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'''Enaction''' as a theory argues that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment;<ref name=Rowlands/> action and perception are directly connected, and "only a creature with certain features – for example, eyes, hands, legs, and skills – can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities".<ref name=RWilson/> The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create through our capacities to enact with that world.<ref name=Rowlands1/> '''Enaction''' as a theory argues that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment;<ref name=Rowlands/> action and perception are directly connected, and "only a creature with certain features – for example, eyes, hands, legs, and skills – can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities".<ref name=RWilson/> The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create through our capacities to enact with that world.<ref name=Rowlands1/>


In a 2012 article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.<ref name=Ward/> They place enaction as one part of a wider context for cognition as being enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended.<ref name=Rowlands/><ref name=Ward/> For convenience, these aspects are sometimes named the ''E′s'', and are parts of several theories of mind which, in various ways, hold that cognition is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, their environment, and their interactions. According to Rowlands, for the theory of enaction to succeed, it must establish a "parity with respect to certain abstract, general features of cognition that will be identified by the mark of the cognitive."<ref name=Rowlands2/> IStapleton and Ward see enaction as central to our cognition and perception.<ref name=Ward/> They place enaction as one part of a wider context for cognition as being enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended.<ref name=Ward/> For convenience, these aspects are sometimes named the ''E′s'', and are parts of several theories of mind which, in various ways, hold that cognition is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, their environment, and their interactions.


The theory sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.<ref name=Rowlands3/> The theory sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.<ref name=Rowlands3/>

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Not to be confused with Enaction or Enactivism.
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Enaction as a theory argues that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment; action and perception are directly connected, and "only a creature with certain features – for example, eyes, hands, legs, and skills – can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities". The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create through our capacities to enact with that world.

IStapleton and Ward see enaction as central to our cognition and perception. They place enaction as one part of a wider context for cognition as being enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. For convenience, these aspects are sometimes named the E′s, and are parts of several theories of mind which, in various ways, hold that cognition is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, their environment, and their interactions.

The theory sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.

The initial emphasis of enaction upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal", but has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions. "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with ts environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction... allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."

Psychology

Main article: Enactivism (psychology)
Enaction states that we catch fast-moving things using sensory feedback, rather than internal computation.

As a subject in philosophy, enaction involves epistemology insofar as it concerns how knowledge can be acquired. As a subject in psychology, enaction has been about what is sometimes called "low-level cognition", things like motor learning, design of the human-machine interface, haptic perception, and psycholinguistics, but the developments of enaction in philosophy are finding wider application in psychology, extending to "high-level cognition" like reasoning, problem-solving, and planning.

The theory emphasises interaction with the environment in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world. The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity.

An enactive view of perception

Alva Noë put forward an enactive view of perception. He wished to address the following issue. We perceive three-dimensional objects, on the basis of two-dimensional input, in a visual image which is clearly not three dimensional. How are we able to directly perceive their solidity and volume, not just their two dimensional outline or image?

Noë explains how we perceive this solidity (or 'volumetricity') by appealing to patterns of sensorimotor expectations. These arise from our agent-active 'movements and interaction' with objects, or 'object-active' changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object's appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us.

His theory has been opposed by several philosophers, notably by Andy Clark. Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach in saying that action constitutes perception, rather than causes it. He also points to internal processing of visual signals, e.g. in the ventral and dorsal pathways, the two-streams hypothesis. This results in an integrated perception of objects (their recognition and location, respectively) yet this processing cannot be described as an action or actions.

See also

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References

  1. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
  2. Robert A Wilson, Lucia Foglia (July 25, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied Cognition: §2.2 Enactive cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  3. Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 70 ff. ISBN 0262014556. Rowlands attributes this idea to D M MacKay (1967). "Ways of looking at perception". In W Watthen-Dunn (ed.). Models for the perception of speech and visual form (Proceedings of a symposium). MIT Press. pp. 25 ff.
  4. ^ Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.
  5. Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 79. ISBN 0262014556.
  6. ^ Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 33 ff. ISBN 978-0262526012. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  7. Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio (1994). "Doing without representing" (PDF). Synthese. 101: 401–434.
  8. Marieke Rohde (2010). "§3.1 The scientist as observing subject". Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press. pp. 30 ff. ISBN 978-9078677239.
  9. John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo (2014). "Introduction". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo, eds (ed.). Enaction (Paperback ed.). MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-52601-2. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  10. McGann, Marek; De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel (June 2013). "Enaction and psychology" (PDF). Review of General Psychology. 17 (2): 203–209. doi:10.1037/a0032935.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  11. Basil Smith. "Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12. Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  13. Alva Noë (2004). Action in perception. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0262140881.
  14. Andy Clark (March 2006). "Vision as Dance? Three Challenges for Sensorimotor Contingency Theory" (PDF). Psyche. 12 (1).

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Further reading

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