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Holodomor

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File:Holodomor2.jpg
Child victim of the Holodomor

The Ukrainian famine (1932-1933), or Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомор), was one of the largest national catastrophes of the Ukrainian nation in modern history with direct loss of human life in the range of millions (estimates vary). While the famine in Ukraine was a part of a wider famine that also affected other regions of the USSR, the name Holodomor is specifically applied to the events that took place in territories populated by ethnic Ukrainians. The word comes from the Ukrainian words holod, ‘hunger’, and mor, ‘plague’, possibly from the expression moryty holodom, ‘to inflict death by hunger’.

The famine mostly affected the rural population and in comparison to the previous famine in the USSR during 1921–22, which was caused by drought, and the next one in 1947, the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was caused not by infrastructure breakdown, or war, but by deliberate political and administrative decisions. The result was disastrous. Within a few months, the Ukrainian countryside, one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world, was the scene of a general famine. By 1933, Ukrainian refugees from striken regions had asked Poland, Germany or any other state for military intervention to save them.

Most modern historians agree that the famine was caused by the policies of the government of the Soviet Union under Stalin, rather than by natural causes, and the Holodomor is sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Genocide, implying that the famine was engineered by the Soviets, specifically targeting the Ukrainian people to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor and social entity. However, some scholars note that natural causes (weather and inadequate harvest) and insufficient traction power were also among the reasons that contributed to the origins of famine and its severity.

While historians continue to disagree whether the policies which led to the famine fall under the legal definition of genocide, the governments of some countries, including Ukraine, consider the famine to be such.

Causes and outcomes

Cover of the Soviet magazine Kolhospnytsia Ukrayiny ("Collective Farm Woman of Ukraine") dated December 1932

While complex, it is possible to group the causes of the Holodomor. They have to be understood in the larger context of the social revolution 'from above' that took place in the Soviet Union at the time.

Reversal of Ukrainization

In the 1920s, government ethnic policies of promoting representatives of titular nation of Soviet republics and national minorities on all levels of administrative and public life were widely implemented (see Korenization). In the territory of Ukraine and even the Ukrainian-populated territories of other republics, the Ukrainization became a local implementation of the Korenization policies. Under such conditions the Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine enjoyed a decade of revival of their national culture, resulting in the increase of national self-consciousness and rapid development of indigenous cultural and a social elite. By the early 1930s this development had become increasingly alarming to the Soviet regime, which saw a danger in the loyalties of increasingly nationally conscious Ukrainians aligned with the Ukrainian nation rather than with the Communist ideology or the Soviet state. In the early 1930s, Ukrainization policies were abruptly reversed and replaced with a policy of effective Russification thereby causing significant social, cultural, and political conflict in the Ukrainian populated territories.

Policy of collectivization

Simultaneously, a policy of collectivization of agriculture was introduced and by early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, Ukrainian agriculture was the most substantially affected. The collectivization campaign proved highly unpopular with the rural population: when collectivization was still voluntary, very few peasants joined collective farms. For this reason, the regime increasingly pressured peasants to join collective farms. To expedite the process of collectivization, tens of thousands of Soviet officials were sent into the countryside in 1929–1930.

At the same time, the "Twenty-Five Thousanders" (industrial workers and mostly devoted Bolsheviks) were sent to help run the collective farms. In addition, they were expected to quash the increasing passive and active resistance to collectivization by engaging in what was euphemistically referred to as "dekulakization": the arresting of 'kulaks' — allegedly "well-to-do" farmers who opposed the regime and withheld grain — and transferring kulak families to the Urals and Central Asia, where they were to be placed in others sectors of the economy such as timber. Effectively, the term 'kulak' was applied to anybody resisting collectivization. In fact, many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well off than other peasants. It is documented that around 300,000 Ukrainians out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930-31 and Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide.

Collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, but since Ukraine was the most agriculturally productive area (over 50% of wheat produced in the Russian Empire originated from Ukraine in the beginning of 20th century), the effects here were particularly dramatic. As projections for agricultural production declined, so did collections by the state. For the 1932 harvest, it was planned that there would be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:

USSR Grain production and collections, 1930-33 (million tons)
Year Production Collections Remainder Collections as % of production
1930 73-77 22.1 51-55 30.2-28.7
1931 57-65 22.8 34-43 40-35.1
1932 55-60 18.5 36.5-41.5 33.6-30.8
1933 70-77 22.7 47.3-54.3 32.4-29.5


Restrictions on the freedom of movement

Special barricades were set up by the GPU troops to prevent exodus of peasants from the hunger-stricken regions. During only one month of 1933 219,460 people were intercepted and escorted back or arrested and sentenced . The government introduced new identity papers and obligatory registration for citizens in December 1932 .

To further prevent the spread of information about the famine, travel from Ukraine and some Don regions was specifically forbidden by directives of January 22 1933 (signed by Molotov and Stalin) and of January 23 1933 (joint directive VKP(b) Central Committee and Sovnarkom). The directives stated that the travels "for bread" from these areas were organized by enemies of the Soviet power with the purpose of agitation in northern areas of the USSR against kolkhozes. Therefore railway tickets were to be sold only by ispolkom permits, and those who managed to travel northwards should be arrested.

Information blockade

The Soviet government denied initial reports of the famine, and prevented foreign journalists from travelling in the region. Scholars who have conducted research in declassified archives have reported "the Politburo and regional Party committees insisted that immediate and decisive action be taken in response to the famine such that 'conscientious farmers' not suffer, while district Party committees were instructed to supply every child with milk and decreed that those who failed to mobilize resources to feed the hungry or denied hospitalization to famine victims be prosecuted."

Insufficient assistance

However, aid to famine-stricken regions had only a limited impact on the famine. Between February and July 1933 at least thirty-five Politburo decisions and Sovnarkom decrees selectively authorized issue of a total of only 320,000 tons of grain for food for 30 million people. Documentary evidence confirms the cases when the Soviet leadership expressed even personal interest in ensuring the aid distribution.

Documents from the Soviet archives suggest, however, that the aid distribution was made selectively and the aid's purpose was limited to sustaining the agricultural workforce. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine ordered dividing peasants hospitalized and diagnosed with dystrophy into ailing and recovering patients. The resolution ordered improving the nutrition of the latter within the limits of available resources so that they could be sent out into the fields to sow the new crop as soon as possible. The food was dispensed according to the special resolutions from the government bodies and was given in the field where the laborers worked.

Export of grain

Also, the grain exports during 1932-1933 continued, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930/31 there had been 5,832 thousand tons of grains exported. In 1931/32, grain exports declined to 4,786 thousand tons. In 1932/1933, grain exports were just 1,607 thousand tons and in 1933/34, this further declined to 1,441 thousand tons.


Primitive agriculture

Another factor in the decline of the harvests were the shortage of draught power for ploughing and reaping was even more acute in 1932 than in the previous year. The number of working horses declined from 19.5 million on July 1, 1931 to 16.2 million on July 1, 1932. The desperate efforts to replace horses by tractors failed to compensate for this loss. In 1931, the total supply of tractors to agriculture amounted to 964,000 h.p., 393,000 produced at home, and 578,000 imported. But in 1932, because of the foreign trade crisis, no tractors at all were imported. In the whole of 1932, only 679,000 tractor horse-power was supplied to agriculture, considerably less than in 1931. Only about half became available in time for the harvest, and even less in time for the spring sowing. Animal draught power deteriorated in quality. Horses were fed and maintained even more inadequately than in the previous year. The acute shortage of horses led to the notorious decision to employ cows as working animals. On February 23, the Lower Volga party bureau decided to use 200,000 cows for special field work. The following shows the number of horses in the USSR:

Horses in USSR
Year All Horses(thousands)
1930 30237
1931 26247
1932 19368
1933 16579
1934 15664


Remembrance

To honor those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide. The fourth Saturday in November is the official day of remembrance for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repression.

In 2006, the Holodomor Remembrance Day took place on November 25. President Viktor Yushchenko directed, in decree No. 868/2006, that a minute of silence should be observed at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on that Saturday. The document specified that flags in Ukraine should fly at half-mast as a sign of mourning. In addition, the decree directed that entertainment events are to be restricted and television and radio programming adjusted accordingly.

See also

References

  1. Ukrainian holod (голод, ‘hunger’, compare Russian golod) should not be confused with kholod (холод, ‘cold’). For details, see romanization of Ukrainian. Mor means ‘plague’ in the sense of a disastrous evil or affliction, or a sudden unwelcome outbreak. See wiktionary:plague.
  3. Timothy Snyder, Covert Polish missions across the Soviet Ukrainian border, 1928-1933 (p.77, in Cofini, Silvia Salvatici (a cura di), Rubbettino, 2005)
  4. U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine" , Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., April 19 1988
  5. US House of Representatives Authorizes Construction of Ukrainian Genocide Monument
  6. Statement by Pope John Paul II on the 70th anniversary of the Famine
  7. HR356 "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933", U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003
  8. Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156.
  9. See collection of papers by Mark D. Tauger
  10. R. W. Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (The Industrialization of Soviet Russia)", Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, ISBN 0-333-31107-8.
  11. Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Holodomor-33: Why and how?", Zerkalo Nedeli (The Mirror Weekly), November 25 - December 1, 2006.In Russian, in Ukrainian
  12. R. W. Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (The Industrialization of Soviet Russia)", Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, ISBN 0-333-31107-8. p.487
  13. eg. 83% in Lower Volga, Davies and Wheatcroft, ibid
  14. Wheatcroft and Davies
  15. Davies and Wheatcroft, p.490
  16. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 448
  17. ^ Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Panné, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7
  18. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939., Ithaca. N.I., 2001, p. 306
  19. Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 424
  20. Davies and Wheatcroft, p.214
  21. On April 6, 1933, Sholokhov, who lived in Vesenskii district, wrote at length to Stalin describing the famine conditions and urging him to provide grain. Stalin received the letter on April 15, and on April 16 the Politburo granted 700 tons of grain to the district. Stalin sent a telegram to Sholokhov "We will do everything required. Inform seize of necessary help. State a figure." Sholkhov replied on the same day, and on April 22, the day on which Stalin received the second letter, Stalin scolded him, "You should have sent answer not by letter but by telegram. Time was wasted" Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 217
  22. CC C(b)PU resolution cited through Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Why did Stalin exterminate the Ukrainians?", Den', 29 November 2005
  23. Davies and Wheatcroft, p.471
  24. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p.111
  25. Davies and Wheatcroft, pg.449
  26. Bradley, Lara. "Ukraine's 'Forced Famine' Officially Recognized. The Sundbury Star. 3 January 1999. URL Accessed 12 October 2006
  27. Yushchenko, Viktor. Decree No. 868/2006 by President of Ukraine. Regarding the Remembrance Day in 2006 for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repressions Template:Uk icon

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