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| Part of Battle of the Frontiers of the First World War | |||||||
 Rossignol and surrounding area from a 1954 map. Neufchâteau is off the north of this extract, Virton to the south-south-east and Sedan due west. | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 French Third Republic |
 German Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| General Lefèvre | General Kurt von Pritzelwitz | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| Colonial Corps | VI Corps | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 11,388 killed, wounded or missing | 3,473-3,984 killed wounded or missing | ||||||
The Battle of Rossignol was an early battle of the First World War and part of the Battle of the Frontiers. In order to counter the German invasion of Belgium French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre ordered an attack upon the centre of the German advance. This was to be spearheaded by the French Fourth Army comprising the Colonial Corps and II Corps. At the same time the German army broke with their Schlieffen Plan and turned the 5th Army southwards towards the French border. The French Colonial Corps advanced towards Neufchâteau expecting the nearest German forces to be several days march away.
Advance elements of the 3rd Colonial Infantry Division marching column clashed with German cavalry north of Rossignol and soon found themselves facing a strong defensive German position. After several bayonet charges through dense woods failed to make progress French troops retreated southwards to Rossignol. The German 11th and 12th Divisions pushed around both flanks and engaged that part of the Colonial Corps still on the march. With the French II Corps behind schedule and unable to offer any support German artillery destroyed the bridge at Breuvanne, the only means of reinforcing the 3rd Colonial Division at Rossignol. Thus isolated the German forces were able to defeat the troops remaining in the village. The remainder of the Colonial Corps was able to pull back to defensive positions.
The battle saw the destruction of the 3rd Colonial Division as a fighting force, with some 10,520 men killed, wounded or missing. The division's commander Léon Amédée François Raffenel was killed alongside one of his brigade commanders Charles Rondony (the other brigade commander Charles Montignault was captured). An additional 868 men were lost from the supporting 2nd Colonial Division, German amounted to between 3,473 and 3,984 men. An alleged instance of a franc-tireur killing a German soldier resulted in reprisals after the battle in which 63 civilians were killed shortly after the battle and a further 122 executed folloiwing court-martial.
Background
The German invasion from 4 August saw German armies advancing through Belgium, whilst holding a static defensive front south from Metz to the Swiss border in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan which prioritised the capture of Paris. The French Colonial Corps, part of the Fourth Army was situated at Stenay (North-eastern France) on the Chiers River, with the XII Corps on its left flank and the II Corps on its right. The Colonial Corps was formed of Troupes coloniales, troops raised in France for service abroad, as well as troops raised in the colonies such as parts of the Army of Africa. The corps comprised the 2nd and 3rd Colonial Infantry Divisions with supporting non-divisional assets. The 3rd Colonial Division, which would see the heaviest fighting at Rossignold, was composed entirely of regular army troops (with the exception of the 5th and 6th reserve squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Regiment which had recently joined the division as reinforcements) and was considered one of the elite formations of the French army.
General Joffre, commander-in-chief of the French armies, decided to strike against the German centre in Belgium in order to threaten the communication lines of the German right flank which would be subject to a simultaneous attack by the northern French forces. In accordance with this plan the French Grand Quartier Général (army headquarters) issued orders for the French Fourth Army to move north into Belgium at 9.30pm on 20 August. The Colonial Corps was to establish itself at Tintigny, in Belgium on 22 August whilst the II Corps was to move on Léglise via Bellefontaine to cover the right flank.
Strategic movements
The Colonial Corps set off northwards with an advance guard of units drawn from the 3rd Division under the command of General Charles Montignault. This unit, comprising the 1st Colonial Infantry Regiment, the 4th battery of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, two platoons of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique and the 6th Squadron of the 6th Dragoon Regiment, marched north to Virton, Belgium. The French troops brushed aside German cavalry reconnaissance units and met no resistance. Pushing on through Chauvenoy and St Vincent they captured the bridge at Breuvanne by nightfall on 21 August. The remainder of the 3rd Division followed on behind, hampered by late changes of orders, blocked roads, hot weather, a rainstorm and thick fog. The unit made the 17 mile journey in twenty hours.
The opposing German forces comprised the VI Corps (commanded by General Kurt von Pritzelwitz) which remained fairly static on 20 August except for the seizure of Neufchâteau, Belgium which was intended to house the XVIII Reserve Corps. Late on 21 August overriding German strategy was changed, instead of proceeding westwards in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan the 5th Army under Crown Prince Wilhelm was directed to turn south to capture Virton. The 11th Division was to take Tintigny and the 12th Division Rossignol with the 4th Army protecting their right flank.
The French Grand Quartier Général assumed German forces were still proceeding to the north-west at some two to three days march from the 3rd Colonial Division. This was in spite of intelligence garnered by French Fourth Army cavalry and aerial reconnaissance units showing a strong German force in the Neufchâteau area with no evidence of westward movement on 21 August.
Initial contact
At 6.40am on 22 August General Léon Amédée François Raffenel, commander of the French 3rd Division, reached St Vincent in heavy fog where he met with the Colonial Corps commander General Lefèvre. Lefèvre issued his orders for the day, stating that Raffenal's division simply had to march 25 kilometres to Neufchâteau and secure billets. Lefèvre stated that he did not expect to encounter the enemy until 23 or 24 August. The German Fourth Army had spotted the advance of the Colonial Corps by aerial reconnaissance and means of their cavalry screen but did not know whether this force intended to continue north or move eastwards. Final confirmation of the French intentions came only on the morning of 22 August when the advance elements of the 3rd Division were encountered moving north on the road to Neufchâteau.
These troops were the 6th Dragoons, who were at the fore of the French advance, and were pushing German cavalry from the road ahead. The remainder of the division, moving in column along a road hemmed in by thick hedgerows and wire fences, was in good spirits in anticipation of an easy march. The Dragoons soon reached the village of Rossignol, north of the Semois River and headed into the dense Ligny forest. Within two kilometres the advance unit came under rifle fire and suffered heavy casualties. Retreating to a nearby crest the commander requested orders, the time being 7.23am. Receiving instructions to recommence the advance and protesting that it was impossible to do so the infantry were instead sent forwards to clear the road by the bayonet.
The German forces were from the 2nd Uhlan Regiment which had been advancing southwards from Les Fosses. Dismounting and opening fire upon the French cavalry they had soon been supported by the 157th Infantry Regiment that took up positions behind a crest from which it could enfilade any troops on the road at several kilometres range. The French made a series of frontal bayonet charges but were unable to push the Germans back owing to the strong defensive position and the narrow front available due to the dense nature of the forest. German troops likewise were unable to press forward due to the continual French assault and the inability of their supporting artillery to deploy within the forest.
Escalation
General Raffenal established his initial command post at Rossignol some 400m south of the forest's edge. Despite meeting personally with the advance guard commander he refused to believe that a sizeable German force was in the vicinity. With the 2nd Colonial Infantry Regiment, under General Charles Rondony, arriving at Rossignol by 10am he ordered it to move in support of the 1st Colonial Infantry - by then wholly committed in the forest. Raffenal also established the divisional artillery at Rossignol where it could fire on the forest and be protected by the 3rd African Chasseurs and one detached battalion of the 2nd Colonial Infantry.
General Martin Chales de Beaulieu, commander of the German 12th Division, received news from his advance guard commander, General Vollbrecht, that the 157th Infantry Regiment was under great pressure and had suffered many casualties. Chales de Beaulieu ordered the 63rd Infantry Regiment and a battery of artillery to move around the French left flank to Termes to support Vollbrecht. This movement was completed by 11am when the German forces at Termes encountered French troops still moving along the road to Rossignol. A firefight erupted and a battery of the German artillery went into action on nearby Hill 363, supported by the machine guns of the infantry. A French artillery battery, still in column of march and unable to move off the road due to marshes and fences, deployed on the highway and within minutes had almost wiped out the German artillery, destroying three pieces and killing or wounding almost all of its officers and men. The two remaining German batteries, shocked by this setback, deployed behind the crest of Hill 363 and commenced indirect fire upon the French column. The supporting 63rd Infantry Regiment was unable to advance to the road but continued to harass the French forces.
Simultaneously the German 11th Division, under General Von Weber, moving to seize Tintigny via Ansart discovered the 3rd Division in column of march on the Rossignol-Breuvanne road. Deploying some artillery onto Hill 345, near Breuvanne bridge, to attack the French the remainder of the 11th Division advance guard continued its march southwards. Thus the French found themselves threatened on both flanks.
French withdrawal
Raffenal's attacks in the German centre in the Ligny forest were beginning to have an effect, by 10.30am the German 157th Infantry had begun to give way, almost all of their officers having been incapacitated. However the French had suffered grievously themselves particularly amongst their officers, easily distinguished by their gold braided caps. Three battalion commanders had been made casualties by a single burst of German machine gun fire and the French attacks had been reduced to squad or smaller units led by junior officers or NCOs. French Lieutenant-Colonel Guerin, noting the disorganisation amongst the remaining French troops, took the initiative and ordered a fighting withdrawal towards Rossignol. A covering position was established some 300m south of the forest edge.
The French cavalry at Rossignol, receiving orders to defend a French battery to the east failed to locate the artillery and instead attempted to charge the German artillery on Hill 363. Unable to reach the gunners due to marshland, impenetrable fences and heavy defensive fire they moved south across the Breuvanne bridge and west towards Termes. Finsind themselves dispersed by this movement the detachment was unable to make any effective contribution to the fight and only rejoined the 3rd Colonial Division at the day's end.
Encirclement of Rossignol
At 11am the bridge over the Semois, the only access to the village of Rossignol from the south, was destroyed by German artillery fire from the 11th Division at Ansart. This prevented two battalions of the 3rd Colonial Infantry Regiment, the entirity of the 7th Colonial Infantry Regiment and the Colonial Corps artillery from reaching Rossingol. Raffenal, already concerned by the delays in bringing up his reserves, was isolated in Rossignol with a fraction of his division. At this point De Beaulieu committed his reserve brigade to take the French covering position south of the woods.
To the south the French artillery remained confined to the road, unable to render any support to the fight at Rossignol and being whittled down by infantry and artillery attacks from the east, west and south-east. The German 11th Division, less the one battalion of artillery at Hill 345, had reached Tintigny by 10am and continued onwards to St Vincent. At the same time Lefèvre and his Colonial Corps headquarters was moving through St Vincent on the way to Neufchâteau. Encountering a small unit of German cavalry north of the town which was dispersed by his Dragoon escort the headquarters staff found themselves subject to artillery and rifle fire. Lefèvre ordered the 7th Colonial Infantry Regiment and some artillery to the east of St Vincent to defend the town and removed his headquarters to Jamoigne. Here he encountered the lead elements of the 2nd Colonial Division, which he lacked the authority from his army commander to redirect. Despite this the 2nd Division commander, General Paul Leblois, acted on his own initiative to send the 22nd Colonial Infantry Regiment to Termes to support the 3rd Division. The French II Corps was unable to render any effective support on the right flank as, three hours behind schedule, it was halted to the south of Tintigny.
The 3rd Division at Rossignol, cut into two by the destruction of the bridge, hurriedly organised the defence of the village. Raffenal's forward elements were still fighting a retreat from the woods and he had no means of communication with that part of his division trapped south of the river. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd Colonial Infantry Regiment, unable to join their third battalion at Rossignol instead attacked the Germans to the west at Termes. Suffering losses from artillery and machine gun fire from Termes and in their rear from Ansart they were eventually forced to retreat to Jamoigne.
Defence of the village
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At 12.30pm the German 157th Infantry Regiment and 2nd Uhlans, reached the southern limit of the forest and encountered Rodony's hastily organised defence force - which had orders from Raffenal to hold Rossignol "at all costs" - holding a small crest. The Germans managed to bring up two 77mm guns and two 105mm howitzers along the forest road which opened fire on Rondony's men and the clock tower in the village, further fire was directed upon the French from artillery across the Semois to their rear. For more than two hours Rodony, reinforced by ad-hoc units retreating from the woods, was able to hold the German forces in place. The first major German attack came at 2.30pm and was repelled by machine gun and rifle fire but a second at 3.30pm managed to gain the crest and force the French back to the village.
An initial attack upon Rossignol at 4pm was repelled after half an hour's hard fighting at the vilage's edge. With the covering position neutralised the German artillery was able to move through the forest and come into action. These units commenced a bombardment which set the houses of the village ablaze before a second assault was made at 5.30pm. The German troops managed to encircle the village, capturing the remaining French artillery trapped between Rossignol and the Semois river. The French gunners fought to the last, firing off the remainder of their ammunition, disabling their guns and killing their limber horses before surrendering. It was in this action that French author, religious thinker and artillery officer Ernest Psichari was killed whilst defending his artillery pieces.
Surrounded, the remnants of the French defence force - some 400-500 men of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Colonial Infantry together with elements of teh engineers and chasseurs - attempted to breakout to the south-east between the German 11th and 12th Divisions. Hit by artillery and running into the German VI Corps and V Corps command posts only a fraction of this force was able to reach French lines and join the 2nd Colonial Division at Jamoigne. After a final attack the German troops were able to take possession of Rossignol itself by 6.50pm, no pursuit was made of the French south of the Semois.
Aftermath
At 5pm Lefèvre finally received direct control of the 2nd Colonial Division but by 6pm the 7th Colonial Infantry had come under heavy attack at St Vincent. The German 22nd Infantry Brigade, amounting to five-and-a-half battalions of infantry, with supporting artillery and machine guns pushed the ten French companies then in St Vincent back. The French retreated by echelon to a defensive line on the road to Limes which the Germans declined to assault.
French losses were extremely heavy with the 3rd Colonial Division effectively wiped out as a formed unit, having suffered 10,520 men killed, wounded or missing (the 2nd Colonial Division lost 868 men), the divisional artillery wiped out and much of the transport lost. Generals Rondony and Raffenel were amongst those killed, becoming the first French generals to lose their lives during the war. General Montignault was wounded and taken prisoner. German losses were between 3,473 and 3,984 men in total from the 11th and 12th Divisions.
On 22 August at Tintigny a German soldier had been shot, almost certainly by a French patrol or mobilised Belgian foresters. However the attack was blamed on armed civilian francs-tireurs and in retribution German troops in the area shot several civilians in the street and burned others alive in their houses. A further group was taken prisoner and interrogated by a German officer who afterwards had forty of the men shot. Another group of civilians were marched towards Rossignol, where upon hearing the sound of gunfire four were executed, the remainder were taken back to Tintigny and used as human shields against French artillery fire on 23 August. In all 63 of the inhabitants of Tintigny were killed by the German forces and the hamlet itself almost completely destroyed. Subsequent to the battle the rumour spread around German troops that the French at Rossignol had been assisted by civilians. In addition to those executed by German courts-martial at nearby Arlon, 122 civilians (108 of which were from Rossignol) were accused of involvement and executed on the orders of Colonel Richard Karl von Tessmar by telephone from Luxembourg.
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- http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll14/id/536/rec/3
Order of battle
France
Colonial Corps
2nd Colonial Infantry Division
- 2nd Colonial Infantry Brigade
- 4th Colonial Infantry Brigade
- Organic elements
- 1st Colonial Field Artillery Regiment
- 5th (Reserve) Squadron of the 6th Dragoon Regiment
- Company 22/1 of the 1st Engineer Regiment
3rd Colonial Infantry Division
- 1st Colonial Infantry Brigade
- 3rd Colonial Infantry Brigade
- Organic elements
- 2nd Colonial Field Artillery Regiment
- 6th (Reserve) Squadron of the 6th Dragoon Regiment
- Company 22/3 of the 1st Engineer Regiment
Non-divisional elements
- 5th Colonial Infantry Brigade
- 21st Colonial Infantry Regiment
- 23rd Colonial Infantry Regiment
- 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique
- 3rd Colonial Artillery Regiment
- Companies 22/2, 22/4, 22/16, 22/31 of the 1st Engineer Regiment
Germany
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VI Corps
11th Infantry Division
- 21st Infantry Brigade
- 22nd Infantry Brigade
- 11th Cavalry Brigade
- 11th Field Artillery Brigade
12th Infantry Division
- 23rd Infantry Brigade
- 24th Infantry Brigade
- 78th Infantry Brigade
- 12th Cavalry Brigade
- 44th Cavalry Brigade
- 12th Field Artillery Brigade
Non-divisional elements
- 6th Jager Battalion (2nd Upper Silesian)
- 3rd Machine gun detachment of the 51st (4th Lower Silesian) Infantry
- 6th (Silesian) Foot Artillery "von Dieskau"
- 6th Supply Train Group (Silesian)
Sources for order of battle
- Journal du commandant Jean MOREAU, chef d'état-major de la 3 division coloniale par Jean-Louis Philippart et Éric Labayle
- M. DENOLLE, LA GRANDE GUERRE vécue - racontée - illustrée PAR LES COMBATTANTS, tome premier, pages 61 à 65, Librairie Aristide Quillet, éditeur. Paris 1922
References
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 3
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 4
- Beasley 1933, p. 5
- Beasley 1933, p. 6
- Beasley 1933, p. 7
- Beasley 1933, p. 9
- Beasley 1933, p. 11
- Beasley 1933, p. 12
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 13
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 14
- Beasley 1933, p. 15
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 16
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 18
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 17
- Beasley 1933, p. 20
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 22
- Beasley 1933, p. 21
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 23
- Beasley 1933, p. 19
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 24
- Beasley 1933, p. 27
- Beasley 1933, p. 25
- Beasley 1933, p. 26
- Beasley 1933, p. 28
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 30
- Beasley 1933, p. 32
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 33
- Beasley 1933, p. 34
- Beasley 1933, p. 35
- Beasley 1933, p. 36
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 40
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 41
- Spottiswoode & Company 1922, p. 52 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFSpottiswoode_&_Company1922 (help)
- Beasley 1933, p. 37
- Beasley 1933, p. 38
- Beasley 1933, p. 39
- ^ Beasley 1933, p. 42
- Gehin, pp. 81–86
- Gehin & Lucas 2008, p. 478
- Horne & Kramer 2001, p. 56
- Horne & Kramer 2001, p. 57
Bibliography
- Beasley, Major Rex W. (1933). "Critical analysis of the operations of the French Colonial Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes, with particular attention to the operations of the 3d Colonial Division at Rossignol". Command and General Staff School Student Papers, 1930-1936. Combined Arms Research Library. Retrieved 6 April 2014.
- Gehin, Gérard. Livre d'or des officiers superieurs mort pour le France guerre 14-18 (PDF). Le Souvenir français. pp. 81–86.
- Gehin, Gérard; Lucas, Jean-Pierre (2008). Dictionnaire des Généraux et Amiraux Francais de la Grande Guerre (Volume 2) (in French). Paris: Archives et Culture. p. 478. ISBN 978-2-35077-070-3.
- Horne, John N.; Kramer, Alan (2001). German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. Yale University Press. p. 57.
- The Church quarterly review, Volumes 94-95. Spottiswoode & Company, 1922. 1922. p. 52.