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Operation Barbarossa
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
German soldiers advancing deep into the Russian interior, June 1941
Date 22 June – 5 December 1941 (5 months, 1 week and 6 days) Location European Russia, including present-day Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia Result Failed Axis conquest of the Soviet Union Soviet victory, despite huge losses in men, material and landmass Opening of the Eastern Front
Belligerents
Germany  Romania  Italy  Hungary  Slovakia  Finland	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Adolf Hitler Walther von Brauchitsch Franz Halder Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb Fedor von Bock Gerd von Rundstedt Ion Victor Antonescu Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim	Joseph Stalin Georgy Zhukov Aleksandr Vasilyevskiy Semyon Budyonny Kliment Voroshilov Semyon Timoshenko Markian Popov Fedor Kuznetsov Dmitry Pavlov  Ivan Tyulenev Mikhail Kirponos †
Units involved
Axis armies Army Group North 16th Army 18th Army 4th Panzer Army Army Group Center 4th Army 9th Army 2nd Panzer Army 3rd Panzer Army 2nd Army Army Group South 6th Army 11th Army 17th Army 1st Panzer Army Romanian 3rd Army Romanian 4th Army Army Norway Finnish Army	Soviet armies Northern Front 7th Army 8th Army 48th Army 52nd Army 54th Army 55th Army Northwestern Front 11th Army 27th Army 34th Army Western Front 3rd Army 10th Army 13th Army 16th Army 19th Army 20th Army 22nd Army 24th Army 28th Army 40th Army 50th Army Southwestern Front 5th Army 6th Army 12th Army 21st Army 26th Army 37th Army Southern Front 9th Army 18th Army Coastal Army
Strength
Frontline strength 3,8 million personnel 4,300 tanks 4,389 aircraft 7,200 artillery pieces	Frontline Strength 5 million personnel 15,000–25,000 tanks 35,000–40,000 aircraft (11,357 combat ready)
Casualties and losses
Total military casualties: 800,000+ Breakdown Casualties of 1941: (according to German Army medical reports) 167,347 killed in action 600,584 wounded in action 11,000 taken prisoner 34,527 missing in action 3,827 aircraft destroyed 2,839 tanks destroyed 2,464 tanks destroyed	Total military casualties: 4,000,000+ Breakdown Casualties of 1941: (according to sources from the Soviet archives) 566,852 killed in action 235,339 killed in non-combat 1,256,421 wounded 2,335,482 missing in action 79,726 sick 21,200 aircraft destroyed 20,500 tanks destroyed
Finland was a co-belligerent that launched its own offensive on 25 June; it was not a member of the Axis powers, and the Finnish offensive was coordinated with, but distinct from Operation Barbarossa. However, Soviet losses resulting from the Finnish offensive are included in the totals.

Operation Barbarossa (German: Fall Barbarossa) was the code name for Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II, commencing on 22 June 1941. Over the course of the operation, about four million soldiers of the Axis powers invaded Soviet Russia along a 2,900 km (1,800 mi) front, making it the largest invasion in the history of warfare. In addition to troops, the Germans employed some 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000 horses. The ambitious operation was driven by Adolf Hitler's persistent desire to conquer the Soviet territories as outlined in Mein Kampf. It marked the beginning of the pivotal phase in deciding the victors of the war.

Prior to the invasion, the two countries had signed political and economical pacts to strengthen their relations. An invasion of Russia was authorized by Hitler on 18 December 1940 for a start date of 15 May 1941, but this would not be met, and instead the invasion began on 22 June 1941. Tactically, the Germans won resounding victories and occupied some of the most important economic areas of the Soviet Union, mainly in Ukraine. Despite these successes, the German offensive stalled on the outskirts of Moscow and was then pushed back by a Soviet counter offensive without taking the city. The Germans would never again mount a simultaneous offensive along the entire strategic Soviet-German front. The Red Army repelled the Wehrmacht's strongest blow and forced an unprepared Germany into a war of attrition.

Operation Barbarossa's failure led to Hitler's demands for further operations inside the USSR, all of which eventually failed, such as continuing the Siege of Leningrad, Operation Nordlicht and Operation Blue, among other battles on occupied Soviet territory.

Barbarossa was the largest military operation in world history in both manpower and casualties. Its failure was a turning point in the Third Reich's fortunes. Most importantly, the operation opened up the Eastern Front, to which more forces were committed than in any other theater of war in world history. Regions covered by the operation became the site of some of the largest battles, deadliest atrocities, highest casualties, and most horrific conditions for Soviets and Germans alike, all of which influenced the course of both World War II and history of the 20th century. The German forces captured million Soviet prisoners of who were not granted the protection stipulated in the Geneva Conventions. Most of them never returned alive. Germany deliberately starved the prisoners to death as part of its "Hunger Plan", aimed to reduce the population of Eastern Europe and then repopulate it with ethnic Germans.

Background

Racial policies of Nazi Germany

As early as 1925, Adolf Hitler suggested in political manifesto and autobiography Mein Kampf that he would invade the Soviet Union, asserting that the German people needed to secure Lebensraum ("living space") to ensure the survival of Germany for generations to come. Nazism viewed the Soviet Union (and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by sub-humans, ruled by "Jewish Bolshevik conspirators". Mein Kampf said Germany's destiny was to "turn to the East" as it did "six hundred years ago". Thereafter, Hitler spoke of an inescapable battle against "pan-Slav ideals" in which victory would lead to the "permanent mastery of the world", although he also said that they would "walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us". Accordingly, it was stated Nazi policy to kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other Slavic populations and repopulate the land with Germanic peoples. Verification of the belief in German ethnic predominance is discernible in official German records and by pseudo-scientifically validated articles in German periodicals at the time, works which covered matters like "how to deal with alien populations".

Before World War II, observers believed that in a war with the Soviet Union, Germany would attack through the Baltic states while the Kriegsmarine (Navy) would seize Leningrad from the Baltic sea. They assumed that possessing the entire Baltic basin would satisfy Hitler, who would not repeat Napoleon Bonaparte's mistake of concentrate all his forces and energy on taking Moscow. Some historians also believe that a decision to invade Russia was premeditated, based on Hitler being afraid of having to fight a war both against the Western allies and against the Russians in the East. This preventative war would allow the Germans to avoid making the same mistake they had made in World War I.

German-Soviet relations of 1939–40

The Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow in August 1939, known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shortly before the German invasion of Poland that triggered the outbreak of World War II in Europe, which was followed by the Soviet invasion of the Eastern part of the country. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the border states between their respective "spheres of influence"; the Soviet Union and Germany would split Poland if an invasion were to occur, and Russia would be allowed to swallow the Baltic states and Finland. The pact stunned the world because of the parties' mutual hostility and their conflicting ideologies. As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strong diplomatic relations and an important economic relationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940, in which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help Germany circumvent a British blockade.

Despite the parties' ongoing relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the pact. After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12 to 14 November, Germany presented a proposed written agreement for a Soviet entry into the Axis. The Soviet Union offered a written counterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940, to which Germany did not respond. As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they signed a border and commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941. Historians also believe that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany as well as the rest of Europe.

German invasion plans

Stalin's own reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and their faith in success; many competent and experienced military officers were killed in the Great Purge during the 1930s, leaving the Red Army with a relatively inexperienced leadership compared to that of their German counterparts. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda. German propaganda claimed the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own invasion was thus presented as a preemptive strike.

In the of 1940, when German raw materials crises and a potential collision with the Soviet Union over territory in the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union looked increasingly like Hitler's only solution. While no concrete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his generals in June that the victories in Western Europe, "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism". Although German generals told Hitler that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation" the Führer anticipated additional benefits. These additional benefits included the labor shortage in German industry could be relieved by demobilization of many soldiers, Ukraine would be a reliable source of immense agricultural products, forced labor under German rule would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position and overall economy, and the Allies would further isolated, especially the United Kingdom.

On 5 December 1940, Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion which the German high command (OKW) had been working on since July 1940 under the codename "Operation Otto". Hitler, however, was dissatisfied with the Otto version and on 18 December issued Directive No. 21 which called for a new battle plan, now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa". The operation was named after medieval Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941, but this would not met. The plan for Barbarossa assumed that the Wehrmacht would emerge victorious if it could destroy the bulk of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. This assumption would be proven fatally wrong less than a month into the invasion.

According to a 1978 essay by the conservative German historian Andreas Hillgruber, the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were coloured by hubris stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, the economy or culture and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was ignored as a factor, in favour of a very narrow military view.

Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite Hitler was able to push through a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders", even though it was quite clear that this would be a violation of all accepted norms of warfare.

In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a further economic burden for Germany. Another German official argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic form were harmless and that the occupation would not produce a gain for Germany.

Hitler disagreed with economists about the risks and told his right-hand man Hermann Göring, the chief of the Luftwaffe, that, "everyone on all sides was always raising economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From now on I'm not going to listen to any more of that kind of talk". This was passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of an invasion of the Soviet Union—that it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured intact.

Beginning in March 1941, Göring's Green Folder laid out details of the Soviet Union's proposed economic disposal after the invasion. The entire urban population of the invaded land was to be starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allowing the urban population's replacement by a German upper class. In 1941, German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following Reichskommissariate:

Name	Notes	Image	Ref.
Ostland	The Baltic countries and Belarus
Ukraine	Ukraine, enlarged eastwards to the Volga
Kaukasus	Southern Russia and the Caucasus region	—
Moskowien	Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia	—
Turkestan	Central Asian republics and territories	—

Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraum ideal for the benefit of future generations of the "Nordic master race".

Operation Barbarossa was to combine a northern assault towards Leningrad, a symbolic capturing of Moscow, and an economic strategy of seizing oil fields in the south beyond Ukraine. Hitler and his generals disagreed on which of these aspects should take priority and where Germany should focus its energies; deciding on priorities required a compromise. While planning Barbarossa, Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the Donbass second, Moscow third".

Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army West of the capital. This belief led to conflicts between Hitler and several German senior officers including Heinz Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bock and Franz Halder, who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow. Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the East. He was convinced Britain would sue for peace, once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union, the "real area of Germany's interests".

Hitler had grown overconfident in his own military judgment from the rapid success in Western Europe and the Red Army's ineptitude in the Winter War against Finland in 1939-40. He expected victory within a few months and therefore did not prepare for a war lasting into the winter. This meant his troops lacked adequate warm clothing and preparations for a longer campaign when they began their attack. The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would prove to be his undoing.

German preparations

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in the Balkans had finished. By the third week in February 1941, 680,000 German soldiers were stationed on the Romanian-Soviet border. In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved more than 3,2 million German and about 500,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launched many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled war materiel in the East. Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this, Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attack only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant very little was done. The Soviet dictator also believed the Nazis would be likely to finish their war with Britain before opening a new front; he refused to believe repeated warnings from his intelligence services on the Nazi buildup, fearing the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a war between Germany and the USSR.

Russian Spy Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date, but Sorge and other informers had previously given different invasion dates which passed peacefully before the actual invasion. In addition, British intelligence gathering information through Ultra warned the Soviet Union of impending invasion several months prior to 22 June 1941.

Since April 1941, the Germans had begun setting up deception operations to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real target. These simulated preparations in Norway, the Channel coast and Britain. There were supporting activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises.

We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.

German military planners also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. In their calculations they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Soviet Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus had to be defended.

The strategy Hitler and his generals agreed on involved three separate army groups assigned to capture specific regions and cities of the Soviet Union. The main German thrusts were conducted along historical invasion routes. Army Group North was to march through the Baltics into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk and then Moscow, marching through what is now Belarus and the West-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing Eastward over the steppes of the Southern USSR to the Volga with the aim of controlling the oil-rich Caucasus.

The postponement of Barbarossa from the initially planned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22 June 1941 (a 38-day delay) occurred due to a combination of reasons. Namely, the Balkans Campaign required a diversion of troops and resources which hampered the preparations and an unusually wet winter that kept rivers at full flood until late spring. The full floods could have discouraged an earlier attack, even if it was unlikely to have happened before the end of the Balkans Campaign. The importance of the delay is still debated.

The Germans also decided to bring rear forces (mostly Waffen-SS and Einsatzgruppen units) into the conquered territories to counter any partisan activity in areas they controlled.

Soviet preparations

In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be ready to repulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Stalin was remembered saying, "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years".

Despite the estimations held by Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak. Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to Germany. Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively more oriented toward military production. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, one of the prominent military theorists in tank warfare in the interwar period, lobbied the Kremlin for colossal investment in the resources required for the production of weapons in mass quantities. In 1930 he forwarded a memo to the Kremlin, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks". In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations, in the form of the Deep Battle Concept. Defense expenditure also grew rapidly: in 1933 it had reached 12 percent of gross national product, from just 5 percent in 1913, and by 1940 it stood at 18 percent.

War with Germany is inevitable. If comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for two or three years that will be our good fortune, but you yourselves must go off and take measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces.

During the late 1930s, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support, but after their experiences in the Winter War and their observation of the German campaign against France, they had begun to emulate the Germans and organize most of their armored assets into large armored divisions and corps. This reorganization was only partially implemented at the dawn of Barbarossa.

One area where the Soviets held a clear advantage, was in tanks. The Red Army dominated overwhelmingly in numbers with a possession of more than 20,000 of which about 12,782 were in the five Western military districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). Hitler later declared to some of his generals, "If I had known about the Russian tank's strength in 1941 I would not have attacked". However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks needed to carry supplies.

The German Wehrmacht had about 3,500 tanks for the invasion of Russia. This yielded a balance of immediately available tanks in the Red Army's favor. However, the most advanced Soviet tank models, the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7 percent of the total Soviet tank force.

According to British historian Alan Taylor, the Soviet Armed Forces in the Western districts were outnumbered at the start of the invasion, with 2,6 million Soviet soldiers versus 3,9 million for the Axis. However, American historian David Glantz reports about 3,8 million as the total force of the Axis in June 1941, with 900,000 of them deployed in the West. The overall size of the Soviet forces in early July 1941 amounted to a little more than five million men, with 2,6 million based in the West, 1,8 million in the Far East, and the rest being deployed or training elsewhere. The figure for Soviet strength in the Western districts of the Soviet Union counts only the First Strategic Echelon, which was stationed on and behind the Soviet Western frontier to a depth of 400 kilometers; it also underestimates the size of the First Strategic Echelon, which was actually 2,9 million strong. The figure does not include the smaller Second Strategic Echelon which, as of 22 June 1941, was in the process of moving towards the frontier, according to the Soviet strategic plan. It was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Strategic Echelon by early July. Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov states that while the strength of both sides varied, the Axis belligerents fought with a slight numerical superiority in manpower at the front.

The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been massacred in Stalin's Purges of the late 1930s, in which 3 field marshals, 84 generals arrested, 36 divisional commanders, and 57 army corps commanders where murdered. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed, while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable". By 1941, 75 percent of Red Army officers had held their posts for less than one year.

The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire-control techniques. Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing. Prior to the invasion the Soviet Air Force (VVS) was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspace.

Despite all this, the Red Army was dispersed and thoroughly unprepared for war when the Germans attacked. Its units were often separated and without transportation to concentrate prior to combat. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely well equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The army was in the midst of reorganizing their armor units into large tank corps, adding to the disorganization.

In August 1940, British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week after Hitler informally approved the plans for Barbarossa. Stalin's distrust of the British led to his ignoring their warnings, believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war on their side. In early 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services and American intelligence gave regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack. However, Stalin decided to ignore them. Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in general and making significant preparations, he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler. He had an ill-founded confidence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR. Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire back without permission when attacked.

Soviet offensive plans

Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR, Hitler put forward a thesis that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the German invasion as a pre-emptive strike. This thesis was reiterated in the 1980s based on the analysis of circumstantial evidence. Thus it has been found that Marshal Georgy Zhukov drew up a proposal (signed by Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin) suggesting secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops on the Western border, under the cover of training. This proposed operation aimed to cut Germany off from its allies, especially from Romania and its oilfields that Germany needed to conduct the war.

According to Viktor Suvorov, a former Russian intelligence agent of the Cold War, Stalin planned to use Germany as a proxy against the West. Stalin aimed to fuel Hitler's aggressive plans against Europe, and only after the countries had fought each other, and exhausted themselves to some extent, would the USSR make their move. For this reason Stalin provided significant material and political support Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to "liberate" the whole of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov saw Barbarossa as a German pre-emptive strike that capitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the 1941 borders. Meltyukhov, however, reject this part of Suvorov's theory, arguing that both sides prepared for an attack on their own, not in response to the other side's preparations.

Although this thesis has drawn the attention of the general public in some countries (Germany, Russia and Israel) and has been supported by some historians (Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann, and Mark Solonin) the idea that Stalin was preparing an attack in 1941 has not been accepted by many Western historians.

Order of battle

Axis forces

Army Group North

• 16th Army
• 4th Panzer Group
• 18th Army
• Air Fleet 1

Army Group Center

• 4th Army
• 2nd Panzer Group
• 3rd Panzer Group
• 9th Army
• Air Fleet 2

Army Group South

• 17th Army
  • Slovak Expeditionary Force
  • Royal Hungarian Army "Fast Moving Army Corps"
• 1st Panzer Group
• 11th Army
  • Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia
• 6th Army
  • Romanian 3rd Army
  • Romanian 4th Army
• Air Fleet 4

Soviet Forces

Northern Front

• 14th Army
• 7th Army
• 23rd Army

North-Western Front

• 8th Army
• 11th Army
• 27th Army
• Northern Fleet
• Baltic Fleet

Western Front

• 3rd Army
• 4th Army
• 10th Army
• 13th Army

South-Western Front

• 5th Army
• 6th Army
• 12th Army
• 26th Army

Southern Front

• 9th Independent Army
• 18th Army
• 2nd Mechanized Corps
• 18th Mechanized Corps
• Black Sea Fleet

Invasion

Phase one

At 3:15 am on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powers bombed major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland. Roughly three million soldiers of the Wehrmacht went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troops at the border. The contribution of Germany's allies would generally not make itself felt until later. Though the Stavka was alarmed by reports about German troops approaching the border and had, at 00:30 am, warned that the border troops that war was imminent, only a small number of units were alerted in time.

At around noon on the day of the invasion, the news of the invasion was broadcast to the population by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov:

The Red Army and the whole nation will wage a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for honour, for liberty ... Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours!

— Vyacheslav Molotov

By calling upon the population's devotion to their nation rather than the Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord while allowing a stunned people to absorb the shattering news. The invasion did not come as a surprise to Stalin but he was completely astounded. Stalin addressed the nation for the first time since the start of the German invasion on 3 July, and just like Molotov's announcement, he called for a "Patriotic War ... of the entire Soviet people".

In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels announced the invasion to the waking nation in a radio broadcast:

At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight!

— Joseph Goebbels

Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to colleagues, "before three months have passed, we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which has never been seen in history".

Aside from the roughly 3,2 million German ground troops engaged in, or earmarked for, the Eastern Campaign, about 500,000 Romanian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, and Italian troops accompanied the German forces, while the Army of Finland made a major contribution in the North. The 250th Spanish "Blue" Infantry Division, was a formation of volunteered Spanish Falangists and Nazi sympathizers.

Luftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration, supply dumps, and airfields, and mark them down for destruction. The Luftwaffe's task was to neutralize the Soviet Air Force. This was not achieved in the first days of operations, despite the Soviets having concentrated their aircraft in huge groups on the permanent airfields rather than dispersing them on field landing strips, making them ideal targets. The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the first day of operations. Hermann Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, distrusted the reports and ordered the figure checked. Picking through the wreckages of Soviet airfields, the Luftwaffe's figures proved conservative, as over 2,000 destroyed Soviet aircraft were found. The Luftwaffe lost only 35 aircraft on the first day of combat. The Germans claimed to have destroyed over 3,100 Soviet aircraft in the first three days. In reality, Soviet losses were far higher; according to Russian historian Viktor Kulikov, some 3,922 Soviet aircraft had been lost. The Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority over all three sectors of the front, and would maintain it until the end of the year.

Phase two

On 3 July, Hitler finally gave the go-ahead for the Panzers to resume their drive East after the infantry divisions had caught up. However, a rainstorm typical of Russian summers slowed their progress and Russian defenses stiffened. The delays gave the Soviets time to organize a massive counterattack against Army Group Center. Its ultimate objective was Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six armies. On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd Panzer Army with 700 tanks. The Germans defeated this counterattack with overwhelming air superiority. The 2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dnieper and closed on Smolensk from the South while the 3rd Panzer Army, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from the North. Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the Panzer Groups came to within sixteen kilometres of closing the gap but the trap would not snap shut until 26 July. When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap, 300,000 Red Army soldiers were captured. Even so, liquidating the pocket took another ten days in which time 100,000 Red Army soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow.

Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The German troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement. Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation. Hitler had by now lost faith in battles of encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers. He now believed he could defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seizing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donbass and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the South and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the North.

Fedor von Bock, in overall charge of Army Group Center, and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa, vehemently argued in favor of continuing the all-out drive towards Moscow. Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemy's capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet communications as well transportation system. More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red Army was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital. But Hitler was adamant, and issued a direct order to the talented panzer ace Heinz Guderian, bypassing his commanding officer von Bock, to send Army Group Centre's tanks to the North and South, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.

Phase three

By mid-July, below the Pinsk Marshes, the Germans had come within a few kilometers of Kiev. The 1st Panzer Army then went South while the 17th Army struck East and trapped three Soviet armies near Uman. As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned North and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Army, diverted from Army Group Center, had crossed the River Desna with 2nd Army on its right flank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.

For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Center. On 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within 30 mi (48 km) of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed Southeast on both sides of Lake Ladoga, reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.

At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army Group North began the final push which within ten days had brought it within 7 mi (11 km) of the city. However, the advance over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) proved very slow and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of patience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed, but starved into submission. Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army Group Center had remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in particular the Yelnya Offensive in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began. These attacks drew Hitler's attention back to Army Group Center and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to break off their Siege of Leningrad and support Army Group Center on its attack on Moscow.

Before it could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of Army Group Center had swung to the South in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group South moved to the North from its Dniepr bridgehead. The encirclement of Soviet Forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A savage battle ensued in which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment. After ten days of vicious fighting, the Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured. Actual losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery pieces and mortars from 43 Divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and 37th Soviet Armies.

Phase four

After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more directly available trained reserves. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800,000 men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow, began on 2 October. In front of Army Group Center was a series of elaborate defense lines, the first centered on Vyazma and the second on Mozhaysk.

The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise as the 2nd Panzer Army, returning from the South, took Oryol which was 75 mi (121 km) South of the Soviet first main defense line. Three days later, the Panzers pushed on to Bryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the West. The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were now encircled. To the North, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies. Moscow's first line of defense had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to three million. The Soviets had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defense of Moscow.

The German government now publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow, convincing foreign correspondents of a pending Soviet collapse. On 13 October, the 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within 90 mi (140 km) of the capital. Martial law was declared in Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon, however, the weather had deteriorated. Temperatures fell while there was a continued rainfall, turning the unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowing the German advance on Moscow to as little as 2 mi (3.2 km) a day. The supply situation rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganized. The pause gave the Soviets, who were in a far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of newly activated reservists. In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies which included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalin there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. With the Siberian forces came over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.

The Germans were nearing exhaustion, while they also began to recall Napoleon's invasion of Russia. General Günther Blumentritt noted in his diary:

They remembered what happened to Napoleon's Army. Most of them began to re-read Caulaincourt's grim account of 1812. That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I can still see von Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and standing before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand.

— Günther Blumentritt

On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on Moscow. Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no delay allowed to improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies. The Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the Northeast. 2nd Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the South. As the Soviets reacted to the flanks, 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. However, in the South, 2nd Panzer Army was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units, augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Army and inflicted a shocking defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16th Army back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement.

On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 15 mi (24 km) of Moscow, and could see the spires of the Kremlin, but by then the first blizzards of the Russian Winter had begun. A reconnaissance battalion also managed to reach the town of Khimki, only about 8 km (5.0 mi) away from the Soviet capital, and captured its bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as its railway station, which marked the farthest advance of German forces. The Wehrmacht had not been equipped for winter warfare. The bitter cold also caused severe problems for their guns and equipment. Furthermore, weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe from conducting any large scale operations. Newly created Soviet units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a massive counterattack which pushed the Germans back over 200 mi (320 km). By December 1941, the invasion had cost the German Army over 830,000 casualties in killed, wounded or captured.

Historical significance

Operation Barbarossa was the biggest and one of the fastest military operations in human history. More men, tanks, guns and aircraft were committed to the inferno then had ever before been throwing into any battle. The invasion opened up the Eastern Front, the largest theater of World War II which saw titanic clashes of unprecedented violence and destruction, with more than 26 million deaths. More people died fighting on the Eastern Front than on all the other fighting across the globe during World War II. A total of 75% of the entire German Armed Forces were concentrated in Barbarossa.

Aftermath

With the failure of the Battle of Moscow, all German plans of a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet counteroffensives in December 1941 caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately eliminated the German threat to Moscow.

Nevertheless, despite this setback, the Soviet Union had suffered heavily from the loss of large parts of its army and industry, allowing the Germans to mount another large-scale offensive in the July 1942, codenamed Case Blue, now directed towards the oil fields of Baku. This offensive failed just as Barbarossa had; the Germans again conquered vast amounts of no-mans land, but failed to achieve their ultimate goals when they were defeated at Stalingrad. By then, the Soviet war economy was fully operational and was able to simply outproduce Germany, which was not prepared for a long war of attrition. It ended with the total destruction and occupation of Nazi Germany in May 1945.

See also

• Operation Silver Fox
• Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II
• Black Sea Campaigns

References

1. ^ Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941.
2. ^ Kirchubel 1997, pp. 95–98.
3. ^ Hitler Strikes East.
4. ^ The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler.
5. Shirer 1990, p. 716.
6. Rauschning 2006, pp. 136–137. sfn error: no target: CITEREFRauschning2006 (help)
7. Fahlbusch 1999, pp. 241–264.
8. Adolf Hitler's Navy.
9. ^ Weeks 1998, p. 98.
10. Kirby 1980, p. 120.
11. Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939.
12. Shirer 1990, pp. 668–669.
13. ^ Roberts 2006, p. 57.
14. ^ Hartmann 2013, pp. 16–21.
15. Ericson 1999, p. 127.
16. Ericson 1999, pp. 129–130.
17. ^ Battle For Russia.
18. Brackman 2001, p. 344.
19. Glantz 2010, p. 19.
20. ^ Wolfram 2007, pp. 21–22.
21. ^ Gorodetsky 2001, pp. 69–70.
22. ^ Ericson 1999, p. 162.
23. Patterson 2003, p. 562.
24. ^ Handrack 1981, p. 40.
25. ^ Higgins 1966, pp. 11–59.
26. Glantz 2010, p. 60.
27. Glantz 2010, pp. 55–60.
28. Shirer 1990, p. 822.
29. ^ Operation Barbarossa.
30. ^ Waller 1996, p. 192.
31. Rich 1973, p. 212.
32. Baker 2013, pp. 26–27.
33. Bradley & Buell 2002, pp. 35–40.
34. Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 47.
35. Axelrod 2007, p. 750.
36. Clark 2012, p. 56.
37. Clark 2012, p. 55.
38. Ryan 2012, p. 365.
39. Dunnigan 1978, p. 82.
40. Barnett 1989, p. 456.
41. Taylor 1974, p. 98.
42. ^ Glantz 2010, p. 9.
43. ^ Ryan 2012, p. 366.
44. Meltyukhov 2000, p. 477.
45. Russian Military Library.
46. ^ Rayfield 2004, p. 315.
47. Dunnigan 1978, pp. 93–94.
48. ^ Sawka 2005, pp. 225–227. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSawka2005 (help)
49. Waller 1996, pp. 196–198.
50. Waller 1996, p. 202.
51. Roberts 1995, p. 1293.
52. Roberts & House 1995, p. 42. sfn error: no target: CITEREFRobertsHouse1995 (help)
53. Uldricks 1999, pp. 626–643.
54. Bellami 2007, p. 103.
55. ^ Meltyukhov 2006, pp. 108–131. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMeltyukhov2006 (help)
56. Uldricks 1999, pp. 491–493.
57. ^ Kirchubel 2005, p. 30.
58. ^ Kirchubel 2007, p. 31.
59. ^ Kirchubel 2003, p. 31.
60. ^ Kirchubel 2005, p. 29.
61. ^ Kirchubel 2007, p. 30.
62. ^ Kirchubel 2005, p. 31.
63. ^ Kirchubel 2012, pp. 33–34. sfn error: no target: CITEREFKirchubel2012 (help)
64. Ridder 2007, p. 292.
65. ^ Clark 2012, p. 70.
66. Clark 2012, p. 92.
67. ^ Clark 2012, p. 82.
68. Ward 2004, pp. 127–128.
69. Ward 2004, p. 127-128.
70. Askey 2014, p. 272-273.
71. Glantz & House 1995, p. 49. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantzHouse1995 (help)
72. Thomas 2012, p. 13.
73. ^ Thomas 2012, pp. 12–14.
74. ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 77. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantzHouse1995 (help)
75. Glantz & House 1995, p. 343. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantzHouse1995 (help)
76. Smith 2000, pp. 83–91.
77. Clark 1995, p. 165. sfn error: no target: CITEREFClark1995 (help)
78. Shirer 1990, p. 1032.
79. Commager 1991, p. 144.
80. Moskoff 2002, p. 236.
81. Weinberg 2005, p. 243.
82. Symonds 2014, p. 70.

Sources

Printed

• Askey, Nigel (2014). Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational And Statistical Analysis, And Military Simulation. Lulu Publishing. ISBN 978-1312413269. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Axelrod, Alan (2007). Encyclopedia Of World War II. H. W. Fowler. ISBN 978-0816060221. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Baker, Lee (2013). The Second World War On The Eastern Front. Routledge Publishing. ISBN 978-1317865049. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Bellami, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia In The Second World War. Vinage Publishing. ISBN 978-0-375-72471-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007). Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation Of World War II Through The Eyes And Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, And Stalin. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81538-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Brackman, Roman (2001). The Secret File Of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life. Frank Cass Publishing. ISBN 0-7146-5050-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Bradley, John; Buell, Thomas (2002). Why Was Barbarossa Delayed? The Second World War: Europe And The Mediterranean. Square One Publishing. ISBN 0-7570-0160-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Barnett, Correlli (1989). Hitler's Generals. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-79462-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle. Headline Review. ISBN 978-0755336395. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Commager, Henry (1991). The Story Of The Second World War. Brassey's Publishing. ISBN 978-0080410661. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dunnigan, James (1978). The Russian Front. Arms & Armour Press. ISBN -0-85368-152-X. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ericson, Edward (1999). Feeding The German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid To Nazi Germany, 1933-1941. Praeger Publishing. ISBN 978-0275963378. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Fahlbusch, Michael (1999). Die Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (in German). German Historical Institute. ISBN 978-0-375-41086-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001). Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. Yale University. ISBN 978-0300084597. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David (2010). Barbarossa Detailed: The Battle for Smolensk. Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1906033729. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David; Jonathan, House (1995). When Titans Clashed: How The Red Army Stopped Hitler. Michigan University. ISBN 978-1906033729. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Handrack, Hans-Dieter (1981). Das Reichskommissariat Ostland: Die Kulturpolitik Der Deutschen Verwaltung Zwischen Autonomie Und Gleichschaltung 1941-1944 (in German). Michigan University. ISBN 978-3879980383. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hartmann, Christian (2013). Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der Deutsche Krieg Im Osten 1941-1945 (in German). Durchgesehene Verlag. ISBN 978-3406612268. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Higgins, Trumbull (1966). Hitler And Russia: The Third Reich In A Two-Front War, 1937-1943. Macmillan Publishing. ASIN B0000CNOQU. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kirby, D.G. (1980). Finland In The Twentieth Century: A History And An Interpretation. Minnesota University. ISBN 0-8166-5802-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kirchubel, Robert (2005). Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-857-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kirchubel, Robert (2007). Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group Center. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-107-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kirchubel, Robert (2003). Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group South. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1782004257. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kirchubel, G. (1997). Soviet Casualties And Combat Losses In The Twentieth Century. Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1853672804. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Meltyukhov, Mikhail (2000). Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939-1941 (in Russian). Вече. ISBN 5-7838-0590-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Moskoff, William (2002). The Bread Of Affliction: The Food Supply In The USSR During World War II. Cambridge University. ISBN 978-0521522830. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Patterson, David (2003). The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry. Transaction. ISBN 978-1412820073. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rauschning, Hermann (2010). Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1-4286-0034-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rayfield, Donald (2004). Stalin and his Hangmen. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-100375-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rich, Norman (1973). Hitler's War Aims Ideology The Nazi State And The Course Of Expansion. W.W. Norton. ISBN 978-0233964768. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ridder, Willem (2007). Countdown to Freedom. AuthorHouse. ISBN 978-1434312297. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Roberts, Cynthia (1995). Planning For War: The Red Army and The Catastrophe Of 1941. Taylor & Francis. doi:10.1080/09668139508412322. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Roberts, Geoffrey (2006). Stalin's Wars: From World War To Cold War, 1939-1953. Yale University. ISBN 0-300-11204-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ryan, Dan (2012). Dorneywood. AuthorHouse Publishing. ISBN 978-1468575040. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Sakwa, Richard (2005). The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. Routledge Publishing. ISBN 978-1134806027. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Shirer, William (1990). The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich: A History Of Nazi Germany. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-72868-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Smith, Howard (2000). Last Train From Berlin. Phoenix Press. ISBN 978-1842122143. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Symonds, Craig (2014). Neptune: The Allied Invasion Of Europe And The D-Day Landings. Oxford University. ISBN 978-0199986118. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Taylor, Alan (1974). History of World War II. Octopus Books. ISBN 978-0706403992. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Thomas, Nigel (2012). The German Army 1939-45: Eastern Front 1941-43. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1782002192. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Uldricks, Teddy (1999). The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan To Attack Hitler?. Slavic Review. doi:10.2307/2697571. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Waller, John (1996). The Unseen War In Europe: Espionage And Conspiracy In The Second World War. Tauris & Company. ISBN 978-1-86064-092-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ward, John (2004). Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The Ju 87 at War, 1936-1945. MBI Publishing. ISBN 978-0760319918. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Weeks, Albert (1998). Was Hitler Forced Into Attacking Russia? New Evidence And Analysis By Revisionist Historians. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-231-10676-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Weinberg, Gerhard (2005). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge University. ISBN 978-0521618267. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Wolfram, Wette (2007). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Harvard University. ISBN 978-0674025776. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Online

• "Adolf Hitler's Navy". Life Magazine. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941". World War II Stats. Retrieved 10 May 2013.
• "Hitler Strikes East". World Media Rights. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939". University of Fordham. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "Operation Barbarossa". Channel One Russia. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "Оценка советским руководством событий Второй мировой войны в 1939-1941" (in Russian). Russian Military Archives. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "The Battle For Russia". Public Broadcasting Service. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "The Dark Charisma of Adolf Hitler". British Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
• "The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler". Cambridge University. Retrieved 19 March 2015.

External links

• Marking 70 Years to Operation Barbarossa on the Yad Vashem website
• Operation Barbarossa original reports and pictures from The Times
• Multimedia map over the invasion of Russia

• Code names
• Operation Barbarossa