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Hedonism refers to the prioritization of pleasure in one's lifestyle, actions, or thoughts. The term can include a number of theories or practices across philosophy, art, and psychology, encompassing both sensory pleasure and more intellectual or personal pursuits, but can also be used in everyday parlance as a pejorative for the egoistic pursuit of short-term gratification at the expense of others.

The term originates in ethical philosophy, where axiological or value hedonism is the claim that pleasure is the sole form of intrinsic value, while normative or ethical hedonism claims that pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain for oneself or others are the ultimate expressions of ethical good. Applied to well-being or what is good for someone, it is the thesis that pleasure and suffering are the only components of well-being.

Psychological or motivational hedonism claims that human behavior is psychologically determined by desires to increase pleasure and to decrease pain.

The nature of pleasure

Bacchante by Frederick William MacMonnies, 1894.
Main article: Pleasure

Pleasure plays a central role in all forms of hedonism; it refers to experience that feels good and involves the enjoyment of something. Pleasure contrasts with pain or suffering, which are forms of feeling bad. Discussions within hedonism usually focus more on pleasure, but as its negative side, pain is equally implied in these discussions. Both pleasure and pain come in degrees and have been thought of as a dimension going from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees. The term "happiness" is often used in this tradition to refer to the balance of pleasure over pain.

In everyday language, the term "pleasure" is primarily associated with sensory pleasures like the enjoyment of food or sex. But in its most general sense, it includes all types of positive or pleasant experiences including the enjoyment of sports, seeing a beautiful sunset or engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity. Theories of pleasure try to determine what all these pleasurable experiences have in common, and what is essential to them. They are traditionally divided into quality theories and attitude theories. Quality theories hold that pleasure is a quality of pleasurable experiences themselves while attitude theories state that pleasure is in some sense external to the experience since it depends on the subject's attitude to the experience.

The plausibility of the various versions of hedonism is affected by how the nature of pleasure is conceived. An important appeal of most forms of hedonism is that they are able to give a simple and unified account of their respective fields. But this is only possible if pleasure itself is a unified phenomenon. This has been put into question, mainly due to the wide variety of pleasure experiences which seem to have no one shared feature in common. One way open to quality theorists to respond to this objection is by pointing out that the hedonic tone of pleasure-experiences is not a regular quality but a higher-order quality. Attitude theories have an easier way to reply to this argument since they may hold that it is the same type of attitude, often identified with desire, that is common to all pleasurable experiences.

Psychological hedonism

Psychological hedonism, also known as motivational hedonism, is an empirical theory about what motivates us: it states that all actions by humans aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain. This is usually understood in combination with egoism, i.e. that each person only aims at their happiness. For example, Thomas Hobbes theorized that a person's ego was the primary impulse in determining their behavior. Human actions rely on beliefs about what causes pleasure. False beliefs may mislead and thus each person's actions may fail to result in pleasure, but even failed actions are motivated by considerations of pleasure, according to psychological hedonism. The paradox of hedonism concerns the thesis that pleasure-seeking behavior is self-defeating in the sense that it results in less actual pleasure than would result from following other motives.

Psychological hedonism gives a straightforward theory explaining the totality of human behavior. It has intuitive plausibility because pleasure-seeking behavior is a common phenomenon, and may indeed dominate human conduct at times; however, the generalization of psychological hedonism as an explanation for all behavior is highly controversial. Critics point to counterexamples involving actions that seem to have no plausible explanation in terms of pleasure, such as egoistic motives for things other than pleasure (e.g. health, self-improvement, post-mortem fame), and altruistic motives (e.g. pursuing one's child's happiness, sacrificing one's life for a greater cause). Psychological hedonists reinterpret such cases in terms of pleasure-seeking behavior, for example positing that seeing one's children happy or knowing that one's death will have been meaningful brings pleasure to the person sacrificing their immediate pleasure.

Critics also contend that, via introspection, one can conclude that the pursuit of pleasure is only one type of motivating force among others and that reinterpreting every case in terms of pleasure/pain contradicts this. Critics also contend that psychological hedonism's basic claim of what motivates humans falls within the realm of the science of psychology rather than philosophy, and as such demands experimental evidence to confirm or contradict it.

Ethical hedonism

Ethical hedonism or normative hedonism, as defined here, is the thesis that considerations of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain determine what people should do or which action is right. However, it is sometimes defined in a wider sense in terms of intrinsic value, in which case it includes axiological hedonism as defined below. It is different from psychological hedonism since it prescribes rather than describes human behavior. In the narrow sense, ethical hedonism is a form of consequentialism since it determines the rightness of an action based on its consequences, which are measured here in terms of pleasure and pain. As such, it is subject to the main arguments in favor and against consequentialism. On the positive side, these include the intuition that the consequences of human actions matter and that, through them, humans ought to make the world a better place. On the negative side, consequentialism would entail that humans rarely if ever know right from wrong since human knowledge of the future is rather limited and the consequences of even simple actions may be vast. As a form of hedonism, it has some initial intuitive appeal since pleasure and pain seem to be relevant to how people should act. But it has been argued that it is morally objectionable to see pleasure and pain as the only factors relevant to what humans should do since this position seems to ignore, for example, values of justice, friendship and truth. Ethical hedonism is usually concerned with both pleasure and pain. But the more restricted version in the form of negative consequentialism or negative utilitarianism focuses only on reducing suffering. Ethical hedonism is said to have been started by Aristippus of Cyrene, who held the idea that pleasure is the highest good and later was revived by Jeremy Bentham.

Ethical hedonist theories can vary in relation to whose pleasure is held within the circle of concern. Individualist forms of hedonism can overlap with Ethical egoism, dictating that each agent has no moral obligation beyond their own pleasure. This position is usually not held in very high esteem. Altruist theories, commonly known by the term "classical utilitarianism", are more respectable in the philosophical community. They hold that the agent should maximize the sum-total of everyone's happiness. This sum-total includes the agent's pleasure as well, but only as one factor among many. A common objection against utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. This is most pronounced in cases where the agent has to sacrifice his own happiness in order to promote someone else's happiness. For example, various commentators have directed this argument against Peter Singer's position, who suggests along similar lines that the right thing to do for most people living in developed countries would be to donate a significant portion of their income to charities, which appears overly demanding to many. Singer justifies his position by pointing out that the suffering that can be avoided in third world countries this way considerably outweighs the pleasure gained from how the money would be spent otherwise. Another common objection to utilitarianism is that it disregards the personal nature of moral duties, for example, that it may be more important to promote the happiness of others close to each individual person, such as family and friends, even if the alternative course of actions would result in slightly more happiness for a stranger.

Axiological hedonism

Axiological hedonism is the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. It has also been referred to as evaluative hedonism or value hedonism, and it is sometimes included in ethical hedonism. A closely related theory often treated together with axiological hedonism is hedonism about well-being, which holds that pleasure and pain are the only constituents of well-being and thereby the only things that are good for someone. Central to the understanding of axiological hedonism is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake. Instrumental value, on the other hand, is ascribed to things that are valuable only as a means to something else. For example, tools like cars or microwaves are said to be instrumentally valuable in virtue of the function they perform, while the happiness they cause is intrinsically valuable. Axiological hedonism is a claim about intrinsic value, not about value at large.

Within the scope of axiological hedonism, there are two competing theories about the exact relation between pleasure and value: quantitative hedonism and qualitative hedonism. Quantitative hedonists, following Jeremy Bentham, hold that the specific content or quality of a pleasure-experience is not relevant to its value, which only depends on its quantitative features: intensity and duration. For example, on this account, an experience of intense pleasure of indulging in food and sex is worth more than an experience of subtle pleasure of looking at fine art or of engaging in a stimulating intellectual conversation. Qualitative hedonists, following John Stuart Mill, object to this version on the grounds that it threatens to turn axiological hedonism into a "philosophy of swine". Instead, they argue that the quality is another factor relevant to the value of a pleasure-experience, for example, that the lower pleasures of the body are less valuable than the higher pleasures of the mind.

One appeal of axiological hedonism is that it provides a simple and unified account of what matters. It also reflects the introspective insight that pleasure feels valuable as something worth seeking. It has been influential throughout the history of western philosophy but has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy. Most objections can roughly be divided into 2 types: (1) objections to the claim that pleasure is a sufficient condition of intrinsic value or that all pleasure is intrinsically valuable; (2) objections to the claim that pleasure is a necessary condition of intrinsic value or that there are no intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure. Opponents in the first category usually try to point to cases of pleasure that seem to either lack value or have negative value, like sadistic pleasure or pleasure due to a false belief. Qualitative hedonists can try to account for these cases by devaluing pleasures associated with the problematic qualities. Other ways to respond to this argument include rejecting the claim that these pleasures really have no or negative intrinsic value or rejecting that these cases involve pleasure at all.

Various thought experiments have been proposed for the second category, i.e. that there are intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure. The most well-known one in recent philosophy is Robert Nozick's experience machine. Nozick asks whether people would agree to be permanently transported into a simulated reality more pleasurable than actual life. He thinks that it is rational to decline this offer since other things besides pleasure matter. This has to do with the fact that it matters to be in touch with reality and to actually "make a difference in the world" instead of just appearing to do so since life would be meaningless otherwise. Axiological hedonists have responded to this thought experiment by pointing out that human intuitions about what people should do are mistaken, for example, that there is a cognitive bias to prefer the status quo and that if people were to find out that people had spent human life already within the experience machine, people would be likely to choose to stay within the machine. Another objection within this category is that many things besides pleasure seem valuable to us, like virtue, beauty, knowledge or justice. For example, G. E. Moore suggests in a famous thought experiment that a world consisting only of a beautiful landscape is better than an ugly and disgusting world even if there is no conscious being to observe and enjoy or suffer either world. One way for the axiological hedonist to respond is to explain the value of these things in terms of instrumental values. So, for example, virtue is good because it tends to increase the overall pleasure of the virtuous person or of the people around them. This can be paired with holding that there is a psychological bias to mistake stable instrumental values for intrinsic values, thus explaining the opponent's intuition. While this strategy may work for some cases, it is controversial whether it can be applied to all counterexamples.

Aesthetic hedonism

Aesthetic hedonism is the influential view in the field of aesthetics that beauty or aesthetic value can be defined in terms of pleasure, e.g. that for an object to be beautiful is for it to cause pleasure or that the experience of beauty is always accompanied by pleasure. A prominent articulation of this position comes from Thomas Aquinas, who treats beauty as "that which pleases in the very apprehension of it". Immanuel Kant explains this pleasure through a harmonious interplay between the faculties of understanding and imagination. A further question for aesthetic hedonists is how to explain the relation between beauty and pleasure. This problem is akin to the Euthyphro dilemma, i.e. the issue whether something is beautiful because it is enjoyed or whether it is enjoyed because it is beautiful. Identity theorists solve this problem by denying that there is a difference between beauty and pleasure: they identify beauty, or the appearance of it, with the experience of aesthetic pleasure.

Aesthetic hedonists usually restrict and specify the notion of pleasure in various ways in order to avoid obvious counterexamples. One important distinction in this context is the difference between pure and mixed pleasure. Pure pleasure excludes any form of pain or unpleasant feeling while the experience of mixed pleasure can include unpleasant elements. But beauty can involve mixed pleasure, for example, in the case of a beautifully tragic story, which is why mixed pleasure is usually allowed in aesthetic hedonist conceptions of beauty.

Another problem faced by aesthetic hedonist theories is that people are known to have taken pleasure from many things that are not beautiful. One way to address this issue is to associate beauty with a special type of pleasure: aesthetic or disinterested pleasure. A pleasure is disinterested if it is indifferent to the existence of the beautiful object or if it did not arise due to an antecedent desire through means-end reasoning. For example, the joy of looking at a beautiful landscape would still be valuable if it turned out that this experience was an illusion, which would not be true if this joy was due to seeing the landscape as a valuable real estate opportunity. Opponents of hedonism usually concede that many experiences of beauty are pleasurable but deny that this is true for all cases. For example, a cold jaded critic may still be a good judge of beauty due to his years of experience but lack the joy that initially accompanied his work. One way to avoid this objection is to allow responses to beautiful things to lack pleasure while insisting that all beautiful things merit pleasure, that aesthetic pleasure is the only appropriate response to them.

History

Etymology

The term hedonism derives from the Greek hēdonismos (Template:Lang-grc; from Template:Lang-grc), which is a cognate from Proto-Indo-European swéh₂dus through Ancient Greek hēdús (Template:Lang-grc) or hêdos (Template:Lang-grc) + suffix -ismos (-ισμός, 'ism').

Opposite to hedonism, there is hedonophobia, which is a strong aversion to experiencing pleasure. According to medical author William C. Shiel Jr., hedonophobia is "an abnormal, excessive, and persistent fear of pleasure." The condition of being unable to experience pleasure is anhedonia.

Ancient

Picture of Aristippus
Aristippus of Cyrene is often seen as the first proponent of philosophical hedonism.

Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, written around 2100–2000 BCE. A central topic in ancient Greek thought, Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE), he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of Cyrenaics he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences. Plato (c. 428–347 BCE) critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality. Following a similar approach, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) associated pleasure with eudaimonia or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.

Epicurus (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a tranquil state of mind, and avoid pain. Following Antisthenes (c. 446—366 BCE), the Cynics warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom. The Stoics also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.

In ancient India, the Charvaka school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the non-existence of God or an afterlife led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended for a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain schools of thought. In ancient China, Yang Zhu (c. 440–360 BCE) argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of Yangism.

Medieval

Picture of al-Razi
Al-Razi's Islamic philosophy was influenced by Epicurean hedonism.

Hedonist philosophy received less attention in medieval philosophy. The early Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a beatific vision of God. In Islamic philosophy, al-Razi (c. 864—925 or 932 CE) was influenced by Epicureanism and defended a subtle form of hedonism, emphasizing moderation and the avoidance of excess. Both al-Farabi (c. 878–950 CE) and Avicenna (980–1037 CE) asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.

Modern and contemporary

At the transition to the early modern period, Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with Christian ethics, suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues. Hedonism gained prominence during the Age of Enlightenment. According to Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679) psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation. John Locke (1632-1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil. Joseph Butler (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects. According to David Hume (1711–1776), pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions. The libertine novels of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or sexual restraint.

Painting of Jeremy Bentham
Jeremy Bentham formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) developed an influential form of hedonism known as classical utilitarianism. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the hedonic calculus to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration. His student John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided. An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by Franz Brentano (1838–1917). He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects—a position also later defended by Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999). Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early psychoanalytic theory. He stated that the pleasure principle describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the reality principle represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.

The 20th century also saw various criticisms of hedonism. G. E. Moore (1873–1958) rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his axiological pluralism, there are other sources, such as beauty and knowledge, a criticism also shared by W. D. Ross (1877–1971). Both C. D. Broad (1887–1971) and Richard Brandt (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value. Robert Nozick (1938–2002) used his experience machine thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.

In response to these and similar criticisms, Fred Feldman (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved. Peter Singer (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about animal welfare. He has advocated effective altruism, relying on empirical evidence and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact. Inspired by the philosophy of Albert Camus (1913–1960), Michel Onfray (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form. David Pearce (1959–present) has developed a transhumanist version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future. The emergence of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.

Criticism

Critics of hedonism have objected to its exclusive concentration on pleasure as valuable or that the retentive breadth of dopamine is limited.

In particular, G. E. Moore offered a thought experiment in criticism of pleasure as the sole bearer of value: he imagined two worlds—one of exceeding beauty and the other a heap of filth. Neither of these worlds will be experienced by anyone. The question then is if it is better for the beautiful world to exist than the heap of filth. In this, Moore implied that states of affairs have value beyond conscious pleasure, which he said spoke against the validity of hedonism.

Perhaps the most famous objection to hedonism is Robert Nozick's famous experience machine. Nozick asks to hypothetically imagine a machine that will allow humans to experience whatever people want—if a person wants to experience making friends, the machine will give this to its user. Nozick claims that by hedonistic logic, people should remain in this machine for the rest of their lives. However, he gives three reasons why this is not a preferable scenario: firstly, because people want to do certain things, as opposed to merely experience them; secondly, people want to be a certain kind of person, as opposed to an 'indeterminate blob' and thirdly, because such a thing would limit their experiences to only what people can imagine. Peter Singer, a hedonistic utilitarian, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek have both argued against such an objection by saying that it only provides an answer to certain forms of hedonism, and ignores others.

See also

References

Notes

  1. Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.
  2. According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.
  3. Singer was initially a proponent of preference utilitarianism but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.

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