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Operation Chengiz Khan was the code name assigned to the pre-emptive strikes carried out by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) on the forward airbases and radar installations of the Indian Air Force (IAF) on the evening of 3 December 1971 and marked the formal initiation of hostilities of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Mounted in three waves between 17:39 and 23:00 hrs, the strikes were targeted against Indian Airbases of Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Awantipur, Bikaner, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Pathankot, Srinagar and Uttarlai as well as against air defence radars at Amritsar and Faridkot.

These first strikes marked the official initiation of hostilities. In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the airstrikes as a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial airstrikes that very night that were expanded to massive retaliatory airstrikes the next morning and continued hitting PAF installations through the duration of the war. Statements released by both the nations the next day confirmed the "existence of a state of war between the two countries", although neither governments had formally issued a Declaration of War.

Background

Pakistan, by the last quarter of 1971, was in a state of civil war, its eastern arm locked in a ferocious battle for independence from the West. The crisis started taking shape in March 1971 when rising political discontent and cultural nationalism in what was then East Pakistan was met by brutal suppressive force from the ruling elite of the West Pakistan establishment in what came to be termed Operation Searchlight.

The massive and disproportionate crackdown by West Pakistan forces became an important factor in precipitating the civil war as a sea of refugees (estimated at the time to be about 10million) came flooding to the eastern provinces of India. Facing a mounting humanitarian crisis, India started actively aiding and re-organising what was by this time already the nucleus of the Mukti Bahini.

However, although Pakistan came under increasing criticism from India, Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe as the plight of the refugees and it's impacts on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in a number of tours around the globe and at the UN, United States and China showed little interest in the crisis and actively opposed aid or intervention supplied to the Mukti Bahini, possibly fearing advancement of Soviet influence deep into South Asia. India's aid to the Mukti Bahini continued unabated, and fighting between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani Forces grew increasingly vicious. On 9 August 1971, India signed a twenty-year co-operation treaty with the Soviet Union which promised military support to either nation should she be attacked. This provided India cover against any possible Chinese intervention in aid of Pakistan if and when the conflict precipitated. To the Pakistani leadership, it became clear that armed Indian intevention and secession of East Pakistan was becoming inevitable.

The strategy of pre-emption

By October 1971, the Mukti Bahini had started launching massive raids deep into East Pakistan with active support of the Indian Army troops. The situation had detoriorated to a state of active undeclared war in the East by the end of November, when Indian and Mukti Bahini forces launched offensives on both the eastern and western borders of East Pakistan. Regular Indian army troops engaged and mauled Pakistani armour at Garibpur while offensive manouvres were launched in Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time. It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run. Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy - "The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West".

This policy made the assumptions that an open conflict with India would not last long due to International pressure, and where East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territorry as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's "overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive". The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. For the PAF to achieve such a position, opposition interference by the Indian Air Force had to be neutralised- or at the least- temporarily blunted, even before the offensive started. To achieve this goal, the PAF had to strike the Forward Air Bases of the Indian Air Force from which the heaviest of interference was expected against the proposed Pakistani offensive. It was therefore necessary that Pakistani Air Force intiate the first strike to open the conflict in its own terms and choice, and attempt to draw as much of the Indian offensive capabillity from the Eastern theater to the west.

The end result of this school of thought within the Pakistani Military was to launch offensive counter air strikes codenamed Operation Chengiz Khan.

A second objective for the PAF was to conduct interdiction strikes against the supply routes for the Indian troops opposing Khan's proposed offensive, but these were accorded as secondary targets to be engaged after the Operation started.

Operation Chengiz Khan

The PAF's strikes were based on the same strategy of pre-emptive neutralisation of enemy air capabillity followed by the Israeli Air Force on Egyptian and Arab air forces in Operation Focus during the six day war.

The decision to hit India with a pre-emptive air-strike was taken on 30 November 1971 during a meeting between the Pakistani President Gen. Yahya Khan, Chief of Staff Gen. Abdul Hammed Khan, and Chief of General Staff, Gen. Gul Hasan.

The objectives of the strike were:

• To surprise the IAF by attacking its forward airfields when it was least expected.

• To neutralise these in order to obtain at least temporary battlefield air superiority in the West.

• To counter-balance the Indian numerical advantage by hitting the Forward Operating Bases of the Indian Air Force as a measure reducing the weight of expected counterattacks on PAF'S own bases.

To achieve surprise, the decision was made to strike on a Friday, the day of the Jumma (Muslim Sabbath), at 17:45 hrs when shifts in IAF control centres were changing. Emulating its operations' experience in battle against the Indian Air Force during the Indo-Pakistani Conflict of 1965, the decision was made to hit the Indian bases in a two wave dusk strike followed by a number of night-interdiction missions through the night. However, the plans for the strike also anticipated the Indians to secure their aircraft in blast pens. Also, anticipating difficulty in target acquisition for camouflaged targets such as fuel tankage, ammunition dumps and command centres the primary objectives set for the Operation were the runways and air defence radars.

The first strikes

The final orders for the strike were issued at 17:30 hrs. The first formations were in air and heading for their targets by 17:40 hrs. Officially, it was announced via government channels that the airstrikes were launched in response to attacks along the western border on Pakistan Rangers' outposts by regular troops of the Indian army, which the Indian Air Force was providing support to. The Indians would later deny any engagement on the Western Front. However, the Indian air defence radars failed to detect the approaching formations. The first indications for the Indians of the impending assault was the roar of the strike aircrafts over their airfields, while in Delhi, the air-raid sirens were the first indications for newsmen, gathered for the daily brief of the East-Pakistan situation, that something was going on.

The first two waves deployed 32 aircraft. Of these, 24 were F-86F Sabres equipped with bombs, 8 Mirage IIIs armed with bombs, and 4 F-104s armed with cannons. The raids were limited to one pass at a relatively high level with the pilots ordered not to operate below 300m AGL as defence against ground fire.

• Pathankot — The first of the strikes were mounted against Pathankot AB. Led by a flight of two Mirage IIIs (a reconnaissance craft and a strike escort) , a six ship mission of F-86Fs flying from Murid and led by Wg.Cdr. S N Jilani hit Pathankot with unguided rockets and dropped several 125kg bombs. The main target of this strike was the runway, which suffered minor damage and took the Indian ground crew several hours to repair. These missions went unopposed since the IAF had not scrambled any interception, and faced only AA. Pathankot was covered by interceptors from Adampur following this first strike during the time it took the ground crew to repair its runway.

• Amritsar — At 17:45 hrs, four Mirages flying from Sargodha and led by Wg.Cdr. Hakimullah attacked Amritsar AB. Hakimullahs flight was armed with two 500 kg bombs each, which the strike used efficiently hitting the first 300m of the runway and cratering it enough to leave it unoperational for several hours. However, the Amritsar runway was repaired whithin the same night to receive detachments of Mig 21s and Su-7 that flew against Rafiqui AB the next morning. A second strike of two F-104 Starfighters, led by Wing Commander Amjad H Khan hit the P-35 radar station at Amritsar, rendering it inoperational for nearly an hour. Indian air defence gunners claimed to have shot down one F-104 while attempting to pinpoint the radar location, but Pakistanis deny this claim.

• Srinagar — Srinagar was hit at 17:50 hrs by a flight of six F-86Fs led by Wg.Cdr. Changezi. Flying from Peshawar, the strike hit a fully lit up Srinagar airport with 250 kg bombs. However, this strike failed to cause any significant damage. Srinagar was to be attacked a second time, during the followup strikes later in the evening, by a C-130 commanded by Gp.Cpt. Qayyum. However Srinagar largely escaped unscathed.

• Awantipur — Awantipur was hit at the same time as Srinagar, at approximately 17:50 hrs by a flight of F-86 Sabres led by Wg Cdr Abdul Aziz. Awantipur, at this time did not have any IAF aircraft based there. The strike therefore did not achieve any significant results.

• Faridkot — At 17:53 hrs, a two ship mission of F-104As flying from Masroor and led by WgCdr Arif Iqbal hit the Faridkot radar station with cannon fire. This strike damaged the P-35 radar significantly, as well as destroy a light aircraft parked near the runway.

All the Pakistani aircrafts deployed in this first wave were recovered safely. However, the orders to make relatively high level passes also compromised the effectiveness of these strikes, with the result that IAF ground personnel were able to complete the repair to whatever damage was caused within the same night, hindered only by the follow-up waves.

Within forty-five minutes of these strikes, Pakistani troops had shelled India's western frontier and were reported to have crossed the border at Punch in the state of Jammu.

Followup counter-air strikes

The third wave of the PAF counter air strikes were directed to strike Ambala, Agra and Halwara around 18:00 hrs and continued in single or two ship formations through the evening until at least 22:30 hrs. These strikes involved fifteen B-57 Canberras, four T-33s, and one C-130. The B-57s flew seven single ship sorties. At least two of these would be lost that evening to Indian groundfire over Amritsar and Halwara respectively. However although, like the first waves, these did not cause significant damage except in Uttarlai and Halwara, these flights did impede to some extent the IAF's preparation for retaliation.

• Ambala — Ambala was a hit by a two ship B-57 formation led by Wg.Cdr. Rais Rafi. The flight hit the runway with eight bombs, causing minor damage.

• Agra — Like Ambala, Agra, which lay deepest among the PAF's targets that evening, was struck by a two ship mission of B-57 led by Wg.Cdr. Yunus and suffered minor damage. Ironically, the first Indian Counter strikes launched that very night included the Canberras of No.5 Sqn were based at Agra.

• Halwara — Halwara was struck twice on the night of the 3rd. The first of these was by a two ship flight of B-57s led by Sqn.Ldr. Abdul Basit. This flight struck the runway with eight bombs, three of which landed on target and significantly damaged it.Halwara was attacked a second time by a single B-57 bomber just before midnight. The arrival of the aircraft was detected by radar and the anti aircraft defences were ready. The aircraft dropped some bombs on the runway and airfield. On the second pass, the B-57 was hit by a Surface to Air Missile. The aircraft was seen streaming smoke. Radio Pakistan would later announce that one of its bombers crashed after returning from a raid. One of the bombs dropped by the aircraft was equipped with a delayed fuse. It exploded while being examined and killed a navigator from the missile squadron. Halwara was not repaired before early the next morning.

• Amritsar and Bikaner — Amritsar was attacked a second time at around 22:10 hrs by the flight of Flt.Lt. Javed, hitting the runway again, but his aircraft was shot down over Amritsar. Bikaner was attacked by Sqn.Ldr. Haq while Pathankot was struck by Flt.Lt. Sultan Arshad. Neither of these caused any significant damage.

• Sirsa — Sirsa was hit by Sqn.Ldr. Alvi with bombs equipped with time-delayed fuses, damaging the runway heavily and forcing the runway to be closed for the rest of the night.

• Uttarlai — Four T-33s from A-Flight No.2 Squadron, led by Sqn.Ldr. Qureshi, hit Uttarlai, causing damage to the runway. These were launched at the same time as the second strike over Srinagar. Uttarlai was attacked a second time later that night by Wg.Cdr. Akhtar. The net damage to the runway was significant enough to keep the runway closed for six days and for the taxiway to be used instead.
• Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Jamnagar — In the south, Sqn.Ldr. Ishtak Qureshi's bombs hit the underground power cable at Jaisalmer, cutting off the power supply and telephone connection for six hours. At the same time, Jodhpur was hit by two B-57s led by Sqn.Ldr. Sohail Mansur while Jamnagar was hit by Flt.Lt. Ejaz Azam.

The later flights were not expected to achieve any significant objectives which they miraculously did, and also aided to hamper any counter-air strike by the IAF. The pilots were all qualified for night flying and were to continue flying such raids for the rest of the war, gaining the nick-name "Uttarlai Night Mail".

The Indian retaliation

As Indira Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister, addressed the nation on radio shortly after midnight informing about the Pakistani attack , the IAF hit back with force. Although intially caught surpirsed by the airstrikes, the IAF retaliation was massive. By 21:00hrs, the Canberras of the No.35 Squadron and No.106 Squadron, as well as No.5 and No.16 squadron were armed and ready for their foray deep into Pakistan. These flew against eight Western Pakistani airfields of Murid, Mianwali, Sargodha, Chander, Risalewala, Rafiqui, and Masroor. In total, 23 combat sorties were launched that night, inflicting heavy damage to Sargodha and Masroor. The PAF units stationed on these airfields had to operate from taxiways for the following two days.

Although several of the Canberras were intercepted by PAF Mirages, there was no significant losses. One Canberra crewed by Flt.Lt. M. Sasoon and R.M. Advani, was shot down by a Mirage piloted by Sqn.Ldr. N. Atta with a Matra R.530 air-to-air missile.

Through the night The IAF also struck the main East Pakistani airfields of Tejgaon, and later Kurmitolla. At the same time, the IAF was deploying additional aircraft to its forward airfields for the strikes that were to follow the next morning. Within two days, the Indian Air Force was to achieve complete air supremacy in the East and repeatedly strike PAF western airfields and prevent it from providing support to the ground troops.

Analysis

In total, 183 bombs were dropped over 12 target runways and 120 hits were reported by the pilots. However, of its stated objectives, the PAF was unable to neutralise the Indian Air Force in the west. It most certainly achieved surprise. The Indian Air Force was unable to offer any resistance to the first waves other than ground fire. The damage to the facilities, albeit limited, also meant that the third wave went unchallenged in the air.

However,compared to Operation Focus that it emulated, only a limited section of the PAF's strike capabillity was employed during Operation Chengiz Khan. Also, compared to the Israeli Air Force's preparation for airstrikes against Egyptians (the Israeli pilots had flown against replicas of the most important Arab airfields)and the use of specific armaments, the PAF had been limited by servicabillity before the USA supplied spare parts in March of the year and training was limited if any. Constraints of the fledgling Pakistani economy also meant the development of its military could not be supported.The Pakistani Air Force thus lacked ammunition for effective runway denial. A failure of intelligence also meant that the strikes were launched at a time when the Indian Air Force was only initiating forward deployment and not finished operational deployment.

Lastly, East Pakistani personnel of the PAF who defected were certain to have revealed at least some of the plans, and certainly, the IAF was to be expecting a pre-emptive strike against its forward airfields. A large-scale offensive was therefore doomed to fail, likely to cause heavy losses and bring the PAF in a position where it could never seriously challenge IAF operations. It is therefore notable that the PAF actually achieved surprise at all.

See also

References and notes

1. ^ India - Pakistan War, 1971; Western Front, Part I.Cooper T and Shaiz A Air Combat Information Group October 29, 2003 Cite error: The named reference "acig" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
2. ^ Pakistan intensifies air raids on India BBC. On This Day. 3 December 1971
3. ^ India and Pakistan: Over the Edge. TIME Dec 13, 1971 Vol. 98 No. 24
4. ^ Squadron 5, "Tuskers". From GlobalSecurity.org
5. Indian Air Force gears up to retaliate Bharat-rakshak.com. Serialised in newspaper format as Liberation Times
6. Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971. Gendercide Watch.
7. Emerging Discontent, 1966-70. Country Studies Bangladesh
8. Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military Action: Operation Searchlight Bose S Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, October 8, 2005
9. The Pakistani Slaughter That Nixon Ignored , Syndicated Column by Sydney Schanberg, New York Times, May 3, 1994
10. ^ Crisis in South Asia - A report by Senator Edward Kennedy to the Subcommittee investigating the Problem of Refugees and Their Settlement, Submitted to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, November 1, 1971, U.S. Govt. Press.pp6-7 Cite error: The named reference "report" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
11. ^ India: The Soviet Stake in Stability. Donaldson R H. Asian Survey Vol. 12, No. 6. (Jun., 1972), pp. 475-492
12. War of Liberation, The . Banglapedia Encyclopedia Entry
13. Remarks of President Richard M Nixon on April 10, 1971 at State Depeartment Signing of Biological Weapon's Convention.

    Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbours.

    . USIS Text, pp 1-2.
14. Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance. Kapur A. Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 6. (June 1972), pp. 463-474.
15. ^ Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born. TIME. Dec 20, 1971 Vol. 98 No. 25
16. Mukti Bahini. Banglapedia article
17. Colonel Anil Shorey The Unique Battle of Garibpur.Sainik Samachar Vol.49, No.8, 16-30 April 2002. From The Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India.
18. Pakistan. Yahya Khan and Bangladesh Library of Congress Country Studies
19. The India-Pakistan War Of 1971: A Modern War. Kyly R G. CSC 1984
20. Failure in Command: Lessons from Pakistan's Indian Wars, 1947–1999. Faruqui A. Defense Analysis Vol.17, No. 1 April 1, 2001
21. ^ The PAF’s Operational Concept Institute of Defence Studies
22. The War of December 1971. Indian Air Force
23. ^ PAF Begins War in the West : 3 December Institute of Defense Studies. Pakistan Military Consortium
24. ^ My Years with the IAF by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, First Edition, Lancer International, 1986.

• Battles of the Indo-Pakistan Wars
• Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
• Pakistan Air Force