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Operation Charnwood
Part of Operation Overlord, Battle of Normandy
Troops pick their way through the rubble of Caen
Date 7–9 July 1944 Location Normandy, France Result Allied Tactical Victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom  Canada	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Miles Dempsey John Crocker	Heinrich Eberbach Sepp Dietrich
Strength
3 Infantry Divisions 3 armoured brigades	1 Panzer Division 1 Infantry Division 61 tanks
Casualties and losses
3,817 casualties ~80 tanks	Over 2,000 casualties 18 –32 tanks
3–400 French civillian casualties

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Operation Charnwood was an offensive mounted by the British Second Army during the Normandy campaign of World War II. The operation was one of several major offensives conducted in an attempt to seize the city of Caen, a D-Day objective for the Second Army. Tactically, the offensive was partially successful, as areas of Caen west of the Orne were taken; however, the rest of the city, including the important Colombelles steel works, remained in German hands. Strategically, the operation contributed to the German belief that the main Allied offensive would be launched in the British Second Army sector.

Background

The town of Caen in Normandy was one of the D-Day objectives for the British 3rd Infantry Division that landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944. The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", has been described by historian L F Ellis as the most important D-Day objective assigned to Lieutenant-General Crockers's I Corps. Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, in order to acquire airfields and protect the left flank of the United States First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing right to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River. The terrain between Caen and Vimont was especially promising, being open, dry and conducive to swift offensive operations. Since the Allied forces greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, transforming the battle into a more fluid fast-moving battle was to their advantage.

Hampered by congestion on the Sword Beachhead and unable to deploy much of its armoured support against the German 21st Panzer Division, the 3rd Infantry Division was unable to assault Caen in force and was brought to a halt short of the outskirts of the city. Follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified with the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division in the sector. Abandoning the direct approach, Operation Perch—a pincer attack by the I and XXX Corps—was launched on 7 June 1944, with the intention of encircling Caen from the east and west. I Corps, striking south of the Orne River, was halted by the 21st Panzer Division, while XXX Corps' attack stalled near Tilly-sur-Seulles west of Caen, facing heavy opposition from the Panzer Lehr Division. In an effort to force the Panzer Lehr to withdraw, the British 7th Armoured Division attacked through a gap in the German line towards Villers-Bocage. The resulting day-long tank battle on 13 June 1944 saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town, though the Panzer Lehr Division withdraw several days later when XXX Corps captured Tilly-sur-Seulles on 19 June.

On 26 June 1944, the next offensive was launched. Codenamed Operation Epsom. VIII Corps would attack to the west of Caen on a 4-mile (6.4 km) front between Carpiquet and Rauray, south across the River Odon and the Orne to capture the high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize and encircle Caen. The attack was preceded by Operation Martlet (also known as Operation Dauntless) which, was to secure VIII Corps flank by capturing the high ground on the right of their axis of advance. Although the Germans managed to contain the offensive, to do so they had been obliged to commit all their available strength, including two SS panzer divisions newly arrived in Normandy and earmarked for a planned offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux. On 4 July 1944, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division launched Operation Windsor, designed to capture Carpiquet and the adjacent airfield from the 12th SS Panzer Division. Although Carpiquet was taken on 5 July 1944, the airfield remained under German control.

With the strategic value of Caen lessening in the eyes of Army Group B's command, Rundstedt directed on 1 July 1944 that Caen should be gradually abandoned by German defenders, with the intent of shifting the bulk of the German Panzer Divisions to the American front. Hitler responded by dismissing Rundstedt from command of Army Group B, replacing him with Field-Marshal Gunther von Kluge. Learning of this, Allied commanders ordered Bernard Montgomery to draw up an offensive with two purposes: to capture Caen permanently from German forces, and to prevent a large-scale redeployment of German forces from the Anglo-Canadian to American fronts.

Planning and preparation

Allied planning and preparation

Having failed to take Caen through successive flanking manoeuvres, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of all Allied ground forces in Normandy, chose to plan the next major offensive against Caen as a frontal assault against the city's defences. Though the strategic importance of Caen had vastly diminished since D-Day, Montgomery sought control of Bourguébus and the surrounding high ground to the south. A directive on 30 June shifted control of Caumont to Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of the United States First Army, and allowed the 7th Armoured Division to be relocated to the Caen sector. Eager for progress against Caen, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF), met with Winston Churchill to convince Montgomery to accelerate his plans for the capture of Caen. Aware of growing concern within the AEF over the Caen sector, Montgomery began to design Operation Charnwood, scheduled to begin on the morning of 8 July 1944.

A directive by Montgomery to Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, on 1 July 1944 ordered Dempsey to prepare to execute the first phase of the final capture of Caen: A frontal assault by John Crocker's I Corps—consisting of the 3rd Infantry Division, 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division, and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions—against Caen's defenses. On 3 July 1944, Bradley attacked St. Lô in preparation for the First US Army's own breakout in the sector. In light of the partial Canadian success during Operation Windsor, Montgomery prepared to go ahead with Operation Charnwood against Caen's defenses.

For the preliminary bombardment of Caen, Montgomery enlisted the support of the Allied strategic bomber command. To assist in the long-range bombardment of German defenses, 450 heavy bombers would attack Caen—primarily with delayed-action bombs—to clear the city of defensive positions in preparation for I Corps' assault. Additional support would be provided by the 16-inch guns of the British battleship Rodney. The artillery regiments of five divisions were tasked by Dempsey and Crocker to strike at known German defensive positions—some 656 artillery guns in total. In all, it was planned that 2 000 tons of bombs would be dropped on Caen before the infantry assault began. Due to the bombed area's proximity to Montgomery's command, and the risk of hitting Allied infantry as a by-product, the target zone was shifted 6,000 yards (5,500 m) to the south, bypassing most of the main German defenses between the British front lines and Caen.

Following a one-day saturation bombardment of Caen, the three infantry divisions of I Corps were to attack through the fortified villages in their path and directly into the northern edge of Caen. To the west, the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, with supporting armour, renewed the fighting to capture Hill 112 in a new operation codenamed Operation Jupiter. It was hoped that the saturation bombing of Caen would enable I Corps to move through the entirety of Caen and towards the Verrières and Bourguébus ridges to the south, thereby preparing the British Second Army for a breakout towards Falaise.

German planning and preparation

The defense of Caen fell to two divisions—one armoured and one infantry. The 12th SS Panzer Division, under the command of Kurt Meyer, still possessed 61 tanks for the defense of Caen. The 12th SS held the approach from the northwest of Caen, defending Carpiquet facing the 3rd Canadian and 59th British Infantry Divisions. The 12th SS had at its disposal three primary regiments. On the western flank of German positions around Caen, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment concentrated its defense in the area around Carpiquet Airfield and Franqueville, armed with limited tanks and mortar batteries. The 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and the 12th SS Panzer Regiment held positions north of those of the 26th, with the 12th's overall command centered in Ardenne Abbey. The second formation—the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division—held the villages to the immediate north of Caen and to the east of the Orne River; its single regiment north of Caen was centered around Lebisey.

Preliminary attacks

On the night of 7 July 1944, 450 Lancaster and Halifax bombers of the Royal Air Force—half of the available strength of Bomber Command at the time—attacked Caen, dropping over 2,000 tons of delayed-fuse bombs on the city. The bombing, though designed to clear Caen of German defenses, failed to destroy German armour and infantry positions to the north of Caen. The pathfinders of No. 625 Squadron, tasked with laying the target-markers over Caen, were instructed not to let the target zone "drift back", as was the tendency among bombing missions in Normandy at the time. In many cases, the targets were dropped farther than planned, pushing the bombed zone back even farther into Caen and away from German defenses. By 22:00, the bombing raid had ended, leaving 80% of the northern sector of Caen destroyed. The Caen University was particularly hard-hit, starting chemical fires that soon spread to other parts of the city. At 23:00 on 7 July, the 636 artillery guns of the 3rd Canadian Infantry, 59th Infantry and 3rd Infantry Divisions opened fire on German defenses, with the added guns of the Rodney and other support ships adding additional support. The prolonged bombardment was intensified by the addition of artillery from the VII Corps, targeting the defensive villages north of Caen in an effort to eliminate German strongpoints before the infantry assault began.

8 July

At 04:30 on 8 July 1944, the artillery regiments of I and VIII Corps shifted their fire deeper into German defensive positions on the lines of the 3rd Canadian and 59th Infantry Divisions. As the advance towards Caen began, the barrage slowly shifted forward, concentrating its fire on positions in front of the advancing infantry and armour. The 59th and 3rd Canadian Divisions advanced on a two-brigade front, which translated to two battalions and supporting armour per brigade. By 07:30, when Crocker ordered the second phase of the operation to begin, neither division had managed to reach its objectives. The second phase was begun with the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment still in control of the higher-ground to the east of the 59th and 3rd Canadian divisions. To the east the British 3rd Infantry Division attacked Lebisey, rapidly pushing through the weak defenses of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and towards Caen. Fighting in the 3rd Division sector intensified near the village of Herouville, as the 3rd Infantry Division continued to push towards Caen.

Concerned about the state of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, General Heinrich Eberbach—commander of Panzer Group West, ordered the 21st Panzer Division to redeploy northeast of Caen in support of the 16th against the 3rd Infantry Division. When an attempt was made to shift the Panzers across the Caen Canal, a strong naval barrage was directed against them. Facing the possibility of heavy losses, the 21st Panzer was unable to advance in support of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division.

To the west, the 59th Infantry Division was facing much more resistance from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment in Galmanche and la Bijude. The 176th Infantry Brigade of the 59th Division had particularly heavy casualties in la Bijude, with one infantry company losing all of its senior officers when German flak batteries prevented armoured support from reaching the village. By noon, the 197th Brigade had bypassed the fighting Galmanche and pushed on to St-Contest. The capture of Authie by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division later in the day enabled the assault on St-Contest to capture the town as Phase 3 of the operation began.

On the western flank of the operation, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had heavy fighting in Buron, with units of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade attacking 200 men of the 12th SS with support from the 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment. By noon Buron had been captured. The assault companies of the 9th Brigade lost 60% casualties. South of Buron, a counterattack by Panther tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment was defeated by the 62nd Antitank Regiment, destroying 13 German tanks in the most successful antitank engagement of the campaign. To the west, Gruchy was captured with relative ease, with the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade encountering mortar and artillery fire in their drive to Authie. In Phase 3 of the operation, the 7th Brigade pushed towards Ardenne Abbey, securing the position before midnight.

To the east, the British 3rd Infantry Division pushed into the outskirts of Caen from the northeast. At 19:15 that evening, both Kurt Meyer and Eberbach authorized the withdrawal of all heavy weapons of the 12th SS and the remnants of the 16th Luftwaffe across the Orne to the southern side of Caen. Throughout the early evening, the 12th SS fought a rearguard action against elements of the 59th and 3rd Infantry Divisions as it withdrew from positions which were considered "untenable". Reports came into the British and Canadian divisional headquarters that German forces were withdrawing, prompting Crocker to prepare for I Corps to secure Caen the following day.

9 July

On the morning of 9 July, Anglo-Canadian patrols began to infiltrate Caen as the advance resumed at dawn. In the early morning, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division captured Carpiquet Airfield, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment having withdrawn during the night. In the center, the 59th Infantry Division encountered opposition from a battlegroup of the 21st Panzer Division north of Caen. By noon, the 3rd division had reached the north bank of the Orne, destroying the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. As their positions became untenable, the battlegroups of the 21st Panzer Division withdrew across the Orne to Verrières and Bourguébus Ridges.

As Anglo-Canadian forces entered northern Caen, the remaining regiments of the 12th SS Panzer Division conducted a slow withdrawal and rearguard action across the Orne River. Over the course of two days, the official reports of the 12th SS Panzer Division claimed the destruction of 103 British and Canadian tanks, putting their own losses at 20. Reduced to a battalion-sized infantry unit, the 12th SS was forced to withdraw to the high ground of Verrières Ridge.

Upon entering Caen, Anglo-Canadian forces found the city in ruins; 80% of the Old City had been destroyed in the 7 July bombings. The rubble made it nearly impossible for British armour to maneuver through the northern half of the city, preventing any further exploitation of the capture of Caen by the British Second Army. Without possession of southern flanking-territory outside of the city, no further gains could be made within Caen. By the mid-afternoon of 9 July, Operation Charnwood was over.

Aftermath

Operation Jupiter

On 10 July 1944, the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division attacked the positions of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg on Hill 112 as part of Operation Jupiter. The two-day preliminary bombardment included support from naval vessels and Hawker Typhoons. The attack was designed to threaten southern Caen from the west, pushing back the 10th SS Panzer Division from the city and securing a strong armoured attack route for the British Second Army for future breakouts. Two additional armoured brigades supported the 43rd Division in their assault, which began at dawn on 10 July.

By 08:00 on 10 July, the 43rd Division was "well up" the slopes of Hill 112, fighting units of the 10th SS and capturing Eterville in the mid-morning. As the 4th Armoured Brigade and the 43rd Division ascended Hill 112, General Eberbach insisted that "Hill 112 is the pivotal point of the whole position West of Caen, and must therefore be held". To reinforce the position, the 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion and the 1st SS Panzer Division were committed to the defense of the position. When the 4th Armoured Brigade reached the summit of Hill 112, it was counterattacked by remnants of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions on the evening of 10 July.

On 11 July, the attacks resumed with the support of Antitank Regiments from the Second Army. When the 102nd Panzer Battalion counterattacked the 4th Armoured Brigade, heavy casualties were taken by the supporting antitank regiments. Hill 112 was briefly controlled on 11 July by a battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, only to be lost to German counterattacks in the late-afternoon. By the evening of 11 July, the attack reached a stalemate, as both sides were exhausted and had taken heavy casualties. 2,000 casualties were taken by the 43rd Division and its supporting armour in two days of attacks on Hill 112.

Overall

Having been pushed back across the Orne, Rommel and Eberbach consolidated their defensive positions in southern Caen and on Verrières Ridge. The 12th SS, 1st SS, and 9th SS Panzer Divisions soon maintained considerable defenses on Verrières and Bourguébus. Having committed all of his Panzer divisions to combat, Rommel transferred the remainder of his infantry divisions—the 708th, 276th, 277th, and 272nd—to the Anglo-Canadian front. On 8 July, Rommel also transferred two of his best panzer divisions, Panzer Lehr and the 2nd SS, to the American sector in Normandy. On 17 July, Rommel's staff-car was strafed by British fighters, severely injuring the Field Marshal and confining him to hospital. Two days later, Rommel was removed from command of Army Group B, replaced by Field-Marshal Günther von Kluge. Implicated in the 20 July plot against Hitler, he was forced to commit suicide on 14 October 1944.

The capture of the northern half of Caen allowed Bradley to accelerate his own plans for a breakout in Normandy, with the VII Corps attacking German positions in Saint-Lo shortly after Charnwood. With orders to "hold at all costs", the 2nd SS Panzer Division was transferred into Saint-Lo to ensure that Bradley's forces could not break through. On 18 July 1944, after eight days of fighting and more than 5,000 casualties, the VII Corps succeeded in securing the town. In the fighting, 95% of the city was destroyed. The capture of Saint-Lo allowed Bradley to launch his breakout offensive—Operation Cobra—on 25 July.

The same day, Dempsey and Second Army launched Operation Goodwood, 1,100–1,300 British tanks participating in the largest armoured battle in British history. O'Connor's VIII Corps spearheaded the attack with three armoured divisions, with Crocker's I Corps and Guy Simonds' newly-activated II Canadian Corps, which launched its own offensive—Operation Atlantic—in conjunction with Goodwood. After a preliminary attack by 1,056 heavy-bombers, the 7th, 11th, and Guards armoured divisions attacked the positions of the LXXXVI Corps north of Bourguébus. Though 12,000 yards (11 km) had been gained by the VIII Corps by noon, strong resistance by LXXXVI in the afternoon prevented the capture of Bourguébus Ridge. From 19–20 July 1944, Simonds' II Corps attacked Verrières Ridge twice, sustaining 1,349 casualties and failing to take the ridge. Over the seven-day Battle of Verrières Ridge, the II Corps would sustain 2,800 casualties. It would take until 8 August to overcome German defenses on Verrières Ridge.

Notes

Footnotes

1. The 12th SS Panzer Division tank strength on 7 July was 24 Panthers and 37 Panzer IVs.
2. The 12th SS Panzer Division recorded the loss of 11 Panthers and 7 Panzer IVs.
3. Buckley reports that the 12th SS Panzer lost 10 Panthers and 22 Panzer IVs destroyed during the operation.
4. "The quick capture of that key city and the neighbourhood of Carpiquet was the most ambitious, the most difficult and the most important task of Lieutenant-General J.T. Crocker's I Corps". Wilmot states "The objectives given to Crocker's seaborne divisions were decidedly ambitious, since his troops were to land last, on the most exposed beaches, with the farthest to go, against what was potentially the greatest opposition." However Miles Dempsey always considered the possibility that the immediate seizure of Caen might fail.
5. The exact quantity of munitions dropped on Caen is subject to some degree of dispute. Keegan estimates the tonnage at 2,000 tons, while Cawthorne puts the figure at 2,300 tons. D'Este does not provide a figure for the tonnage of munitions dropped, yet does state that "Bomber Command dropped some 6,000 bombs in a narrow area of northern Caen".

Citations

1. Trew, p. 40
2. ^ Trew, p. 32
3. Trew, p. 39
4. Trew, p. 42
5. ^ Trew, p. 35
6. ^ Trew, p. 46
7. Buckley, p. 31
8. Stacey, p. 160
9. Williams, p. 24
10. Ellis, p. 171
11. Wilmot, p. 272
12. Buckley, p. 23
13. Ellis, p. 78
14. Ellis, p. 81
15. Van-Der-Vat, p. 146
16. Cawthorne, p. 41
17. ^ Van der Vat, p. 114
18. Ellis, p. 250
19. ^ Van der Vat, p. 139
20. D'Este, p. 172
21. Taylor, p. 76
22. Clay, pp. 262-263
23. Hastings, p. 138
24. Clark, pp. 32–33
25. Clark, pp. 31–32
26. ^ Clark, p. 21
27. Ellis, p. 275
28. Hart, p. 108
29. Reynolds (2002), p. 13
30. Wilmot, p. 334
31. Copp, p. 99
32. ^ Van der Vat, p. 150
33. Keegan (1982), p. 187
34. D'Este, p. 251
35. D'Este, p. 305
36. ^ D'Este, p. 298
37. ^ Hastings, p. 222
38. D'Este, p. 299
39. D'Este, p. 303
40. ^ Copp, p. 101
41. D'Este, p. 306
42. Keegan (1982), p. 187
43. ^ Keegan (1982), p. 188
44. Hastings, pp. 222–223
45. ^ Hastings, p. 223
46. ^ Copp, p. 102
47. Roy, p. 46
48. Swanston, p. 278
49. Keegan (1982), p. 189
50. ^ Cawthorne, p. 120
51. D'Este, p. 313
52. ^ Keegan (1982), p. 188
53. Van der Vat, p. 153
54. Hastings, p. 222
55. Trew, p. 36
56. ^ Copp, p. 103
57. ^ D'Este, p. 318
58. ^ Trew, p. 39
59. ^ Ellis, pp. 314–315
60. "Operation Charnwood - 59th (Staffordshire) Divisional History". Robert Morss. Retrieved 2009-03-18.
61. ^ Copp, p. 104
62. Tony Fould, In support of Canadians, p. 78
63. ^ Copp, p. 105
64. Wood, p. 92
65. D'Este, p. 318; The division was reported to have had 75% casualties
66. ^ Wood, p. 93
67. Wood, p. 99
68. ^ D'Este, p. 319
69. Copp, p. 106
70. ^ Copp, p. 106
71. Hastings, p. 225
72. Hastings, p. 226
73. ^ Hastings, p. 227
74. ^ Keegan (1982), p. 188
75. Wood, p. vii
76. Cawthorne, p. 121
77. ^ Van der Vat, p. 158
78. D'Este, pp. 339–341
79. Wood, p. 99
80. Wood, p. 100
81. Hastings, p. 249
82. Van der Vat, p. 159
83. Van der Vat, p. 161
84. D'Este, p. 357
85. Trew, pp. 71–72
86. Reynolds (2001), pp. 170–171
87. Zuehlke, p. 168
88. Hastings, p. 296

References

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• D'Este, Carlo. Decision in Normandy. Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1-56852-260-6.
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• Taylor, Daniel (1999). Villers-Bocage Through the Lens. After After the Battle. ISBN 1-87006-707-X. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
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External links

• The Battle of Caen - Complete overview, video / audio and a large picture gallery.

• Operation Overlord
• Military history of Normandy
• World War II operations and battles of Europe
• Battles and operations of World War II
• Battle for Caen
• Battles involving Canada
• Battles involving Germany
• Battles involving the United Kingdom