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Battle of Jenin (2002)

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Battle of Jenin
Part of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Operation Defensive Shield

IDF D9L and D9N armored bulldozers, instrumental in changing the style of combat and the outcome of the battle.
DateApril 2002
LocationJenin, West Bank
Belligerents
 Israel IDF File:Fateh-logo.jpg Fatah (Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Tanzim)
Hamas
File:Flag of PIJ.gif Islamic Jihad
Commanders and leaders
Yedidia Yehuda Mahmoud Tawallbe†
Strength
1,000 200-250
Casualties and losses
23 soldiers killed 52 killed (38 armed men, 14 civilians according to IDF; 30 militants, 22 civilians according to HRW)
685 persons arrested (mostly released)
Second Intifada

Lists

The Battle of Jenin, previously referred to as the Jenin Massacre, took place between the 3rd and 11th of April 2002 in Jenin's Palestinian refugee camp as part of Operation Defensive Shield.

A series of suicide attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, which culminated in the March 27, 2002 Passover massacre in which 30 Israelis were killed, followed by six other suicide bombings in a span of two weeks, prompted the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to conduct what it considered a large-scale counter-terrorist offensive.

Israel targeted Jenin's refugee camp, referred to as "the martyrs' capital" by Palestinians after it charged that the city had "served as a launch site for numerous terrorist attacks against both Israeli civilians and Israeli towns and villages in the area", including the dispatch of 28 suicide bombers.

Palestinian sources alleged that the camp and its dwellings were attacked indiscriminately by Israel with heavy military equipment, combat helicopters, rockets and missiles, and raised allegations of war crimes and massacre, which were reported in the international media, leading to an increase in negative feelings toward Israel; the allegations of massacre were subsequently refuted, and the Palestinian death toll was estimated at 52, while 23 Israeli soldiers were killed.

Template:Arab-Israeli conflict 2002

Background

From the beginning of March until the first week in May 2002, there were approximately 16 bombings in Israel, mostly suicide attacks. More than 100 civilians were killed and scores wounded. 18 Israelis were killed in two separate Palestinian attacks on March 8 and March 9, and a terrorist attack in Netanya killed 30 and injured 140 on March 27. Within 24 hours Israel called up 30,000 reserve soldiers and launched Operation Defensive Shield in Ramallah and Bethlehem, entering Tulkarm and Qalqilyah a day later.

The second largest UNRWA refugee camp in the West Bank, the Jenin camp existed since 1953 and housed 13,055 in an area of 548 metres squared, forming a neighbourhood of densely packed buildings alongside Jenin-proper and not far from the Green Line. It had come under Palestinian civil and security control with the rest of the city as part of the Oslo Accords in 1995, which dictated a prevention of attacks on Israelis. According to Israeli and Palestinian observers who gave information to the UN, 200 armed men from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas had been using the camp as a base, known as "the martyrs' capital", and of the 100 suicide bombers who had launched attacks since the Second Intifada began in October 2000, 23 or 28 attacks had been launched from there. On of the key planners of attacks was Mahmoud Tawallbe, Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander of the camp.

Limited Israeli forces had entered the camp along a single route twice in the previous month; they had encountered heavy resistance and quickly departed. The command decided to this time send in three thrusts comprised mainly of the reservist 5th Infantry Brigade/Nachshon from the town of Jenin to the north, as well as a company of the Nahal Brigade from the southeast and Battalion 51 of the Golani Brigade from the southwest. The force of 1,000 troops also included elements of the Naval commando and Duvdevan Unit special forces, the Armoured Corps, and Combat Engineers with armored bulldozer for neutralising the roadside bombs that would line the alleys of the camp according to Military Intelligence. Anticipating the heaviest resistance in Nablus, IDF commanders sent two regular infantry brigades there, assuming they could take over the Jenin camp in 48-72 hours with just the one reservist brigade, an assessment which turned out to be overly optimistic. The force's entry was delayed until April 2 due to rain.

Since the previous Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian militants had prepared by boobytrapping both the town and camp's streets in a bid to trap the Israeli soldiers, some of them as large as 113 kilograms, ten times larger than a typical suicide bomber's charge. They had also cut tunnels between homes to maintain mobility without exposing themselves to the street.

The battle

Israeli forces entered on 2 April, and had secured the town of Jenin by the second day. Israeli intelligence estimated that half the population of noncombatants had left before they arrived, and 90% had done so by the third day, leaving around 1,300 people. The EU's report said "at least 4,000 remained inside and did not evacuate the camp."Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page). although there was limited use of helicopters.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page). and the threat of being buried alive, caused the Palestinian militants to surrender. Later, IDF forces withdrew gradually from the refugee camp under international pressure.

After the conflict Israeli reports claim that 8-9% of the houses within the refugee camp were destroyed. This was largely within an area of intense fighting of approximately 100 m by 100 m according to the IDF. . An area within the refugee camp, 100 m by 200 m according to some (up to 400 m by 500 m by other estimates) was reported to have been flattened. Reports added that six (globalsecurity.org) or ten (BBC) percent of the camp were destroyed in the fighting.

Most of the demolition occurred in the Hawashin neighborhood, where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives.

In October 2002, according to the Walla news agency, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas websites reported that their forces in Jenin before the Israeli entry included 250 armed militants. The official Kol Yisrael radio station reported that 15,000 explosive charges were at the militants' disposal, as well as a large number of handguns. The militants were well organized and had an extensive system of communications.

Al-Ahram Online interviewed with "Omar the Engineer", a Palestinian bombmaker who claimed that some 50 homes were booby trapped. "We chose old and empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel because we knew the soldiers would search for them," he said.

According to Lt. Colonel Adir Haruvi of the IDF, numerous buildings, passages and even bodies were booby-trapped, often prompting Israelis to use armored bulldozers to level numerous buildings. The Israelis also claimed to have found more than a dozen explosive-making labs.

Body count estimates

Initial fatalities estimates put forward by both Palestinian and Israeli officials were high, measuring in the hundreds. In examples cited in the timeline below, figures include both civilians and armed combatants unless otherwise indicated:

  • April 3 - Fighting begins
  • April 7 - Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian minister for Local Government is quoted in the Washington Post making the first allegation of a massacre.
  • NBC News hears from Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority Abdel Rahman that "over 250 Palestinians killed".
  • April 10 - Israel estimates 150 dead
  • April 12 - Fighting ends
  • IDF spokesman Brigadier-General Ron Kitrey reports on Israeli Army Radio that there are apparently hundreds killed, the IDF quickly clarify he meant hundreds of casualties (killed or injured).
  • An IDF source reportedly puts the number of dead at 250
  • Palestinian Information Minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo, accuses Israel of digging mass graves for 900 Palestinians in the camp, whilst Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Abdel Rahman claimed that "thousands" had died, the most serious accusations of the episode
  • April 14 - After the IDF reportedly estimate 250 and 188, a final figure of 45 is given.
  • April 16 - Observers were allowed into the camp.
  • April 18 - Zalmon Shoval, adviser to Prime Minister Sharon, said only about 65 bodies had been recovered, of which five were civilians.
  • April 30 - Kadoura Mousa Kadoura, the director of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement for the northern West Bank set the total dead at 56.

Allegations of a massacre

According to the United Nations (which was prevented from making a visit), "at least 52" Palestinian deaths were confirmed. Human Rights Watch "confirmed that at least fifty-two Palestinians were killed ... This figure may rise". No other Palestinian deaths from the battle have been confirmed since this time. The IDF estimate the number at 52. The designation of combatants differs (IDF counts 38 "armed men", HRW counts 30 "militants"). Palestinian Fatah investigators claimed the death toll is 56, announced by Kadoura Moussa, the Fatah director for the Northern West Bank. 23 Israeli soldiers were also killed.

The battle attracted widespread international attention due to Palestinian claims that war crimes were committed (these claims were repeated in the HRW report), and as a result of inflated reports on body counts by all parties. The IDF barred journalists from entering the camp during the fighting on safety grounds and at one point reported casualties as high as 250, yet many journalists gave some credence to Palestinian claims that a massacre of Palestinian civilians may have taken place during the fighting, and claims that hundreds, or even thousands, of bodies had been secretly buried in mass graves by the IDF were spread. These allegations were aired widely in the Arab world, inciting extreme antipathy toward Israel. Due to this activity, critics in the West name the events as the "Big Jenin Lie".

Many Arabs and Palestinians still use the term "Jenin Massacre" (Template:Lang-ar) regardless of the results of the investigations.

Post-fighting investigations

In an article about the battle in Jenin, Time ruled out Palestinian allegations of massacre, writing that:

A Time investigation concludes that there was no wanton massacre in Jenin, no deliberate slaughter of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. But the 12 days of fighting took a severe toll on the camp.

United States Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Jenin during the month of the battle, and upon returning to the States testified to a congressional panel that there was no evidence of mass graves or a massacre.

Several months later, the UN concluded an investigation into the events and found claims of a "massacre" to be baseless. Human Rights Watch found no evidence for a massacre, but said "Israeli forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes." The human rights organization also criticized Palestinian militants for having endangered the lives of Palestinian civilians in part by "intermingling" with them.

According to the Anti-Defamation League, "International organizations, non-governmental organizations, and many foreign governments prematurely and summarily attacked Israel for committing atrocities during its military operations in the West Bank. But while a massacre of hundreds was alleged, reported and condemned, it is now essentially certain that no such massacre occurred."

Derek Holley, a military advisor to Amnesty International, corroborated that there was no massacre. "Talking to people and talking to witnesses, even very credible witnesses, it just appears there was no wholesale killing." he added.

International statements and human rights reports

In late April and on May 3, 2002, the UN, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch released reports about the Israeli military incursions into Jenin. The reports documented that approximately 30 Palestinian militants, 22 Palestinian civilians, and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in the fighting and thus felt no evidence that a massacre took place. However, HRW did say that Israel "committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes," while Amnesty International similarly alleged evidence that Israel had committed war crimes.

The Anti-Defamation League questioned how HRW and AI could both acknowledge the lack of a supposed Israeli massacre and the endangerment of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian gunmen and still maintain its accusation of Israel, and labelled the reports prejudiced.

UN visiting mission

The United Nations visiting mission ordered by the UN Commission on Human Rights on 5 April 2002 and headed by Mary Robinson, ex-President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was refused entry to Israel.

UN fact finding mission

The United Nations Security Council unanimously proposed a fact finding mission with resolution 1405 on April 19, 2002 (ie 8 days after the surrender of the majority of the militants). The Government of Israel considered the intitiative to set up the mission as "an anti-Israeli diplomatic offensive".

While formally agreeing to co-operate with the inquiry, the government of Israel set a list of preconditions, three being most important to them:

  • That the mission should include anti-terrorism experts (one Amnesty International military advisor went public saying that this was necessary - Derek Holley said "I think Israel has a very valid point. The UN team was going to be made up of UN civil servants, and I think you would then get a very one-sided view of what happened in Jenin. I think it is important that you do have military men and anti-terrorist experts on that UN commission. I think it is unfair for a lawyer to go to Jenin to then build up a military picture of what happened. You do need a soldier's perspective to say, well, this was a close quarter battle in an urban environment, unfortunately soldiers will make mistakes and will throw a hand grenade through the wrong window, will shoot at a twitching curtain, because that is the way war is."
  • That the UN agree not to prosecute Israeli soldiers for any violations of international law which might be uncovered during by the mission.
  • And that the mission limit its scope exclusively to events in Jenin.

These conditions were justified by the Israeli government's legal experts on the grounds that "the conditions under which the UN proposed the mission were unfair, as the UN did not agree to give the anti-terrorism expert full membership, would not give the mission a strict mandate, nor declare the mission solely investigatory (as opposed to having a judicial purpose)". According to the Israeli legal experts, all three positions violate of the UN's own principles (as stated in the "Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations", A/RES/46/59 of December 9, 1991).

The UN refused to accept the last two conditions, whereupon the Israeli authorities announced that they would not allow the mission entry into any Israeli-controlled territory, nor cooperate with its activities in any way. According to commentaries by the diplomatic correspondents of the main Israeli papers (Yediot Aharonot, Maariv and Haaretz), the Sharon Government took this stance after being assured of tacit support from the Bush Administration in the US.

The members of the UN mission waited for several days in Switzerland. As described in several commentaries on the Israeli and international press at the time, the United Nations had several choices:

  • Accept the Israeli conditions. Palestinian and other Arab diplomats at the UN headquarters made clear they would condemn such a move;
  • Proceed with the investigation without Israeli cooperation and without physical access to Jenin. This would have meant relying largely on Palestinian eye-witnesses who had been able to exit the West Bank;
  • Continue pressure on the Israeli Government to change its stance. This was felt to have little possibility of success in light of US support for Israel's position on the mission's team.

On the May 3 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan announced that he was disbanding the fact-finding mission.

On the May 7 2002, the UN General Assembly passed, condemning both the Israeli operations and Israel's refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team. At the same time, the UN issued a press release repeating the points made and including statements made by the representatives of individual nations. The GA requested the Secretary-General to present a report, drawing upon available resources and information.

UN report

The UN report stated that fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the end of May 2002, which mirrored the IDF report, but fell short of the estimate by a senior Palestinian Authority official who had claimed that about five hundred were killed which was not corroborated by evidence. This report was criticized by the group Human Rights Watch as being "flawed" due to a lack of first-hand evidence.

The report was written without a visit to Jenin or the other Palestinian cities in question and relied completely on available resources and information, including submissions from five United Nations Member States and Observer Missions, documents in the public domain and papers submitted by non-governmental organizations.

The report explains the failure of the fact-finding mission and explains the rising violence of the first two years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, with particular reference to the suicide bombings that had been carried out. It describes all the operations carried out in the West Bank.

On the subject of Jenin, it says the "IDF urged civilians in Arabic to evacuate the camp. Some reports, including of interviews with IDF soldiers, suggest that those warnings were not adequate ..... Estimates vary on how many civilians remained in the camp throughout but there may have been as many as 4,000."

The UN report confirmed that "at least 52 Palestinians" deaths were reported by the Jenin hospital by the end of May 2002 and that Palestinian reports of 500 dead had not been substantiated.

Following the ambush of the 9th Apr the IDF shifted tactics and began bombardment with tanks and missiles, and used armoured bulldozers to demolish portions of the camp. The report says "Witness testimonies and human rights investigations allege that the destruction was both disproportionate and indiscriminate, some houses coming under attack from the bulldozers before their inhabitants had the opportunity to evacuate."

Several UNRWA facilities in the camp, including its health centre and sanitation office, were badly damaged and from 11 to 15 April, United Nations and other humanitarian agencies petitioned and negotiated for access to the camp with IDF and made many attempts to send in convoys, to no avail. On 18 April, senior United Nations officials criticized Israel for its handling of humanitarian access in the aftermath of the battle and, in particular, its refusal to facilitate full and safe access to the affected populations in violation of its obligations under international humanitarian law. Many reports from human rights groups contain accounts of wounded civilians waiting days to reach medical assistance, and being refused medical treatment by IDF soldiers. In some cases, people died as a result of these delays. In some instances the IDF targeted medical personnel.

United Nations and other humanitarian personnel offered to comply fully with IDF security checks on entering and leaving the camp, but were not able to enter the camp on this basis (although some Israeli journalists were given escorted access to the camp on 14 April). On 15 April the Red Crescent and Red Cross were permitted to enter the camp under military escort but reported that their movement was strictly confined to certain areas and further constrained by the presence of large quantities of unexploded ordnance including booby traps. After evacuating only seven bodies, they aborted their efforts. Supplies were distributed to the camp inhabitants only on 16 April. Bomb disposal experts were barred for several weeks, during which time at least two Palestinians were killed in explosions.

The UN did not specifically refer to war-crimes or contain examples of human shields and so forth.

Human Rights Watch report

See also: Criticism of Human Rights Watch § Battle of Jenin

The Human Rights Watch report found "no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF". The report agreed with the total casualty figures provided by the IDF but documented a higher proportion of civilian casualties. Amnesty International concurred. The HRW report documented instances of unlawful or willful killing by the IDF, some of which could have been avoided if proper procedures were followed, as well as instances of summary executions. It also documented use of Palestinians as 'human shields', by the IDF, and prevention of humanitarian organizations from accessing the camp despite the great need. The report concluded:

Israeli forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes. Human Rights Watch found no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF in Jenin refugee camp. Ultimately, Human Rights Watch verified the deaths of 52 Palestinians, of whom it concluded that 27 were suspected to be armed combatants, 22 were civilians, and the status of the remaining 3 could not be determined.

While focusing mainly on the actions of the IDF, the report also stated that:

Palestinian gunmen did endanger Palestinian civilians in the camp by using it as a base for planning and launching attacks, using indiscriminate tactics such as planting improvised explosive devices within the camp, and intermingling with the civilian population during armed conflict, and, in some cases, to avoid apprehension by Israeli forces.

The report notes that:

The presence of armed Palestinian militants inside Jenin refugee camp, and the preparations made by those armed Palestinian militants in anticipation of the IDF incursion, does not detract from the IDF's obligation under international humanitarian law to take all feasible precautions to avoid harm to civilians ... Unfortunately, these obligations were not met.

Amnesty International

Amnesty sent 15 "research missions" to the region between Sept 2000 and April 2002, and issued eight reports. Their research included reviewing Israeli High Court cases and examining medical records, statements, and video documentation. Delegates conducted numerous interviews. Testimony and other evidence were cross-checked for accuracy.

Amnesty accepts Israel's security concerns: "Israel has the right and responsibility to take measures to prevent unlawful violence. .... As the occupying power of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, Israel has an obligation to respect and protect the human rights of all people in these areas."

Amnesty's research included reviewing Israeli High Court cases and examining medical records, statements, and video documentation. Delegates conducted numerous interviews. Testimony and other evidence were cross-checked for accuracy. Amnesty criticises Israel for their use of human shields, damage to electric and water grids, and inconsistent access to external relief and medical agencies. It also says that much of the destruction took place after April 11, the date it argues combat died down.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).

  • During the battle, Dr. David Zangen, chief medical officer of the Israeli paratroop unit that was fighting in Jenin, reported that the IDF had worked to keep the local Palestinian hospital open and that Israeli doctors had offered the Palestinians blood for their wounded, who then refused to be given "Jewish blood". Col. Arik Gordin of the IDF Office of Military Spokesmen has stated Israel subsequently flew in 2,000 units of blood from Jordan and arranged 40 more units of blood from the Muqased Hospital (East Jerusalem), which were sent to the Ramallah and Tulkarm hospitals, and also facilitated the delivery of 1,800 units of anti-coagulants that had come from Morocco.

See also

Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Participants
Israelis
Palestinians
Principals
Other groups
Third-party groups
Individuals
Israelis
Palestinians
Background
1920–1948
 
1948–1970
Palestinian
insurgency
1968–1982
 
1973–1987
First Intifada
1987–1991
Second Intifada
2000–2005
Palestinian dissident
campaigns
2006–present
Gaza–Israel
conflict
2006–present
Diplomacy/law
Timeline
1948–1991
1990s
2000s
2010s
United Nations
Analysis

References

  1. ^ The Battle of Jenin (also)
  2. Passover Massacre: Passover suicide bombing at Park Hotel in Netanya March 27, 2002
  3. Israel enters West Bank villages
  4. Statements by Israeli PM Sharon and DM Ben-Eliezer 29 Mar 2002
  5. ^ Jenin: The Capital of the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists (according to Fatah)
  6. ^ 'Jenin rises from the dirt' by Ken Lee (BBC News)
  7. Apr 2002 Jenin's Terrorist Infrastructure 4 Apr 2002 (Communicated by the IDF Spokesman)
  8. ^ UN Report on Jenin
  9. Report of the Secretary-General on Jenin, paragraphs 32, 33, 50
  10. Jenin Camp Official Web Site (Google Translated), (Source) Template:Languageicon)])
  11. Suicide Bombers from Jenin
  12. ^ The 'engineer'
  13. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/4/Aerial%20Photographs%20of%20Jenin
  14. David Blair (17 April, 2002). "Blasted to rubble by the Israelis". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 2007-02-22. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  15. Amnesty International report on Jenin & Nablus
  16. ^ Expert weighs up Jenin 'massacre'
  17. 'Jenin, Palestine - 32°27'39"N 35°17'20"E/IDF aerial imagery the Jenin Refugee Camp' (globalsecurity.org)
  18. http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo63.pdf
  19. ^ CAMERA
  20. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1920463.stm
  21. http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/12/163750.shtml
  22. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/04/15/1018333482108.html?oneclick=true
  23. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/04/15/1018333482108.html?oneclick=true
  24. http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0240.htm
  25. http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0240.htm
  26. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1937048.stm
  27. http://www.rense.com/general24/dt.htm
  28. HRW Summary on hrw.org
  29. http://www.rense.com/general24/dt.htm
  30. BBC: UN says no massacre in Jenin
  31. CNN: Access to Jenin difficult/Palestinians are reporting 500 dead
  32. ^ 'Hundreds of victims 'were buried by bulldozer in mass grave'/Daud, a claimed witness, testifies.' (Telegraph.co.uk)
  33. CNN Transcripts: Fierce Fighting Continues in Jenin/Stories of mass graves
  34. "Evidence and reality collide in a battle of words/43-year-old Muiassar Abu Ali interview". Sydney Morning Herald. 16 April 2002. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  35. CNN Transcripts: Interview With Adel Al-Jubeir/Saudi Arabian response
  38. Colin US Secretary of State Powell: I've seen no evidence that would suggest a massacre took place.
  39. http://www.adl.org/Israel/jenin/jenin.pdf
  40. http://hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502-01.htm#P49_1774
  41. Anatomy of Anti-Israel Incitement: Jenin,Anti-Defamation League
  42. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/377/00/PDF/N0237700.pdf?OpenElement .resolution ES-10/10
  43. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GA10015.doc.htm
  44. http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/jenin080202.htm
  45. http://hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502-01.htm#P49_1774
  46. http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/diplomacy/articles/dip_0204.htm#
  47. Humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians 15 Apr 2002 (Communicated by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories)
  48. Interview with Gideon Meir, Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman

External links

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Reports by human rights groups, the UN, the IDF and the PA

Press reports, opinions and articles about Jenin battle

Whilst considering these press and news reports, it is important to consider the date. At first, many international newspapers reported the possibility of a massacre, whereas 3-4 weeks on, they often describe the massacre as particularly unlikely.

Articles from The Observer and The Guardian

Articles from the BBC

Articles from Ha'aretz

Published personal accounts

The books below present contrasting Israeli and Arab views of the battle. Each is a collection of personal anecdotes, based on the authors' interviews with eyewitnesses / participants:

Israeli Accounts

  • Goldberg, Brett (2003). A Psalm in Jenin. Israel: Modan Publishing House . p. 304. ISBN 965-7141-03-6. {{cite book}}: External link in |publisher= (help) is a sketch of the experiences of several Israeli soldiers who participated in the battle (either as combatants or auxiliaries such as field medics), based on their accounts and/or accounts of families and friends, in the case of soldiers who fell in the battle.

Arab Accounts

Related issues to Jenin battle

Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Participants
Israelis
Palestinians
Principals
Other groups
Third-party groups
Individuals
Israelis
Palestinians
Background
1920–1948
 
1948–1970
Palestinian
insurgency
1968–1982
 
1973–1987
First Intifada
1987–1991
Second Intifada
2000–2005
Palestinian dissident
campaigns
2006–present
Gaza–Israel
conflict
2006–present
Diplomacy/law
Timeline
1948–1991
1990s
2000s
2010s
United Nations
Analysis
Categories: