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Revision as of 02:22, 27 March 2002 by Guppie (talk | contribs) (Added details of 1981-1998, removed some un-NPOV stuff)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)The Kosovo war was a war between Serbian military (officially Yugoslavia, but Montenegro did not participate) on one side and NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) on the other. NATO bombed Serbia from March 24 to June 10 of 1999, and this is generally concidered the timespan of the war, although civil war between KLA and Serb security forces occured both before and after this time.
Trouble had been brewing in Kosovo for years. Since 1981, a majority of the people there had demanded independence from Yugoslavia. The situation worsened in 1989, when Kosovo's autonomous status was rewoked by Slobodan Milosevic, prime minister of Serbia at that time. In the mid-90s, armed uprising in Kosovo began, led by the KLA. By summer 1998, the violence had escalated to full civil war in Kosovo, with hundreds dead and as much as 300.000 internal refugees. The international community, spear-headed by NATO and OSCE, realized that something had to be done. A NATO-brokered cease-fire of October 25, 1998 saw a large contigent of OSCE peace monitors to Kosovo.
In December of 1998 the cease-fire between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Yugoslavia broke down. The following months were marked by military and civilian killings by both sides. On January 15 the Serbian military killed 45 Albanians in Racak, and this was not the usual practice of the army.
Very un-NPOV paragraph, must be reworked: It is unlikely that this is what spurred the war. Many reports of Albanians being slaughtered by Yugoslavia were broadcast by western media creating a popular opinion by the general public. Many of these were later found to be false fabricated claims by separatist Albanians but these new discoveries only surfaced on certain independent media channels.
Peace talks between Yugoslavia and Albanians in Rambouillet outside Paris broke down on March 19. The international monitors from OSCE on March 22, for fear of the monitors' safety. NATO started its bombing campaign on March 24. Shortly after that, refugees started streaming out of Kosovo, having been forced out of their homes. At the time in media we heard of the genocide that occurred against the Albanians. In a retrospective in December 1999, the Wall Street Journal called the killings in Kosovo an "ethnic-cleansing light." Undoubtedly the killings and ethnic cleansing were terrible, but the great majority occurred after the bombing began. U.S. General Wesley Clark called this outcome "entirely predictable."
The bombings themselves also exacted a humanitarian toll: bridges were bombed during rush hour, cities known for their opposition to Milosevec were not spared. The bombings have drawn critizism by many experts on international law since international conventions ageed to by NATO countires among others prohibit destroying structures vitally important for human survival, prohibit destroying media organizations, TV and radio towers, journalist studios among other structures. The bombings however violated these agreements by targeting many of these structures including water treatment plants, TV stations and other vitally important sites. Critizism was also drawn by the fact that NATO charter specifies that NATO is an organization created for defence of it's members but in this case it was used to attack a country without any visible threat to any NATO members. Many believe that there was some economic incentive in the bombing for NATO since KLA was classified as a terrorist organization before the war but was actively helped during the war by NATO.
Before the bombing began there were two peace proposals on the table: the Rambouillet Agreement suggested by NATO, and the other by the Serb National Assembly. The Rambouillet Agreement called for unrestricted access by NATO armies not only throughout Kosovo (of which it would have control over), but the rest of Yugoslavia as well. NATO would be immune to the laws of Yugoslavia, but NATO could give orders to Serbians. So, basically what it called for was surrender by Yugoslavia. The Serbian proposal called for equality and autonomy for Kosovo, ask for the UN for help on a peace proposal, but rejected a foreign military presence in Kosovo. It condemned the withdrawal of international monitors. The final proposal that ended the bombing rejected the heavy NATO presence throughout Yugoslavia, but Serbia agreed to have a military presence within Kosovo headed by the UN (it ended up being a NATO affair anyways.) The diplomatic options were not looked into enough by NATO, which is logical considering how stronger NATO is on the battlefield then the diplomatic one.
The Kosovo War was significant from a military standpoint in that it
marked the first effective use of low technology local ground forces in combination with high technology air power provided by the United States.
This combination would also prove effective in the United States campaign
against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.
During the early phase of the war, NATO air power had difficulty attacking Serbian ground forces which were well hidden and dug in. Faced with the unpalitible prospect of introducing NATO ground forces, NATO developed a new strategy. The Kosovo Liberation Army would attach Serbian ground forces making it impossible for those forces to stay under cover. Once the ground forces began to move, they were easy targets for NATO air strikes. Most Serbian losses occurred in the last week of the war, and these were sufficient to cause Slobodan Milosevic to decide to seek terms of peace.