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Strategic Bombing during World War II was unlike anything the world had previously witnessed. The strategic bombing campaigns conducted by Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, United States and Empire of Japan used conventional weapons, incendiaries, and nuclear weapons.

Europe

The September Campaign

Main article Polish September Campaign

From the beginning of the war Germany engaged in massive air raids against Polish cities, bombing civilians, hospitals, and refugees. Cities like Warsaw,Wieluń,Frampol and many others were devestated by indiscriminate German air bombardments, often targeting civilians. In case of Frampol, the city was destroyed as test case to determine the effects and accuracy of bombardment. The first bombs that fell on Germany during World War II, were dropped by a single PZL.23 Karaś of the 21st escadre on a factory in Olawa. Even though the Polish Air Force had a small fleet of modern medium-range bombers such as the PZL.37 Łoś, before the full scale of German war atrocities became known, Polish officers were reluctant to order strategic bombardment of targets in Germany for humanitarian reasons. Then just in a period of a few days the Luftwaffe's numerical and technological superiority took its toll on the Polish Air Force and such operations were impossible to carry out.

The Blitz

Main article The Blitz

The British had been deeply psychologically affected by the German strategic bombing campaign of World War I. It was the first time in hundreds of years that the British capital had been successfully attacked by an enemy. In the interwar years, British calculations of the likely effect of a strategic bombing from the data gathered during the German campaign suggested that a strategic attack on an enemy's cities using the latest generation of bombers would knock an enemy out of the war without the need for the stalemate of trench warfare. This had been an important factor in the British adoption of appeasement of Adolf Hitler during the 1930s, because the destruction which it was believed would result from a strategic bombing campaign using conventional bombs and poison gas, was thought to be on a scale which would not be seen in reality until the atomic bomb was developed.

In the rush to rearm in the late 1930s, the British had concentrated their limited resources on fighters which were seen as a defensive measure rather than bombers which were perceived as an offensive weapon. So when the war broke out in 1939, Britain's RAF had just 488 bombers of all kinds, mostly obsolescent, with only about 60 of the capable new Vickers Wellington: many of the remainder had insufficient range to reach the Ruhr (let alone Berlin), had negligible defensive armament, and could not carry a useful payload. In any case, there were no effective bomb sights, very few bombs of a size that could cause significant damage, and even such obvious things as maps of Europe for navigating to and from the target were in severe shortage. Furthermore the sheer difficulty of navigating, by night, long distances to accurately attack small targets was completely underestimated.

Germany, in contrast, had abandoned plans to produce strategic bombers. With German technical resources already hard pressed to supply other needs, with the Luftwaffe being part of the German army and so inherently directly towards short term short range tactical goals intimately tied up with ground-based military operations, and with the benefit of practical experience of modern war in Spain, German planners focused on tactical bombers to act as airborne artillery for the army, and fighters to protect them. When the fighting for Western Europe began in earnest, all three major powers (Britain, Germany and France) concentrated on daylight tactical bombing. German Stukas and medium bombers were highly effective in the military support rolé; the French Air Force, torn by political intra-service conflict and a lack of logistical preparation, was largely unable to employ its large numbers of modern aircraft; and the British found that bravery was no substitute for proper training, doctrine, and equipment— British bomber losses in the defense of France were catastrophic, and the results negligible. In that first year of the war, strategic bombing was almost forgotten. It was in a sense, however, the calm before the storm.

After the fall of France came the Battle of Britain. The major part of the battle (up until about September 1940) was almost entirely tactical; the Luftwaffe aimed to prepare the way for an invasion by ground troops which required air supremacy since this was required to negate the naval supremacy of the British Navy. Initially, the Luftwaffe concentrated their attacks on airfields and coastal shipping. By chance, the British had placed their sector control stations at their airfields and so the organizational infrastructure of the defense came under heavy attack. This, combined with the loss of pilots, progressively disrupted the effectiveness of the British defense. (In fact, Dowding, the head of the RAF, discovered after the Battle that the pilot training establishments were only operating at two-thirds capacity!)

A lost German bomber crew accidentally bombed London. The RAF responded by bombing Berlin on the night of 25/26 August. This was politically embarrassing for Goering as he had boasted of the Luftwaffe ability to protect major German cities. Not realizing how close the Luftwaffe was to success, after the bombing of Berlin, Goering switched Luftwaffe strategy, from attacking airfields and strictly military targets to bombing cities, in particular London, which was attacked for the first time on September 7. Many other British cities were hit, including Liverpool, Bristol, Belfast, Cardiff, and Coventry. The given aim was strategic—to destroy ports and industrial installations—but there is no room to doubt that destroying the will of ordinary people to fight was a major factor, perhaps the major factor.

Gradually, in the face of heavy losses to fighters, the Luftwaffe resorted to night bombing. Targeting had been a problem in daylight; by night it was basically impossible, with accuracy being that of approximately "one city". British civilian casualties were heavy. The expected collapse in civilian morale, however, did not eventuate; indeed, it is widely believed that the bombings had the opposite effect.

Over the next year, an escalating war of electronic technology developed. The defenders struggled to develop countermeasures (in particular, airborne radar), while German scientists improvised a series of radio navigation aids to help their navigators find targets in the dark and through overcasts.

Despite causing a great deal of damage and sorely trying the civilian population, the defenses gradually became more formidable, and the need to divert as many squadrons as possible to the Eastern Front saw the Blitz gradually fade away into mere nuisance raids.

The British retaliation

Britain retaliated with its own night strategic bombing campaign, which built up from RAF Bomber Command's tiny beginnings in 1940 to truly massive strength by the end of the war. The effects of strategic bombing were very poorly understood at the time and grossly overrated. Particularly in the first two years of the campaign, few understood just how little damage was caused and how rapidly the Germans were able to replace lost production—despite the obvious lessons to be learned from the United Kingdom's own survival of the Blitz.

Mid-way through the air war, it slowly began to be realized that the campaign was having very little effect. Despite an ever-increasing tonnage of bombs dispatched, the inaccuracy of delivery was such that any bomb falling within five miles of the target was deemed a "hit" for statistical purposes, and even by this standard, many bombs missed. Indeed sometimes in post raid assessment the Germans could not decide which town, (not the installation in the town) had been the intended target because the scattering of bomb craters was so wide.

These problems were dealt with in two ways: first the precision targeting of vital facilities (ball-bearing production in particular) was abandoned in favour of "area bombing".

"Bomber" Harris, who ran the bombing campaign, said that for want of a rapier, a bludgeon was used. He felt that as much as it would be far more desirable to deliver effective pin-point attacks, as the capacity to do so simply did not exist, and since it was war, it was necessary to attack with whatever was at hand. He accepted area bombing, knowing it would kill civilians, because it was a choice of area bombing or no bombing at all, and area bombing would mean dropping large quantities of bombs into an area full of activities and industries being harnessed for the German war effort.

This change of policy was agreed by the Cabinet in 1942 after a paper was presented by Professor Lindemann, the British government's leading scientific adviser with a seat in the Cabinet, proposing the "dehousing" of the German workforce through area aerial bombing of German cities. Air Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris was appointed to carry out the task and issued a new directive. As the campaign developed, improvements in the accuracy of the RAF raids were by better crew training, electronic aids, and new tactics such as the creation of a "pathfinder" force to mark targets for the main force.

A very large proportion of the industrial production of the United Kingdom was harnessed to the task of creating a vast fleet of heavy bombers—so much so that other vital areas of war production were under-resourced, notably the development of effective tanks and above all the provision of long-range aircraft to safeguard Atlantic shipping from submarine attack. Until 1944 the effect on German production was remarkably small and raised doubts whether it was wise to divert so much effort – the response being that there was no where else the effort could have been applied to greater effect. The effect on German allocation of forces, however, gradually became significant, as Germany devoted upwards of one fourth of its war production to anti-aircraft protection. Every extra anti-aircraft battery and night fighter squadron was one fewer to fight Russian forces on the Eastern Front. The disruption of the German transportation system was extensive, but the German government managed its losses effectively. Nevertheless German industrial production grew much slower than British, American or Russian production.

US bombing in Europe

Mid-way through the war, the United States Army Air Forces arrived to begin its own strategic bombing campaign, which was conducted in daylight. In Europe, the American Eighth Air Force heavy bombers carried smaller payloads than British aircraft (because of the need for defensive armament) but were generally able to deliver them somewhat more accurately. USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim that they were conducting "precision" bombing of military targets for much of the war, and energetically refuted claims that they were simply bombing cities. In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard, whereas the night bombing campaign targeted cities with area bombardment. Nevertheless, the sheer tonnage of explosive delivered by day and by night was eventually sufficient to cause widespread damage, and, more importantly from a military point of view, force Germany to divert resources to counter it. This was to be the real significance of the Allied strategic bombing campaign—resource allocation.

US operations began with 'Pointblank' attacks, designed to eliminate key features of the German economy. These attacks manifested themselves in the infamous Schweinfurt raids. Formations of self-escorting bombers were no match for German fighters, who inflicted a deadly toll. In despair, the 8th halted air operations over Germany until a long-range fighter could be found. This long-range fighter was the P-51 Mustang, which had the range to fly to Berlin and back.

With the arrival of the brand-new Fifteenth Air Force flying out of Italy, the Command of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe was consolidated into the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). With the addition of the Mustang to its strength the Combined Bomber Offensive was resumed. Planners targeted the Luftwaffe in an operation known as 'Big Week' (20 February - 25 February 1944) and succeeded brilliantly - losses were so heavy that German planners were forced into a hasty dispersal of industry and the day fighter arm never fully recovered.

On 27 March, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued orders that control of all the Allied air forces in Europe, including the strategic bombers, would pass to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, who delegated command to his deputy in SHAEF Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder. There was resistance to this order from some senior figures, including Winston Churchill, but after some debate, control passed to SHAEF on April 1, 1944. When the Combined Bomber Offensive officially ended on April 1, Allied airmen were well on the way to achieving air superiority over all of Europe. While they continued some strategic bombing, the USAAF along with the RAF turned their attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy invasion. It was not until the middle of September that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany again became the priority for the USSTAF.

The twin campaigns—the USAAF by day, the RAF by night—built up into massive bombing of German industrial areas, notably the Ruhr, followed by attacks directly on cities such as Hamburg, Kassel, Pforzheim, Mainz and the more often-criticized bombing of Dresden. During the same time, an air raid over Prague was carried out too.

Effectiveness

Despite its popularity with the military and politicians, strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds because it does not always work reliably, and on moral grounds because of the large civilian casualties that result.

For instance, the Strategic bombing survey conducted by the United States in 1946 determined that German industrial production in aircraft, steel, armor, and other sectors had risen hugely during the war despite strategic bombing. However, the increase in production was far less than German potential, and far less than increases in Britain and the United States. Furthermore, most of the supplies could not reach the battlefronts because of transportation failures caused by the bombing. The tanks that reached the western front in summer 1944 were drawn by oxen because their fuel supply was so limited.

The attacks on oil production, oil refineries and tank farms was however extremely successful and made a very large contribution to the general collapse of Germany in 1945. Speer's major concern was the bombing of oil facilities; however, this occurred sufficiently late in the war that Germany was due to be defeated in any case. Nevertheless, it is fair to say the oil bombing campaign materially shortened the war, thereby saving large numbers of Allied and German lives.

However, German insiders credit the Allied Bombing offensive with severely handicapping them. Albert Speer, Hitler's minister of production, repeatedly said (both during and after the war) that the bombing caused crucial production problems. A particular example comes from Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the U-Boat arm, later the entire Kriegsmarine (and, eventually, the entire Reich from Hitler's suicide to the surrender). Dönitz notes in his memoires that the failure to get the revolutionary type XXI U-boats (which could have completely altered the balance of power in the Battle of the Atlantic) into service was entirely a result of the bombing.

Much of the misunderstanding about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from that oft-stated fact that German industrial production increased throughout the war. While this is true, it fails to note that production also increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. And, in all of those countries, the rate of production increased much more rapidly than Germany. Until late in the war, industry had not been streamlined for war use and German factory workers only worked a single shift. Simply by going to three shifts, production could be tripled with no change to the infrastructure. However, attacks on the infrastructure were taking place. The attacks on Germany's canals and railroads made transportation of materials difficult at best. Increased industrial output in the face of a destroyed transportation infrastructure tends to be ineffective.

Effect on morale

Although designed to "break the enemy's will", the opposite often happened. The British did not crumble under the German Blitz and other air raids early in the war. British workers continued to work throughout the war and food and other basic supplies were available throughout.

In Germany, morale collapsed in the face of the bombing campaign, a campaign far more extensive in effect, scope and duration than that endured by Great Britain. However, the Germans clearly differentiated between morale and conduct. Conduct was more or less unchanged - like in Japan, there were no riots demanding for a German surrender.

Allied Bombing Statistics 1939-45

RAF Bombing Sorties & Losses 1939-45

Night Sorties:     297,663       Losses: 7,449
Day Sorties:        66,851       Losses:   876

RAF & USAAF Bomb Tonnages on Germany 1939-45

Year       RAF Bomber Command    US 8th Air Force

1939              31  tons              -
1940          13,033  tons              -
1941          31,504  tons              -
1942          45,561  tons         1,561  tons
1943         157,457  tons        44,165  tons
1944         525,518  tons       389,119  tons
1945         191,540  tons       188,573  tons

Ref: War In The Air 1939-1945 by Richard Humble - Purnell - 1975

Asia

United States strategic bombing of Japan

The United States strategic bombing of Japan took place between 1942 and 1945.

Conventional bombing

The first U.S. raid the Japanese main island was the Doolittle Raid of April 18, 1942 when sixteen B-25 Mitchells were launched from the USS Hornet (CV-8) to attack targets including Yokohama and Tokyo and then fly on to airfields in China. The raids were military pin-pricks but a significant propaganda victory. Launched prematurely, none of the attacking aircraft reached the designated airfields, either crashing or ditching (except for one aircraft which landed in the Soviet Union, where the crew was interned). Two crews were captured by the Japanese.

The key development for the bombing of Japan was the B-29, which had an operational range of 1500 miles (2,400 km); almost 90% of the bombs dropped on the home islands of Japan were delivered by this type of bomber (147,000 tons). The first raid by B-29s on Japan from China was on June 15, 1944. The planes took off from Chengdu, over 1500 miles away. This first raid was also not particularly damaging to Japan. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s airborne hit the target area; four aborted with mechanical problems, four crashed, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and others bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only one B–29 was lost to enemy aircraft. The first raid from the east was on November 24, 1944 when 88 aircraft bombed Tokyo. The bombs were dropped from around 30,000 feet (10,000 m) and it is estimated that only around 10% of the bombs hit designated targets.

The initial raids were carried out by the Twentieth Air Force operating out of mainland China in Operation Matterhorn under XX Bomber Command. Initially the Twentieth Air Force was under the command of Hap Arnold, and later Curtis LeMay. This was never a satisfactory arrangement because not only were the Chinese airbases difficult to supply via the Hump from India, but the B-29s operating from them could only reach Japan if they substituted some of the bomb load for extra fuel tanks in the bomb-bays. When Admiral Chester Nimitz's island-hopping campaign captured islands close enough to Japan to be within the range of B-29s, the Twentieth Air Force was assigned to XXI Bomber Command which organized a much more effective bombing campaign of the Japanese home islands. Based in the Marianas (Guam and Tinian in particular) the B-29s were now able to carry their full bomb loads.

Unlike all other forces in theater, the Bomber Commands did not report to the commanders of the theaters but directly the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In March 1945 they were placed under the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific which was commanded by General Carl Spaatz.

As in Europe, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) tried daylight precision bombing. However, it proved to be impossible due to the weather around Japan, as bombs dropped from a great height were tossed about by high winds. General LeMay, commander of XXI Bomber Command, instead switched to mass firebombing night attacks from altitudes of around 7,000 feet (2,100 m) on the major conurbations of Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. Despite limited early success, LeMay was determined to use such bombing tactics against the vulnerable Japanese cities. Attacks on strategic targets also continued in lower-level daylight raids.

The first firebombing raid was on Kobe on February 3, 1945, and following its relative success the USAAF continued the tactic. Much of the armor and defensive weaponry of the bombers was also removed to allow increased bomb loads; Japanese air defense in terms of night-fighters and anti-aircraft guns was so feeble it was hardly a risk. The first such raid on Tokyo was on the night of February 23–24 when 174 B-29s destroyed around one square mile (3 km²) of the city. Following on that success 334 B-29s raided on the night of March 9–10, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Around 16 square miles (41 km²) of the city was destroyed and over 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the fire storm. The destruction and damage was at its worst in the city sections east of the Imperial Palace. It was the most destructive conventional raid of the war against Japan. In the following two weeks there were almost 1,600 further sorties against the four cities, destroying 31 square miles (80 km²) in total at a cost of 22 aircraft.

Nuclear bombing

main article Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Japanese bombing

Main articles:

Attack on Pearl Harbor

Air raids on Darwin, February 19, 1942

The Japanese had no doctrine of strategic bombing and did not develop long-range bombers. The Imperial Navy used tactical bombing against enemy airfields and military positions, as at Pearl Harbor. The Imperial army also attacked enemy ships and military installations.

References

• Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (1992)
• Air Ministry. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force. New York: St. Martin's, 1983. official RAF history
• Thomas Coffey. Decision over Schweinfurt. New York: Doubleday, 1977.
• Thomas Coffey. Hap. New York: Viking Press, 1982. biography of Hap Arnold AAF
• Wesley F. Craven and Cate James Lea. The Army Air Forces in World War II. 8 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948- 1958. official AAF history
• Arthur Harris. Bomber Offensive. London: Collins, 1947, memoir
• Max Hastings. Bomber Command. New York: Dial, 1979.
• Lee Kennett . A History of Strategic Bombing. New York: Scribner's, 1982.
• Martin Middlebrook and Everitt Chris. eds. The Bomber Command War Diaries. London: Penguin, 1990.
• Alfred Mierzejewski. The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
• Alan Milward. The German Economy at War. London: University of London Press, 1965
• Stewart Halsey Ross, 2003. Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II. The Myths and the Facts.. Jefferson, North Carolina/London: McFarland & Co, Inc.
• R. J. Overy, The Air War New York: Stein and Day, 1980.
• Dudley Saward. Bomber Harris. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Over-All Report (European War) . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The Defeat of the German Air Force. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.
• Anthony Verrier. The Bomber Offensive. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
• Charless Webster and Frankland Noble. The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany. 4 vols. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961. official British history
• Russell Weigley . Eisenhower's Lieutenants. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

Further reading

• Harry Garretsen, Marc Schramm, Steven BrakmanThe Strategic Bombing of German Cities during World War II and its Impact for Germany (PDF) Discussion Paper Series nr: 03-09 Tjalling, C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University
• Facilis descensus averni est: The Allied Bombing of Germany and the Issue of German Suffering — Detailed article about the bombing of Germany in WWII
• European Air War Timeline

Footnotes

1. Brian Grafton on the website Military History Online
2. Norman Longmate The Bombers:The RAF Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 Pages 309-312

• World War II strategic bombing