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The wolfpack was a convoy attack tactic employed in the Second World War. It was used principally by the U-boats of the Kriegsmarine during the Battle of the Atlantic, and by the submarines of the United States Navy in the war in the Pacific. The idea of a co-ordinated submarine attack on convoys had been proposed during the First World War but had no success.

World War I

During the German war on trade Allied ships travelled independently prior to the introduction of the convoy system, and were vulnerable to attacks by U-boats operating as 'lone wolves'. By gathering up merchant ships into convoys the Admiralty denied them targets and presented a more defensible front if found and attacked. The logical remedy for the U-boat Arm was to gather U-boats similarly into attacking formations.

In early 1917 Hermann Bauer, the Commander of the High Seas U-boats (FdU) proposed establishing patrol lines of U-boats across convoy routes, in order to mass for attack on any convoy reported. These boats would be supported by a forward base on land, and a headquarters and supply vessel, such as the Deutschland class converted U-cruisers equipped with radio and resupplies of fuel and torpedoes. The shore station would monitor radio transmissions and the commander in the HQ boat would co-ordinate the attack.

This proved easier to propose than to carry out, and proved disastrous when tried. In May 1918 six U-boats under the command of KL Rucker, in U-103, were operating in the English Channel; U-103 made contact with a troop convoy, but was rammed and sunk by troopship Olympic before she could attack, while U-70 found convoy HS 38 but managed only one torpedo attack, which missed. Finally, UB 72 was caught on the surface by British submarine D4, torpedoed and sunk. During the period of operation, 19 homeward and 11 outward convoys passed through the patrol area without loss, and two U-boats ( a third of the force) had been destroyed.ref>Tarrant p69-70</ref>

In October 1918 another attempt at a co-ordinated attack was made in the Mediterranean; when two U-boats attempted a co-ordinated attack on a convoy one of them was sunk, and its commander, ObLt. Karl Donitz, was taken prisoner.

Inter war years

During the interwar years the German Navy was forbidden to have U-boats, bur began to re-arm in 1935. Under Donitz as FdU developed pack tactics (Rudeltaktik) based on Bauer’s plan and his own experience, and trials of the new tactics in 1936 proved successful

German submarines in World War II

Karl Dönitz called his strategy of submarine warfare Rudeltaktik, which literally translates as "pack tactic", but referred specifically to the hunting tactics of wolves and submarines were known by their nickname of "graue Wölfe" (grey wolves).

Tactics

U-boat movements were controlled by the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (BdU; English translation: "Commander of Submarines") much more closely than American submarines, which were given tremendous independence once on patrol. Accordingly, U-boats usually patrolled separately, often strung out in co-ordinated lines across likely convoy routes to engage individual merchants and small vulnerable destroyers, only being ordered to congregate after one located a convoy and alerted the BdU, so a Rudel consisted of as many U-boats as could reach the scene of the attack. With the exception of the orders given by the BdU, U-Boat commanders could attack as they saw fit. Often the U-Boat commanders were given a probable number of U-Boats that would show up, and then when they were in contact with the convoy, make call signs to see how many had arrived. If their number were sufficiently high compared to the expected threat of the escorts, they would attack.

Countermeasures

Although the wolfpacks proved a serious threat to Allied shipping, the Allies developed countermeasures to turn the U-boat organization against itself. Most notably was the fact that wolfpacks required extensive radio communication to coordinate the attacks. This left the U-boats vulnerable to a device called the High Frequency Direction Finder (HF/DF or "Huff-Duff"), which allowed Allied naval forces to determine the location of the enemy boats transmitting and attack them. Also, effective air cover, both long-range planes with radar, and escort carriers and blimps, allowed U-boats to be spotted as they shadowed a convoy (waiting for the cover of night to attack).

American submarines in World War II

American wolfpacks, officially called coordinated attack groups, usually comprised three boats that patrolled in close company and organized before they left port under the command of the senior captain of the three. "Swede" Momsen devised the tactics and led the first American wolfpack – composed of Cero (SS-225), Shad (SS-235), and Grayback (SS-208) – from Midway on 1 October 1943.

Cold War

Wolfpacks fell out of use during the Cold War; modern submarines have far better weapons and underwater speed than those of World War II, so there is no need for them to operate in large groups. Instead, the United States Navy deploys its attack submarines on individual patrols, with the exception of one or (rarely) two attack submarines in each carrier strike group.

American ballistic missile submarines have always operated alone, while Soviet ballistic missile submarines operated in well-protected bastions.

Post-Cold War

With the opening shots of the Iraq War in March, 2003, the term "wolfpack" was brought back into use to describe the fleet of American and British nuclear submarines which operated together in the Red Sea, firing Tomahawk missiles at Iraqi targets. USS Providence was the first boat to fire its entire load of missiles and earn the nickname "Big Dog of the Red Sea Wolf Pack."

Recently the phrase "wolfpack" has been applied to possible Iranian missile boat tactics in the event of a hypothetical clash with the U.S. Navy; a massive attack of small boats armed with missiles and torpedoes on a single ship, or even a few ships, in order to overrun or saturate the Aegis defense system. Such attacks allow the possibility of effective sacrificial boat deployment.

See also

• List of wolfpacks of World War II
• Convoy SC 7 for an account of one of the first Allied convoys to suffer a wolfpack attack

References

1. Tarrant p58
2. Tarrant p80
3. Blair p38
4. Blair p44
5. Der Weg zu den "Grauen Wölfen, by Wolfgang Meyer. P.82"

• Peter Maas, The Terrible Hours: The Man Behind the Greatest Submarine Rescue in History (HarperCollins New York, 1999)
• E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds; Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960)

• Naval warfare tactics
• Wolfpacks of World War II
• World War II submarines of Germany
• World War II submarines of the United States
• Military units and formations of the Kriegsmarine
• Military units and formations of the United States Navy in World War II