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| {{ColdWar}} | {{ColdWar}} | ||
| The '''Origins of the Cold War''' are widely regarded to lie most directly within the immediate post-] relations between the ]s of the ] and the ] in the years 1945 |
The '''Origins of the Cold War''' are widely regarded to lie most directly within the immediate post-] relations between the ]s of the ] and the ] in the years ] - ], leading to the developed ] that endured until the collapse of the Soviet Union in ]. | ||
| Events preceding the World War |
Events preceding the Second World War and extending as far back as the ] of late ] and the subsequent ] are also considered by many historians as underlying the more extended origins of the Cold War. | ||
| == Major schools == | |||
| Three distinct periods have existed in the Western scholarship of the Cold War: the orthodox, the revisionist, and the post-revisionist. For more than a decade after the end of World War II, few American historians saw any reason to challenge the conventional "orthodox" interpretation of the beginning of the Cold War: that the breakdown of relations was a direct result of ]'s violation of the accords of the ], the imposition of Soviet-dominated governments on an unwilling Eastern Europe, Soviet intransigence and aggressive Soviet expansionism. They would point out that ] theory rejected ], while prescribing a worldwide ] and argue that this stance made conflict inevitable. Organizations, such as the ], were regarded as actively working for the overthrow of all Western governments. | |||
| Later ] revisionist historians were influenced by Marxist theory. ] in his 1959 ''The Tragedy of American Diplomacy'' and ] in his 1967 ''America, France and the Cold War, 1945–1967'' argued that the Cold War was an inevitable outgrowth of conflicting American and Russian economic interests. Some new left revisionist historians have argued that U.S. policy of containment as expressed in the ] was at least equally responsible, if not more so, than Soviet seizure of Poland and other states. Some date the onset of the Cold War to the ], regarding the U.S. use of nuclear weapons as a warning to the Soviet Union, which was about to join the war against the nearly defeated Japan. In short, historians have disagreed as to who was responsible for the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet relations and whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable. This revisionist approach reached its height during the ] when many began to view the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as morally comparable empires. | |||
| In the later years of the Cold War, there were attempts to forge a "post-revisionist" ] by historians. Prominent post-revisionist historians include ]. Rather than attribute the beginning of the Cold War to the actions of either superpower, post-revisionist historians have focused on mutual misperception, mutual reactivity and shared responsibility between the leaders of the superpowers. Gaddis perceives the origins of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union less as the lone fault of one side or the other and more as the result of a plethora of conflicting interests and misperceptions between the two superpowers, propelled by domestic politics and bureaucratic inertia. ] contends that ] and ] acted, on the whole, thoughtfully in meeting what was understandably perceived to be a potentially serious threat from a totalitarian communist regime that was ruthless at home and that might be threatening abroad. Borrowing from the ] school of international relations, the post-revisionists essentially accepted U.S. European policy in Europe, such as aid to Greece in 1947 and the ]. According to this synthesis, "Communist activity" was not the root of the difficulties of Europe, but rather a consequence of the disruptive effects of World War II on the economic, political and social structure of Europe, which threatened to drastically alter the balance of power in a manner favorable to the U.S.S.R. | |||
| The end of the Cold War opened many of the archives of the Communist states, providing documentation that orthodox historians have cited as evidence for their position. Gaddis has written that ]'s "authoritarian, paranoid and narcissistic predisposition" locked the Cold War into place. "Stalin alone pursued personal security by depriving everyone else of it: no Western leader relied on terror to the extent that he did. He alone had transformed his country into an extension of himself: no Western leader could have succeeded at such a feat and none attempted it. He alone saw war and revolution as acceptable means with which to pursue ultimate ends: no Western leader associated violence with progress to the extent that he did." | |||
| ==Tsarist Russia and the West == | ==Tsarist Russia and the West == | ||
| A few scholars have traced the origins of the East-West conflict well before the ]. World System theorists have argued that Russia was late to be absorbed by the capitalist world-system, and only in its periphery or semi-periphery upon the ], leaving it ripe for a radical break with capitalism. Some scholars even argue that East and West are fundamentally different civilizations. Among scholars in the latter camp, many have argued that Eastern Orthodox Slavs are heir to the Byzantine tradition. Others point out aspects of the ] cultural heritage, Asiatic influence, and a fundamentally different political culture shaped by rule of the ]. | A few scholars have traced the origins of the East-West conflict well before the ]. World System theorists have argued that Russia was late to be absorbed by the capitalist world-system, and only in its periphery or semi-periphery upon the ], leaving it ripe for a radical break with capitalism. Some scholars even argue that East and West are fundamentally different civilizations. Among scholars in the latter camp, many have argued that Eastern Orthodox Slavs are heir to the Byzantine tradition. Others point out aspects of the ] cultural heritage, Asiatic influence, and a fundamentally different political culture shaped by rule of the ]. | ||
| Others have argued that geographical causes would lead to intractable conflict. They see the states of the North Atlantic and East Asia as being fundamentally maritime powers based on trade and openness, while the states of Central Eurasia, most notably Russia, were land-based powers based on large armies and centralized control. | Others have argued that geographical causes would lead to intractable conflict. They see the states of the North Atlantic and East Asia as being fundamentally maritime powers based on trade and openness, while the states of Central Eurasia, most notably Russia, were land-based powers based on large armies and centralized control. | ||
| Imperial rivalry between the ] and Tsarist ] would foreshadow the East-West tensions of the Cold War. Throughout the 19th century, improving Russia's maritime access was a perennial aim of the tsars' foreign policy; impeding it was a perennial obsession of the UK's. Despite Russia's vast size, most of its ten thousand miles of seacoast was frozen over most of the year or controlled by other powers, particularly in the ] and ] Seas. The British had been determined since the ] in the 1850s to slow Russian expansion at the expense of ], the "]." |
Imperial rivalry between the ] and Tsarist ] would foreshadow the East-West tensions of the Cold War. Throughout the 19th century, improving Russia's maritime access was a perennial aim of the tsars' foreign policy; impeding it was a perennial obsession of the UK's. Despite Russia's vast size, most of its ten thousand miles of seacoast was frozen over most of the year or controlled by other powers, particularly in the ] and ] Seas. The British had been determined since the ] in the 1850s to slow Russian expansion at the expense of ], the "]." After the completion of the ] in 1869, the prospects of seizing a portion of the Ottoman seacoast on the ], whereby it could threaten the strategic waterway, were all the more mortifying to the British. The close proximity of the Tsar's territorially expanding empire in Central Asia to ] also terrified South Asia's British imperial overlords, triggering a series of quixotic British adventures in ]. Fears over Russia, however, subsided following Russia's stunning defeat in the ] in 1905. Some historians have noted that the British long exaggerated the strength of the relatively backward sprawling empire, which in hindsight was probably concerned with trade and securing its frontiers, not threatening Western interests. Some historians have even noted the parallels to the post-] period, when, again, the West exaggerated Russian "expansionism" in Eastern Europe, which, like the territorial growth of imperial ], was probably motivated by securing vulnerable frontiers. | ||
| Strategic rivalry between the United States and Russia—both huge, sprawling nations—goes back to the 1890s when, after a century of friendship, Americans and Russians became rivals over the development of ]. Tsarist Russia, unable to compete industrially, sought to close off and colonize parts of East Asia, while Americans demanded open competition for markets. | Strategic rivalry between the United States and Russia—both huge, sprawling nations—goes back to the 1890s when, after a century of friendship, Americans and Russians became rivals over the development of ]. Tsarist Russia, unable to compete industrially, sought to close off and colonize parts of East Asia, while Americans demanded open competition for markets. | ||
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| ].]] | ].]] | ||
| ==Bolshevik Revolution== | ==Bolshevik Revolution== | ||
| {{main|Bolshevik Revolution}} | {{main|Bolshevik Revolution}} | ||
| In 1917 |
In 1917 after a coup of the revolutionary democratic government by the ]s in Russia the rivalry gained an intensely ideological component. The United States did not even establish relations with the new Soviet government until 1933. The western allies never forgot that the Soviet government negotiated ] with ] in the ] in 1918, leaving the Western Allies to fight the ] alone. Lasting Russian mistrust stemmed from the landing of western troops in Soviet Russia in 1918, who became involved, directly and indirectly, in assisting the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the ]. This helped solidify lasting suspicions among Soviet leadership of the capitalist world. | ||
| The West saw the Soviet system as a threat. In Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States, there were strong socialist and communist movements that threatened the ]. The ] nature of Soviet communism also concerned many. Up until the mid-1930s, both the United Kingdom and the United States believed the Soviet Union to be a much greater threat than ] and focused most of their intelligence efforts against it. ] suspected that the policy of ] was primarily directed at pushing Germany towards the east and into a conflict with the USSR, as a way of exhausting both powers. The exclusion of Soviet negotiators from the ] only increased Stalin's suspicion. The USSR sought to evade the Nazi threat by signing the ], an act which shocked Western countries. | The West saw the Soviet system as a threat. In Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States, there were strong socialist and communist movements that threatened the ]. The ] nature of Soviet communism also concerned many. Up until the mid-1930s, both the United Kingdom and the United States believed the Soviet Union to be a much greater threat than ] and focused most of their intelligence efforts against it. ] suspected that the policy of ] was primarily directed at pushing Germany towards the east and into a conflict with the USSR, as a way of exhausting both powers. The exclusion of Soviet negotiators from the ] only increased Stalin's suspicion. The USSR sought to evade the Nazi threat by signing the ], an act which shocked Western countries. | ||
| == The wartime alliance == | == The wartime alliance == | ||
| ⚫ | When ] broke his alliance with Stalin and attacked the Soviet Union, the Soviets and the Western Allies quickly put their past tensions behind them and cooperated. Most notably, the United States shipped vast quantities of ] materiel to the Soviets, keeping their war effort alive. Britain and the USSR signed a formal alliance, but the US did not join in. Everything was handled on the personal level by Roosevelt and his top aides. | ||
| ] | |||
| ⚫ | When ] broke his |
||
| On one hand, before the war the Soviets had stunned the world by signing the ] with ] Germany, and then participated in the dividing up of Eastern Europe. On the other, the Soviets were annoyed at having to the bear the brunt of the Axis alliance since 1941, despite calls for the Allies to open a second front in Europe, which did not occur until June 1944. In the meantime, the Russians suffered heavy casualties, with as many as twenty million dead. The allies responded by saying that they had opened a second front in ] during 1943 and could not invade France immediately. | On one hand, before the war the Soviets had stunned the world by signing the ] with ] Germany, and then participated in the dividing up of Eastern Europe. On the other, the Soviets were annoyed at having to the bear the brunt of the Axis alliance since 1941, despite calls for the Allies to open a second front in Europe, which did not occur until June 1944. In the meantime, the Russians suffered heavy casualties, with as many as twenty million dead. The allies responded by saying that they had opened a second front in ] during 1943 and could not invade France immediately. | ||
| Throughout the war, mutual distrust was always present. The United States and the United Kingdom did not tell Stalin about breakthroughs such as ], the decoding of German ]. Stalin suspected that the West would stand by and watch Germany defeat the USSR right up to the Invasion of Normandy. However, a mutual interest in the need to defeat a still powerful Germany was enough to keep a functioning alliance. This changed when ] died with victory in sight. His vice president ], an amateur in foreign affairs, was "not up on all details" as he himself admitted. His failure to inform Stalin of the decision to drop the ], which was scheduled right after the ], was seen as a deep personal insult. The Soviets had gained knowledge of these U.S programs through elaborate Soviet spy rings that had continued to operate during the wartime alliance. | Throughout the war, mutual distrust was always present. The United States and the United Kingdom did not tell Stalin about breakthroughs such as ], the decoding of German ]. Stalin suspected that the West would stand by and watch Germany defeat the USSR right up to the Invasion of Normandy. However, a mutual interest in the need to defeat a still powerful Germany was enough to keep a functioning alliance. This changed when ] died with victory in sight. His vice president ], an amateur in foreign affairs, was "not up on all details" as he himself admitted. His failure to inform Stalin of the decision to drop the ], which was scheduled right after the ], was seen as a deep personal insult. The Soviets had gained knowledge of these U.S programs through elaborate Soviet spy rings that had continued to operate during the wartime alliance. | ||
| ==Allied conferences== | ==Allied conferences== | ||
| ] | ] | ||
| A number of ] between the "]" contributed directly to the start of the Cold War. | A number of ] between the "]" contributed directly to the start of the Cold War. | ||
| The ] of 22 |
The ] of 22-26 November, ], held in ], capital of ], addressed the Allied position against Japan during World War II and made decisions about postwar ]. The meeting was attended by President ] of the United States, Prime Minister ] of the ], and Generalissimo ] of the ]. | ||
| The ] was the meeting of ], Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill between 28 November and 1 December 1943 that took place in ], ]. It was the first war conference among the three world powers in which Stalin was present. The chief discussion was centered on the opening of a second front in ]. At the same time |
The ] was the meeting of ], Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill between 28 November and 1 December 1943 that took place in ], ]. It was the first war conference among the three world powers in which Stalin was present. The chief discussion was centered on the opening of a second front in ]. At the same time a separate protocol pledged the three countries to recognize Iran's independence. Most importantly the conference was organized to plan the final strategy for the war against Nazi Germany and its allies. | ||
| The ] was the wartime meeting from February 4 to 11, 1945 between the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The delegations were headed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, respectively. | The ] was the wartime meeting from February 4 to 11, ] between the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The delegations were headed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, respectively. | ||
| The ] was a conference held at Cecilienhof in ], ] (near ]), from 17 July to 2 August 1945. The participants were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the largest and most powerful of the victorious Allies that defeated the ] in World War II. The heads of government of these three nations—Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister ], and President Harry S. Truman, respectively. Stalin, Churchill, and Truman—as well as Clement Attlee, who replaced Churchill after the Labour Party's defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election—had gathered to decide how to administer the defeated Nazi Germany, which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier, on ] (V-E Day). The goals of the conference also included the establishment of post-war order, peace treaties issues, and countering the effects of war. | The ] was a conference held at Cecilienhof in ], ] (near ]), from 17 July to 2 August 1945. The participants were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the largest and most powerful of the victorious Allies that defeated the ] in World War II. The heads of government of these three nations—Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister ], and President Harry S. Truman, respectively. Stalin, Churchill, and Truman—as well as Clement Attlee, who replaced Churchill after the Labour Party's defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election—had gathered to decide how to administer the defeated Nazi Germany, which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier, on ] (V-E Day). The goals of the conference also included the establishment of post-war order, peace treaties issues, and countering the effects of war. | ||
| ==Postwar warning== | |||
| ] | |||
| On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill, while at ] in ], ], gave a speech which he considered to be the most important of his career:<ref>Charmley J. Churchill's Grand Alliance. The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-1957. New York -London, 1995, p. 223.</ref>{{cquote|From ] in the ] to ] in the ] an "]" has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. ], ], ], ], ], ], ] and ]; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.}} A week later, Stalin in an interview with the Russian newspaper ''Pravda'' placed Churchill in the same category as Hitler and declared that Churchill's speech incited the West to begin a war with USSR<ref>Stalin Interview With Pravda on Churchill. The The New York Times, 1946, March 14, p. 6.</ref>. | |||
| In his speech, Churchill noted that in order to assure the ''safety and welfare, the freedom and progress'' of all the world's peoples, ''... they must be shielded from the two giant marauders, war and tyranny... The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power'', and has a unique ''awe-inspiring accountability to the future.'' Addressing the president of the United States, Churchill warned that the freedoms available to the citizens of United States and United Kingdom do not exist in many countries, even the ones possessing considerable military power. In Churchill's opinion, the only instrument capable of preventing war and destroying tyranny, was ''the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples...a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.'' <ref>Winston Churchill and the Sinews of Peace Address http://www.hpol.org/churchill/</ref> | |||
| ==Origin of the term "Cold War"== | |||
| The earliest documented use of the term "cold war" to describe the relationship between nations that exist in a state of being on a brink of war is in the essay "You and The Atomic Bomb"<ref>You and The Atomic Bomb http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/abombs.html</ref> written by ]. The usage did not become mainstream until it was popularized by ], an American financier and an adviser to ] during a congressional debate in 1947<ref>http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9024721</ref> | |||
| ==External links== | |||
| * Portal to topic documents | |||
| * Portal to topic documents | |||
| * The division of Germany | |||
| * Recording of ]'s speech in 5, March, 1946, warning about the advance of communism in central Europe. | |||
| * The 1944 division of Europe between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom into zones of influence. | |||
| ==References== | |||
| <div class="references-small"><references/> | |||
| ==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
| *], ''The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941 |
*], ''The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947'', Columbia University Press, 1972. ISBN 0231083025 (pbk) ISBN 0231032897 (hbk) | ||
| *Yergin, Daniel, ''Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State'', Houghton Mifflin, 1977. ISBN |
*Yergin, Daniel, ''Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State'', Houghton Mifflin, 1977. ISBN 0395246709 | ||
| {{Cold War history}} | {{Template:Cold War history}} | ||
| ] | ] | ||
| ] | |||
Revision as of 05:54, 11 January 2007
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The Origins of the Cold War are widely regarded to lie most directly within the immediate post-World War II relations between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union in the years 1945 - 1947, leading to the developed Cold War that endured until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Events preceding the Second World War and extending as far back as the Bolshevik Revolution of late 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War are also considered by many historians as underlying the more extended origins of the Cold War.
Tsarist Russia and the West
A few scholars have traced the origins of the East-West conflict well before the Bolshevik Revolution. World System theorists have argued that Russia was late to be absorbed by the capitalist world-system, and only in its periphery or semi-periphery upon the Bolshevik Revolution, leaving it ripe for a radical break with capitalism. Some scholars even argue that East and West are fundamentally different civilizations. Among scholars in the latter camp, many have argued that Eastern Orthodox Slavs are heir to the Byzantine tradition. Others point out aspects of the Slavic cultural heritage, Asiatic influence, and a fundamentally different political culture shaped by rule of the tsar.
Others have argued that geographical causes would lead to intractable conflict. They see the states of the North Atlantic and East Asia as being fundamentally maritime powers based on trade and openness, while the states of Central Eurasia, most notably Russia, were land-based powers based on large armies and centralized control.
Imperial rivalry between the United Kingdom and Tsarist Russia would foreshadow the East-West tensions of the Cold War. Throughout the 19th century, improving Russia's maritime access was a perennial aim of the tsars' foreign policy; impeding it was a perennial obsession of the UK's. Despite Russia's vast size, most of its ten thousand miles of seacoast was frozen over most of the year or controlled by other powers, particularly in the Baltic and Black Seas. The British had been determined since the Crimean War in the 1850s to slow Russian expansion at the expense of Ottoman Turkey, the "sick man of Europe." After the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, the prospects of seizing a portion of the Ottoman seacoast on the Mediterranean, whereby it could threaten the strategic waterway, were all the more mortifying to the British. The close proximity of the Tsar's territorially expanding empire in Central Asia to India also terrified South Asia's British imperial overlords, triggering a series of quixotic British adventures in Afghanistan. Fears over Russia, however, subsided following Russia's stunning defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Some historians have noted that the British long exaggerated the strength of the relatively backward sprawling empire, which in hindsight was probably concerned with trade and securing its frontiers, not threatening Western interests. Some historians have even noted the parallels to the post-World War II period, when, again, the West exaggerated Russian "expansionism" in Eastern Europe, which, like the territorial growth of imperial Russia, was probably motivated by securing vulnerable frontiers.
Strategic rivalry between the United States and Russia—both huge, sprawling nations—goes back to the 1890s when, after a century of friendship, Americans and Russians became rivals over the development of Manchuria. Tsarist Russia, unable to compete industrially, sought to close off and colonize parts of East Asia, while Americans demanded open competition for markets.
Many believe the Cold War was an inevitable conflict between the two continent-sized states, each with huge reserves of manpower and natural resources who were destined to compete for world preeminence.
Bolshevik Revolution
Main article: Bolshevik RevolutionIn 1917 after a coup of the revolutionary democratic government by the Bolsheviks in Russia the rivalry gained an intensely ideological component. The United States did not even establish relations with the new Soviet government until 1933. The western allies never forgot that the Soviet government negotiated a separate peace with Germany in the First World War in 1918, leaving the Western Allies to fight the Central Powers alone. Lasting Russian mistrust stemmed from the landing of western troops in Soviet Russia in 1918, who became involved, directly and indirectly, in assisting the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the civil war. This helped solidify lasting suspicions among Soviet leadership of the capitalist world.
The West saw the Soviet system as a threat. In Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States, there were strong socialist and communist movements that threatened the status quo. The atheistic nature of Soviet communism also concerned many. Up until the mid-1930s, both the United Kingdom and the United States believed the Soviet Union to be a much greater threat than Nazi Germany and focused most of their intelligence efforts against it. Stalin suspected that the policy of appeasement was primarily directed at pushing Germany towards the east and into a conflict with the USSR, as a way of exhausting both powers. The exclusion of Soviet negotiators from the Munich Agreement only increased Stalin's suspicion. The USSR sought to evade the Nazi threat by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an act which shocked Western countries.
The wartime alliance
When Hitler broke his alliance with Stalin and attacked the Soviet Union, the Soviets and the Western Allies quickly put their past tensions behind them and cooperated. Most notably, the United States shipped vast quantities of Lend Lease materiel to the Soviets, keeping their war effort alive. Britain and the USSR signed a formal alliance, but the US did not join in. Everything was handled on the personal level by Roosevelt and his top aides. On one hand, before the war the Soviets had stunned the world by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany, and then participated in the dividing up of Eastern Europe. On the other, the Soviets were annoyed at having to the bear the brunt of the Axis alliance since 1941, despite calls for the Allies to open a second front in Europe, which did not occur until June 1944. In the meantime, the Russians suffered heavy casualties, with as many as twenty million dead. The allies responded by saying that they had opened a second front in Italy during 1943 and could not invade France immediately.
Throughout the war, mutual distrust was always present. The United States and the United Kingdom did not tell Stalin about breakthroughs such as Ultra, the decoding of German cyphers. Stalin suspected that the West would stand by and watch Germany defeat the USSR right up to the Invasion of Normandy. However, a mutual interest in the need to defeat a still powerful Germany was enough to keep a functioning alliance. This changed when Franklin D. Roosevelt died with victory in sight. His vice president Harry Truman, an amateur in foreign affairs, was "not up on all details" as he himself admitted. His failure to inform Stalin of the decision to drop the atomic bomb, which was scheduled right after the Potsdam Conference, was seen as a deep personal insult. The Soviets had gained knowledge of these U.S programs through elaborate Soviet spy rings that had continued to operate during the wartime alliance.
Allied conferences
A number of wartime and immediate post-war conferences between the "Big Three" contributed directly to the start of the Cold War.
The Cairo Conference of 22-26 November, 1943, held in Cairo, capital of Egypt, addressed the Allied position against Japan during World War II and made decisions about postwar Asia. The meeting was attended by President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China.
The Tehran Conference was the meeting of Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill between 28 November and 1 December 1943 that took place in Tehran, Iran. It was the first war conference among the three world powers in which Stalin was present. The chief discussion was centered on the opening of a second front in Western Europe. At the same time a separate protocol pledged the three countries to recognize Iran's independence. Most importantly the conference was organized to plan the final strategy for the war against Nazi Germany and its allies.
The Yalta Conference was the wartime meeting from February 4 to 11, 1945 between the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The delegations were headed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, respectively.
The Potsdam Conference was a conference held at Cecilienhof in Potsdam, Germany (near Berlin), from 17 July to 2 August 1945. The participants were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the largest and most powerful of the victorious Allies that defeated the Axis Powers in World War II. The heads of government of these three nations—Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and President Harry S. Truman, respectively. Stalin, Churchill, and Truman—as well as Clement Attlee, who replaced Churchill after the Labour Party's defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election—had gathered to decide how to administer the defeated Nazi Germany, which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier, on 8 May (V-E Day). The goals of the conference also included the establishment of post-war order, peace treaties issues, and countering the effects of war.
Further reading
- Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, Columbia University Press, 1972. ISBN 0231083025 (pbk) ISBN 0231032897 (hbk)
- Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, Houghton Mifflin, 1977. ISBN 0395246709