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The Civil Friday prayer (Turkish: Sivil Cuma namazı) was a protest movement among Kurds in Turkey after a group of Kurdish imams had boycotted Diyanet mosques, imams, and institutions.

History

Kurdish imams, colloquially called meles, were usually graduates of local unrecognised Shafi'i schools rather than the official İmam Hatip schools. They had a highly respected status in Kurdish society which extended beyond religion. In 2011, many Kurdish imams declared their boycott of Diyanet and any form of Islam associated with the Turkish state. The movement began in Diyarbakır and "rapidly spread" to other Kurdish cities. As a symbol of defiance, thousands of Kurds began to regularly pray in Diyarbakir's Dağkapı square, where Sheikh Said and his 46 companions were executed in 1925. Salahettin Demirtaş supported the movement and also told Kurds to avoid "Turkist", "Fethullahist", and "statist" mosques. The movement challenged the Turkish government both politically and religiously, politically because the sermons were given in Kurdish, and religiously because the prayers were held in the streets instead of state mosques, and the imams wrote their own sermons instead of reading the sermons written by Diyanet. The largest gathering in Diyarbakır was around 5,000 people. The movement drew much attention to the assimilation of Kurds in Turkey, and particularly highlighted the ban on Kurdish sermons while generally highlighted the restrictions on the Kurdish language. The movement, and many other factors during the peace process, had pressured the state to give de facto permission to sermons in Kurdish.

In 2011, a group known as DİAY-DER, comprised of retired Kurdish imams and Islamic scholars, began a boycott of Diyanet, the Turkish state institution for religious affairs, as a protest against the use of religion by the Turkish state for its political objectives and the ban on sermons in Kurdish. The movement used civilian disobedience, and held prayers outdoors instead of Diyanet mosques, seen as instruments of state control in Kurdish cities. They read their sermons in Kurdish, instead of the Turkish sermons dictated by Diyanet.

The movement continued during the 2013-2015 peace process, which failed. The AKP appeals to Kurds had also failed for many reasons, mainly because Kurdish identity was important for Kurdish Muslims, the Islamic identity the AKP presented to replace Kemalism still included "the heavy dose of nationalism", and instead of being a genuine attempt to resolve the conflict, the AKP mostly wanted to diffuse its domestic and foreign pressure over the Kurdish demands.

In December 2011, Diyanet claimed that it would hire 1000 Kurdish imams as state-employed imams, although it was dismissed as being for AKP political purposes. In 2013, Abdullah Öcalan called for a "Democratic Islam Congress" amid the rise of the Islamic State.

During kandil of 2011, the ceremony was conducted in Kurdish for the first time in the Ulu Cami, the main mosque of Diyarbakir.

In a June 1, 2011 rally, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticised the movement, causing disagreements with senior AKP politicians of Kurdish descent.

The motive of the imams was to "challenge the authority of the state as well as the secular Kurdish actors."

A cleric who participated in the movement stated "clearly God wants us to communicate with our jamaat in our own language. Our jamaat is composed of Kurds, we are Kurds, why are we not allowed to give our sermons in Kurdish? What sort of Islam does the AKP believe in?", while another stated that if the AKP government was "religious, as it claims to be, then it should allow us to give the sermons in Kurdish" and that "Turkish Muslims keep saying we are religious siblings. However, in their eyes, we are siblings so long as they are the elder sibling."

Some Turks had supported the movement, with a politician known as Mustafa stating that "for a thousand years, Kurds and Turks formed an ummah that fought against the invading kuffar armies. However, even in this unification, Kurds stayed as Kurds, Turks stayed as Turks. This is how religion should be employed; it should not be employed for assimilation purposes, as the Turkish state is so intent on doing."

A Turkish activist claimed that "this concept is not new to Muslim Turks. Because they were repressed for years under Kemalist regimes, several Muslim Turkish associations and NGOs developed the ritual of having their own Friday prayers in small groups in their own apartments and offices, free from state monitor and control. These were not mass events though. Since Muslim Turks feared the state's rage the prayers were held without any public announce-ment. Only those who were in the know attended. However, when it comes to Kurds, all of a sudden, Muslim Turks find this ritual disturbing. They label Civil Friday prayers as 'so-called Friday prayers' and they say that these prayers are harmful to Muslim unity. So, what has changed? Why is it that alternative, state-free Friday prayers, which were completely acceptable when Turks had them, are deemed dangerous when Kurds organize them? I think Muslim Turks are angry at Muslim Kurds for having achieved something they have not been able to achieve themselves: challenge the state in a public and visible way." She also claimed that Muslim Turks "take pride in the universalism of Islam, and emphasize that 'Muslims help any oppressed groups regardless of their ethnic, religious, national background.' Yet, when it comes to practice, this discourse is shattered easily. The biggest reason for this is that the state has co-opted Muslim Turks with the implementation of Turkish-Islamic policies. For example, as a Muslim Turk, you are free to campaign for the sufferings of Muslims in other countries, such as Bosnia, Palestine, China, Syria, etc. However, you are not allowed to draw attention to the sufferings of Muslim Kurds." She also stated "I have been actively involved in Kurdish rights activism since the 80s. For years, Muslim Turks, including close friends of mine, have labeled me as a Kurdist/Kurdophile. When I worked with Muslim Turkish NGOs in Istanbul, or in other Western cities, after becoming good friends they would tell me that they have been warned about my Kurdist tendencies. Yet, no one calls you Chechenist, Arabist, Bosniakist when you show an interest in the sufferings of Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine, or Bosnia. The irony is that, most of these people who accuse me of being a Kurdist are actually Turkists, but they do not even acknowledge it."

State-appointed Diyanet clerics of Kurdish descent had also supported the movement, while another supporter of the movement rebuffed Diyanet and Turkish government claims, and stated that "they think these prayers are only politically motivated. Yet, in reality, we are only demanding what Islam promises to us. When it comes to Kurds they cease to be Muslims."

References

1. Comparative Kurdish Politics in the Middle East: Actors, Ideas, and Interests, 2017, pp. 149
2. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 3
3. https://eurasianet.org/turkey-kurds-boycott-mosques-for-language-rights
4. The Political Representation of Kurds in Turkey: New Actors and Modes of Participation in a Changing Society, Cengiz Gunes, 2021, pp. 80
5. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 48
6. The Political Representation of Kurds in Turkey: New Actors and Modes of Participation in a Changing Society, Cengiz Gunes, 2021, pp. 81
7. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 48
8. https://eurasianet.org/turkey-kurds-boycott-mosques-for-language-rights
9. https://eurasianet.org/turkey-kurds-boycott-mosques-for-language-rights
10. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 79
11. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 81
12. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 82
13. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 83-84
14. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 84
15. Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity, Gülay Türkmen, 2021, pp. 90