Hampton Roads Conference

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The Hampton Roads Conference of February 3, 1865, was an unsuccessful peace conference held by high officials on both sides to discuss terms for ending the American Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward, representing the Union, met with three commissioners from the Confederate States of America (CSA): Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, and Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell.

The representatives discussed a possible alliance against France, the possible terms of surrender, the question of whether slavery might persist after the war, and the question of whether the South would be compensated for property lost through emancipation. Lincoln and Seward reportedly offered some possibilities for compromise on the issue of slavery. The only concrete agreement reached was over prisoner-of-war exchanges.

The Confederate commissioners immediately returned to Richmond at the conclusion of the conference. CSA President Jefferson Davis announced that the North would not compromise. The war continued until April 9, 1865.

Overtures for peace

In 1864, pressure mounted for both sides to seek a peace settlement, ending the long and devastating Civil War. Several people had sought to broker a North–South peace treaty in 1864. Francis P. Blair, a personal friend of both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, had unsuccessfully encouraged Lincoln to make a diplomatic visit to Richmond. Blair had advocated to Lincoln that the war could be brought to a close by having the two opposing sections of the nation stand down in their conflict, and reunite in attacking the French-installed Emperor Maximilian in Mexico. Lincoln asked Blair to wait until Savannah had been captured

South

Davis was pressed for options as the Confederacy faced collapse and defeat. Peace movements in the South had been active since the beginning of the war, and intensified in 1864.

Stephens, though Vice President of the CSA, had initially opposed secession and by 1863 became an active advocate for ending the war. Stephens had almost begun negotiations with Lincoln in July 1863, but his efforts were thwarted after Confederate defeat in the Battle of Gettysburg. By 1864, Stephens was an outright dissident against the power of Davis's CSA government, and was invited by General William T. Sherman to discuss independent peace negotiations between Georgia and the Union.

Stephens addressed the Confederate Senate on January 6, 1865, urging peace talks with the North. Some Confederate legislators agreed with Stephens and began to agitate for negotiations.

North

Lincoln would clearly insist on full sovereignty of the Union. Slavery posed a more difficult problem. The Republican platform in 1864 had explicitly endorsed abolition; but pushing too hard on the slavery issue might offend mainstream politicians and voters. Within this precarious political situation, in July 1864 Lincoln issued a statement via Horace Greeley:

"To Whom It May Concern,"

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of Slavery, and which comes by and with authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

Lincoln confided to James W. Singleton that his primary concern was the Union. In Singleton's words: "that he never has and never will present any other ultimatum—that he is misunderstood on the subject of slavery—that it shall not stand in the way of peace". Lincoln's reassurance earned him Singleton's support in the 1864 election.

Having won the election, Lincoln told Congress that reaching a peace agreement with Davis would be unlikely: "He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot voluntarily reaccept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it." However, said Lincoln, the South could end the War by laying down arms:

They can, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. . . . If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in constitutional and lawful channels. . . . In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that "while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the emancipation proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the Acts of Congress.

Preparation for conference

Blair duly renewed his efforts in January 1865, and traveled to Richmond on January 11. He met with Davis and outlined a plan to end the war, based partly on a North–South alliance against French presence in Mexico. Blair assured Davis that Lincoln had become more willing to negotiate.

On January 12, Davis wrote a letter inviting Lincoln to begin negotiations "with a view to secure peace to the two countries". Lincoln replied, via Blair, that he would discuss only "securing peace to the people of one common country." Davis was upset by this response; Blair blamed the political climate in Washington.

At Blair's suggestion, Davis proposed a meeting between Generals Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. Lincoln refused. Grant ultimately smoothed over the “two countries” dispute and convinced Lincoln to meet the Confederates at Fort Monroe. Davis appointed his three commissioners on January 28 and instructed them to explore all options short of renouncing independence. (Davis's precise understanding of what an "independent" Confederacy might be, in 1865, is not fully clear.)

The Union Congress was shaken by the news of possible Confederate peace negotiations in late January, just days before a rescheduled Thirteenth Amendment vote. Some Congresspeople feared that adopting an emancipation amendment would signal hostility and undermine the talks. Sunset Cox, an Ohio Democrat widely expected to vote in favor of the Amendment, entered a surprise vote of nay for this reason.

Radical Republicans, hoping for a complete victory and stringent terms of surrender, were dismayed by the prospect of a compromise. Lincoln deliberately met the Confederates in Hamtpon Roads instead of Washington, D.C., in order to avoid the impression that he recognized them as representatives of a legitimate state. Stephens later blamed this political reaction for the failure of the Conference.

On January 29, a Confederate Officer with a flag of truce interrupted the Siege of Petersburg to announce the passage of the three Confederate peace commissioners. Soldiers from both armies cheered.

Conference

There are no official records of the conference itself, so all reports originate from the subsequent commentary of involved parties. The two lengthy accounts of the Conference—written by Confederates Stephen and Campbell—concur on most of the details.

Lincoln and Stephens, had been political allies before the war and the meeting began on friendly terms. Stephens discussed the topic of a military alliance against France in Mexico, but Lincoln eventually cut him off and asked directly about the question of sovereignty. Prodded by Campbell, Lincoln insisted that the South would have to disband its armies and submit to federal authority.

On the question of slavery, Lincoln reportedly told the Confederates that Northern opinion was divided on the question of how new laws would be enforced. Regarding the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln reportedly interpreted it as a war measure that would permanently affect only the 200,000 people who came under Army protection during the War—but noted that the Courts might feel differently. Seward reportedly showed the Confederates a copy of the newly adopted Thirteenth Amendment, referred to this document also as a war measure, and suggested that if they were to rejoin the Union they might be able to prevent its ratification. After further discussion, Lincoln suggested that the Southern states might “avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation” by ratifying the Amendment “prospectively, so as to take effect—say in five years.”

Lincoln also offered possible compensation for emancipation, perhaps naming the figure of $400,000,000 which he later proposed to Congress.

The Conference ended with agreement on prisoner-of-war exchange. Lincoln would release Stephens's nephew in exchange for a Northern official in Richmond—and would recommend that Grant establish a system for prisoner exchange.

Dispute over events

Lincoln's personal communications confirm that he might have been willing to privately give ground on slavery. That Lincoln proposed a delayed ratification plan is mentioned by the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel in June 1865—based on a report by Stephens from after the meeting. Seward's biographers generally agree that the Secretary of State may have gone further, suggesting an outright rejection of the Amendment. The Confederate delegates spread word of this suggestion privately, contradicting Jefferson Davis's public statements that the surrender terms had been unconscionable.

Some historians dispute Stephens's account entirely. Michael Vorenberg writes that Lincoln would have known that a constitutional amendment cannot be "prospectively" ratified, and therefore "the story is suspicious at best." Vorenberg suggests that although Lincoln might have expressed his preference for "gradual emancipation", he would not have sought to portray this option as legally or politically possible. James McPherson suggests: "It is probable that Stephens was reading his own viewpoint into Seward's remarks."

According to David Herbert Donald, Lincoln and Seward may have advanced offered these olive branches to the Confederates based on their sense that the institution of slavery was doomed and would end regardless. Relenting on the slavery issue might thus have prevented unnnecessary warfare. Ludwell H. Johnson theorizes that peace negotiations reflected Lincoln's efforts to consolidate political power by creating "a new conservative coalition which would include Southerners". Johnson argues that negotiations would have built support among Northern Democrats as well as nascent Southern governments.

Aftermath

Congress debated a resolution asking Lincoln to provide a report on the Conference. Willard Salisbury introduced an amendment stipulating that Lincoln reveal the precise terms he had offered. Salisbury's amendment failed and the resolution passed. Lincoln released a set of documents which met with an exceptionally positive reaction from Congress.

Davis portrayed the conference in harsh terms, saying that Lincoln had demanded unconditional surrender and that the Confederacy must continue to fight. Some historians argue that Davis entered the Conference in bad faith in order to generate publicity around Northern hostility. Charles Sanders contends that Davis did not retain enough control over the negotiations to ensure they would serve his purpose, writing: "If Davis's motive, therefore, was to discredit the 'croakers,' he was running the enormous political risk that the negotiations might actually succeed." Sanders also argues that if Davis had intended to sabotage the Conference, he would not have considered such prominent representatives as Lee or Stephens. Stephens left Richmond and went home to Georgia on February 9.

Lincoln followed through on his promise to pursue compensation, requesting amnesty and $400,000,000 for the Southern states if they ended armed resistance and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. These terms were unpopular and no such arrangement was reached.

In culture

The film Lincoln (2012) includes a brief dramatization of the conference, focusing on the slavery aspect and the desire of the Confederates to block adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment if re-admitted to the Union.

References

Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 576.
^ Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), pp. 201–202.
^ Harris (2000).
Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 556.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), pp. 804–805.
^ Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), pp. 806–807. "Stephens was also the best-known peace advocate in the South. In June 1863 he had petitioned Davis for permission to proceed to Washington to resolve prisoner of war issues and, if the circumstances warranted, to engage Union authorities in discussions that might lead to 'a correct understanding and agreement between the two governments . . . .' In July 1863 the vice president was poised to enter Washington and initiate negotiations, but the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg doomed his efforts at obtaining an audience with President Abraham Lincoln."
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 808.
^ Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), pp. 577–578. "The lowest common denominator of all the important factions was the preservation of the Union, but if Lincoln did not go beyond that in negotiating with the South, he would be repudiating his party's platform and would irrevocably alienate the Radicals. Yet if he made abolition a sine qua non, he would offend conservative Republicans and War Democrats. No matter what his offer, it seemed that the Democrats' chances in November would be improved. Still he could not simply remain silent (so desperate was the longing for peace) should an occasion for negotiations arise."
"The Sham Peace Negotiation", New York Times, 16 August 1864.
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 579
^ Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 559. “Stephens's record would be highly suspect were it not confirmed by other, more contemporary evidence that Lincoln did not now insist upon the end of slavery as a precondition for peace. He told Representative Singleton that his 'To Whom it May Concern' letter to the Confederate commissioners at Niagra Falls had 'put him in a false position—that he did not mean to make the abolition of slavery a condition' of peace and that 'he would be willing to grant peace with an amnesty, and restoration of the union, leaving slavery to abide the decisions of judicial tribunals.' On the day before Christmas, Lincoln repeated these views to Browning, who was advising Singleton; he declared 'that he had never entertained the purpose of making the abolition of slavery a condition precedent to the termination of the war, and the restoration of the Union.'”
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), pp. 579–580. "So impressed was Singleton with what the South could expect from Lincoln that he refused to support the Democratic candidate George Brinton McClellan, who he believed would be more severe."
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), pp. 580–581.
^ Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 810–811.
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 203.
^ Ethan S. Rafuse, "Hampton Roads Conference"; Encyclopedia Virginia, 29 March 2011.
^ Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 813.
Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 557. “At this point Grant, who was increasingly eager to finish off the war and who was not attuned to the niceties of diplomatic negotiations, intervened. He persuaded the commissioners to delete from their instructions the reference to two separate countries and wired to Washington that he hoped Lincoln could meet with them. Agreeing with Grant that to send the three Confederates back to Richmond 'without any expression from anyone in authority' would be impolitic, Lincoln forthwith joined Seward at Fort Monroe for a conference from which he expected little.”
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 817–819.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 825.
Vorenberg, Final Freedom (2001), p. 205.
Vorenberg, Final Freedom (2001), pp. 206–207. “The Ohio War Democrat had planned to vote for the amendment and had even prepared a speech in its favor. But Cox now believed that, despite Lincoln's suggestion to the contrary, peace commissioners from Richmond were headed north, and that the adoption of the amendment might turn them back. To the surprise of many in the hall, the Ohioan voted nay.”
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 203. “Radical Republicans distrusted the Blairs for their conservative views and their persistent influence over Lincoln. They also believed, reasonably enough, that the war would soon come to a successful end and that negotiations ran the risk of compromising away key elements of victory.”
Vorenberg, Final Freedom (2001), pp. 205–206. “He eventually would meet them in Hampton Roads, Virginia, south of Washington, but he never intended to receive them in the nation's capital. To do so would contradict his position that the Confederacy was not a legitimate nation deserving official recognition. So Lincoln wrote a clever reply to Ashley to put the rumors to rest: 'So far as I know, there are no peace commissioners in the city, or likely to be in it.'”
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 820.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 803.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 818.
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 204. “Historians have debated ever since precisely what was said at the conference. No records were kept of the discussion as it was taking place, and so scholars have had to rely on accounts written later, principally recollections by two of the Confederate commissioners, John A. Campbell and Alexander H. Stephens.”
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 207.
^ Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 205.
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 581.
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 582.
^ Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 206.
^ Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), pp. 582–583.
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 207–208.
Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), p. 211. “Could Seward have made such a statement? Biographers of Seward have accepted that he did and have not questioned accounts of Campbell and Stephens. For example, in an early study, Frederic Bancroft concluded that Seward 'at least suggested' that the rebellious states could 'defeat the adoption of the amendment' by a speedy return to the Union.”
^ Escott, "What Shall We Do with the Negro?" (2009), pp. 211–212. “When Stephens, Campbell, and Hunter returned to Richmond, Jefferson Davis controlled the presentation of their report—as Stephens feared he would—in order to convince his public that the South had to fight on. The commissioners refused to state that only insulting terms had been offered, but Davis then prefaced a very brief summary by them with his own interpretation that 'unconditional submission' had been demanded. This irritated the Confederate emissaries.”
Vorenberg, "The Deformed Child" (2001), p. 256.
Vorenberg, "The Deformed Child" (2001), p. 257.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (1988), p. 823.
Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 559–560. “Since Lincoln himself left no record of any of these interviews, it is possible that all the witnesses distorted his message. But it is more likely—though this can only be a speculation—that Lincoln's remarks stemmed from his realization that slavery was already dead. His principle concern now was that the war might drag on for at least another year. His purpose was to undermine the Jefferson Davis administration by appealing to those 'followers' mentioned in his annual message to Congress.”
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 584–585.
Johnson, "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms" (1968), p. 585.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 812.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), pp. 814, 817. "Indeed, a strong case can be made that Stephens was exactly the wrong man to send if Jefferson Davis truly intended to scuttle the conference. Had that been his object, he would have been much better served by sending someone less prominent, less skilled, and less dedicated to peace than Alexander H. Stephens.
Sanders, "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference" (1997), p. 821.
Donald, Lincoln (1995), p. 560

Sources

Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln. London: Jonathan Cape, 1995. ISBN 0-224-0422-x
Escott, Paul D."What Shall We Do with the Negro?" Lincoln, White Racism, and Civil War America. University of Virginia Press, 2009. ISBN 9780813927862
Harris, William C. (January 2000). "The Hampton Roads Peace Conference: A Final Test of Lincoln's Presidential Leadership". Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association. 21:1: 30–61.
Johnson, Ludwell H. "Lincoln's Solution to the Problem of Peace Terms, 1864-1865," Journal of Southern History (1968) 34#4 pp. 576–586 in JSTOR
McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 9780199743902
Sanders, Charles W. Jr. "Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference: 'To secure Peace to the two countries'." Journal of Southern History (1997) 63#4 pp 803–826. in JSTOR
Vorenberg, Michael. "'The Deformed Child': Slavery and the Election of 1864". Civil War History 47(3), September 2001. Accessed via Project Muse, 29 June 2013.
Vorenberg, Michael .Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Cambridge University Press, 2001. ISBN 9781139428002

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