This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 2602:306:ceab:8320:188a:b983:8d84:6034 (talk) at 18:10, 4 November 2017 (del nonnotable bs). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.
Revision as of 18:10, 4 November 2017 by 2602:306:ceab:8320:188a:b983:8d84:6034 (talk) (del nonnotable bs)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)at the war would likely extend into 1942, Goebbels grew increasingly concerned about the triumphant tone of the communiques. However, a string of spectacular victories in September, especially in the Battle of Kiev, removed any restraint from the texts, making propagandists's work more difficult later on, when they had to explain the Wehrmacht's failures to the German public which was rapidly losing confidence in a swift victory.
Because of the competing goals, approaches and chains of command, along with the chaotic nature of the regime itself, the propaganda materials produced by Goebbels's ministry, the OKW and Hitler's press chief, Otto Dietrich, did not always agree in tone or assessment of the situation. After the assault on Moscow, Operation Typhoon, began on 2 October 1941, Goebbels described in his diary the "excessive optimism" that was developing in the population after the announcements about the initial rapid advance of the German forces. Concerned about an "almost illusionistic" mood, he instructed the press to adopt a more cautious approach and spoke to Jodl about tempering down the tone of the Wehrmacht communiqués. Nonetheless, the broadcast on 16 October announced that the first defensive line in front of Moscow had been broken, being still "too optimistic" for Goebbels.
The Battle of Stalingrad
The Wehrmachtbericht communiqués around the 1942 summer campaign and the defeat of the German army in the Battle of Stalingrad provide another case study on their effects on Germany's population and the evolution of the propaganda efforts themselves. In August 1942, the name "Stalingrad" was featured prominently in the communiqués even before the Wehrmacht reached the outskirts of the city. The communiqués were factual and restrained; nevertheless, Goebbels issued instructions to the German press to exercise "cautious optimism" so as not to set expectations too high among the population.
The Soviet counter-offensive, Operation Uranus, broke the thinly-held German flanks on 19 November; by 22 November, the encirclement of the 6th Army was complete. The concern of the propaganda organisations, both military and civilian, was how to present this military disaster to the public. Initially, every effort was made to hide the true scope of the events from the population. The communiqués published between 19 and 24 November merely mentioned the Soviet attack in the southern sector of the East front, not addressing the extent of Wehrmacht's difficulties.
From 24 November onward, the Wehrmacht communiqués began acknowledging the Soviet breakthrough and described "heavy fighting", but provided no references to the encirclement. The reports by the SD, the security and intelligence service of the SS, indicated that the 24 November report caused alarm among the population. There were periods where the OKW dispatches did not mention Stalingrad at all. Wild rumors describing 100,000 German troops trapped at Stalingrad were beginning to circulate, as some Germans were able to get the news from foreign radio.
On 16 January 1943, the dispatch finally mentioned that the 6th Army was fighting the enemy "on all sides", thus acknowledging the encirclement, but little was said about the situation in subsequent reports. Meanwhile, Goebbels was working behind the scenes to advance his program of mobilisation of the population for the "total war", using the impending defeat at Stalingrad as a rallying cry. Getting the go-ahead from Hitler, Goebbels launched the effort in the late winter of 1943. The state propaganda after that focused on the home-front mobilization, the civilian contribution to the German war effort, with this message continuing through the rest of the war.
Impact
Despite occasional mis-alignment of messages, with the tone of the Wehrmacht communiqués being too exuberant for Goebbels, a self-described "realist", the relations between the military and civilian propaganda organizations proved successful throughout the war. Friction was low, even though several apologetic postwar publications, such as an account provided by Wedel, described the relations between them as problematic. Both Goebbels and Jodl considered the Wehrmachtbericht a vital instrument of the German home-front mobilization, especially after the defeat at Stalingrad.
From the onset, according to historian Daniel Uziel, the Nazi propaganda machine regarded the Wehrmacht communiqués as "possessing a future value, besides the immediate use as news delivery medium". Along with all the other propaganda materials produced by the Wehrmacht, the underlying message was the supposed "superiority of the German warrior's spirit and character". The final broadcast, issued by the Dönitz Government, aired on 9 May 1945 and read in part:
Since midnight the weapons on all the fronts are silent. By the order of the Grand Admiral Dönitz, the Wehrmacht ceased its hopeless fighting. With this, a nearly 6-year heroic struggle has ended. It brought us great victories but also heavy defeats. The Wehrmacht has been honorably defeated by superior forces. The German soldier, in accordance with his oath, has given his unforgettable effort to his people. Till the end the homeland supported him with all its strength, under the heaviest sacrifices. The singular performance of the front and Fatherland shall receive its final honor in the later, fair judgement. The achievements and sacrifices of German soldiers at sea, on the land and in the air has not escaped the notice of our enemy. Therefore, every soldier can hold his head high, and proudly lay his weapon down. He can start to work bravely and confidently the bitterest hour of our history, for the eternal life of our people.
Those words were intended for public consumption by the now defeated nation. According to Uziel, in this final radio address, the Wehrmacht propagandists hoped to set the frame of reference for the entire war effort of 1939–45. In this they were successful; the last communiqué helped lay the foundation for the legend of the "clean Wehrmacht", the notion that Wehrmacht had fought honourably and professionally, and was not in any way implicated in the crimes of the Nazi regime, for which (according to the myth) the SS bore sole responsibility. This assessment is echoed by historian Wolfram Wette in his 2006 work The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality.
Named reference in the Wehrmachtbericht
According to the German historian Felix Römer the named reference in the Wehrmachtbericht (" Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)" or " Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)"), among other military decorations, was an award and played a critical role of utmost importance ( Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)) for all German soldiers. Römer stated that military decorations in general created respect and symbolized soldiery masculinity. For the German military, awards and decorations created an indispensable environment of incentives and willingness to risk ones live in combat. As an award, the named reference in the Wehrmachtbericht was based on the Walther von Brauchitsch decree of 27 April 1940 and was published in the Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (Army Ordinance Gazette) dated 6 May 1940. Murawski stated, in order for an individual or unit to be singled out by name in the Wehrmachtbericht, the soldier or unit had to distinguish themselves in combat. This distinction was made available across all ranks, ranging from a senior commander and officer to a low-ranking soldier. Another reason was reserved for admirals, generals and recipients of high awards who had been killed in action.
See also
- Nazi propaganda
- Signal, a magazine published by the Wehrmacht
- Waffen-SS in popular culture
References
Citations
- ^ Kallis 2005, p. 113.
- Longerich 2015, pp. 497–498.
- Uziel 2008, p. 296.
- Uziel 2008, p. 298.
- ^ Uziel 2008, pp. 298–299.
- Longerich 2015, p. 551.
- ^ Yad Vashem.
- ^ Uziel 2008, p. 339.
- Wette 2006, pp. 204–206.
- Römer 2012, p. 131.
- Oberkommando des Heeres 2011, p. 189.
- Murawski 1962, p. 68.
Bibliography
- Kallis, Aristotle (2005). Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-4039-9251-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Krockow, Christian von (1992). The Hour Of The Women (First ed.). London: Harper Collins. ISBN 0-571-14320-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Longerich, Peter (2015). Goebbels: A Biography. New York: Random House. ISBN 978-1-4000-6751-0.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Murawski, Erich (1962). Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht 1939 – 1945, vom 1.7.1944 bis zum 9.5.1945 (in German) (2nd ed.). Boppoard am Rhein, Germany: Harald Boldt Verlag. OCLC 906100905.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Oberkommando des Heeres, ed. (24 February 2011) . Heeres-Verordnungsblatt (in German). Vol. 22nd (2nd ed.). Boppoard am Rhein, Germany: University of Michigan. OCLC 73536101.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|editorlink=ignored (|editor-link=suggested) (help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link) - Stahel, David (2009). Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-76847-4.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Römer, Felix (2012). Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht von innen (in German). Munich, Germany: Piper. ISBN 978-3-492-05540-6.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Uziel, Daniel (2008). The Propaganda Warriors: The Wehrmacht and the Consolidation of the German Home Front. Oxford, UK: Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften. ISBN 978-3-03911-532-7.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Uziel, Daniel. "Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops and the Jews" (PDF). Yad Vashem. Retrieved 28 December 2015.
- Wette, Wolfram (2006). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02577-6.
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