments that "there was a popular delusion, widespread at the time, sedulously fostered in the 1920s and 1930s by German propaganda, generally believed then and remaining the staple pabulum of history textbooks today, that Germany had been most terrible crushed by the peace settlement, that all manner of horrendous things had been done to her, and that wide variety of onerous burdens and restrictions imposed upon her by the peace had weakened her into the indefinite future".<ref name=Weinberg15>Weinberg, p. 15</ref> A position supported by ], who comments "one is hard put to find a school textbook with anything good to say about the achievements of the Paris peacemakers."<ref>Mazower, p. 8</ref> Weinberg continues "Germany – a bare quarter of a century after the armistice of 1918 – controlled most of Europe and had come within a hair's breadth of conquering the globe, there was obviously something wrong about the picture generally accepted then and later."<ref name=Weinberg15/> | |||
===War guilt === | |||
] | |||
In May 1919, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau complained – prior to having seen the treaty – that it forced Germany to accept full responsibility for the war.<ref name=Craig141/> On 18 June 1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau, "on behalf of the German delegation", politically charged the article by further claiming it blamed Germany for starting the war. His position was rebuffed by Clemenceau who "showed that the legal interpretation was the correct one" rather than a political one. Instead "Brockdorff-Rantzau continued to hang the discussion of the political origin of the war on the text of Article 231"<ref>Binkley, p. 399</ref> and it later appeared "that Article 231 was not correctly translated into German. Rather than stating " ... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage ..." the German Government's edition reads "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ..."<ref name=Blinkley399400>Binkley, p. 399-400</ref> Brockdorff-Rantzau's position was further propagated by politicians.<ref name=Marks232/> The "prevailing German belief" was that Germany "signed away her honor in Article 231".<ref>Binkley, p. 400</ref> German historians worked hard to "undermine the validity of this clause" and in doing so "found a ready acceptance among 'revisionist' writers in France, Britain, and the USA."<ref name=Bell21/> The "most outspoken and influential critic" was the American historian Sidney Fay. In 1928, he concluded that all of Europe shared the blame for the war and that Germany had no intention of launching a general European war in 1914.<ref>Slavicek,p. 19-20</ref> | |||
Writing in 1926, Robert Binkley and Dr. Mahr, both of ] and the latter the assistant Professor of German, comment that the German accusations were "ill-founded" and "mistaken".<ref name=Blinkley398>Binkley, p. 398</ref> In 1940, Albrecht-Carrie stated "article 231 gave rise to an unfortunate controversy, unfortunate because it served to raise a false issue."<ref name=AC15>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 15</ref> Binkley and Mahr note that the war guilt article was "an assumption of liability to pay damages than an admission of war guilt" and compare it with "a man who undertakes to pay all the cost of a motor accident than to the plea of guilty entered by an accused criminal".<ref name=Blinkley398/> Albrecht-Carrie supports this point noting that the German inter-war argument "rested on her responsibility for the out-break of the war" and if that guilt could be disproven then the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.<ref name=AC15/> Binkley and Mahr comment that "it is absurd" to charge the reparation articles of the treaty with "political meaning" and the legal interpretation "is the only one that can stand". They conclude the German mistranslation and position "is based upon a text which has no legal validity whatsoever, and which Germany never signed at all."<ref name=Blinkley399400/> | |||
Between 1959 and 1969, the German historian ] reignited the war guilt issue. In his "well-researched", but highly controversial, works '']'' and '']'' Fischer "destroyed the consensus about shared responsibility for the First World War" and "placed the blame for the First World War firmly on the shoulders of the ] elite." By the 1970s, his work "had emerged as the new orthodoxy on the origins of the First World War".<ref>Mulligan, pp. 11-2</ref> During the 1980s, historian ] led a new wave of First World War research concluding "that the origins of the First World War were "complex and varied" although "by December 1912" Germany had decided to go to war.<ref>Mulligan, p. 14</ref> | |||
In 1978, historian Sally Marks reexamined the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in a work entitled ''The Myths of Reparations''. Marks comments that "the much-criticized 'war guilt clause', Article 231, which was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations, in fact makes no mention of war guilt". She notes it only specifies Germany was to pay for the damages caused by the war they imposed upon the allies and "that Germany committed an act of aggression against Belgium is beyond dispute" and highlights that "technically, Britain entered" the war and French troops entered Belgium "to honor" the "legal obligation" to defend Belgium "under the ]" and that "Germany openly acknowledged her responsibility in regard to Belgium on August 4, 1914 and May 7, 1919." She further notes that "the same clause, '']''" was incorporated "in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, neither of whom interpreted it as declaration of war guilt."<ref>Marks, pp. 231-2</ref> Wolfgang Mommsen supports this position, noting that "Austria and Hungary, understandably paid no attention to this aspect of the draft treaty".<ref name=Boemeke5378>Boemeke, pp. 537-8</ref> Writing in 1986, Marks echoed Albrecht-Carrie. She commented that the German foreign office, supported by military and civilian notables, "focused on Article 231 ... hoping that, if one could refute German responsibility for the war, not only reparations but the entire treaty would collapse".<ref name=Martle9919>Martel (1999), p. 19</ref> Mommsen highlights that "before the Versailles negotiations began, the German government took the position that it would be inadvisable ... to elevate the question of war guilt" and it was only "at the last minute that Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to disregard the repeated explicit decisions of the Reich cabinet and launch a frontal attack on the Allies' position regarding war guilt". Mommsen further comments that top-level German "government officials were apparently aware that Germany's position on this matter was not nearly so favorable as the imperial government had led the German public to believe during the war."<ref name=Boemeke5378/> | |||
In his 2005 work, Stephen Neff details the history of clause. He notes that the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties" examined the background of the war and concluded the "war was premeditated by the Central Powers ... and was the result of acts deliberately committed to make it unavoidable." Germany and ] had "deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war." This conclusion, Neff asserts, "was duly incorporated ... as the famous 'war guilt clause'". However, he concedes that, "the term 'war guilt' is a slight unfortunate one, since to lawyers, the term 'guilt' primarily connotes criminal liability" while "the responsibility of Germany envisaged in the Versailles Treaty ... was civil in nature, comparable to the indemnity obligation of classical ]."<ref>Neff, p. 289</ref> Slavicek comments that while "the article was an honest reflection of the treaty-writers' beliefs, including such a clause in the peace settlement was undiplomatic, to say the least."<ref>Slavicek, p. 57</ref> Norman Davies takes a more partisan view claiming that the Treaty of Versailles invited Germany "to accept sole guilt for the preceding war"<ref name=Davies133/> while Diane B. Kunz comments that "rather than being seen as an American lawyer's clever attempt to limit actual German financial responsibility by buying off French politicians and their public with the sop of a piece of paper" Article 231 "became an easily exploitable open sore".<ref name=Boemeke524>Boemeke, p. 524</ref> | |||
Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser perhaps provide the most balanced view. They note "pragmatic requirements characteristically influenced the shaping of the much misunderstood Article 231. That paragraph reflected the presumed legal necessity to define German responsibility for the war in order to specify and limit the Reich's obligations".<ref>Boemeke, p.16</ref> Finally, Klaus Schwabe highlights that the article's influence went far beyond the discussion of war guilt. By "refusing to acknowledge Germany's 'war guilt' the ] implicitly exonerated the ]" and more importantly failed "to dissociate itself from ]." In doing so "it undermined its claim that post-revolutionary Germany was a historic new democratic beginning deserving credit at the peace conference."<ref>Boemeke, p. 48</ref> | |||
=== Reparations, and the impact on the German economy === | |||
====Contemporary==== | |||
] | |||
The economist ] "set the fashion for critics of the economic aspects of the treaty" and "made probably the severest and most sweeping indictment of its economic provisions".<ref>Campbell, p. 161</ref> Keynes was temporarily attached to the ] during the war and was their official representative at the Paris Peace Conference. He resigned from the latter position "when it became evident that hope could no longer be entertained of substantial modifications in the draft Terms of Peace" due to the "policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of Europe". He 1919, he wrote '']'' based on his objections.<ref>Keynes, preface</ref> He commented that he believed "that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible"<ref>Keynes, p. 146</ref> and called the treaty a "]" that would economically effect all of Europe.<ref>Keynes, pp. 86-7</ref> Keynes claims that the treaty's reparation figures "generally exceed Germany's capacity" to pay<ref>Keynes, p. 215</ref> and asserts 10 billion dollars was the "safe maximum figure", but even then he did "not believe that pay as much".<ref>Keynes, p. 200</ref> The Reparation Commission, he believed, was a tool that could "be employed to destroy Germany's commercial and economic organization as well as to exact payment".<ref>Keynes, p. 79</ref> Keynes identified reparations as the Allies "main excursion into the economic field" but notes that the treaty included "no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, – nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves."<ref>Keynes, p. 226</ref> Coal provides an example of these destabilizing effects within Germany and beyond. Keynes claimed that the "surrender of the coal will destroy German industry" although he concedes that without it the French and Italian industry – damaged directly via the war or indirectly due to damage to coal mines – would be effected. He notes that this is "not yet the whole problem". The treaty would have a knock on effect on ] and ] as neutral states such as Switzerland and Sweden made up for their own coal deficiencies by trading with Germany, as did Austria who would now be consigned to "industrial ruin" as "nearly all the coalfields of the former Empire lie outside of what is now ]".<ref>Keynes, pp. 94-5</ref> Rather, in Keynes opinion, the reparation figure should have been fixed "well within Germany's capacity to pay" so to "make possible the renewal of hope and enterprise within her territory" and to "avoid the perpetual friction and opportunity of improper pressure arising out of the Treaty clauses".<ref>Keynes, p. 265</ref> | |||
Historian Claude Campbell, writing in 1942, notes that the "apparent majority did not regard the treaty as perfect by any means, but, as ] ably maintained in his book, ''The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty'', published in 1920, they did believe it to be the best agreement obtainable under the circumstances." Campbell notes that it was a minority who attacked the treaty, but these attacks "centered upon its economic provisions".<ref>Campbell, p. 160</ref> ], writing in his 1939 book ''What Germany Forgot'', claimed "the only 'unendurable servitudes' in the treaty were in the sections on Reparation and the Polish settlement and raised the question as to what part of Germany's grievance against the peace lay in the substance of its exactions and what part in the manner of their imposition." Sir Andrew McFayden, who likewise represented the British Treasury at the peace conference and worked on the Reparation Commission, published his work ''Don't Do it Again'' in 1941. Campbell comments that McFayden's position "falls somewhere between the views of Keynes and Shotwell". MacFayden's attack on reparations "was as harsh as Keynes" but conceded the "fault did not lie primarily in the provisions of the treaty but in their execution" and also believed "that he Polish settlement was the only readjustment ... which was decidedly unwise."<ref>Campbell, pp. 161-2</ref> Albrecht-Carrie highlights that prior to the German surrender Woodrow Wilson dispatched a note to the German Government on 5 November 1918, the terms of which were accepted by the German Government. The note stated that he allies "under-stand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."<ref name=AC15/> Regardless of which, Albrecht-Carrie concedes that "the reparation section of the Treaty of Versailles proved indeed to be a dismal failure."<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 16</ref> Campbell, herself, comments "although there was much in the peace that was 'petty, unjust, and humiliating', there was little aside from reparation clauses and certain territorial concessions, which had much real bearing upon Germany's economic future."<ref>Campbell, p. 162</ref> Summarizing the view of economists throughout the 1920s, she notes that the territorial changes to Germany were "not necessarily ... economically unsound", but the removal of the Saar and territory to Poland thus "depriving Germany of her resources in excess of the amount necessary to fulfill the legitimate economic demands of the victors ... was indefensible". Furthermore, the treaty failed to "include ... provisions looking to the restoration of Germany to her former position as the chief economic and financial stabilizing influence in central Europe" and that this was economically shortsighted and was a failing of the treaty from an "economic standpoint".<ref>Campbell, p. 163</ref> | |||
The "fullest and ablest attack"<ref>Hazlitt, p. 96</ref> on Keynes work came from the "convincing broadside" launched by the French economist ]. In his a posthumously published book ''The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes'', Mantoux asserted that Keynes "had been wrong on various counts, especially with respect to his predictions about Germany's coal, iron and steel production ... and its level of national saving." Citing the rearmament under Hitler as an example, Mantoux suggested Germany "had been in a stronger position to pay reparations than Keynes had made out".<ref>Cord, p. 41</ref> | |||
====Modern==== | |||
P.M.H Bell comments that "it was not unusual for cash payments, or indemnities, to be imposed upon the losing side in war" and highlights the example of France, which had "a substantial indemnity ... imposed ... as the defeated power at the end of the ] of 1871."<ref name=Bell22/> However, the financial terms of Treaty of Versailles were labeled reparations as they were designed to pay for reconstruction and compensate families who had lost someone during the war, thus "to distinguish them from the punitive payments, usually called indemnities".<ref name=Weinberg14/> Of the reparation figure imposed on Germany, less than the equivalent of 21 billion gold marks were paid out of a total of 50 billion gold marks. Sally Marks states that "figures based upon publications of the Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements" place the total German payment at 20.598 billon gold marks<ref>Marks, pp. 233 and 237</ref> whereas ] estimates that 19 billion gold marks "would seem to be a reasonable figure for the total value of unrequited transfer from Germany to the Allies". Ferguson notes that this was "a relatively small proportion (2.4 percent) of total national income over the period" of 1919-32.<ref name=Boemeke424>Boemeke, p. 424</ref> Stephen Schuker provides slightly different figures. He comments that "for the whole period 1919-31, Germany transferred to the Allies, in cash and kind together, an average of only 2.0 percent of national income" which in total made an "unilateral transfer equal to a startling 5.3 percent of German national income for 1919-31."<ref name=Martel1999,p.43/> | |||
Louise Slavicek notes that the "traditional interpretation of the treaty's impact on Germany" was that it "plunged the nation into an economic free fall"<ref>Slavieck, p. 95</ref> Niall Ferguson comments that the initial German reaction that the treaty was robbing Germany of its wealth is incorrect. He notes "not many historians would today agree with Warburg's]] characterization of the Versailles treaty as 'pillage on a global scale'".<ref>Boemeke, p. 401</ref> He goes on to note that the annual payment of reparations "was less of a burden than Keynes and others claimed" and that the "potential burden on national income of the annuity vary from 5 percent to 10 percent."<ref name=Boemeke424/> However, he states that the initial German effort "should not be underestimated" and that between eight and 13 billion gold marks were transferred to the Allies prior to the implementation of the Dawes Plan, which was "between 4 and 7 percent of total national income". Further, he calculates that "the annuity demanded in 1921 put an intolerable strain on the state's finances" and total expenditure - between 1920 and 1923 - "under the terms of the Versailles treaty" amounted to "at least 50 percent of Reich revenue, 20 percent of total Reich spending and 10 percent of total public spending."<ref name=Boemeke425>Boemeke, p. 425</ref> Thus, Ferguson claims, reparations "undermined confidence in the Reich's creditworthiness" and "''were'' therefore excessive - as the German government claimed."<ref>Boemeke, p. 426</ref> Norman Davies briefly furthers this position, claiming the treaty forced Germany to "pay astronomic reparations".<ref name=Davies133/> Tim McNeese states "France and Britain had placed war damages on Germany to the tune of billions of gold marks, which the defeated Germans could not begin to pay in earnest."<ref>McNeese, p. 19</ref> Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer, in a paper highlighting how Versailles benefited Germany, comment that "reparation payments were indeed a severe economic burden for Germany". They note that "the German economy was deprived of between one and 2.2 billion Reichsmark (RM) annually, which amounted in the late 1920s to nearly 2.5 per cent of Germany's GDP."<ref name=Hantke849>Hantke, p. 849</ref> | |||
Taking the middle ground is Robert D. Boyce. He called the reparations "a heavy burden on Germany, both as a financial charge ... and as a charge on Germany's balance of payments". However, he notes while "Germany claimed it could not afford to pay reparations" this was far from the truth. He states "in fact Germany had made little effort to pay reparations. It refused to levy the necessary taxes, and far from accumulating the foreign exchange required for their payment by collecting some of the overseas earnings of German exporters, it allowed them to leave their earnings abroad."<ref>Martel (2010), p. 183</ref> Bell comments that reparations were "unwelcome to Germany", did provide a "strain on the German balance of payments", but "could be paid, and indeed that they were compatible with a general recovery in European commerce and industry.<ref name=Bell38/> | |||
], 1918, one of the many destroyed French villages that needed to be rebuilt following the war and reparations intended to pay for.]] | |||
Sally Marks notes that "while Article 231 ... established an unlimited theoretical liability" it "in fact narrowed German responsibility to civilian damages". She further comments that "much ink has been wasted on the fact that civilian damages were stretched to cover war widows' pensions and allowances for military dependents." However, "since the German reparations bill was established ... on the basis of an Allied assessment of German capacity to pay, not on the basis of Allied claims, these items did not affect German liability but merely altered distribution of the receipts." As an example, she states "inclusion of pensions and allowances increased the British share of the pie but did not enlarge the pie."<ref name=Marks232/> Marks states that the delay until 1921 to assign a final reparation total "was actually in Germany's interest" as the figures discussed at the Peace Conference were "astronomic, ranging to sixteen times the amount finally set" and she highlights the British contingent for particular comment. "The British experts, Lords ] and ], were so unrealistic that they were nicknamed ]."<ref name=Marks233/> The final total imposed on Germany "was a Belgian compromise between higher French and Italian totals and a lower British figure." The final total "represented an assessment of the lowest amount that public opinion in continental receiver states would tolerate" and the British pushed for a smaller figure since they were working towards "an immediate German economic revival."<ref>Marks, p. 236</ref> Marks comments that "historians have focused upon the figure of 132 billion without examining the nature of its implementation. The London Schedule of Payments of May 5, 1921, both enshrined this sum and demolished it. The full liability of all the Central Powers combined, not just Germany alone, was set at 132 billion gold marks" and this figure "was to be organized in three series of bonds, labeled A, B, and C. ... C Bonds, which contained the bulk of the German obligation, were deliberately designed to be chimerical. They were entirely unreal, and their primary function was to mislead public opinion ... into believing that the 132-billion-mark figure was being maintained. ... Thus the A and B Bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of Germany capacity to pay. ... Therefore the A and B Bonds represented the total German reparations liability to a face (or nominal) value of 50 billion gold marks or $12 1/2 billion, an amount smaller than what Germany had ... offered to pay." Marks highlights that in 1921 "Germany met her first cash payment of one billion gold marks in full" because "west German customs posts and an area around ] were under Allied occupation."<ref name=Marks237/> Afterwards, the Allies "relinquished the customs posts but remained at Düsseldorf" and thereafter Germany "made no further payments in cash until after the Dawes Plan went into effect late in 1924" although they did pay "a tiny portion of the variable annuity due in November 1921 and small amounts on annuities due in early 1922".<ref name=Marks238>Marks, p. 238</ref> Weinberg notes that the reparations were paid, the "devastated towns were rebuilt, the orchards replanted, the mines pumped out and all the pensions to survivors were paid". However, as he points out, the Germans were not the funders of this reconstruction. Rather, Germany shifted "the burden of repair costs from the less damaged German economy to the more damaged economies of others thus served to redouble rather than off-set the impact of the war itself."<ref name=Weinberg16>Weinberg, p. 16</ref> ], in his highly controversial work ''The Origins of the Second World War'', comments that "no doubt the impoverishment of Germany was caused by war, not by reparations. Not doubt the Germans could have paid reparations, if they had regarded them as an obligation of honour, honestly incurred." However, he concedes that "reparations ... kept the passions of war alive."<ref name=Taylor44>Taylor, p. 44</ref> Bernadotte Schmitt comments had "pensions and separation allowances ... not been included, reparations would probably never have become bogey that poisoned the post-war world for so many years."<ref>Schmitt, p. 107</ref> ] comments that historians have refuted the myth that reparations caused an "intolerable burden" on Germany.<ref name=Boemeke524/> | |||
] | |||
The issue of reparations and Versailles is closely followed and somewhat linked to the ] Erik Goldstein states that attempting to implement the payment scheme envisioned by the Reparations Commission, in 1921, "almost immediately caused a crisis". He goes on to state that the occupation of the Ruhr had a disastrous effect on the German economy, resulting in the German Government printing more money as the currency collapsed in value. He notes that "more than 30 paper mills worked at top speed and capacity to deliver notepaper to the Reichsbank, and 150 printing firms had 2,000 presses running day and night to print the Reichsbank notes" with the end result being that by November 1923, "1 US dollar equaled 4,200,000,000,000 marks".<ref name=Martel2010156/> Niall Ferguson comments that due to the decisions made by ] - the German Economics Minister - at the urging of Warburg, Germany avoided an economic collapse in 1919 and 1920.<ref>Boemeke, p. 409-10</ref> However, Ferguson goes on to say - agreeing with an earlier work by Steven Webb on German hyperinflation - that "reparations accounted for the lion's share of the Reich deficit in 1921 and 1922 (68 percent of and 56 percent respective totals)" and reparations "were thus, in ]'s words, 'ultimately responsible for the inflation'".<ref name=Boemeke425/> | |||
However, Weinberg bluntly counters this position stating "the Germans shook off the reparation payments by simple refusal to pay, by destroying their own currency - in part to demonstrate inability to pay - and by more than off-setting what payments were made through borrowing abroad followed by repudiation of most of these loans in the 1930s."<ref name=Weinberg16/> Anthony Lentin also supports this position. He comments that inflation was "a consequence of the war rather than of the peace" and the hyperinflation was a result of the "German government's reckless issue of paper money during the Ruhr crisis".<ref name=Lentin201226/> Marks, comments that the "Germans argued that reparations were destroying their currency while British and French experts agreed that Germany was deliberately ruining the mark, partly to avoid budgetary and currency reform, but primarily to escape reparations."<ref name=Marks238/> She continues "Those historians who have accepted the German claim that reparations were the cause of the inflation have overlooked the fact that the inflation long predated reparations" and "they have similarly overlooked the fact that the inflation mushroomed in the period from the summer of 1921 to the end of 1922 when Germany was actually paying very little in reparations" and "have also failed to explain why the period of least inflation coincided with the period of largest reparation payments ... or why Germans claimed after 1930 that reparations were causing deflation" and concludes "there is no doubt that British and French suspicions late in 1922 were sound."<ref>Marks, p. 239</ref> Marks concludes that the "astronomic inflation which ensued was a result of German policy" and not only did Germany fund "passive resistance" of the Ruhr "from an empty exchequer" but the "German government" paid "off its domestic debts, including the war debt, and those of the state enterprises in worthless marks."<ref>Marks, p. 245</ref> Bell, also supports these attacks, commenting that the "inflation had little direct connection with reparation payments themselves, but a great deal to do with the way the German government chose to subsidize industry and to pay the costs of passive resistance to the occupation by extravagant use of the printing press." Bell concludes that "the Ruhr occupation and the German hyperinflation were not inevitable consequences of the reparation clauses of Versailles; but they as events turned out, they were among the actual results."<ref>Bell, p. 25</ref> | |||
Hantke and Spoerer provide a different perspective on the effect of reparations on the German economy. They note that focusing on the reparation and inflation issue ignores "the fact that the restriction of the German military to 115,000 men relieved the German central budget considerably."<ref name=Hantke849/> The duo comment that their findings show "that even under quite rigorous assumptions the net economic burden of the Treaty of Versailles was much less heavy than has been hitherto thought, in particular if we confine our perspective to the Reich's budget.<ref>Hantke, p. 851</ref> They note that "though politically a humiliation" the limitation on the military "was beneficial in fiscal terms" and that their economic models show that "the restriction of the size of the army was clearly beneficial for the Reich budget."<ref>Hantke, p. 860</ref> Additionally, their economic scenarios highlight that while "the Treaty of Versailles" was "overall clearly a burden on the German economy" it "also offered a substantial peace dividend for Weimar's non-revanchist budget politicians." They conclude that "The fact that did not make sufficient use of this imposed gift supports the hypothesis that the Weimar Republic suffered from home-made political failure."<ref>Hantke, p. 861</ref> | |||
] | |||
Historians have also noted how American and European powers took an active interest in the German economy during the inter-war years. Taylor comments that "Germany was a net gainer by the financial transactions of the nineteen-twenties: she borrowed far more from private American investors ... than she paid in reparations."<ref name=Taylor44/> From January 1925 to April 1930, Germany - from the Reich Government down to the state and municipal level as well as private enterprises and church organizations - had borrowed 6.7 billion gold marks on top of the 800 million gold marks that was raised as part of the Dawes Plan.<ref>Marks, p. 249</ref> By spring 1931, German foreign debt stood at 21.514 billion Reichsmarks, with the main sources of aid being the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.<ref>Tooze, p. 7</ref> Taylor further highlighted that Britain wanted to reintegrate Germany into European trade as soon as possible.<ref>Martel (1999), p. 24</ref> Outside of reparation payments, French imports of German goods "increased by 60 per cent between 1926 and 1930" highlighting how "closely linked" French industrial growth was to "Germany production" and the increase in "Franco-German co-operation."<ref>Bell, p. 38-9</ref> Bell also notes that the creation of a multi-national committee, which would eventually result in the Dawes Plan, was done to consider how the German budget could be balanced, the currency stabilized, and fixing the German economy to ease reparation payments.<ref name=Bell37/> | |||
In summary, Sally Marks comments that a "substantial degree of scholarly consensus now suggests that paying what was actually asked of her was within Germany's financial capacity".<ref>Boemeke, p. 357</ref> A partisan view of this opinion exists, as evident by the opposition to this statement by historians Peter Kruger, Gerald D. Feldman, and Niall Ferguson, who argue that "the initial German effort to pay reparations was very substantial (the August 1921 payment in particular), that it produced an immense strain." An opinion supported by economic historians such as Barry Eichengreen and Steven Webb.<ref>Boemeke, pp. 445-6</ref> However, William Keylor notes that historians have "successfully refuted the myth ... that reparations were an intolerable burden"<ref>Boemeke, p. 523-4</ref> and Ruth Henig comments "most historians of the Paris peace conference now take the view that, in economic terms, the treaty was not unduly harsh on Germany and that, while obligations and damages were inevitably much stressed in the debates at Paris to satisfy electors reading the daily newspapers, the intention was quietly to give Germany substantial help towards paying her bills, and to meet many of the German objections by amendments to the way the reparations schedule was in practice carried out."<ref>Henig, p. 65</ref> | |||
===Impact on the rise of the Nazi Party and influence on the origins of the Second World War=== | |||
] | |||
Some commentators have believed that a direct connection between the Treaty of Versailles and the rise of Adolf Hitler exists. John Maynard Keynes biographer claimed "Had Keynes 1919 programme been carried out, it is unlikely that Hitler would have become German chancellor."<ref>Boemeke, p. 503</ref> Ruth Henig highlights that "many politicians and commentators in Britain after 1933 saw Hitler's rise in power in Germany as an inevitable consequence of the wrongs of Versailles"<ref>Henig, p. 52</ref> and Lousie Slavicek notes that "traditionally, the burdensome financial, military, and territorial terms of the Treaty of Versailles have been blamed for the rise of Adolf Hitler". However, Slavicek comments that "a growing number of modern scholars ... reject the view that the treaty's more stringent provisions pushed Germany towards Nazism" and note the only connection between the two was "Hitler's genius for exploiting the unpopular treaty's propaganda value."<ref>Slavicek, p. 94</ref> Alex Woolf <!-- Apparently not the same Alex Woolf Phd who has a wiki article, so unless confirmed as one and the same please do not link there --> summarizes the conflicting arguments. On one hand, it is claimed that resentment of the treaty created a "mood of national humiliation and betrayal, which made it easier for the Nazis, who promised national revival to gain support" while on the other hand "some historians downplay" the treaty and highlight that "Germany was already an unstable country, on the brink of dictatorship, before 1919, because its constitution (written in 1871) tended to give too much power to extremist groups."<ref>Woolf, p. 5</ref> Henig states "there was undoubtedly a 'German problem' in Europe in the 1920s which remained unresolved, but the ensuing ] and the growth of extremism in Germany were not easy to forecast, and the coming to power of Hitler was by no means inevitable."<ref>Henig, p. 73</ref> ] expands on this point, arguing that it is untrue that Versailles caused the end of the Weimar Republic, contending that it was the Great Depression that put an end to German democracy; a depression that "owed little to the effects of Versailles and was only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations."<ref name=Evans107>Evans, p. 107</ref> Adam Tooze comments that in the first election following the "stabilization of 1924 ... the entire electorate of Germany ] to give their verdict on the achievements of the Weimar Republic". In doing so, Hitler's ] gained a mere 2.5 per cent of the vote and "only 12 seats out of the 491 in the ]." Tooze highlights that "by the autumn of 1928" the Nazis "were so cash-strapped ... that they were forced to call off their annual party rally" and that "sales of '']'' had slumped so badly that Hitler's publishers decided to hold back his ] for fear if spoiling the market."<ref>Tooze, pp. 2-3, 12-13</ref> ] comments that "there is doubtless a path leading from Versailles to Hitler." But he "cannot agree that Versailles made Hitler's takeover of power inevitable." Klein summarizes that "the Germans had a choice when they decided to take this path. In other words, they did not have to. Hitler's victory was not an unavoidable result of Versailles."<ref>Boemeke, p. 220</ref> | |||
On the issue of if the treaty resulted in the Second World War, Bell notes that two schools of thought exist on the issue. The first, the ] states that the First World War "shook the foundations of Europe to an extent that was virtually irreparable" and the Treaty of Versailles "proceeded to make the situation worse rather than better" eventually "precipitating repeated crises and providing at least the circumstances, and arguably the causes, of European war."<ref>Bell, pp. 17, 19, 30</ref> The opposing argument holds that Europe had reconciled their differences and was on the way to recovery, a recovery "cut off in its prime by the great depression and its dreadful consequence, the advent of Hitler."<ref>Bell, p. 43</ref> The German historian ] expands this line of thought. He states that "the achievements of the policy of rapprochement that was pursued between 1923 and 1929 can scarcely be exaggerated", and it was this policy "committed to political co-operation and economic integration" that became "the inevitable casualty when the world economy collapsed and policies of autarky and national self-interest took rot among the ruins"<ref name=Peukert278>Peukert, p. 278</ref> ] argues that the guilt associated with the treaty, rather than the treaty itself, "helped spark World War II".<ref>Boemeke, p. 523</ref> ] highlights that war was not an inevitable consequence of the treaty. He notes that "it is almost certain that if Hitler had not come to power in 1933, another German government would have continued the revisionist thrust and might have achieved through negotiation much of what Hitler ultimately achieved through unilateralism."<ref name=Martel95>Martel (1999), p. 95</ref> | |||
Hitler, writing in 1925, stated in ''Mein Kampf'' that the Versailles treaty should be exploited and put forth his ideological vision for Germany's future. In regards to the treaty, he asked the following questions: "To what purpose could the Treaty of Versailles have been exploited? In the hands of a willing Government, how could this instrument of unlimited blackmail and shameful humiliation have been applied for the purpose of arousing national sentiment to its highest pitch? How could a well-directed system of propaganda have utilized the sadist cruelty of that treaty so as to change the indifference of the people to a feeling of indignation and transform that indignation into a spirit of dauntless resistance?"<ref>Hitler, p. 514-16</ref> In establishing his ideological future for Germany, he wrote "to demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored is a glaring political absurdity" and "for the future of the German nation the 1914 frontiers are of no significance." He believed this was the case since the pre-First World War borders did not include "all the members of the German nation." Hitler concluded this thoughts on the borders of Germany by noting that "we put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of pre-war times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future. But when we speak of new territory in Europe today we must principally think of Russia and the border States subject to her."<ref>Hitler, pp. 528–33</ref> He further developed this line of thought, writing "without consideration of traditions and prejudices, Germany must find the courage to gather our people and their strength for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted living space ], and hence also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation."<ref>Hitler, p. 646</ref> Richard Overy further comments that examining Hitler's second book clarifies his goals "even more than first". Overy states that "Hitler was not concerned just with treaty revision ... but saw in Germany's future the building of a solid racial core, the race-contest with international Jewry, and the build-up of sufficient military power to allow Germany to seize an economic empire in the spaces of the ill-defined 'east'".<ref name=Martel95/> ] furthers this position, arguing that the goal of overthrowing Versailles was only a prelude to seizing ''Lebensraum'' in Eastern Europe for Germany with no regard as to where Germany's 1914 frontiers had been.<ref>Koch, pp. 242-245</ref> Alexander Stilwell summarizes the argument against the Thirty Year War thesis and expands on the above points. He states "fundamentally, the Second World War was fought because of political ideas - ideologies." He continues "political extremism in post-First World War Germany brought to power Adolf Hitler, a man convinced of his own infallibility and almost divine calling to lead Germany to victory in a race war that would establish the Germans in their rightful position ... a war of conquest in which the inherent superiorty of the German race would be demonstrated and Germany's racial and ideological competitors would be destroyed, leaving Germany at the helm of a unified Europe." Stilwell concludes "this ideological dimension underpinned the reasons for the fighting".<ref>Stilwell, p. 10</ref> | |||
===Overall historical assessment=== | |||
Catherine Lu notes that "the Versailles peace settlement represented the 'most far-reaching and the widest-ranging system of treaties made up to that time.'" Quoting the Allied and associated powers, Lu comments that "the Allies drafted the Treaty of Versailles, confident 'that it is not only a just settlement of the great war, but that it provides the basis upon which the peoples of Europe can live together in friendship and equality.'" However, as became apparent these noble intentions were problematic and historians are divided on the issue of if the treaty was just, too lenient, or too harsh.<ref>Lu, p. 4 ff. and p. 15</ref> | |||
] | |||
Albrecht-Carrie comments the peace treaties "were conditioned to a large extent by the previous history of Europe".<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 2</ref> In this light, when reexamining the treaty "the cessions of Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania were little more than pin pricks" and the "Danish cession was wholly justified."<ref name=A-C12>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 12</ref> In regards to Alsace-Lorraine, he notes that Alsace was "not old French territory" yet "its restoration to France was, almost universally considered to have been warranted" and the French and Germans had almost reconciled on this issue during the inter-war period.<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 3</ref> He concedes that Poland "was looked upon by many as the great territorial crime perpetrated against Germany".<ref name=AC9/> This position is expanded upon by Richard Evans who argues that the German right was committed to an ] during the war, and found any peace settlement unacceptable that did not leave Germany as the conqueror.<ref name=Evans107/> Albrecht-Carrie argues against the German shock at the loss of territory to Poland. He notes that "the simple fact, which must be duly emphasized, in her career of expansion, Germany had extended her rule over large sections of alien peoples." While "the German people had been a civilizing influence" they "had not known how to win the allegiance of the subject peoples who found in the defeat of the Central Empires their opportunity of liberation."<ref name=A-C12/> Sally Marks notes that the territorial terms of the treaty "did not surprise Germany's cabinet, but shocked the people and generated bitterness." Marks states Gustav Stresemann, who she calls "Weimar's ablest foreign minister", "largely predicted" the losses that the treaty would demand. She highlights that the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and territory to Poland were "anchored in the fourteen points and the armistice" while the "north-Schleswig plebiscite" had been promised in 1866 "by an ]".{{#tag:ref|The 1866 ] resulted in Austria ceding to Prussia "all the rights acquired over the duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, with the condition that the population of the northern districts of Schleswig should be ceded to Denmark if, by a free vote, they should express a wish to be so united." However, without enacting a plebiscite, the region was annexed by Prussia on 12 January 1867. Around 50,000 people migrated pending this plebiscite. When the vote did not take place, these people returned to their homes in Schleswig "where, owing to their having lost their Danish citizenship and not being allowed by the Prussians - as a punishment - to acquire Prussian citizenship, they became in their unprotected state the special object of persecution in the Prussian efforts to Germanize the country."<ref>Wambaugh, pp. 145-6</ref>|group=nb}} Marks further notes that "the losses - thanks partly to self-determination - were minuscule, amounting to Eupen-Malmedy permanently and the Saar Basin provisionally.<ref name=Martle9919/> Ewa Thompson comments how the treaty freed "the Polish nation imprisoned in the German empire" and likewise how "the Treaty of Versailles liberated ... the Czechs, Slovaks, and members of other Eastern European states created as the European empires shrank."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~ethomp/The%20Surrogate%20Hegemon.pdf|title=The Surrogate Hegemon in Polish Postcolonial Discourse|last1=Thompson|first1=Ewa|page=10|date=22 September 2007|website=Time World|publisher=]|accessdate=2 October 2013}}</ref> Norman Davies highlights that while the Treaty of Versailles "delineated Poland's frontier with Germany, and the Treaty of Saint-Germain delineated Czechoslovakia's frontier with Austria" neither of them established the Polish-Czech border leaving a gaping legal hole that "simmered angrily for the next twenty years."<ref>Davies, p. 136</ref> Bernadotte Schmitt comments that the treaty, as well as the Paris Peace Conference as a whole, resulted "for the first time in European history" with "almost every European people ... allowed to obtain independence and a government of its own."<ref name=Schmitt105>Schmitt, p. 105</ref> | |||
] who had escaped the 1904 - 1907 ] committed by the German Empire. The genocide was an example of how the Allies viewed Germany as incompetent in colonial management.<ref>Totten, pp. 38-9</ref>]] | |||
Moving onto the ex-German colonies, Schmitt argues that due to opposition from Belgium, France, and the British Dominions, the mandate system was not established as Wilson had originally conceived. Schmitt looks to Robert Lansing, who pointed out "that the mandatory system set up ... enabled Belgium and France and the British Dominions to acquire the former German colonies, practically in full sovereignty although not technically so, but without having to take over the public debts which those colonies had accumulated under German rule."<ref name=Schmitt106/> Albrecht-Carrie states that any assertion that the United Kingdom and France had merely carried out a ] annexation of colonies while hiding behind the treaty and the League of Nations is "an oversimplification".<ref name=AC13>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 13</ref> Weinberg supports this view, noting that the ex-German colonies had been turned into mandates: "territories under the control ... of the victors but not included in their territory or colonies and instead being prepared for self-government at some future time."<ref name=Weinberg14/> Finally, Albrecht-Carrie comments that there had been "widespread ... belief in German colonial incompetence" and that it would be "inaccurate to say that it was the intent of the Treaty of Versailles merely to despoil Germany of her colonies" as the idea of mandates was "of American origin" and "perfectly sound".<ref name=AC13/> Schmitt comments that later on during the 1930s, the "government of Italy was fond of complaining that no mandates had been awarded to Italy" although as Schmitt highlights "it should be recorded that ... the Italians did not put in any claim for mandates, either of the German colonies or any part of the ], because the Italian interest was then concentrated on the ]."<ref name=Schmitt106/> | |||
] comments that while the intent of the policy of ] - as supported by Woodrow Wilson and embedded within the treaty - was noble,<ref>Boemeke, p. 32</ref> it was not without its problems. "National borders did not correspond to ethnic ones" and "Woodrow Wilson dealt with this problem by pretending that it did not exist." Likewise, the redrawing of the map resulted in cases of "two or more peoples claim the same land".<ref>Boemeke, p. 25</ref> Corona Brezina argues that Article 80 of the treaty was an "effective ban on the union of Germany and Austria" and this "ran counter to the doctrine of national self-determination" as promoted by Wilson.<ref name=Brezina34/> Likewise, Bell comments that the "Germans could thus claim unfair treatment" as "a series of unofficial plebiscites showed overwhelming majorities in favour of union with Germany" yet "the treaty laid it down firmly that such a union was forbidden." As such, while the "victorious Allies had claimed loudly that they were fighting for ] and self-determination" the situation arose were they "applied these great principles selectively, or even cynically."<ref name=Bell20/> ] alleges "on the whole, self-determination was deemed irrelevant where the people's will was certain to run counter to the victor's geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests."<ref>Cassese, p. 25</ref> Mark Mazower bluntly asserts that national determination "could never have been applied across the board".<ref name=Mazower9>Mazower, p. 9</ref> However, he notes that "it is to the credit of the Versailles peacemakers that they confronted the problem of ethnic violence head on." He highlights how, across Europe, the smaller ethnic groups were not given national self-determination and "would remain under the rule of others." But in doing so, the treaty and the League of Nations forced the newly created nations to sign ], which aimed to protect the smaller ethnic groups. However, Mazower concedes the treaties were "scarcely used" and by 1929 the League of Nation powers were "reluctant to act at all against member states accused of rights violations."<ref>Mazower, p. 13</ref> Albrecht-Carrie argues that the Allies did not want to reward "a defeated Germany by an increase of territory and population" by allowing Germany and German Austria to merge.<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 5</ref> Anthony Lentin supports this point, commenting that a Austro-German unification "would have made Germany even larger than in 1914" and added a further seven million people to the German population.<ref name=Lentin201226/> William Keylor furthers this position, arguing that had the allies redrew the borders of Europe purely on the basis of ethnicity, this "would have had the paradoxical consequence of significantly strengthening the German state by authorizing it to expand its national territory far beyond the frontiers of Bismarck]]'s Reich."<ref name=Slavicek102>Slavicek, p. 102</ref> Finally, Weinberg notes that "the adoption of the national principles as the basis for the peace settlement meant that ... Germany, would survive the war" rather than be divided.<ref name=Weinberg15/> | |||
], the professional Germany army that was established following the war in lines with the Treaty of Versailles, parade through Berlin during October 1924.]] | |||
When formulating the treaty, the issue of conscription proved problematic. Lloyd George, "in response to British public opinion, was insistent on conscription being abolished in Germany." However, Ferdinand Foch wanted to allow Germany to retain a conscript army as this would justify France maintaining a similar force. When Lloyd George "insisted on a long-term volunteer army for German", Foch argued that "such an army would be more dangerous than a conscript army" and therefore an army of this kind "must be small". A compromise was reached, rather than a 200,000 strong German army of conscripts as "Foch was willing to allow", the treaty "provided for only 100,000 volunteers". A move that the Germans argued left them "defenseless against their enemies."<ref>Schmitt, pp. 104-5</ref> Schmitt comments that "there is no reason to believe that the Allied governments were insincere when they stated at the beginning of Part V of the Treaty ... that in order to facilitate a general reduction of the armament of all nations, Germany was to be required to disarm first." Unfortunately, Schmitt argues, due to the American failure to ratify the treaty or join the League of Nations along with the Anglo-American failure "to ratify the treaties of alliance which had been the French price for the promise to disarm" this left "the French so nervous that, until too late, they were never willing to accept a measure of disarmament that would satisfy Germany." While the French were unwilling to disarm, so were the Germans. Schmitt notes that Germany evaded "the provisions of the Treaty relating to its own disarmament."<ref name=Schmitt104/> Davies highlights a lack of foresight, which he deems "a curious oversight", within the treaty's military restrictions: the treaty "did not include rockets in its list of prohibited weapons", which provided ] an area to research within eventually resulting in "his break came in 1943" leading to the development of the ].<ref>Davies, p. 416</ref> | |||
On the whole, critics of the treaty have highlighted various issues with it. ] called the treaty a "very silly humiliating and punitive peace".<ref name=Lu5>Lu, p. 5</ref> ] argues that the treaty was "harsh in the wrong places and lenient in the wrong ways" and claims certain terms were "unjust, unilateral, discriminatory, harsh and unrealistic."<ref>Joshi, p. 27</ref> Walter McDougall comments that "the Treaty of Versailles was not a failure, for it was never tried." He continues "everyone hated it, including the entire spectrum of French opinion. It is said to have been unfulfillable, for it gave the Germans no incentive to cooperate. ... The weakness of Versailles was not that it displeased Germany but that it also displeased the Allies. The Americans defected, the British turned pro-German under the impact of the postwar depression, and the tool the German industrialists and government discovered to wreck reparations – inflation – made the French plight increasingly desperate."<ref>McDougall, p. 12</ref> Bell comments that from some perspectives it could be said that "the war shook the foundations of Europe to an extent that was virtually irreparable" and that "it is widely argued" that the treaty "proceeded to make the situation worse rather than better."<ref name=Bell19/> Norman Davies comments that "the foundation of the League of Nations ... must be counted as a promising achievement" however it "contained several inbuilt flaws" rendering the organization impotent as it lacked American support and "no independent instruments of enforcement" resulting in it depending of the Anglo-French military whose armed forces were limited in range and lacked planes able to "fly non-stop to Danzig and back".<ref>Davies, pp. 136-7</ref> Davies also comments that "by far the most obvious flaw in the so-called Versailles Settlement lay in the fact that the most turbulent parts of Europe lay in the East, far beyond its reach."<ref>Davies, p. 137</ref> Louise Slavicek highlights that "some critics have even accused the Allies of laying the foundations for the ethnic violence that led to the disintegration of ] in the 1990s" although she counters this accusation by noting that the problems – like those between the ] and ] - "did not originate with the Allies" or the peace settlements.<ref name=Slavicek102/> Mark Mazower highlights various arguments made against the treaty: some consider the treaty to have been ineffective and "based upon an inaccurate appraisal of the European balance of power", ignoring "the fact that the almost simultaneous collapse of Germany and Russia", and was "deprived of the means of its own defense by American withdrawal and British indifference". Other arguments, he notes, consider the treaty to be "overly ideological" that "lacked realism or understanding of the political passions which animated people in Europe". Mazower notes that it has also been argued that the "European liberals lost their enthusiasm for defending the Versailles order" and as a result did not hinder the rise of fascism in order to allow them to "take over the task of saving Europe from red revolution".<ref name=Mazower9/> He further comments that the main problem with the treaty was the lack of "will to uphold it".<ref>Mazower, p. 14</ref> This final argument is supported by Charles Dobbs and Spencer Tucker, who take the view that "it matters little whether was too harsh or too lenient" for "it was never enforced".<ref name=Tucker2005a1224/> | |||
On the other hand, Walter McDougall "argues that in a way" the treaty "was not harsh enough, or at least had not been carried out harshly enough, because it did not succeed in creating a viable balance of power and of economic potential between Germany and France."<ref>Schwabe, p. 70</ref> Niall Ferguson argues that when compared to outcome of the Second World War, the "Versailles peace was relatively lenient." He goes on to quote ] who states that the treaty was "too weak to be a 'Carthaginian peace'".<ref>Boemeke, p. 402</ref> The French historian Georges-Henri Soutou asserts it "would not have been easy" for the peacemakers "to do much better."<ref>Henig, p. 62</ref> Ruth Henig comments that "the great majority of British, German, French and American historians now generally agree that the treaty was ... 'relatively lenient'".<ref>Henig, p. 61</ref> | |||
] and the Soviet Russian delegation arrive in ] and are met by officers from the staff of Field Marshall von Hindenburg.]] | |||
Likewise, when comparing the treaty with the ], which Germany imposed on Soviet Russia in March 1918, numerous historians have noted the leniency of Versailles. Brest-Litovsk, "Germany's Carthaginian Peace terms against Russia" was "right in front of the allied statesmen at the Peace of Paris."<ref name=Truitt114/> Brest-Lotovsk, came "two months after the announcement of the Fourteen Points" and appeared "even to Wilson, to demonstrate that Germany had no right to demand or expect leniency."<ref name=Tucker2005a902/> While Versailles stripped Germany of {{convert|25,000|sqmi|km2|adj=off}} of territory and 7 million people,<ref name=Truitt114/> the German treaty "pushed Russia back to its ] frontiers" by taking {{convert|1,300,000|sqmi|km2|adj=off}} square miles of territory and 62 million people.<ref name=Tucker2005a225>Tucker (2005a), p. 225</ref> This loss equated to one third of the Russian population, 25 per cent of their territory, around a third of the country's arable land, three-quarters of its coal and iron, a third of its factories (totaling 54 per cent of the nation's industrial capacity), and a quarter of its railroads. <ref name=Truitt114/><ref name=Tucker2005a225/> Slavicek states that "the Versailles settlement appears almost mild" in comparison to Brest-Litovsk".<ref name=Slavicek77/> Truitt asserts that the treaty "was probably the most punitive peace treaty signed since ancient times."<ref name=Truitt114/> Charles Dobbs and Spence Tucker state that "it is worth remembering that the Treaty of Brest Litovsk was much harsher on the defeated power" than Versailles was on Germany.<ref name=Tucker2005a225/> Ian Bickerton states Versailles "was extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms Germany had in mind to impose on the Allies" and "when contrasted with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ... the Versailles treaty does appear very lenient."<ref>Bickerton, p. 133</ref> Fritz Fischer proposed, based off German archival sources including the ] written before the ], that Germany sought a similar peace for the whole of Europe. The September program was "an incredibly comprehensive shopping list of German war aims", in which Chancellor ] called for France "to be destroyed as a great power, Russia reduced to the dimensions reached under ], Belgium turned into a German ], Luxemburg annexed outright, French and Belgian coastal areas and ore-mining districts likewise annexed, Russia and Britain replaced by Germany as the dominant power in the ] and ], the ] states and ] brought into the German orbit, a 'Central African Colonial Empire' created as a reservoir of raw materials, and the states of Central and Eastern Europe from the ] to the ] – friend, foe, and neutral alike – gathered under the umbrella of an economic alliance dominated by Germany" while "Ottoman Turkey as well as ] Austria-Hungary, in effect, were to become German ]."<ref>Martel (1992), p. 56</ref> | |||
Ruth Henig comments that until the 1950s, the general historical consensus on the treaty was that it had been conducted by vindictive powers.<ref>Henig, p. 49</ref> For example, Kennan talks of "the vindictiveness of the British and French peace aims".<ref name=Lu5/> However, Klaus Schwabe highlights the work of ] who has attempted to revise the "cliché" of allied vindictiveness. Trachtenberg argues that the French were quite "moderate" rather than vindictive during the peace talks and "the real villain in Trachtenberg's story ... is Britain, which according to him, clung to excessive reparation demands and thereby destroyed whatever chances existed for a reasonable solution of the reparation problem."<ref>Schwabe, p. 68</ref> However, Schwabe argues that this is an oversimplified view of the situation and Trachtenberg arrived at this "somewhat one-sided conclusion" by looking at "the reparation question" in isolation.<ref>Schwabe, p. 69</ref> ], somewhat supports Trachtenberg's assertions. Stevenson argues since "the opening of the archives ... a much more detailed reconstruction of French policy" has occurred. He concludes "most commentators since the 1970s have been impressed by French moderation and defensiveness" and looks to Walter McDougall's work which asserts "Clemenceau's policy was "the best calculated to bring about a lasting settlement." However, Stevenson warns "the jury is still out, however, and there have been signs that the pendulum of judgment is swinging back the other way."<ref>Boyce, p. 11</ref> | |||
] | |||
Irrespective of whether the treaty was just or unjust, historians have highlighted that the treaty did little to weaken Germany. ] argues that, in strategic terms, due to the treaty Germany was now in a superior position than she had been in 1914. Then, Germany′s eastern frontiers faced the Russian Empire and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, both of whom in the past had balanced Germany's power. Due to the war both these empires had collapsed and in conjunction with the treaty, left Germany unrivalled. Barnett asserts that Poland was no match for Germany and in the west; France and Belgium were less economically vibrant and had smaller populations. Barnett concludes that rather than weakening Germany, the treaty instead "much enhanced" German power.<ref>Barnett, p. 316</ref> Barnett argues that Britain and France should have "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again.<ref>Barnett, p. 318</ref> By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".<ref>Barnett, p. 319</ref> Weinberg supports this attack. He comments "though weakened by the war, Germany had been weakened less than her European enemies, and she had thus emerged relatively stronger potentially in 1919 than she had been in 1913."<ref name=Weinberg15/> Weinberg further comments that "the very portion of the peace treaty that all Germans found most obnoxious, the revival of Poland" actually "protected Germany from her potentially most powerful and dangerous adversary, Russia." He continues that the various treaties created a patchwork of new nations in Central and Eastern Europe, and Germany "was now actually or potentially infinitely more powerful than any of" these countries, "and that there was practically no likelihood of those neighbors ever joining together against Germany."<ref>Weinberg, 15-6</ref> | |||
] | |||
Schmitt raises an interesting side note about the treaty. He highlights how the newly created states all had to abide by the ], however despite "all the punishment inflicted upon Germany ... the Allies did not impose a minorities treaty on Germany, although Germany was left with a considerable Polish minority."<ref name=Schmitt105/> Lu notes that despite the clauses in the treaty regarding punishing war criminals, "no real punishment was ever effected." ] highlights that while the Allied powers attempted to bring to justice war criminals, due to "the passions of the time" they failed to look inwards at themselves at "any of their own nationals accused of similar offenses by the German Government".<ref>Lu, pp. 13-4</ref> Impacting Germany throughout the peace talks was the ongoing ]. However, Marks comments it is a myth that there was a policy of "deliberate Allied starvation of countless Germans by maintaining the naval blockade." She highlights that while "Allied warships remained in place against a possible resumption of hostilities, the Allies offered food and medicine after the armistice, but Germany refused to allow its ships to carry supplies." Despite these problems, "and the efforts by more conservative leaders to persuade American emissaries to delay shipments until Germany had a stable non-socialist government, Allied food arrived in Allied ships before the charge made at Versailles."<ref name=Martle9919/> Elisabeth Glaser supports this argument. She highlights that while there was disagreement amongst the allies in regards to the blockade, from the armistice onwards the blockade of Germany and her neutral neighbors was relaxed. A task force was established to help feed the German population and by May 1919 "Germany became the chief recipient of American and Allied food shipments".<ref>Boemeke, pp. 388-90</ref> Glaser concludes that "the very success of the relief effort had in effect deprived the conference of a credible threat to induce Germany to sign" the peace treaty.<ref>Boemeke, p. 391</ref> The treaty also impacted countries other than Germany. Weinberg comments that the Versailles peace conference presented the "first internationally visible sign of one of the major results of World War I, the breakup of the European colonial empires into independent political entities. The ] ... had earned their independence and their right to participate in the proceedings on their own by their share in the fighting."<ref name=Weinberg12/> Likewise, Weinberg notes how the inclusion of the Japanese to the peace talks highlighted Japan's rise to power and European recognition to a non-European and non-neo-European power.<ref>Weinberg, p. 13</ref> | |||
[[File:Charles Joseph Doherty.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A man, looking to the right, poses for a photograph.| | |||
Charles Joseph Doherty, ], who, alongside the ] ], signed the treaty for Canada.]] | |||
In accessing the overall impact of the treaty, Albrecht-Carrie comments that "the Treaty of Versailles, like any other treaty, was an expression of the power relationship at the time of its making. Beyond that, if it was to be a positive achievement, it had to lay the bases of future reconstruction" and "it attempted to do in two ways": via disarming Germany and by creating the League of Nations. He continues, "the failure, however, cannot be laid to the Treaty of Versailles which by itself could not control the use to which these provisions were eventually put".<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 20</ref> Rather, "the whole edifice of Versailles ... created certain grievances" but also "redressed greater ones" and its failure came down to all involved parties and the failure of the League of Nations.<ref>Albrecht-Carrie, p. 20-4</ref> Detlev Peukert argues that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during the inter-war period and while not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany. Rather than it being the actual terms of the treaty that was harsh, it was the "]" forged during the war that caused "the revanchist Versailles myth".<ref name=Peukert278/> The myth being what the people thought the treaty had done to them, "the shameful diktat of Versailles", rather than the reality of what it had done. With the public outrage focused on the myth, it "blinded them to the medium-term strategic advantage which the new realities created by Versailles and the other Paris treaties had given them."<ref>Peukert, pp. 42, 45</ref> Schmitt highlights that while tradition in peace talks stated all parties should "meet on terms of equality", the allied powers were "well aware of great differences among themselves" and "fearful that if they admitted Germany to the ordinary verbal exchanges, the Germans would succeed in playing off Britain against France and both against the United States. Therefore, to protect themselves, they required that all negotiations between Germany and themselves should be in writing." This resulted in a major "psychological blunder because it enabled the Germans ever after to talk about the 'Diktat,' or the dictated peace of Versailles."<ref name=Schmitt103/> Schmitt argues it was to avoid a repeat of this, why the Allies "demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany in the Second World War". He further argues that the treaties signed at the Paris Peace Conference "would have taken a different form" had the British and French been aware that the Americans would not ratify it as "the whole settlement was based on the assumption that the United States would be a member of the League ."<ref name=Schmitt104/> Schmitt argues "had the four Allies remained united, they could have forced Germany really to disarm, and the German will and capacity to resist other provisions of the treaty would have correspondingly diminished."<ref name=Schmitt108/> Schmitt concludes that while the treaties "were not bad settlements", the peacemakers showed "irresolution, nor firmness, in dealing with the situation" and "committed many errors", which "the Germans took advantage of".<ref>Schmitt, p. 110</ref> Bell echoes Schmitt's assessment. He comments that "it was natural enough that Germans should resent" their defeat in the war and the peace treaty, but it was surprising "to which the same view took hold among the victors" resulting in "the stability of the settlement" being "undermined by both vanquished and victors alike."<ref name=Bell20/> Bell states while the following argument can be overly cynical, "the war destroyed the pre-1914 European balance , and the peace could put nothing adequate in its place." However, he notes to the contrary it was believed that the errors made "were thought to not be beyond remedy" and "it was also hoped that the instability of the Continent could be remedied, on the one hand by the resurrection of something like the nineteenth-century 'Concert of Europe', an informal grouping of the great powers to provide a guiding influence in international affairs, and on the other by the development of the League of Nations."<ref>Bell, pp. 25, 35</ref> | |||
], Berlin, against the against the 'diktat of Versailles'.]] | |||
Sally Marks comments that following the peace, the German foreign office initiated a campaign of disinformation to spread the myths of the Stab-in-the-back, war guilt, and the continuation of the Allied blockade. The aim of this campaign, which included the "publication of forty volumes of carefully selected documents", was to "refute German responsibility" with the hope that "the entire treaty would collapse." The campaign was a partial success, persuading many. Marks notes that it was not until 1961 when Fritz Fischer examined the evidence and published his findings that the view of the treaty finally changed within the historical community, but by then "the propaganda and myths had forty years to become 'fact'".<ref>Martel (1999), pp. 19-20</ref> Bell supports this point, he notes how "German historians worked hard to undermine the validity of this clause, and their claims found a ready acceptance among 'revisionist' writers in France, Britain, and the USA."<ref name=Bell21/> In regards to the enforcement of the treaty, Marks comments that "by 1925, much of the Versailles system was gone, and more followed Locarno". She notes in the 1924-25 period, enforcement of the treaty collapsed due to a lack of Allied unity to enforce the treaty via "non-military actions to compel fulfillment ... such as seizing custom receipts, taxing German exports to victors, surprise disarmament inspections, requiring German to tax to the level of the victors (as the treaty specified), or to transfer some railway profits".<ref>Martel (1999), pp. 26-7</ref> Stephen Schucker argues that "Anglo-US politicians and financiers, in forcing the 1924 Dawes settlement on France, destroyed Europe's best hope for stability" and the Locarno treaties "merely sealed this fateful development" resulting in the erosion of the balance of power and any check to "Germany's 'inevitable' revisionism."<ref>Cohrs, p. 3</ref> A.J.P. Taylor states "Locarno gave to Europe a period of peace and hope".<ref>Taylor, p. 58</ref> Marks disagrees, and sides with Schucker stating Locarno "provided no solid peace, only a fragile respite of civility" and it marked the defeat of France and "Germany's return to diplomatic equality and potential superiority." Locarno, Marks argues, saw the defeat of France attempting to enforce and maintain the Treaty of Versailles due to a "combination of its allies with the enemy and the relaxation of its own will."<ref>Martel (1999), p. 27</ref> However, Patrick O. Cohrs disagrees with the bleak assessments. He argues that Versailles had resulted in an "inherently unstable" Europe and created a Franco-German crisis. Attempting to learn from their mistakes "British and US policy makers, and their French and German counterparts," had attempted "to forge a more sustainable Euro-Atlantic international system ... to create ... a viable peace system" first in the west "and then to extend it, from a western nucleus including Germany, to the east."<ref name=Cohrs31>Cohrs, p. 31</ref> Thus Locarno resulted in Germany recognizing "the existing Franco-German status quo on the Rhine" while at the same time renouncing "a forcible revision of its eastern borders" although leaving Germany open to seek peaceful revisions.<ref>Cohrs, p. 27</ref> Likewise, France would accept the gradual return to power of Germany.<ref name=Cohrs31/> Bell notes that during the 1920s "it appeared ... that the economic and social disruption left by the war had been overcome: currencies were stabilized, industrial production reached and passed the levels of 1913, threats of revolution diminished, and the new states settled down. It was not outrageously optimistic to think that things were looking up."<ref name=Bell36/> Locarno, Cohrs argues, "offered the best prospects for Polish and Czechoslovak security, and their peaceful coexistence with Germany".<ref>Cohrs, p. 28</ref> Thus, Locarno "marked 'the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace' in post-First World War Europe."<ref name=Cohrs31/> | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
{{portal|World War I}} | {{portal|World War I}} | ||
{{wikisource|Treaty of Versailles 1919}} | {{wikisource|Treaty of Versailles 1919}} | ||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*], 1919 | |||
*] | |||
*], 1920 | |||
*]. | |||
*], 1921 | |||
*] | *] | ||
*], incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
*{{cite book|last=Andelman|first=David A.|title=A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today|publisher=J. Wiley|location=New York/London|year=2008|isbn=978-0-471-78898-0}} | |||
{{Refbegin|3}} | |||
*Bell, Origins of the Second World War | |||
* Cooper, John Milton. ''Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations'' (2010) | |||
*{{cite book|last=Demarco|first=Neil|title=The World This Century|publisher=Collins Educational| location=London|year=1987|isbn=0-00-322217-9}} | |||
* Herron, George D. (1924). ''The Defeat in the Victory''. Boston: Christopher Publishing House. xvi, , 202 p. | |||
*{{cite book|last=Macmillan|first=Margaret|title=Peacemakers|publisher=John Murray|location=London| year=2001|isbn=0-7195-5939-1}}. | |||
Also published as {{cite book|last=Macmillan|first=Margaret|title=Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World|publisher=Random House|location=New York| year=2001|isbn=0-375-76052-0}} | |||
*{{cite book|last=Markwell|first=Donald|title=John Maynard Keynes and International Relations| publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|year=2006|isbn=0-19-829236-8}} | |||
*Martel, Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered | |||
*{{cite book|author=Sharp, Alan|title=Consequences of Peace: The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919-2010|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=v0GrPAAACAAJ|year=2011|publisher=Haus Publishing|url=http://www.amazon.com/Consequences-Peace-Versailles-Settlement-Aftermath/dp/1905791747/}} | |||
* Sharp, Alan. '' The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking After the First World War, 1919-1923'' (2008) | |||
*{{cite book |last=Stevenson |first=David |authorlink=David Stevenson (WWI historian) |year=1998 |chapter=France at the Paris Peace Conference: Addressing the Dilemmas of Security |editor=Robert W. D. Boyce |editor-link=Robert Boyce |title=French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power |location=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-15039-2 |ref=harv}} | |||
*{{cite book|title=The Wreck of Reparations, being the political background of the Lausanne Agreement, 1932|last=Wheeler-Bennett|first=Sir John|authorlink=John Wheeler-Bennett|coauthors=| year=1972|publisher=H. Fertig|location=New York|isbn=}} | |||
==Further reading== | |||
*{{Citation|last=Albrecht-Carrie|first=Rene|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1940|month=March|title=Versailles Twenty Years After|journal=Political Science Quarterly|volume=Vol. 55|issue=No. 1|pages=pp.1-24|accessdate=|publisher=The Academy of Political Science|jstor=2143772|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*''The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years'', Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Gläser, editors. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1998. | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Jürgen|last1=Backhaus|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences|title=The Beginnings of Scholarly Economic Journalism: The Austrian Economist and The German Economist |publisher=Springer|year=2012|origyear=2011|isbn=978-146140078-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Anni|last1=Baker|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence|publisher=Praeger; First Edition|series=Perspectives on the Twentieth Century|year=2004|origyear=|isbn=978-027597354-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Correlli|last1=Barnett|author1-link=Correlli Barnett|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Collapse of British Power|publisher=Prometheus Books|year=1986|origyear=|isbn=978-039103-439-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Omer|last1=Bartov (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Eric D.|last2=Weitz (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands|publisher=Indiana University Press|year=2013|origyear=|isbn=978-025300635-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=P.M.H.|last1=Bell|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (2nd Edition)|publisher=Pearson|year=1997|origyear=1986|isbn=978-058230-470-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Steven|last1=Beller|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Cambridge Concise Histories|title=A Concise History of Austria |publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2007|origyear=|isbn=978-052147-886-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Ernest Alfred|last1=Benians (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Sir James|last2=Carrington (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Cambridge History of the British Empire Volume 3, The Empire Commonwealth 1870-1919 (volume 3)|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1959|origyear=|isbn=978-052104-512-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Richard|last1=Bessel|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Germany After the First World War|publisher=Oxford University Press, USA|year=|origyear=|isbn=978-019821-938-5|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Ian|last1=Bickerton|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Illusion of Victory: The True Costs of War|publisher=Melbourne University|year=2011|origyear=|isbn=978-052285-615-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Binkley|first=Robert C.|author1-link=|coauthors=Mahr, Dr. A. C.|year=1926|month=June|title=A New Interpretation of the "Responsibility" Clause in the Versailles Treaty|journal=Current History|volume=Vol. 24|issue=3|pages=pp. 398-400|accessdate=|publisher=Periodicals Archive Online|jstor=|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Manfred F.|last1=Boemeke (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Gerald D.|last2=Feldman (Editor)|first3=Elisabeth|last3=Glaser (Editor)|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Publications of the German Historical Institute|title=Versailes: A Reassessment after 75 Years|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1998|origyear=|isbn=978-052162-132-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=|last1=|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Boyce|editor-first=Robert|editor-link=|series=Routledge Studies in Modern European History|title=French Foreign and Defence Policy 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power|publisher=Routledge|year=1998|origyear=|isbn=978-041515-039-2 |lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Paul S.|last1=Boyer|author1-link=Paul Boyer (historian)|first2=Clifford E.|last2=Clark|first3=Sandra|last3=Hawley|first4=Joseph.F|last4=Kett|first5=Andrew|last5=Rieser|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People, Volume 2: From 1865|publisher=Cengage Learning|year=2009|origyear=|isbn=978-054722-278-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Corona|last1=Brezina|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Primary Sources of American Treaties|title=The Treaty of Versailles, 1919:: A Primary Source Examination of the Treaty That Ended World War I |publisher=Rosen Central|year=2006|origyear=|isbn=978-140420-442-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Michael E.|last1=Brown (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Sean M.|last2=Lynn-Jones (Editor)|first3=Steve E.|last3=Miller (Editor)|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Debating the Democratic Peace|publisher=The MIT Press|year=1996|origyear=|isbn=978-026252-213-7 |lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Keith|last1=Bullivant (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Geoffrey|last2=Giles (Editor)|first3=Walter|last3=Pape (Editor)|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Yearbook of European Sutdies|title=Germany and Eastern Europe: Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences|publisher=Rodopi Bv Editions|year=1999|origyear=|isbn=978-904200688-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Campbell|first=Claude A.|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1942|month=Jan|title=Economic Errors of the Treaty of Versailles|journal=Southwestern Social Science Quarterly|volume=|issue=23|pages=160-165|accessdate=17/5/2013|publisher=Periodicals Archive Online|jstor=|doi=|issn=|url=http://libezproxy.open.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/docview/1291566833?accountid=14697}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Antonio|last1=Cassese|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures|title=Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1999|origyear=|isbn=978-052163-752-7|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Elizabeth|last1=Cobbs-Hoffman (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Edward J.|last2=Blum (Editor)|first3=Jon|last3=Gjerde (Editor)|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Major Problems in American History Series|title=Major Problems in American History, Volume II: Since 1865|publisher=Cengage Learning; 3rd edition|year=2011|origyear=|isbn=978-111134-316-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Cohrs|first=Patrick O.|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=2003|month=February|title=The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925|journal=Contemporary European History|volume=Vol. 12|issue=No. 1|pages=pp. 1-31|publisher=Cambridge University Press|jstor=20081138|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Robert|last1=Cord|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Reinterpreting the Keynesian revolution|publisher=Routledge|year=2013|origyear=|isbn=978-0-203-07752-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Gordon|last1=Corrigan|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Second World War: A Military History|publisher=Thomas Dunne Books|year=2011|origyear=|isbn=031-257709-5|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Gordon Alexander|last1=Craig (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Felix|last2=Gilbert (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Diplomats 1919-1939|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1994|origyear=1953|isbn=978-069103660-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Norman|last1=Davies|author1-link=Norman Davies|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory |publisher=Pan Books|year=2007|origyear=|isbn=978-033035-212-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Richard K.|last1=Debo|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921|publisher=Mcgill Queens University Press, First Edition|year=1992|origyear=|isbn=978-077350828-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=John V.|last1=Denson|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Reassessing the Presidency: The Rise of the Executive State and the Decline of Freedom|publisher=Mises Institute|year=2001|origyear=|isbn=978-094546-629-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Duff|first=John B.|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=|month=|title=The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans|journal=The Journal of American History|volume=Vol. 55|issue=No. 3|pages=pp.582-598|accessdate=|publisher=Organization of American Historians|jstor=1891015|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Bruce A.|last1=Elleman|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1927|publisher=M E Sharpe Inc|year=1997|origyear=|isbn=978-076560142-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Richard J.|last1=Evans|author1-link=Richard J. Evans|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=In Hitler's Shadow|publisher=Pantheon; 1St Edition edition|year=1989|origyear=|isbn=978-067972-348-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Xenia Joukoff|last1=Fisher|author1-link=|first2=Harold H.|last2=Eudin|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: a documentary survey|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=1957|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=|last1=|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Frucht|editor-first=Richard|editor-link=|series=|title=Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture |publisher=ABC-CLIO|year=2004|origyear=|isbn=978-157607-800-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=David J.|last1=Goldberg|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=The American Moment|title=Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|year=1999|origyear=|isbn=978-080186-005-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Citation|last1=Hantke|first1=Max|last2=Spoerer|first2=Mark|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=2010|month=|title=The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924-9|journal=The Economic History Review|volume=63|issue=4|pages=pp. 849-864|accessdate=|publisher=The Economic History Review|jstor=|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Gerd|last1=Hardach|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The First World War, 1914-1918 |publisher=Penguin|year=1987|origyear=|isbn=978-014022-679-9|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Cite book|first1=Ruth|last1=Henig|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Versailles and After: 1919-1933|publisher=Routledge|year=1995|origyear=1984|isbn=0-415-12710-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Adolf|last1=Hitler|author1-link=Adolf Hitler|first2=James|last2=Murphy (Translator)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Mein Kampf|publisher=Hurst and Blackett|year=1939|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Charles|last1=Ingrao (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Franz A.J.|last2=Szabo (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Germans and the East|publisher=Purdue University Press|year=2007|origyear=|isbn=978-155753-443-9|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Srivastava|last1=Joshi|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=International Relations|publisher=GOEL Publishing House|year=2005|origyear=1978|isbn=81 85842701|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{cite book|last=Keylor|first=William R.|title=The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919.|year=1998|publisher=Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin|isbn=0-669-41711-4}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=John Maynard|last1=Keynes|author1-link=John Maynard Keynes|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Economic Consequences of the Peace|publisher=Harcourt Brace and Howe|year=1920|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Cite book|first1=H.W.|last1=Koch (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Aspects of the Third Reich|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=1985|origyear=|isbn=978-033335-273-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Raphael|last1=Lemkin|author1-link=|first2=William A.|last2=Schabas|first3=Samantha|last3=Power|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Foundations of the Laws of War|title=Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress|publisher=The Lawbook Exchange, Lrd 2 edition|year=2008|origyear=|isbn=978-158477-901-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Lentin|first=Antony|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1992|month=Dec|title=Trick or Treat? The Anglo-French Alliance, 1919|journal=|volume=Vol. 42|issue=|pages=28-32|accessdate=5/28/2013|publisher=History Today|jstor=|doi=|issn=|url=http://libezproxy.open.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/docview/1299048769?accountid=14697}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Lentin|first=Antony|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=2012|month=Jan|title=Germany: a New Carthage?|journal=|volume=|issue=|pages=20-27|accessdate=5/28/2013|publisher=History Today|jstor=|doi=|issn=|url=http://libezproxy.open.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=70292413&site=ehost-live&scope=site}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Clifford R.|last1=Lovin|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=A School for Diplomats: the Paris Peace Conference of 1919|publisher=University Press Of America |year=1997|origyear=|isbn=978-076180-755-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Lu|first=Catherine|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=2002|month=Autumn|title=Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles|journal=International Studies Review|volume=Vol. 4|issue=No. 3|pages=pp. 3-25|publisher=Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association|jstor=3186461|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Marks|first=Sally|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1978|month=September|title=The Myth of Reparations|journal=Central European History|volume=Vol. 11|issue=No. 3|pages=pp.231-255|publisher=Cambridge University Press|jstor=4545835|doi=|issn=}} | |||
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*{{Citation|last=Mazower|first=Mark|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1999|month=July|title=Two Cheers for Versailles|journal=History Today|volume=|issue=|pages=|accessdate=5/28/2013|publisher=History Today|jstor=|doi=|issn=|url=http://www.historytoday.com/mark-mazower/two-cheers-versailles}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=McDougall|first=Walter A.|author1-link=Walter A. McDougall|coauthors=|year=1979|month=Mar|title=Political Economy versus National Sovereignty: French Structures for German Economic Integration after Versailles|journal=The Journal of Modern History|volume=Vol. 51|issue=No. 1|pages=4-23|accessdate=|publisher=The University of Chicago Press|jstor=1877866|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Tim|last1=McNeese|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Jensen|editor-first=Richard|editor-link=Richard L. Jensen|series=Discovering U.S. History|title=World War II 1939-1945|publisher=Chelsea House Publications; 1 edition|year=2010|origyear=|isbn=978-160413-358-5|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Hans|last1=Mommsen|author1-link=|first2=Elborg|last2=Foster|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy|publisher=The University of North Crolina Press|year=1988|origyear=|isbn=978-080784721-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Cite book|first1=Stephen C.|last1=Neff|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=War and the Law of Nations: A General History|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2005|origyear=|isbn=978-052166-205-5|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Keith L.|last1=Nelson|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Victors divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923|publisher=University of California Press|year=1975|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Edmund Jan|last1=Osmańczyk|author1-link=Edmund Osmańczyk|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Mango|editor-first=Anthony|editor-link=|series=|title=Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, Vol. 1, A-F|publisher=Routledge; 3rd edition|year=2003|origyear=|isbn=978-041593-921-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Margaret|last1=Pawley|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Watch on the Rhine: The Military Occupation of the Rhineland|publisher=I.B. Tauris|year=2008|origyear=|isbn=978-184511457-2|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Cite book|first1=Detlev J.K.|last1=Peukert|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Weimar Republic|publisher=Hill and Wang|year=1993|origyear=|isbn=978-080901-556-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=David J.|last1=Phillips|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=On This Day: Volume One|publisher=iUniverse|year=2007|origyear=|isbn= 978-059546-288-9|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Jim|last1=Powell|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Wilson's War: How Woodrow Wilson's Great Blunder Led to Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and World War II |publisher=Crown Forum|year=2005|origyear=|isbn=978-140008-236-0|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Norrin M.|last1=Ripsman|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements|publisher=Pennsylvania State University Press|year=2004|origyear=|isbn=978-027102-398-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
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*{{Cite book|first1=Frank M.|last1=Russell|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Saar: Battleground and Pawn|publisher=Stanford University Press, First Edition|year=1951|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Raffael|last1=Scheck|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Germany, 1871-1945: A Concise History|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic, First Edition|year=2008|origyear=|isbn=978-184520817-2|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Schmitt|first=Bernadotte|author1-link=Bernadotte Everly Schmitt|coauthors=|year=1960|month=Feb|title=The Peace Treaties of 1919-1920|journal=Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society|volume=Vol. 104|issue=No. 1|pages=pp. 101-110|accessdate=|publisher=American Philosophical Society|jstor=985606|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=David F.|last1=Schmitz|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations|title=The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941|publisher=Potomac Books Inc|year=|origyear=|isbn=978-161234313-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Schwabe|first=Klaus|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1979|month=March|title=Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference, and Political Economy versus National Sovereignty: Comment on Trachtenberg and McDougall|journal=The Journal of Modern History|volume=Vol. 51|issue=No. 1|pages=pp. 68-73|publisher=The University of Chicago Press|jstor=1877870|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Richard|last1=Shuster|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Strategy and History|title=German Disarmament After World War I: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 1912-1931|publisher=Routledge|year=2006|origyear=|isbn=978-041535808-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Peter|last1=Simkins|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The First World War: Volume 3 The Western Front 1917-1918|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2002|origyear=|isbn=978-184176-348-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Peter|last1=Simkins|author1-link=|first2=Geoffrey|last2=Jukes|first3=Michael|last3=Hickey|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The First World War: The War to End All Wars|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2003|origyear=|isbn=978-184176-738-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Louise Chipley|last1=Slavicek|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Milestones in Modern World History|title=The Treaty of Versailles|publisher=Chelsea House Publications|year=2010|origyear=|isbn=978-160413-277-9|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=George E.|last1=Stanley|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=A Primary Source History of the United States|title=An Emerging World Power: 1900-1929|publisher=Gareth Stevens Publishing|year=2005|origyear=|isbn=978-083685-837-2|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Barry H.|last1=Steiner|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Suny Series in Global Politics|title=Collective Preventive Diplomacy: A Study in International Conflict Management|publisher=State University of New York Press|year=2007|origyear=|isbn=978-079145988-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=|last1=|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Stilwell|editor-first=Alexander|editor-link=|series=Essential Histories Specials|title=The Second World War: A World in Flames|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2004|origyear=|isbn=978-184176-830-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=A.J.P.|last1=Taylor|author1-link=A.J.P. Taylor|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Origins of the Second World War|publisher=|year=1996|origyear=1961|isbn=978-068482-947-0|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Philipp|last1=Ther (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Ana|last2=Siljak (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series|title=Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|year=2001|origyear=|isbn=978-074251094-4|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Adam|last1=Tooze|author1-link=Adam Tooze|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy|publisher=Penguin Books|year=2007|origyear=2006|isbn=978-014100348-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Samuel|last1=Totten (Editor)|author1-link=|first2=Robert K.|last2=Hitchcock (Editor)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Genocide of Indigenous Peoples: A Critical Bibliographic Review|publisher=Transaction Publishers|year=2010|origyear=|isbn=978-141281-495-9|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Citation|last=Trachtenberg|first=Marc|author1-link=|coauthors=|year=1982|month=July|title=Versailles after Sixty Years|journal=Journal of Contemporary History|volume=Vol. 17|issue=No. 3|pages=pp. 487-506|publisher=Sage Publications Ltd|jstor=260557|doi=|issn=}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Wesley B.|last1=Truitt|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Power and Policy: Lessons for Leaders in Government and Business|publisher=Praeger|year=2010|origyear=|isbn=978-031338-240-6|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=|last1=|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=Tucker|editor-first=Spencer C.|editor-link= Spencer C. Tucker |series=Garland Reference Library of the Humanities|title=European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia|publisher=Routledge|year=1999|origyear=1996|isbn=978-081533-351-7|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Spencer C.|last1=Tucker|author1-link= |first2=Priscilla|last2=Roberts|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=The Encyclopedia of World War I : A Political, Social, and Military History |publisher=ABC=CLIO|year=2005a|origyear=|isbn=978-185109-420-2|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=A.J.P.|last1=Taylor|author1-link=A. J. P. Taylor|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Origins of the Second World War|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=2005|origyear=1961|isbn=978-0-684-82947-0|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Spencer C.|last1=Tucker|author1-link= |first2=Priscilla|last2=Roberts|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=World War I: A Student Encyclopedia|publisher=ABC=CLIO|year=2005b|origyear=|isbn=978-185109-879-8|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=|last1=|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last= Venzon|editor-first=Anne Cipriano|editor-link=|series=Military History of the United States |title=The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia|publisher=Routledge|year=1999|origyear=|isbn= 978-081533-353-1|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Sarah|last1=Wambaugh|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=A monograph on plebiscites|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1920|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Gerhard L.|last1=Weinberg|author1-link=Gerhard Weinberg|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II |publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1994|origyear=|isbn=0-52144-317-2|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Woodrow|last1=Wilson|author1-link=Woodrow Wilson|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Addresses of President Wilson|publisher=Washington Government Printing Office|year=1919|origyear=|isbn=|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Alex|last1=Woolf|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Questioning History|title=Nazi Germany|publisher=Smart Apple Media|year=2004|origyear=|isbn=978-158340-442-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Peter J.|last1=Yearwood|author1-link=|first2=|last2=|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=|title=Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914-1925|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2009|origyear=|isbn=978-019922-673-3|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
*{{Cite book|first1=Steven|last1=Zaloga|author1-link=Steven Zaloga|first2=Howard|last2=Gerrard (Illustrator)|first3=|last3=|first4=|last4=|editor-last=|editor-first=|editor-link=|series=Campaign|title=Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2002|origyear=|isbn=978-184176408-5|lastauthoramp=y}} | |||
{{Refend}} | |||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||
{{Commons category|Treaty of Versailles}} | {{Commons category|Treaty of Versailles}} | ||
* | |||
*{{cite web |url=http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0441912/|title=My 1919|last1=Huang|first1=Jian-zhong|date=1999 |website=Internet Movie Database|publisher=|accessdate=7/9/2013}} A modern Chinese movie about the Treaty of Versailles. The Synopsis reads "To the Chinese, the Conference at Versailles was more of an insult at their dignity and sovereignty than a celebration of peace." | |||
* | |||
*{{cite web |url=http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-23.html|title=Treaty of Versailles 1919 (including Covenant of the League of Nations) |last1=Museum of Australian Democracy|first1=|date= |website= |publisher=|accessdate=7/9/2013}} A description of the treaty and photographs of the documents. | |||
* | |||
*{{cite web |url= http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1925/chamberlain-facts.html|title= The Nobel Peace Prize 1925, joint winner Austen Chamberlain |accessdate=7/9/2013|author=Nobelprize.org|}} | |||
* Shapell Manuscript Foundation | |||
*{{cite web |url= http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1926/briand-facts.html|title= The Nobel Peace Prize 1926, joint winner Aristide Briand |accessdate=7/9/2013|author=Nobelprize.org|}} | |||
* | |||
*{{cite web |url= http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1926/stresemann-facts.html|title= The Nobel Peace Prize 1926, joint winner Gustav Stresemann |accessdate=7/9/2013|author=Nobelprize.org|}} | |||
* (Review of Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge, UK: German History Institute, Washington, and Cambridge University Press, 1998), ''Strategic Studies'' 9:2 (Spring 2000), 191–205 | |||
* at omniatlas.com | |||
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Revision as of 04:26, 4 October 2013
This article is about the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, at the end of World War I. For other uses, see Treaty of Versailles (disambiguation).
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany | |
---|---|
Cover of the English version | |
Signed | 28 June 1919 |
Location | Palace of Versailles, Versailles, France |
Effective | 10 January 1920 |
Condition | Ratification by Germany and three Principal Allied Powers. |
Signatories | Central Powers German Reich Allied Powers
|
Depositary | French Government |
Languages | French, English |
Full text | |
Treaty of Versailles at Wikisource |
The Treaty of Versailles (French: Traité de Versailles) was one of the peace treaties at the end of World War I. It ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. It was signed on 28 June 1919, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The other Central Powers on the German side of World War I were dealt with in separate treaties. Although the armistice, signed on 11 November 1918, ended the actual fighting, it took six months of negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. The treaty was registered by the Secretariat of the League of Nations on 21 October 1919, and was printed in The League of Nations Treaty Series.
Of the many provisions in the treaty, one of the most important and controversial required "Germany accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war (the other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles). This article, Article 231, later became known as the War Guilt clause. The treaty forced Germany to disarm, make substantial territorial concessions, and pay reparations to certain countries that had formed the Entente powers. It liberated numerous nationalities in Central Europe from oppressive German rule. In 1921 the total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion Marks (then $31.4 billion or £6.6 billion, roughly equivalent to US $442 billion or UK £284 billion in 2025). At the time economists, notably John Maynard Keynes predicted that the treaty was too harsh—a "Carthaginian peace", and said the figure was excessive and counterproductive. However, many historians have judged the reparation figure to be lenient, a sum that was designed to look imposing but was in fact not, that had little impact on the German economy and analyzed the treaty as a whole to be quite restrained and not as harsh as it could have been.
The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left none contented: Germany was not pacified or conciliated, nor permanently weakened. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to the Locarno Treaties, which improved relations between Germany and the other European Powers, and the renegotiation of the reparation system resulting in the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and finally the postponement of reparations at the Lausanne Conference of 1932. The reparations were finally paid off by Germany after World War II.
Negotiations
Negotiations between the Allied powers started on 18 January in the Salle de l'Horloge at the French Foreign Ministry, on the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. Initially, 70 delegates of 27 nations participated in the negotiations. Having been defeated, Germany, Austria, and Hungary were excluded from the negotiations. Russia was also excluded because it had negotiated a separate peace with Germany in 1918, in which Germany gained a large fraction of Russia's land and resources. The treaty's terms were extremely harsh, as the negotiators at Versailles later pointed out.
Until March 1919, the most important role for negotiating the extremely complex and difficult terms of the peace fell to the regular meetings of the "Council of Ten", which comprised the heads of government and foreign ministers of the five major victors (the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan). As this unusual body proved too unwieldy and formal for effective decision-making, Japan and—for most of the remaining conference—the foreign ministers left the main meetings, so that only the "Big Four" remained. After his territorial claims to Fiume (today Rijeka) were rejected, Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Orlando left the negotiations and only returned to sign in June.
The final conditions were determined by the leaders of the "Big Three" nations: British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, and American President Woodrow Wilson. Even with this smaller group it was difficult to decide on a common position because their aims conflicted with one another.
French aims
As the only major allied power sharing a land border with Germany, France was chiefly concerned with weakening Germany as much as possible. The French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau described France's position best by telling Wilson: “America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not even Napoleon himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not.” Clemenceau wished to bring the French border to the Rhine or to create a buffer state in Rhineland but this demand was not met by the treaty. Instead France obtained the demilitarization of the Rhineland, a mandate over the Saar and promises of Anglo-American support in case of a new German aggression, but the United States did not ratify the treaty.
Keynes argued,
So far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be remedied for generations.
France, which suffered much damage and the heaviest human losses among allies, was adamant on the payment of reparations. The failure of the Weimar Republic to pay reparations led to the Occupation of the Ruhr by French and Belgian forces.
British aims
Further information: Heavenly Twins (Sumner and Cunliffe)Britain had suffered little land devastation during the war and Prime Minister David Lloyd George supported reparations to a lesser extent than the French. Britain began to look on a restored Germany as an important trading partner and worried about the effect of reparations on the British economy.
American aims
Main article: Fourteen PointsBefore the end of the war, President Woodrow Wilson put forward his Fourteen Points, which represented the liberal position at the Conference and helped shape world opinion. Wilson was concerned with rebuilding the European economy, encouraging self-determination, promoting free trade, creating appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, creating a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace. He opposed harsh treatment of Germany but was outmaneuvered by Britain and France, He brought along top intellectuals as advisors, but his refusal to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation made his efforts partisan and risked political defeat at home.
Content
Impositions on Germany
Penalties
- Article 227 charges the former German Emperor, Wilhelm II, with "supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties", and that Allied and Associated Powers would "request ... the Government of the Netherlands surrender to them of the ex- Emperor in order that he may be put on trial."
- Articles 228–230 of treaty note the right of the "Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals" people believe to have committed war crimes and compelled Germany to "furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility." The treaty also ensured that in all cases, the accused would have the right to choose their own consul.
- Article 231 (the so-called "War Guilt Clause") stated Germany accepted responsibility for "all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." Similar wording was used in the treaties signed by the other Central Powers, having them accept responsibility for the damage they and their allies caused.
Occupation of the Rhineland
As a guarantee of compliance by Germany, Part XIV of the Treaty provided that the Rhineland would be occupied by Allied troops for a period of 15 years.
Military restrictions
Part V of the treaty begins with the preamble, "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
- German armed forces will number no more than 100,000 troops, and conscription will be abolished.
- Enlisted men will be retained for at least 12 years; officers to be retained for at least 25 years.
- German naval forces will be limited to 15,000 men, six battleships (no more than 10,000 tons displacement each), six cruisers (no more than 6,000 tons displacement each), 12 destroyers (no more than 800 tons displacement each) and 12 torpedo boats (no more than 200 tons displacement each). No submarines are to be included.
- The import and export of weapons is prohibited.
- Poison gas, armed aircraft, tanks and armoured cars are prohibited.
- Blockades on ships are prohibited.
- Restrictions on the manufacture of machine guns (e.g. the Maxim machine gun) and rifles (e.g. Gewehr 98 rifles).
- German armed forces were prohibited from entering or fortifying any part of German territory west of the Rhine or within 50 kilometres east of the Rhine.
Territorial changes
Germany′s borders in 1919 had been established nearly 50 years earlier, at the country′s official establishment in 1871. Territory and cities in the region had changed hands repeatedly for centuries, including at various times being owned by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Poland, and Kingdom of Lithuania. However, Germany laid claim to lands and cities that it viewed as historically "Germanic" centuries before Germany′s establishment as a country in 1871. Other countries disputed Germany′s claim to this territory. In the peace treaty, Germany agreed to return disputed lands and cities to various countries.
Germany was compelled to yield control of its colonies, and would also lose a number of European territories. Most of the province of West Prussia would be ceded to the restored Poland, thereby granting it access to the Baltic Sea via the "Polish Corridor" which Prussia had annexed in the Partitions of Poland. This turned East Prussia into an exclave, separated from mainland Germany.
- Alsace and much of Lorraine—both originally German-speaking territories—were part of France, having been annexed by France′s King Louis XIV, who desired the Rhine as a "natural border". After approximately 200 years of French rule, Alsace and the German-speaking part of Lorraine were ceded to Germany in 1871 under the Treaty of Frankfurt. In 1919, both regions were returned to France.
- Northern Schleswig was returned to Denmark following a plebiscite on February 14, 1920 (area 3,984 km (1,538 sq mi), 163,600 inhabitants (1920)). Central Schleswig, including the city of Flensburg, opted to remain German in a separate referendum on 14 March 1920.
- Most of the Prussian provinces of Province of Posen (now Poznan) and of West Prussia which Prussia had annexed in the Partitions of Poland (1772–1795) were ceded to Poland (area 53,800 km (20,800 sq mi), 4,224,000 inhabitants (1931)) without a plebiscite. Most of the Province of Posen had already come under Polish control during the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918–1919.
- The Hultschin area of Upper Silesia was transferred to Czechoslovakia (area 316 km (122 sq mi) or 333 km (129 sq mi), 49,000 inhabitants) without a plebiscite.
- The eastern part of Upper Silesia was assigned to Poland, as in the Upper Silesia plebiscite inhabitants of about 45% of communities voted for this (with general results of 717,122 votes being cast for Germany and 483,514 for Poland).
- The area of Eupen-Malmedy was given to Belgium. An opportunity was given to the population to "protest" against the transfer by signing a register, which gathered few signatures. The Vennbahn railway was also transferred to Belgium.
- The area of Soldau in East Prussia, an important railway junction on the Warsaw–Danzig route, was transferred to Poland without a plebiscite (area 492 km (190 sq mi)).
- The northern part of East Prussia known as the "Memelland" or Memel Territory was placed under the control of France and was later annexed by Lithuania.
- From the eastern part of West Prussia and the southern part of East Prussia, after the East Prussian plebiscite a small area was ceded to Poland.
- The Territory of the Saar Basin was to be under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years, after which a plebiscite between France and Germany was to decide to which country it would belong. During this time, coal would be sent to France. The region was then called the Saargebiet (German: "Saar Area") and was formed from southern parts of the German Rhine Province and western parts of the Bavarian Palatinate under the "Saar statute" of the Versailles Treaty of 28. 6. 1919 (Article 45–50).
- The strategically important port of Danzig with the delta of the Vistula River on the Baltic Sea was separated from Germany as the Freie Stadt Danzig (Free City of Danzig).
- Austria (see the Republic of German Austria) was forbidden from integrating with/into Germany.
- In article 22, German colonies were made trusteeships under the control of Belgium, Great Britain, and certain British Dominions, France, and Japan.
- In Africa, Britain and France divided German Kamerun (Cameroons) and Togoland. Belgium gained Ruanda-Urundi in northwestern German East Africa, Britain obtained by far the greater landmass of this colony, thus gaining the "missing link" in the chain of British possessions stretching from South Africa to Egypt (Cape to Cairo), Portugal received the Kionga Triangle, a sliver of German East Africa. German South West Africa was mandated to the Union of South Africa.
- In the Pacific, Japan gained Germany’s islands north of the equator (the Marshall Islands, the Carolines, the Marianas, the Palau Islands) and Kiautschou in China. German Samoa was assigned to New Zealand; German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Nauru to Australia as mandatory.
Shandong problem
Main article: Shandong ProblemArticle 156 of the treaty transferred German concessions in Shandong, China, to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations and a cultural movement known as the May Fourth Movement and influenced China not to sign the treaty. China declared the end of its war against Germany in September 1919 and signed a separate treaty with Germany in 1921.
Reparations
Main article: World War I reparationsArticle 232 of the treaty noted Germany would pay "compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency". Article 233 notes that the level of compensation to be paid would "be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission". The total sum of war reparations demanded from Germany—around 226 billion Marks (ℳ)—was decided by an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission.
In January 1921, the total sum due was decided by an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission and was set at 132 billion gold marks. This figure was divided into three categories. The A Bonds amounted to 12 billion gold marks and the B bonds a further 38 billion marks, which equated to around 12.5 billion dollars "an amount smaller than what Germany had recently offered to pay" Class C bonds amounted for the remaining two-thirds of the total figure and were deliberately designed to be chimerical". "Their primary function was to mislead public opinion in the receiver countries into believing that the 132-billion mark figure was being maintained." Therefore, the sum Class C bonds "amounted to indefinite postponement". Germany was only obliged to pay the Class A and B bonds. The actual total payout from 1920 to 1931 (when payments were suspended indefinitely) was 20 billion German gold marks, worth about 5 billion US dollars or one billion British pounds. Of this amount, 12.5 billion was cash that came mostly from loans from New York bankers. The rest was goods like coal and chemicals, or from assets like railway equipment. The total amount of reparations was fixed in 1921 on the basis of the German capacity to pay, not on the basis of Allied claims. The highly publicized rhetoric of 1919 about paying for all the damages and all the veterans' benefits was irrelevant to the total, but it did affect how the recipients spent their share. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were also supposed to pay some reparations but they were so impoverished that they in fact paid very little. Germany was the only country rich enough to pay anything; it owed reparations chiefly to France, Britain, Italy and Belgium; the US received $100 million. Historian Stephen Shucker notes how the overall payment amounts to "a unilateral transfer equal to a startling 5.3 percent of German national income for 1919-31."
In 1932, due to international agreement at the Lausanne Conference Germany stopped paying reparations. In 2010, Germany finished paying off loans that had been taken out during the 1920s to aid in making reparation payments.
The creation of international organizations
Part I of the treaty was the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for the creation of the League of Nations, an organization intended to arbitrate international disputes and thereby avoid future wars. Part XIII organized the establishment of the International Labour Organization, to promote "the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the prevention of unemployment; the provision of an adequate living wage; the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provision for old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own; recognition of the principle of freedom of association; the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures" Further international commissions were to be set up, according to Part XII, to administer control over the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen (Russstrom-Memel-Niemen) and the Danube rivers.
Other
This section needs expansion with: more specific provisions. You can help by making an edit requestadding to it . (April 2012) |
The Treaty contained many other provisions (economic issues, transportation, etc.). One of the provisions was the following:
- Article 246 states "Within six months ... Germany will restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II." and that "Germany will hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany.
Reactions
Among the allies
Britain
British officials at the conference declared French policy to be "greedy" and vindictive, with Ramsay MacDonald later announcing, after Hitler's re-militarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, that he was "pleased" that the Treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".
France
France signed the Treaty and was active in the League. Clemenceau had failed to achieve all of the demands of the French people, and he was voted out of office in the elections of January 1920. French Marshal Ferdinand Foch—who felt the restrictions on Germany were too lenient—declared (quite accurately), "This is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years."
United States
After the Versailles conference Wilson claimed that "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!"
The Republican Party—led by Henry Cabot Lodge—controlled the U.S. Senate after the election of 1918, but the Senators were divided into multiple positions on the Versailles question. It proved possible to build a majority coalition, but impossible to build a two-thirds coalition that was needed to pass a treaty.
An angry bloc of 12–18 "Irreconcilables", mostly Republicans but also representatives of the Irish and German Democrats, fiercely opposed the Treaty. One block of Democrats strongly supported the Versailles Treaty, even with reservations added by Lodge. A second group of Democrats supported the Treaty but followed Wilson in opposing any amendments or reservations. The largest bloc—led by Senator Lodge— comprised a majority of the Republicans. They wanted a treaty with reservations, especially on Article X, which involved the power of the League of Nations to make war without a vote by the U.S. Congress. All of the Irreconcilables were bitter enemies of President Wilson, and he launched a nationwide speaking tour in the summer of 1919 to refute them. However, Wilson collapsed midway with a serious stroke that effectively ruined his leadership skills.
The closest the Treaty came to passage was on November 19, 1919, as Lodge and his Republicans formed a coalition with the pro-Treaty Democrats, and were close to a two-thirds majority for a Treaty with reservations, but Wilson rejected this compromise and enough Democrats followed his lead to permanently end the chances for ratification.
Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the German Americans were intensely opposed to the Treaty, saying it favored the British.
After Wilson's successor Warren G. Harding continued American opposition to the League of Nations, Congress passed the Knox–Porter Resolution bringing a formal end to hostilities between the U.S. and the Central Powers. It was signed into law by Harding on July 21, 1921.
The U.S.–German Peace Treaty of 1921 was signed in Berlin on 25 August 1921, the US–Austrian Peace Treaty of 1921 was signed in Vienna on 24 August 1921, and the US–Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1921 was signed in Budapest on 29 August 1921.
House's views
Wilson's former friend Edward Mandell House, present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919:
I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris.
In Germany
See also: Stab-in-the-back legendOn April 29, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived in Versailles. On May 7, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "War Guilt Clause", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We know the full brunt of hate that confronts us here. You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie." Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour", soon afterward withdrawing from the proceedings of peace conference.
Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty—particularly the provision that blamed Germany for starting the war—as an insult to the nation's honor. They referred to the treaty as "the Diktat" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Germany′s first democratically elected Chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann, resigned rather than sign the treaty. In a passionate speech before the National Assembly on March 21, 1919, he called the treaty a "murderous plan" and exclaimed,
Which hand, trying to put us in chains like these, would not wither? The treaty is unacceptable.
After Scheidemann′s resignation, a new coalition government was formed under Gustav Bauer. President Friedrich Ebert knew that Germany was in an impossible position. As detested as the treaty was, he feared that the government was not in a position to reject it. With this in mind, he asked Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies decided to renew hostilities, which he believed would be very likely if Germany refused to sign. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff, Wilhelm Groener—concluded the army′s position was untenable. However, rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener cable the army′s recommendation to the government. Upon receiving this, the new government recommended signing the treaty. The National Assembly voted in favour of signing the treaty by 237 to 138, with five abstentions. Foreign minister Hermann Müller and colonial minister Johannes Bell traveled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on June 28, 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on July 9 by a vote of 209 to 116.
Conservatives, nationalists and ex-military leaders condemned the peace and democratic Weimar politicians, socialists, communists, and Jews were viewed by them with suspicion, due to their supposed extra-national loyalties. It was rumored that the Jews had not supported the war and had played a role in selling out Germany to its enemies. Those who seemed to benefit from a weakened Germany, and the newly formed Weimar Republic, were regarded as having "stabbed Germany in the back" on the home front, by either opposing German nationalism, instigating unrest and strikes in the critical military industries or profiteering. These theories were given credence by the fact that when Germany surrendered in November 1918, its armies were still on French and Belgian territory. Furthermore, on the Eastern Front, Germany had already won the war against Russia and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In the West, Germany had seemed to have come close to winning the war with the Spring Offensive earlier in 1918. Its failure was blamed on strikes in the arms industry at a critical moment of the offensive, leaving soldiers with an inadequate supply of materiel. The strikes were regarded by nationalists as having been instigated by traitors, with the Jews taking most of the blame.
Violations
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The German economy was so weak that only a small percentage of reparations was paid in hard currency. Nonetheless, even the payment of this small percentage of the original reparations (132 billion gold marks) still placed a significant burden on the German economy. Although the causes of the devastating post-war hyperinflation are complex and disputed, Germans blamed the near-collapse of their economy on the Treaty, and some economists estimated that the reparations accounted for as much as one-third of the hyper-inflation.
In March 1921, French and Belgian troops occupied Duisburg, which formed part of the demilitarized Rhineland, according to the Treaty of Versailles. In January 1923, French and Belgian forces occupied the rest of the Ruhr area as a reprisal after Germany failed to fulfill reparation payments demanded by the Versailles Treaty. The German government answered with "passive resistance", which meant that coal miners and railway workers refused to obey any instructions by the occupation forces. Production and transportation came to a standstill, but the financial consequences contributed to German hyperinflation and completely ruined public finances in Germany. Consequently, passive resistance was called off in late 1923. The end of passive resistance in the Ruhr allowed Germany to undertake a currency reform and to negotiate the Dawes Plan, which led to the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr Area in 1925.
Some significant violations (or avoidances) of the provisions of the Treaty were:
- In 1919, the dissolution of the General Staff appeared to happen; however, the core of the General Staff was hidden within another organization, the Truppenamt, where it rewrote all Heer (Army) and Luftstreitkräfte (Air Force) doctrinal and training materials based on the experience of World War I.
- On April 16, 1922, representatives of the governments of Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Rapallo Treaty at economic conference in Genoa, Italy. The treaty re-established diplomatic relations, renounced financial claims on each other and pledged future cooperation.
- In 1932, the German government announced it would no longer adhere to the treaty's military limitations, citing the Allies' violation of the treaty by failing to initiate military limitations on themselves as called for in the preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles.
- In March 1935, under the government of Adolf Hitler, Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by introducing compulsory military conscription in Germany and rebuilding the armed forces. This included a new Navy (Kriegsmarine), the first full armored divisions (Panzerwaffe), and an Air Force (Luftwaffe).
- In June 1935, Great Britain effectively withdrew from the treaty with the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.
- In March 1936, Germany violated the treaty by reoccupying the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland.
- In March 1938, Germany violated the treaty by annexing Austria in the Anschluss.
- In September 1938, Germany, with the approval of France, Britain, and Italy, violated the Treaty by annexing the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.
- In March 1939, Germany violated the treaty by occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia.
- On 1 September 1939, Germany violated the treaty by invading Poland, thus initiating World War II in Europe.
Historical assessments
According to David Stevenson, since the opening of French archives, most commentators have remarked on French restraint and reasonableness at the conference, though Stevenson notes that "he jury is still out", and that "there have been signs that the pendulum of judgement is swinging back the other way."
In his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian peace", a misguided attempt to destroy Germany on behalf of French revanchism, rather than to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which Germany had accepted at the armistice. He stated: "I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible." Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and used in his passionate book arguments that he and others (including some US officials) had used at Paris. He believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay, and that these would produce drastic instability.
French economist Étienne Mantoux disputed that analysis. During the 1940s, Mantoux wrote a posthumously published book titled The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes in an attempt to rebut Keynes' claims. More recently economists have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small army saved it so much money it could afford the reparations payments.
More recently, it has been argued (for instance by historian Gerhard Weinberg in his book "A World At Arms") that the treaty was in fact quite advantageous to Germany. The Bismarckian Reich was maintained as a political unit instead of being broken up, and Germany largely escaped post-war military occupation (in contrast to the situation following World War II.) In a 1995 essay, Weinberg noted that with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and with Russia withdrawn from Europe, that Germany was now the dominant power in Eastern Europe.
The British military historian Correlli Barnett claimed that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he claimed, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Germany had imposed on a defeated Russia in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion Marks. Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany′s economy had been restored to its pre-war status.
Barnett also claims that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany′s eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former Austrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the Treaty "much enhanced" German power. Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again. By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".
The British historian of modern Germany, Richard J. Evans, wrote that during the war the German right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them. Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles. Evans further noted that the parties of the Weimar Coalition, namely the the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the social liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Christian democratic Centre Party, were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to claim as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equaled opposition to the Weimar Republic. Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was the Great Depression of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" of National Socialism and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations".
Ewa Thompson points out that the Treaty allowed numerous nations in Central and Eastern Europe to liberate themselves from oppressive German rule, a fact that is often neglected by Western historiography, more interested in understanding the German point of view. In nations that found themselves free as the result of the Treaty; such as Poles or Czechs, it is seen as symbol of recognition of wrongs committed against small nations by their much larger aggressive neighbors.
Regardless of modern strategic or economic analysis, resentment caused by the treaty sowed fertile psychological ground for the eventual rise of the Nazi Party. The German historian Detlev Peukert wrote that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during the interwar period, and though not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany. Rather, Peukert argued that it was widely believed in Germany that Versailles was a totally unreasonable treaty, and it was this "perception" rather than the "reality" of the Versailles treaty that mattered. Peukert noted that because of the "millenarian hopes" created in Germany during World War I when for a time it appeared that Germany was on the verge of conquering all of Europe, any peace treaty the Allies of World War I imposed on the defeated German Reich were bound to create a nationalist backlash, and there was nothing the Allies could have done to avoid that backlash. Having noted that much, Peukert commented that the policy of rapprochement with the Western powers that Gustav Stresemann carried out between 1923 and 1929 were constructive policies that might have allowed Germany to play a more positive role in Europe, and that it was not true that German democracy was doomed to die in 1919 because of Versailles. Finally, Peukert argued that it was the Great Depression and the turn to a nationalist policy of autarky within Germany at the same time that finished off the Weimar Republic, not the Treaty of Versailles.
French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of Germans in the Sudetenland and in Posen-West Prussia were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented. Cartier asserts that, out of 1,058,000 Germans in Posen-West Prussia in 1921, 758,867 fled their homelands within five years due to Polish harassment. In 1926, the Polish Ministry of the Interior estimated the remaining number of Germans at fewer than 300,000. These sharpening ethnic conflicts would lead to public demands to reattach the annexed territory in 1938 and become a pretext for Hitler′s annexations of Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland.
See also
- Wikisource: Treaty of Peace between Germany and the United States of America
- Septemberprogramm
- Decree on Peace
- Aftermath of World War I
- Causes of World War II
- International Opium Convention, incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles
- Little Treaty of Versailles
- Minority Treaties
- Neutrality Acts of 1930s
- Treaty of Rapallo (1920)
Notes
- Footnotes
- Article 117 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye: "... Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her Allies". Article 161 of the Treaty of Trianon: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Hungary accepts the responsibility of Hungary and her allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies." Article 121 of the Treaty Areas of Neuilly-sur-Seine: "Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation". Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres: "Turkey recognises that by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied Powers she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make complete reparation."
- Citations
- Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) with Austria; Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine with Bulgaria; Treaty of Trianon with Hungary; Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire; Davis, Robert T., ed. (2010). U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security: Chronology and Index for the 20th Century. Vol. 1. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-313-38385-4.
- Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," Central European History (1978) 11#3 pp. 231-255 in JSTOR
- Lentin, Antony (1985) . Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George and the Pre-history of Appeasement. Routledge. p. 84. ISBN 978-0-416-41130-0.
- Alan Sharp, "The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919", 1991.
- Keylor, William R. (1998). The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin. p. 34. ISBN 0-669-41711-4..
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- John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920) p. 34
- David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon. Penguin Books. 1970, p. 605.
- John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2011) pp 454-505
- Treaty of Versailles, Article 227
- Treaty of Versailles, Article 228-230
- Treaty of Versailles, Article 231
- http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_Saint-Germain-en-Laye/Part_VIII#Article_177
- http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_Trianon/Part_VIII#Article_161
- http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_II_-_PART_VII,_REPARATION,_ARTICLES_121_-_176
- http://en.wikisource.org/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres/Part_VIII
- Treaty of Versailles, Part XIV at Wikisource.
- Treaty of Versailles, Part V at Wikisource.
- Charles Ingrao; Franz A.J. Szabo (2007). The Germans and East. Purdue University Press. p. 262.
- Ralph Wilde (2010). International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away. Oxford University Press. p. 111.
- Manfred F. Boemeke; Gerald D. Feldman; Elisabeth Glaser (1998). The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge University Press. p. 302.
- Ruth Henig (2013). Versailles and After, 1919-1933. Routledge. p. 17.
- German South West Africa was the only African colony designated as a Class C mandate, meaning that the indigenous population was judged incapable of even limited self-government and the colony to be administered under the laws of the mandatory as an integral portion of its territory
- Australia in effective control, formally together with Britain and New Zealand
- Louis (1967), p. 117-130
- ^ Marks, p. 237
- Bell, p. 23
- ^ Sally. Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," Central European History (1978) 11#3 pp 231-55 in JSTOR
- Martel, p. 43
- http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html
- Treaty of Versailles, Part I: Covenant of the League of Nations at Wikisource.
- Treaty of Versailles, Part XIII: Constitution of the International Labour Office at Wikisource.
- Treaty of Versailles, Part XII at Wikisource.
- Treaty of Versailles, Article 246
- Stevenson 1998, p. 10.
- R. Henig, Versailles and After: 1919–1933 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 52.
- President Woodrow Wilson speaking on the League of Nations to a luncheon audience in Portland OR. 66th Cong., 1st sess. Senate Documents: Addresses of President Wilson (May-November 1919), vol.11, no. 120, p.206.
- Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (1945)
- William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (1980)
- Ralph A. Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (1970)
- John Milton Cooper, Jr. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2009) ch 22-23
- Duff, John B. (1968). "The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans". Journal of American History. 55 (3): 582–598. JSTOR 1891015.
- Wimer, Kurt; Wimer, Sarah (1967). "The Harding Administration, the League of Nations, and the Separate Peace Treaty". The Review of Politics. 29 (1). Cambridge University Press: 13–24. doi:10.1017/S0034670500023706. JSTOR 1405810.
- Bibliographical Introduction to "Diary, Reminiscences and Memories of Colonel Edward M. House".
- Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Ranzau when faced with the conditions on 7 May: "Wir kennen die Wucht des Hasses, die uns hier entgegentritt. Es wird von uns verlangt, daß wir uns als die allein Schuldigen am Krieg bekennen; ein solches Bekenntnis wäre in meinem Munde eine Lüge". 2008 School Projekt Heinrich-Heine-Gesamtschule, Düsseldorf http://www.fkoester.de/kursbuch/unterrichtsmaterial/13_2_74.html
- 2008 School Projekt Heinrich-Heine-Gesamtschule, Düsseldorf http://www.fkoester.de/kursbuch/unterrichtsmaterial/13_2_74.html
- Lauteinann, Geschichten in Quellen Bd. 6, S. 129.
- Koppel S. Pinson (1964). Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (13th printing ed.). New York: Macmillan. p. 397 f. ISBN 0-88133-434-0.
- Stevenson 1998, p. 11.
- Markwell, Donald (2006). John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace. Oxford University Press.
- Keynes (1919). The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Ch VI.
The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - Hantke, Max; Spoerer, Mark (2010). "The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924–9" (PDF). Economic History Review. 63 (4): 849–864.
- Reynolds, David. (February 20, 1994). "Over There, and There, and There." Review of: "A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II," by Gerhard L. Weinberg. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weinberg, Gerhard Germany, Hitler and World War II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 page 16.
- Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: Pan, 2002), p. 392.
- Barnett, p. 316.
- Barnett, p. 318.
- Barnett, p. 319.
- ^ Evans, Richard In Hitler's Shadow, New York: Panatheon 1989 page 107.
- The Surrogate Hegemon in Polish Postcolonial Discourse Ewa Thompson, Rice University
- ^ Peukert, Detlev The Weimar Republic, New York: Hill & Wang, 1992 page 278.
- ^ La Seconde Guerre mondiale, Raymond Cartier, Paris, Larousse Paris Match, 1965, quoted in: Pater Lothar Groppe (28 August 2004). "Die "Jagd auf Deutsche" im Osten: Die Verfolgung begann nicht erst mit dem "Bromberger Blutsonntag" vor 50 Jahren". Preußische Allgemeine Zeitung / 28. August 2004 (in German). Retrieved 22 September 2010.
'Von 1.058.000 Deutschen, die noch 1921 in Posen und Westpreußen lebten', ist bei Cartier zu lesen, 'waren bis 1926 unter polnischem Druck 758.867 abgewandert. Nach weiterer Drangsal wurde das volksdeutsche Bevölkerungselement vom Warschauer Innenministerium am 15. Juli 1939 auf weniger als 300.000 Menschen geschätzt.'
References
- Andelman, David A. (2008). A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. New York/London: J. Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-78898-0.
- Bell, Origins of the Second World War
- Cooper, John Milton. Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (2010) excerpt and text search
- Demarco, Neil (1987). The World This Century. London: Collins Educational. ISBN 0-00-322217-9.
- Herron, George D. (1924). The Defeat in the Victory. Boston: Christopher Publishing House. xvi, , 202 p.
- Macmillan, Margaret (2001). Peacemakers. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5939-1..
Also published as Macmillan, Margaret (2001). Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-375-76052-0.
- Markwell, Donald (2006). John Maynard Keynes and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829236-8.
- Martel, Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered
- Sharp, Alan (2011). Consequences of Peace: The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919-2010. Haus Publishing.
- Sharp, Alan. The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking After the First World War, 1919-1923 (2008)
- Stevenson, David (1998). "France at the Paris Peace Conference: Addressing the Dilemmas of Security". In Robert W. D. Boyce (ed.). French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-15039-2.
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Further reading
- The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Gläser, editors. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1998.
External links
- Photographs of the document
- The consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for today's world
- Text of Protest by Germany and Acceptance of Fair Peace Treaty
- Woodrow Wilson Original Letters on Treaty of Versailles Shapell Manuscript Foundation
- My 1919—A film from the Chinese point of view, the only country that did not sign the treaty
- "Versailles Revisted" (Review of Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge, UK: German History Institute, Washington, and Cambridge University Press, 1998), Strategic Studies 9:2 (Spring 2000), 191–205
- Map of Europe and the impact of the Versailles Treaty at omniatlas.com
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