Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 09:47, 30 December 2013

Jiang Zemin
江泽民
Jiang Zemin
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
Deputy	Li Peng Zhu Rongji Li Ruihuan Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Zhao Ziyang
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
President of the People's Republic of China
In office 27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003
Premier	Li Peng Zhu Rongji
Vice President	Rong Yiren Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Yang Shangkun
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
In office 9 November 1989 – 19 September 2004
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission
In office 19 March 1990 – 8 March 2005
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Member of the 13,14,15 th CPC Politburo Standing Committee
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
General Secretary	Himself
Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee
In office November 1987 – June 1989
Deputy	Zhu Rongji (Mayor)
Preceded by	Rui Xingwen
Succeeded by	Zhu Rongji
Member of the National People's Congress
In office 25 March 1988 – 5 March 2008
Constituency	Shanghai At-large
Personal details
Born	(1926-08-17) 17 August 1926 (age 98) Yangzhou, Jiangsu
Nationality	Chinese
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse	Wang Yeping
Children	Jiang Mianheng Jiang Miankang
Alma mater	Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Profession	Electrical engineer
Signature	File:Jiang Zemin Signature.svg

Template:Chinese name Template:Contains Chinese text

Jiang Zemin (born 17 August 1926) is a retired Chinese politician who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2004. His long career and political prominence have led to him being described as the "core of the third generation" of Communist Party leaders.

Jiang Zemin came to power following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, replacing Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. With the waning influence of Deng Xiaoping and the other members of Eight Elders due to old age — and with the help of old and powerful party and state leaders, elder Chen Yun and former President Li Xiannian — Jiang effectively became the "paramount leader" in the 1990s.

Under his leadership, China experienced substantial developmental growth with reforms, saw the peaceful return of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom and Macau from Portugal, and improved its relations with the outside world while the Communist Party maintained its tight control over the government. Jiang has been criticized for being too concerned about his personal image at home, and too conciliatory towards Russia and the United States abroad.

Background and ascendancy

Jiang was born in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu. His ancestral home was the Jiang Village (江村), Jingde County, Anhui. This was also the hometown of a number of prominent figures in Chinese academic and intellectual establishments. Jiang grew up during the years of Japanese occupation. His uncle, Jiang Shangqing, had died fighting the Japanese in World War II and was considered to be a national hero. Since Shangqing had no heirs, Jiang became the adopted son of Shangqing's wife, or his Aunt, Wang Zhelan, to whom he referred to as "Niang" or "Mom." Jiang attended the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National Central University in Japanese-occupied Nanjing before being transferred to Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He graduated there in 1947 with a Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering.

Jiang married Wang Yeping (Chinese: 王冶坪; pinyin: Wáng Yěpíng, born 1928), also a native of Yangzhou. She graduated from Shanghai International Studies University. They have two sons, Jiang Mianheng and Jiang Miankang.

He claimed that he joined the Communist Party of China when he was in college. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang received his training at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the 1950s. He also worked for Changchun's First Automobile Works. He eventually got transferred to government services, where he began to rise in prominence and rank, eventually becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Electronic Industries in 1983.

In 1985 he became Mayor of Shanghai, and subsequently the Party Chief of Shanghai. Jiang received mixed reviews as mayor. Many of his critics dismissed him as a "flower pot", a Chinese term for someone who only seems useful but actually gets nothing done. Many credited Shanghai's growth during the period to Zhu Rongji. Jiang was an ardent believer, during this period, in Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. In an attempt of curbing student discontent in 1986, Jiang recited the Gettysburg Address in English in front of a group of student protesters.

Jiang was described as having a passable command of several foreign languages, including Romanian, Russian, and English. One of his favorite activities was to engage foreign visitors in small talks on art and literature in their native language, in addition to singing foreign songs in the original language. He became friends with Allen Broussard, the African-American judge who visited Shanghai in 1987 and Brazilian actress Lucelia Santos.

Jiang was elevated to national politics in 1987, automatically becoming a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee because it is customarily dictated that the Party Chief of Shanghai would also have a seat in the Politburo. In 1989, China was in crisis over the Tiananmen Square protest, and the Central Government was in conflict on how to handle the protesters. In June, Deng Xiaoping dismissed liberal Zhao Ziyang, who was considered too conciliatory to student protestors. Jiang, at the time, was the Shanghai Party Chief, the top figure in China's new economic center. In an incident with the World Economic Herald, Jiang closed down the newspaper, deeming it harmful. The handling of the crisis in Shanghai was noticed by Beijing, and then paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping. As the protests escalated and then Party-chief Zhao Ziyang was removed from office, Jiang was selected by the Party leaders as a compromise candidate over Tianjin's Li Ruihuan, Premier Li Peng, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and the retired elders to become the new General Secretary. At the time he was considered to be an unlikely candidate. Within three years Deng had transferred most power in the state, party and military to Jiang.

Early leadership

Jiang was elevated to the country's top job in 1989 with a fairly small power base inside the party, and thus, very little actual power. His most reliable allies were the powerful party elders – Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. He was believed as simply a transitional figure until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Other prominent Party and military figures like Yang Shangkun and brother Yang Baibing were believed to be planning a coup. Jiang used Deng Xiaoping as a back-up to his leadership in the first few years. Jiang, who was believed to have a neo-conservative slant, warned against "bourgeois liberalization". Deng's belief, however, stipulated that the only solution to keeping the legitimacy of Communist rule over China was to continue the drive for modernization and economic reform, and therefore placed himself at odds with Jiang.

At the first meeting of the new Politburo Standing Committee, after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Jiang criticized the previous period as "hard on the economy, soft on politics" and advocated increasing political thought work. Anne-Marie Brady writes that "Jiang Zemin was a long time political cadre with a nose for ideological work and its importance. This meeting marked the beginning of a new era in propaganda and political thought work in China." Soon after, the Central Propaganda Department was given more resources and power, "including the power to go in to the propaganda-related work units and cleanse the ranks of those who had been supportive of the democracy movement."

Deng grew critical of Jiang's leadership in 1992. During Deng's southern tours, he subtly suggested that the pace of reform was not fast enough, and the "central leadership" (i.e. Jiang) had most responsibility. Jiang grew ever more cautious, and rallied behind Deng's reforms completely. In 1993, Jiang coined the new term "socialist market economy" to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into essentially a government-regulated capitalist market economy. It was a huge step to take in the realization of Deng's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". At the same time, Jiang elevated many of his supporters from Shanghai to high government positions, after regaining Deng's confidence. He abolished the outdated Central Advisory Committee, an advisory body composed of revolutionary party elders. He became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, followed by his election to the Presidency in March 1993.

Secretaryship and presidency

Post Deng, China emerged from the reforms and the relative stability of the early 1990s, facing a myriad of economic and social problems. At Deng's funeral, Jiang delivered his eulogy. He had inherited a China rampant with government corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's idea that "some areas can get rich before others" gave rise to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the hinterlands. The unprecedented economic growth had inevitably led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOE's), and a staggering unemployment rate that hit 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%. A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth ending up in foreign countries. Corruption levels had replicated, if not exceeded that of the Republican era in the 1940s. The re-emergence of organized crime and a surge in crime rates began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals. Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the on-going problems. Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions.

Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since Mao and Hua Guofeng's time in office in the late 1970s. The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm national news each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. He appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always comprehensible. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang branded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English. The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night, an event regarded to be in poor taste outside China.

Tong asserts that among the main features of Jiang’s domestic policy was his campaign against the Falun Gong, which once had tens of millions of followers in China. On 25 April 1999 upwards of 10,000 Falun Gong adherents protested outside the Zhongnanhai government compound to request official recognition, in response to which Jiang declared the Falun Gong threat must be defeated. According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown. In June 1999, Jiang established an extralegal department, the 6-10 Office, to oversee the suppression of Falun Gong. On 20 July, hundreds of Falun Gong adherents were allegedly abducted and detained. The suppression that followed was characterized a nationwide campaign of propaganda, as well as the large-scale arbitrarily imprisonment and coercive reeducation of Falun Gong practitioners, sometimes resulting in death. Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. The scope and intensity of the campaign has been described as "unrivaled" in recent history, and as being reminiscent of the extremes of the Cultural Revolution. Falun Gong practitioners outside China have filed dozens of largely symbolic lawsuits against Jiang Zemin and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity. Although courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity in many instances, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang and other officials on the charge of torture and genocide and asked for their arrest in late 2009.

Foreign policy

Jiang went on a groundbreaking state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to supporters of the Chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in passable English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as Jiang and Clinton sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action. Much of Jiang's foreign policy was focused on international trade and economic integration. A personal friend of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere.

Economic development

Jiang did not specialize in economics, and in 1997 handed a most of the economic governance of the country to Zhu Rongji, who became Premier, and remained in office through the Asian financial crisis. Under their joint leadership, Mainland China has sustained an average of 8% GDP growth annually, achieving the highest rate of per capita economic growth in major world economies, raising eyebrows around the world with its astonishing speed. This was mostly achieved by continuing the process of a transition to a market economy. Strong party control over China was cemented by the PRC's successful bid to join the World Trade Organization and Beijing winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.

Entrenching Three Represents

Before he transferred power to a younger generation of leaders, Jiang had his theory of Three Represents written into the Party's constitution, alongside Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Although contradictory to Marxism and Maoism in many facets, it was also written into China's Constitution. Critics believe this is just another piece added to Jiang's cult of personality, others have seen practical applications of the theory as a guiding ideology in the future direction of the CPC. Largely speculated to step down from all positions by international media, rival Li Ruihuan's resignation in 2002 prompted analysts to rethink the man. The theory of Three Represents was believed by many political analysts to be Jiang's effort at extending his vision to Marxist–Leninist principles, and therefore elevating himself alongside previous Chinese Marxist philosophers Mao and Deng.

Gradual retirement

In 2002, Jiang stepped down from the powerful CPC Politburo Standing Committee and CPC General Secretary to make way for a "fourth generation" of leadership headed by Hu Jintao, marking the beginning of a transition of power that would last several years. Hu assumed Jiang's title as party chief, becoming the new general secretary of the Communist Party. Six out of the nine new members of Standing Committee at the time were considered part of Jiang's so-called "Shanghai Clique", the most prominent being Vice President Zeng Qinghong and First Vice Premier Huang Ju.

Although Jiang retained the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission, most members of the commission are professional military men. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, "Having one center is called 'loyalty', while having two centers will result in 'problems.'" This was widely interpreted as a criticism of Jiang's attempt to exercise dual leadership with Hu on the model of Deng Xiaoping.

Hu succeeded Jiang as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China on 15 November 2002. To the surprise of many observers, evidence of Jiang's continuing influence on public policy abruptly disappeared from the official media. Jiang was conspicuously silent during the SARS crisis, especially when compared to the very public profile of Hu and Wen Jiabao. It has been argued that the institutional arrangements created by the 16th Congress have left Jiang in a position where he cannot exercise much influence. Although many of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee are associated with him, the Standing Committee does not have command authority over the civilian bureaucracy.

On 19 September 2004, after a four-day meeting of the 198-member Central Committee, Jiang resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, his last party post. Six months later he resigned his last significant post, chairman of the State CMC. This followed weeks of speculation that Hu Jintao's supporters in the Communist Party leadership were pressing Jiang to step aside. Jiang's term was supposed to have lasted until 2007. Hu also succeeded Jiang as the CMC chairman, but, in an apparent political defeat for Jiang, Xu Caihou, and not Zeng Qinghong was appointed to succeed Hu as vice chairman. This power transition officially marks the end of Jiang's era in China, which roughly lasted from 1993 to 2004.

Although Jiang has been seldom seen in public since giving up his last official title in 2004, he was with Hu Jintao on stage at a ceremony celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, and toured the Military Museum of the Chinese Peoples Revolution with Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and other former senior officials. On 8 August 2008, Jiang appeared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics Games. He also stood beside Hu Jintao during 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China mass parade in October 2009.

In 2011, Jiang has been subject to internet rumors of his death, as he was absent from public events such as the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. As a response, Chinese censors to block searches for the words "Jiang Zemin", or even simply "Jiang". On 6 July Hong Kong media carried headlines that Jiang was "critically ill", while TV station ATV reported that Jiang had died in Beijing. State news agency Xinhua, quoting "authoritative sources", declared that overseas media reports of Jiang's death were "pure rumor".

On 9 October 2011, Jiang made his first public appearance since his premature obituary in Beijing at a celebration to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution.

Legacy

Historians and biographers have disputed what can be accounted into "Jiang Zemin's legacy". Jiang himself had wanted his Three Represents theory, called an "important thought" on the mainland, to become his ideological legacy. Although the theory has been codified into both the State and Party constitutions alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, its actual effect has yet to be assessed, and it seems to be losing ground to Hu Jintao's Scientific Development Concept and the Socialist Harmonious Society ideologies within the party. Jiang has come under quiet criticism from within the Communist Party of China for focusing on economic growth at all costs while ignoring the resulting environmental damage of the growth, the widening gap between rich and poor in China and the social costs absorbed by those whom economic reform has left behind. By contrast, the policies of his successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have widely been seen as efforts to address these imbalances and move away from a sole focus on economic growth toward a broader view of development which incorporates non-economic factors such as health and the environment.

Domestically, Jiang's legacy and reputation is mixed. While some people attributed the period of relative stability and growth in the 1990s to Jiang's term, others argue that Jiang did little to correct mistakes resulting from Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, leaving the next administration facing innumerable problems, some of which it is too late to solve. The fact he arose to power as the direct beneficiary of the turmoils of 4 June has not been forgotten by many in China. Indeed, he is in many circles regarded as a political opportunist; the very model of a new breed of party members directly associated with the widespread corruption and cronyism that flourished during his tenure. His interference with high profile corruption investigations since stepping down from power, such as those involving Shanghai tycoon Zhou Zhengyi, has only served to reinforce this perception.

Jiang's obsession with image has also spurred a trend of face projects around the country, with local governments lending enormous funds to large and mostly unnecessary construction projects. While his showy nature has often been considered charming and even charismatic by the west, in the relatively more conservative Chinese society it is often perceived as frivolous, pompous and lacking in character and substance. Jiang's Theory of Three Represents justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party, and changed the founding ideology of the CPC from protection of the peasantry and workers to that of the "overwhelming majority of the people", a euphemism aimed at including the growing entrepreneurial class. Conservative critics within the party have quietly denounced this as betrayal of the communist ideology, while reformers have praised Jiang as a visionary. Such a move, however, increasingly justified a newly found correlation between the business and ruling elites, thus significantly linking bureaucracy and financial gain, which critics argued fosters more corruption. Some have suggested this is the part of Jiang's legacy that will last, at least in name, as long as the communists remain in power.

Many biographers of Jiang have noted his government resembled an oligarchy as opposed to an autocratic dictatorship. Many of his policies have been attributed to others in government,notably Premier Zhu Rongji, whose tense relationship with Jiang caused widespread speculation, especially following Jiang's decision to suppress the Falun Gong movement. Jiang is often credited with the improvement in foreign relations during his term, but at the same time many Chinese have criticized him for being too conciliatory towards the United States and Russia. The issue of Chinese reunification between the mainland and Taiwan gained ground during Jiang's term, as Cross-Strait talks led to the eventual Three Links after Jiang stepped down as Party general secretary. The construction of the Qinghai–Tibet Railway began under Jiang.

See also

• History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)
• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• Song Zuying, Famous folk singer and former mistress
• The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Jiang's controversial biography by Robert Lawrence Kuhn

References

1. Tomoyuki Kojima. China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy: Cooperation with all, Emphasis on Major Powers. Asia-Pacific Review, 1469–2937, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2001
2. ^ "Jiang Zemin – General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee". People's Daily. Retrieved 4 December 2010.
3. Structure and Choice
4. ^ "BBC: Profile: Jiang Zemin". BBC News. 19 September 2004. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
5. Los Angeles Times: China Leans Heavily on Trouble-Shooter : Politics: Vice Premier Zhu Rongji's assignment is to cope with economic troubles, corruption, rural anger.
6. Kuhn, Robert Lawrence: The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin
7. "Book: Real Story of Jiang Zemin: Introduction(4)". Chinaview.wordpress.com. 25 August 2006. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
8. ^ Kissinger, Henry (2001). "Chapter 17". On China. Penguin Press HC. ISBN 978-1-59420-271-1.
9. China completes military power transfer
10. Comparative Politics: Structure and Choice
11. Lyman Miller: Overlapping Transitions in China's Leadership
12. ^ Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
13. TMichael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990), 546.
14. Hong Kong Journalists Association: FOE Annual Report, 2001
15. ^ James Tong. “Revenge of the Forbidden City: The suppression of the Falungong in China, 1999–2005.” Oxford University Press, 2009
16. Ethan Gutmann, ‘An Occurrence on Fuyou Street’, National Review, 13 July 2009.
17. Jiang Zemin, Letter to Party cadres on the evening of 25 April 1999. Published in Beijing Zhichun no. 97 (June 2001)
18. ^ Human Right Watch (2001). Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong. New York. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
19. Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, ‘The 610 Office:Policing the Chinese Spirit’, China Brief , Volume 11 Issue 17 (9 November 2011).
20. Amnesty International "China: The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called 'heretical organization'" 23 March 2000
21. Johnson, Ian "Death Trap – How One Chinese City Resorted to Atrocities To Control Falun Dafa," Wall Street Journal, 26 December 2000. Third party archive at Pulitzer.org
22. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2009, 10 October 2009.
23. ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, 2008
24. David Ownby, 'Qigong, Falun Gong, and the Body Politic in Contemporary China,' in China's transformations: the stories beyond the headlines, Lionel M. Jensen, Timothy B. Weston ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2007.
25. Human Rights Law Foundation, Direct Litigation. Retrieved 19 March 2011
26. La Audiencia pide interrogar al ex presidente chino Jiang por genocidio, 14 November 2009
27. Luis Andres Henao, Argentine judge asks China arrests over Falun Gong, 22 December 2009
28. Xinhua:China's Jiang Zemin, Canada's Jean Chrétien discuss relations 21 October 2001.
29. http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm7_jm.pdf
30. Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS
31. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (China aktuell)
32. China's leadership makes show of unity ahead of key Communist Party congress International Herald Tribune
33. Former Chinese President tours Military Museum CCTV International
34. "Where is Jiang Zemin?". Financial Times. 1 July 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2011.
35. "Jiang's Rumours of Death Spread". Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 6 July 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2011.
36. Krishnan, Ananth (7 July 2011). "Reports of former president's death "pure rumour", says China, The Hindu
37. "Is China's Ex-Leader Jiang Zemin Dead? Local Censors Don't Want Any Speculation". Time. 6 July 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2011.
38. 2:03 pm ET (9 October 2011). "Jiang Zemin Appears in Public Three Months After Media Reports of Death". Bloomberg.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
40. Lam, Willy. Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao era. pp. 44–46
41. Profile: Jiang Zemin
42. Chinese Citizens Find Court Guilty
43. How Jiang Zemin and Son Profited from Corruption
44. "Washington Post: Jiang Zemin's Puzzlement". Highbeam.com. 25 March 2001. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
45. Communist Party Intensifies Political and Ideological Study Among Young Teachers
46. Editorial: The Chinese Communist Party Has No Way Forward
47. Kuhn, 2004; Lam, 1997
49. "China under Jiang Zemin". Facts and Details. 1 October 1928. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
50. Smoke clears over China's U.S. strategy

Kuhn, L. Robert. "The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin." 2004.

External links

v t e Paramount leaders of the People's Republic of China
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
Mao Zedong (Core 1) Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping (Core 2) Jiang Zemin (Core 3) Hu Jintao Xi Jinping (Core 4)
Xia → Shang → Zhou → Qin → Han → 3 Kingdoms → Jìn / 16 Kingdoms → S. Dynasties / N. Dynasties → Sui → Tang → 5 Dynasties & 10 Kingdoms → Liao / Song / W. Xia / Jīn → Yuan → Ming → Qing → ROC / PRC

v t e Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee	Leader Chen Duxiu (1921–1927) Xiang Zhongfa (1928–1931) Bo Gu (1931–1935) Zhang Wentian (1935–1943) Mao Zedong (1943–1976) Hua Guofeng (1976–1981) Hu Yaobang (1981–1987) Zhao Ziyang (1987–1989) Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) Hu Jintao (2002–2012) Xi Jinping (2012–present) Decision-making bodies General Secretary Politburo (Standing Committee) Secretariat Central Military Commission Departments Organization Department Publicity Department United Front Work Department International Department Social Work Department Political and Legal Affairs Commission Directly administered General Office Office of the General Secretary Central Guard Bureau Central Guard Unit Secrecy Office Cryptography Office Central Archives Policy Research Office Commissions for co-ordination Auditing Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Comprehensively Law-Based Governance Financial Financial and Economic Affairs Foreign Affairs Cyberspace Affairs Office National Security Science and Technology Spiritual Civilization Institutional Organization Office Secrecy Office Dispatched institutions for co-ordination Working Committee of Central and State Organs Central Financial Work Commission Hong Kong Work Committee Macau Work Committee Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong Leading groups Cryptography Work Office Education Rural Work Inspection Work Military Reform Propaganda, Ideology and Culture Taiwan Office Hong Kong and Macau Office Others Central Party School Chinese Academy of Governance Institute of Party History and Literature People's Daily Qiushi Guangming Daily Executive Leadership Academies Pudong Yan'an Jinggangshan
National Congress	1st (1921) 2nd (1922) 3rd (1923) 4th (1925) 5th (1927) 6th (1928) 7th (1945) 8th (1956) 9th (1969) 10th (1973) 11th (1977) 12th (1982) 13th (1987) 14th (1992) 15th (1997) 16th (2002) 17th (2007) 18th (2012) 19th (2017) 20th (2022)
Leadership sittings	Elected by the Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee 4th: 1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Politburo 3rd: 1923–1925 4th: 1925–1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Military Commission 7th: 1945–1949 & 1954–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Approved by the Central Committee Secretariat 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1980–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 CCDI Standing Committee 7th 1949–1956 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1978–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 CCDI Secretary Zhu De (1949–55) Dong Biwu (1955–68) Chen Yun (1978–87) Qiao Shi (1987–92) Wei Jianxing (1992–2002) Wu Guanzheng (2002–07) He Guoqiang (2007–12) Wang Qishan (2012–17) Zhao Leji (2017–22) Li Xi (2022–) Others Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Secretary General of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Elected by National Congress Central Committee 1st: 1921–1922 2nd: 1922–1923 3rd: 1923–1925 4th: 1925–1927 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1945 7th: 1945–1956 8th: 1956–1969 9th: 1969–1973 10th: 1973–1977 11th: 1977–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2002 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027 Discipline Inspection 5th: 1927–1928 6th: 1928–1933 & 1933–1945 7th: 1949–1955 & 1955–1956 8th: 1956–1969 11th: 1978–1982 12th: 1982–1987 13th: 1987–1992 14th: 1992–1997 15th: 1997–2022 16th: 2002–2007 17th: 2007–2012 18th: 2012–2017 19th: 2017–2022 20th: 2022–2027
Wider organisation	People's Liberation Army People's Armed Police Militia (China) Communist Youth League of China Young Pioneers of China United front (China) People's organization
Ideologies	Marxism–Leninism Mao Zedong Thought Socialism with Chinese characteristics Deng Xiaoping Theory Three Represents Scientific Outlook on Development Xi Jinping Thought
Groupings	Shanghai clique Tuanpai Tsinghua clique Eight Elders Crown Prince Party Fujian clique New Zhijiang Army Xishan Society Gang of Four 28 Bolsheviks
Related articles	Shuanggui Neoauthoritarianism List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party Longest-serving members of the Politburo Standing Committee Emblem of the Chinese Communist Party
Category

v t e State representative of the People's Republic of China
President Vice President
Common Program (1949–1954)	CPG Chairman Mao Zedong
1954 Constitution (1954–1975)	Chairperson Mao Zedong Liu Shaoqi Song Qingling & Dong Biwu (co-acting) Dong Biwu (acting)
1975 & 1978 Constitutions (1975–1982)	NPCSC Chairperson Zhu De Song Qingling (acting) Ye Jianying
1982 Constitution (1982–present)	President Li Xiannian Yang Shangkun Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping

v t e Chairmen of the Central Military Commission
CCP	Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping
PRC	Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping

Template:Persondata

• Use dmy dates from June 2012
• 1926 births
• Communist rulers
• Communist Party of China politicians from Jiangsu
• Living people
• Mayors of Shanghai
• Nanjing University alumni
• People from Yangzhou
• Presidents of the People's Republic of China
• Shanghai Jiao Tong University alumni
• Grand Crosses of the Order of Good Hope
• Grand Crosses of the Order of Tahiti Nui
• People's Republic of China politicians from Jiangsu