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Operation Charnwood
Part of Operation Overlord, Battle of Normandy
Troops pick their way through the rubble of Caen
Date 7–9 July 1944 Location Normandy, France Result Allied Tactical Victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom  Canada	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Miles Dempsey John Crocker	Heinrich Eberbach Sepp Dietrich
Strength
3 Infantry Divisions 3 armoured brigades	1 Panzer Division 1 Infantry Division 61 tanks
Casualties and losses
3,817 casualties ~80 tanks	Over 2,000 casualties 18 –32 tanks
3–400 French civilian casualties

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Operation Charnwood was a World War II Anglo-Canadian offensive that took place between 8–9 July 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to capture the German occupied city of Caen, which was a major Allied objective during the opening stages of Operation Overlord, and halt the German transfer of units from the Anglo-Canadian front to the American front.

Preceded by a 467 aircraft bombing of Caen on the night of 7 July, intended to "soften up" German defensive lines, Operation Charnwood began at dawn on 8 July, with battalions of three infantry divisions attacking German positions north of Caen behind a creeping artillery barrage. The heavy bomber raid, despite the large munitions quantities expended on Caen, inflicted minimal damage on primary German defensive positions. Supported by three armoured brigades, the forces of the British I Corps made gradual progress against the 12th SS Panzer Division and the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. By the end of 8 July, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had captured Carpiquet Airfield, while the British 3rd and 59th divisions had reached the outskirts of Caen. On 9 July, all of Caen north of the Orne River was captured, though 80% of the historic city had been destroyed.

Tactically, the operation was a partial success, with British forces capturing Caen and inflicting heavy casualties on the two German divisions defending the immediate sector. Strategically, the operation achieved mixed results, in that it forced Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to withdraw all German units from north of the Orne River, yet did not succeed in stopping the flow of units to the American front. The British maintained the initiative, and were able to launch the joint offensive Operation Atlantic and Operation Goodwood a week later, in which the southern half of Caen was captured.

Background

The town of Caen in Normandy was one of the D-Day objectives for the British 3rd Infantry Division when it landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944. The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", has been described by historian L F Ellis as the most important D-Day objective assigned to Lieutenant-General Crockers's I Corps. Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the southeast of Caen, in order to acquire airfields and protect the left flank of the United States First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing right to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River. The terrain between Caen and Vimont was especially promising, being open, dry and conducive to swift offensive operations. Since the Allied forces greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, transforming the battle into a more fluid fast moving battle was to their advantage.

Hampered by congestion on the Sword Beachhead and unable to deploy much of its armoured support against the German 21st Panzer Division, the 3rd Infantry Division was unable to assault Caen in force and was brought to a halt short of the outskirts of the city. Follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified with the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division in the sector. Abandoning the direct approach, Operation Perch—a pincer attack by the I and XXX Corps—was launched on 7 June, with the intention of encircling Caen from the east and west. I Corps, striking south of the Orne River, was halted by the 21st Panzer Division, while XXX Corps' attack stalled near Tilly-sur-Seulles west of Caen, facing heavy opposition from the Panzer Lehr Division. In an effort to force the Panzer Lehr to withdraw, the British 7th Armoured Division attacked through a gap in the German line towards Villers-Bocage. The resulting daylong tank battle on 13 June saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town, though the Panzer Lehr Division withdraw several days later when XXX Corps captured Tilly-sur-Seulles on 19 June.

On 26 June, the next offensive was launched, codenamed Operation Epsom. VIII Corps would attack to the west of Caen on a 4-mile (6.4 km) front between Carpiquet and Rauray, south across the River Odon and the Orne to capture the high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize and encircle Caen. The attack was preceded by Operation Martlet (also known as Operation Dauntless) which was to secure VIII Corps flank by capturing the high ground on the right of their axis of advance. Although the Germans managed to contain the offensive, they were obliged to commit all their available strength, including two SS panzer divisions newly arrived in Normandy which had been earmarked for a planned offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux.

With the strategic value of Caen lessening in the eyes of Army Group B's command, Rundstedt directed on 1 July that Caen should be gradually abandoned by German defenders, with the intent of shifting the bulk of the German Panzer Divisions to the American front; however the city and the terrain surrounding Caen was considered as the hinge in the defence of Normandy and the German high command was determined to hold an arc of defensible terrain from the English Channel to the western banks of the Orne. Hitler responded to Rundsted by dismissing him from command of Army Group B, replacing him with Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge. Learning of this, Allied commanders ordered Bernard Montgomery to draw up an offensive with two purposes: to capture Caen permanently from German forces, and to prevent a large scale redeployment of German forces from the Anglo-Canadian to American fronts.

On 4 July, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division launched Operation Windsor, designed to capture Carpiquet and the adjacent airfield from the 12th SS Panzer Division. Although Carpiquet was taken on 5 July, the airfield remained under German control.

Planning and preparation

Allied planning and preparation

Having failed to take Caen through successive flanking manoeuvres, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of all Allied ground forces in Normandy, chose to plan the next major offensive against Caen as a frontal assault against the city's defences. Though the strategic importance of Caen had vastly diminished since D-Day, Montgomery sought control of Bourguébus and the surrounding high ground to the south. Aware of growing concern within the AEF over the Caen sector, Montgomery began to design Operation Charnwood. On 5 July the orders for Charnwood were issued and it was set to be launched at 04:20 hours, an hour and half before dawn, on 8 July.

John Crocker's I Corps, consisting of the 3rd Infantry Division, 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division, and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions totalling 115,000 men, was given the task of capturing the city up to the Orne and Odon rivers. In light of the partial Canadian success during Operation Windsor, Charnwood was to be launched on a broad front to increase the pressure on the German defences and disperse their defensive fire. In addition, VIII Corps was ordered to be on 24 hours notice to launch a new attack, to the west of Caen to maintain maximum pressure on the German armed forces.

For the preliminary bombardment of Caen, Montgomery enlisted the support of RAF Bomber Command. To assist in the long range bombardment of German defences 467 heavy bombers would attack Caen the night before, with 15% of the total bomb load being delayed action bombs set to explode when the ground attack was launched. A second wave, made up of light bombers, would bomb targets following the main attack and a third wave, made up of American bombers, would attack on the morning of the operation. Additional support would be provided by the 16-inch guns of the British battleship Rodney. 656 guns from five divisions were tasked by Dempsey and Crocker with bombarding known German positions to the south. In all, it was planned that 2,000 tons of bombs would be dropped on Caen before the infantry assault began. Due to the bombed area's proximity to Montgomery's command and the risk of hitting Allied infantry, the aiming point was shifted 6,000 yards (5,500 m) to the south, beyond most of the main German defences between the British front lines and Caen.

Following a one day saturation bombardment of Caen, the three infantry divisions of I Corps were to attack through the fortified villages in their path and directly into the northern edge of Caen. It was hoped that the bombing of Caen would enable I Corps to move through the entirety of Caen and towards the Verrières and Bourguébus ridges to the south, thereby preparing the British Second Army for a breakout towards Falaise.

German planning and preparation

The defence of Caen fell to two divisions; the 12th SS Panzer Division of the 1st SS Panzer Corps and the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division of LXXXVI Corps. The attack on the city was expected and it was also assumed that if an attack on Caen took place, further attacks in the Odon valley towards the Orne river would quickly follow suit.

The 12th SS Panzer Division, commanded by Kurt Meyer, was comprised of three panzergrenadier regiments, one of which was the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment attached from the 1st SS Panzer Division, and possessed 61 tanks for the defence of the city. The 12th SS held the northwest approaches to Caen, defending the city and Carpiquet from the 3rd Canadian and 59th British Infantry Divisions. The main defensive line, a 9-kilometre (5.6 mi) arc of villages from the northeast to the west, was held by the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and elements of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment. Elements of the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment held the western flank concentrating its defence in the area around Carpiquet airfield, armed with limited tanks and mortar batteries while the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment defended a line from Franqueville to the western end of Eterville. Thirty-five tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment, as well as the rest of the division, were in reserve, with elements located north, west and south of the city. Most of the division's artillery had been moved back across the Orne and the divisional command centre had been relocated from the Ardenne Abbey to Abbaye-aux-Dames in the centre of Caen.

The 16th Luftwaffe Field Division was an inexperienced infantry division that had only recently arrived in Normandy relieving the 21st Panzer Division from the defence of Caen and from its positions east of the Caen canal. The division was under trained and ill equipped with anti tank weapons, due to the latter it was reinforced with a tank battalion from the 21st Panzer Division. The Luftwaffe division was deployed either side of the Orne with three battalions holding the villages to the immediate north of the city.

Preliminary attacks

On the night of 7 July, 467 Lancaster and Halifax bombers of the Royal Air Force, half of the available strength of RAF Bomber Command at the time, attacked Caen dropping over 2,000 tons of bombs on the city. The bombing, though designed to clear Caen of German defenses, failed to destroy German armour and infantry positions to the north of Caen. The pathfinders of No. 625 Squadron RAF, tasked with laying the target markers over Caen, were instructed not to let the target zone "drift back", as was the tendency among bombing missions in Normandy at the time. In many cases, the targets were dropped farther than planned, pushing the bombed zone back even farther into Caen and away from German defences. By 22:00, the bombing raid had ended, leaving 80% of the northern sector of Caen destroyed. The Caen University was particularly hard hit, starting chemical fires that soon spread to other parts of the city.

At 22:50 hours six squadrons of Mosquito bombers attacked pin point targets. At 23:00 the 636 guns of the 3rd Canadian Infantry, 59th Infantry and 3rd Infantry Divisions' artillery opened fire on German defenses, with the guns of Rodney and other support ships adding support. The prolonged bombardment was intensified by the artillery of VIII Corps, targeting the defensive villages north of Caen in an effort to eliminate German strongpoints before the infantry assault began.

Advance begins

At 04:30 on 8 July, the artillery regiments of I and VIII Corps shifted their fire deeper into German defensive positions on the lines of the 3rd Canadian and 59th Infantry Divisions. As the advance towards Caen began, the barrage slowly shifted forward, concentrating its fire on positions in front of the advancing infantry and armour. The 59th and 3rd Canadian Divisions advanced on a two brigade front—four battalions and two armoured regiments in total. At 07:00 hours 192 B-26 Marauder medium bombers arrived over the battlefield. However due to clouds only 87 aircraft dropped their payload, totalling 133 tons, onto Caen; with some bombs landing on the 12th SS Headquarters at Abbaye-aux-Dames. By 07:30, when Crocker ordered the second phase of the operation to begin, neither division had managed to reach its objectives. The second phase was begun with the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment still in control of the higher ground to the east of the 59th and 3rd Canadian divisions. To the east the British 3rd Infantry Division attacked Lebisey, rapidly pushing through the weak defences of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and towards Caen. Fighting in the 3rd Division sector intensified near the village of Herouville, as the 3rd Infantry Division continued to push towards Caen.

Concerned about the state of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, General Heinrich Eberbach—commander of Panzer Group West, ordered the 21st Panzer Division to redeploy northeast of Caen in support of the 16th against the 3rd Infantry Division. When an attempt was made to shift the Panzers across the Caen Canal, a strong naval barrage was directed against them. Facing the possibility of heavy losses, the 21st Panzer was unable to advance in support of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division.

To the west, the 59th Infantry Division was facing much more resistance from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment in Galmanche and la Bijude. The 176th Infantry Brigade of the 59th Division incurred particularly heavy casualties in la Bijude, with one infantry company losing all of its senior officers when German flak batteries prevented armoured support from reaching the village. By noon, the 197th Brigade had bypassed the fighting at Galmanche and pushed on to St-Contest. The capture of Authie by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division later in the day enabled the assault on St-Contest to capture the town as the drive towards Caen began.

On the western flank of the operation, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division engaged in heavy fighting in Buron, with units of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade attacking 200 men of the 12th SS with support from the 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment. By noon Buron had been captured. The assault companies of the 9th Brigade suffered 60% casualties. South of Buron, a counterattack by Panther tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment was defeated by the 62nd Antitank Regiment, destroying 13 German tanks in the most successful antitank engagement of the campaign. To the west, Gruchy was captured with relative ease, with the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade encountering mortar and artillery fire in their drive to Authie. In Phase 3 of the operation, the 7th Brigade pushed towards Ardenne Abbey, securing the position before midnight.

To the east, the British 3rd Infantry Division pushed into the outskirts of Caen from the northeast. At 19:15 that evening, both Kurt Meyer and Eberbach authorized the withdrawal of all heavy weapons of the 12th SS and the remnants of the 16th Luftwaffe across the Orne to the southern side of Caen. Throughout the early evening, the 12th SS fought a rearguard action against elements of the 59th and 3rd Infantry Divisions as it withdrew from positions which were considered "untenable". Reports came into the British and Canadian divisional headquarters that German forces were withdrawing, prompting Crocker to prepare for I Corps to secure Caen the following day.

Fighting in Caen

On the morning of 9 July, Anglo-Canadian patrols began to infiltrate Caen as the advance resumed at dawn. In the early morning, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division captured Carpiquet Airfield, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment having withdrawn during the night. In the centre, the 59th Infantry Division encountered opposition from a battle group of the 21st Panzer Division north of Caen. By noon, the 3rd division had reached the north bank of the Orne, destroying the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. As their positions became untenable, the battle groups of the 21st Panzer Division withdrew across the Orne to Verrières and Bourguébus Ridges.

As Anglo-Canadian forces entered northern Caen, the remaining regiments of the 12th SS Panzer Division conducted a slow withdrawal and rearguard action across the Orne River. Over the course of two days, the official reports of the 12th SS Panzer Division claimed the destruction of 103 British and Canadian tanks, putting their own losses at 20. Reduced to a battalion sized infantry unit, the 12th SS was forced to withdraw to the high ground of Verrières Ridge.

Upon entering Caen, Anglo-Canadian forces found the city in ruins; 80% of the Old City had been destroyed in the 7 July bombings. The rubble made it nearly impossible for British armour to maneuver through the northern half of the city, preventing any further exploitation of the capture of Caen by the British Second Army. Without possession of southern flanking territory outside of the city, no further gains could be made within Caen. By the mid afternoon of 9 July, Operation Charnwood was over.

Aftermath

Operation Jupiter

On 10 July, the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division attacked the positions of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg on Hill 112 as part of Operation Jupiter. The two day preliminary bombardment included support from naval vessels and Hawker Typhoons. The attack was designed to threaten southern Caen from the west, pushing back the 10th SS Panzer Division from the city and securing a strong armoured attack route for the British Second Army for future breakouts. Two additional armoured brigades supported the 43rd Division in their assault, which began at dawn on 10 July.

By 08:00 on 10 July, the 43rd Division was "well up" the slopes of Hill 112, fighting units of the 10th SS and capturing Eterville in the mid morning. As the 4th Armoured Brigade and the 43rd Division ascended Hill 112, General Eberbach insisted that "Hill 112 is the pivotal point of the whole position West of Caen, and must therefore be held". To reinforce the position, the 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion and the 1st SS Panzer Division were committed to the defence of the position. When the 4th Armoured Brigade reached the summit of Hill 112, it was counterattacked by remnants of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions on the evening of 10 July.

On 11 July, the attacks resumed with the support of Antitank Regiments from the Second Army. When the 102nd Panzer Battalion counterattacked the 4th Armoured Brigade, heavy casualties were taken by the supporting antitank regiments. Hill 112 was briefly controlled on 11 July by a battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, only to be lost to German counterattacks in the late afternoon. By the evening of 11 July, the attack reached a stalemate, as both sides were exhausted and had taken heavy casualties. Two thousand casualties were taken by the 43rd Division and its supporting armour in two days of attacks on Hill 112.

Overall

Having been pushed back across the Orne, Rommel and Eberbach consolidated their defensive positions in southern Caen and on Verrières Ridge. The 12th SS, 1st SS, and 9th SS Panzer Divisions soon maintained considerable defenses on Bourguébus and Verrières Ridge. Having committed all of his Panzer divisions to combat Rommel transferred the remainder of his infantry divisions; the 708th, 276th, 277th, and 272nd, to the Anglo-Canadian front. On 8 July, Rommel also transferred the remnants of two panzer divisions, Panzer Lehr (incapable of functioning as a division because of losses and reduced to a number of battlegroups) and the 2nd SS, to the American sector in Normandy. On 17 July, Rommel's staff car was strafed by British fighters, severely injuring the Field Marshal and confining him to hospital. Two days later, Rommel was removed from command of Army Group B, replaced by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge. Implicated in the 20 July plot against Hitler, Rommel was forced to commit suicide on 14 October.

The capture of the northern half of Caen allowed Bradley to accelerate his own plans for a breakout in Normandy, with US VII Corps attacking German positions in Saint-Lo shortly after Charnwood. With orders to "hold at all costs", the 2nd SS Panzer Division was transferred into Saint-Lo to ensure that Bradley's forces could not break through. On 18 July, after eight days of fighting and more than 5,000 casualties, VII Corps succeeded in securing the town. In the fighting, 95% of the city was destroyed.

The same day, Dempsey and Second Army launched Operation Goodwood, 1,100–1,300 British tanks participating in the largest armoured battle in British history. O'Connor's VIII Corps spearheaded the attack with three armoured divisions, with Crocker's I Corps and Guy Simonds' newly activated II Canadian Corps, which launched its own offensive—Operation Atlantic—in conjunction with Goodwood. After a preliminary attack by 1,056 heavy bombers, the 7th, 11th, and Guards armoured divisions attacked the positions of the LXXXVI Corps north of Bourguébus. Though 12,000 yards (11 km) had been gained by VIII Corps by noon, strong resistance in the afternoon prevented the capture of the ridge. Over the following two days Simonds' II Corps attacked Verrières Ridge twice, sustaining 1,349 casualties and failing to take the ridge. Over the seven day Battle of Verrières Ridge, II Corps would sustain 2,800 casualties. It would take until 8 August to overcome German defenses on Verrières Ridge.

Notes

Footnotes

1. The 12th SS Panzer Division tank strength on 7 July was 24 Panthers and 37 Panzer IVs.
2. The 12th SS Panzer Division recorded the loss of 11 Panthers and 7 Panzer IVs.
3. Buckley reports that the 12th SS Panzer lost 10 Panthers and 22 Panzer IVs destroyed during the operation.
4. "The quick capture of that key city and the neighbourhood of Carpiquet was the most ambitious, the most difficult and the most important task of Lieutenant-General J.T. Crocker's I Corps". Wilmot states "The objectives given to Crocker's seaborne divisions were decidedly ambitious, since his troops were to land last, on the most exposed beaches, with the farthest to go, against what was potentially the greatest opposition." However, Miles Dempsey always considered the possibility that the immediate seizure of Caen might fail.
5. The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen and 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, the II SS Panzer Corps, were ordered to Normandy from the Eastern Front within six days of the start of the invasion.
6. Two battalions of the 31st Luftwaffe Rifles Regiment and the divisional fusilier battalion.
7. The exact quantity of munitions dropped on Caen is subject to some degree of dispute. Keegan estimates the tonnage at 2,000 tons, while Cawthorne puts the figure at 2,300 tons. D'Este does not provide a figure for the tonnage of munitions dropped, yet does state that "Bomber Command dropped some 6,000 bombs in a narrow area of northern Caen". Simon Trew states that 2,562 tons.
8. The division was reported to have had 75% casualties.

Citations

1. Trew, p. 40
2. ^ Trew, p. 32
3. ^ Trew, p. 39
4. Trew, p. 42
5. ^ Trew, p. 35
6. ^ Trew, p. 46
7. Buckley, p. 31
8. Stacey, p. 160
9. Williams, p. 24
10. Ellis, p. 171
11. Wilmot, p. 272
12. Buckley, p. 23
13. Ellis, p. 78
14. Ellis, p. 81
15. Van Der Vat, p. 146
16. Cawthorne, p. 41
17. ^ Van der Vat, p. 114
18. Ellis, p. 250
19. ^ Van der Vat, p. 139
20. D'Este, p. 172
21. Taylor, p. 76
22. Clay, pp. 262–263
23. Hastings, p. 138
24. Clark, pp. 32–33
25. Clark, pp. 31–32
26. ^ Clark, p. 21
27. Ellis, p. 275
28. Hart, p. 108
29. Reynolds (2002), p. 13
30. Wilmot, p. 334
31. ^ Keegan (1982), p. 187
32. Daglish, p. 36
33. D'Este, p. 251
34. D'Este, p. 305
35. Copp, p. 99
36. ^ Van der Vat, p. 150
37. ^ D'Este, p. 298
38. ^ Hastings, p. 222
39. ^ Hastings, pp. 222–223
40. ^ Copp, p. 101
41. ^ Ellis, p. 310
42. Buckley, p. 31
43. Jackson, p. 61
44. Trew, pp. 34, 36, 37
45. ^ Keegan (1982), p. 188
46. ^ Meyer, p. 473
47. ^ Reginald, p. 46
48. ^ Reynolds (2001), p. 152
49. Copp, p. 102
50. Swanston, p. 278
51. Reynolds (2001), pp. 152–153
52. Meyer, pp. 472–473
53. Keegan (1982), p. 189
54. ^ Cawthorne, p. 120
55. D'Este, p. 313
56. ^ Trew, p. 36
57. Van der Vat, p. 153
58. Jackson, p. 61
59. ^ Copp, p. 103
60. Trew, p. 37
61. ^ D'Este, p. 318
62. ^ Ellis, pp. 314–315
63. ^ Copp, p. 104
64. Fould, p. 78
65. ^ Copp, p. 105
66. Wood, p. 92
67. D'Este, p. 318
68. ^ Wood, p. 93
69. ^ Wood, p. 99
70. ^ Hastings, p. 223
71. ^ D'Este, p. 319
72. ^ Copp, p. 106
73. Hastings, p. 225
74. Hastings, p. 226
75. ^ Hastings, p. 227
76. Copp, p.86.
77. Wood, p. vii
78. Cawthorne, p. 121
79. ^ Van der Vat, p. 158
80. D'Este, pp. 339–341
81. Wood, p. 100
82. Hastings, p. 249
83. Van der Vat, p. 159
84. D'Este, p. 357
85. Trew, pp. 71–72
86. Reynolds (2001), pp. 170–171
87. Zuehlke, p. 168
88. Hastings, p. 296

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• Van Der Vat, Dan (2003). D-Day; The Greatest Invasion, A People's History. Toronto: Madison Press Limited. ISBN 1-55192-586-9. OCLC 51290297.
• Williams, Andrew (2004). D-Day to Berlin. London: Hodder. ISBN 0-34083-397-1. OCLC 60416729.
• Wilmot, Chester (1997) . The Struggle For Europe. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. ISBN 1-85326-677-9. OCLC 39697844. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Wood, James A. (2007). Army of the West: The Weekly Reports of German Army Group B from Normandy to the West Wall. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-81173-404-8. OCLC 126229849.
• Zuehlke, Mark (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas: Canada's Battlefields from the French and Indian Wars to Kosovo. Toronto and Niagara Falls, New York: Stoddart. ISBN 0-77373-289-6. OCLC 48680462.

External links

• The Battle of Caen - Complete overview, video / audio and a large picture gallery.

• Operation Overlord
• Military history of Normandy
• World War II operations and battles of Europe
• Battles and operations of World War II
• Battle for Caen
• Battles involving Canada
• Battles involving Germany
• Battles involving the United Kingdom