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The 1965 war, also known as the Second Kashmir War, between India and Pakistan was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965. Details of this war, like those of most India-Pakistan wars, are sketchy and riddled with media biases.

The Rann of Kutch

Fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in an area known as the Rann of Kutch, a barren region between the Indian state of Gujarat and Pakistan, in April 1965. Later the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict saw Pakistan gaining 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch.

Pre-war

After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan is said to have believed that the Indian army was unwilling or unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the populace of Kashmir was generally discontent with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar. For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir - a state that Pakistan claims as "disputed", into the Indian union by way Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to declare President's Rule in the disputed state.

The war

On August 15 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Kashmir, marking an official beginning to the war. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to a tip the Indian forces received from Kashmiri civilians about Pakistani soldiers crossing the Line of Control (LoC) dressed as local Kashmiris.

Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armor units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Initially, the Indian army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.

These territorial gains and rapid Indian advances were met with a counterattack by Pakistan in the southern sector (Punjab) where Indian forces, having been caught unprepared, faced technically superior Pakistani tanks and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, calling in its air force to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab.

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6 (some officially claim this to be the beginning of the war).

On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian army within the range of Lahore International Airport, although temporarily. The United States requested for a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by PAF Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point.

On the days following September 9, both nations' premire formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw.

Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan with the intent to capture Amritsar (the capital of Punjab) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division were in a threatening position to push towards New Delhi itself by the end of September 10.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. Pakistan had superiorly captured 2888 km of Indian territory, leaving it to claim it as a “Complete Victory” against India.

Naval war

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a bombardment of the coastal Indian temple town of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. The Indian fleet from Mumbai sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment.

There was no retaliatory response from India. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land based conflict.

There were reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American supplied Pakistani submarines, but this was never confirmed.

Losses

India and Pakistan hold widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

There have been only a few neutral assessments of the damages of the war. According to Global Security Organization"The losses were relatively heavy - on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan."

Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25 1966.

The battle remained largely inconclusive despite Pakistan suffering relatively more losses, and saw a five year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971

Intelligence failures

Indian miscalculations

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained stalemate. The Indian army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss.

It was found later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshall (retd) Lal points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other.The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion, and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary provided the Indian army with enough information for them to learn of "Operation Gibraltar" and the fact that the army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani army regulars.

The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir. "Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnur, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Gen. Ahktar Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command.

Alleged leak of secrets

In a recent press releaseBBC news, Gohar Ayub Khan, son of Ayub Khan (former Pakistan dictator) has alleged that the 1965 war plans of India were sold by an unnamed Brigadier of the Indian Army to Pakistan for a sum of Rs. 20,000 ($335). He added that the Brigadier wanted the money to fund his wife's hobby of canning fruits and vegetables. Gohar Ayub Khan has served as the speaker of the assembly and a stint in the foreign ministry and sources have pointed out that he is among the hawks, ie. does not like normalisation of relations with India. According to him his father, President Ayub Khan did not entirely believe in the war plans since they were quite detailed and was apprehensive over being led into a trap. The result was that only part of the information was used with reasonable success. More details are expected to be revealed in his book. Meanwhile, Pakistan has denied any such information while Indian Army has promised to look into the alleged sellout.

See also

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Kargil War

Sino-Indian War

Sources and external links

United States Library of Congress Country Studies - India

Story of Pakistan

GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965

Grand Slam - A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin — very detailed roll of events and analysis

A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal — dispassionate analysis

Official History of the 1965 War — summary from Pakistani newspaper Dawn

• Indo-Pakistan Wars
• 1965