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The idea that animals might not suffer or feel pain as human beings do traces back to the 17th-century French philosopher, René Descartes, who argued that animals lack consciousness. Bernard Rollin of Colorado State University, the principal author of two U.S. federal laws regulating pain relief for animals, writes that researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain. In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Bernard Rollin was regularly asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" grounds for claiming that they feel pain. Some authors say that the view that animals feel pain differently is now a minority view. Academic reviews of the topic are more equivocal, noting that although the argument that animals have at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings has strong support, some critics continue to question how reliably animal mental states can be determined.

Pain in different species

The presence of pain in an animal, or another human for that matter, cannot be known for sure, but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions. Specialists currently believe that all vertebrates can feel pain, and that certain invertebrates, like the octopus, might too.

Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the RSPCA (which has authority in England and Wales) now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.

As for other animals, plants, or other entities, their ability to feel physical pain is at present a question beyond scientific reach, since no mechanism is known by which they could have such a feeling. In particular, there are no apparent nociceptors in groups such as plants, fungi, and most insects (one known exception being the fruit fly).

In vertebrates, endogenous opioids are neurochemicals that moderate pain by interacting with opiate receptors. Opioid peptides and opiate receptors occur naturally in crustaceans, and although “at present no certain conclusion can be drawn,” some have interpreted their presence as an indication that lobsters may be able to experience pain.

Veterinary medicine uses, for actual or potential animal pain, the same analgesics and anesthetics as used in humans.

Fish

Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the possible suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the British RSPCA now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.

Crustaceans

The question of whether or not crustaceans can experience pain is unresolved. One paper holds that lobsters' opioids may "mediate pain in the same way" as in vertebrates.

Laboratory animals

It has been suggested that Pain and suffering in laboratory animals be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since November 2009.

The extent to which animal testing causes pain and suffering in laboratory animals is the subject of much debate. Marian Stamp Dawkins defines "suffering" in laboratory animals as the experience of one of "a wide range of extremely unpleasant subjective (mental) states." The United States Department of Agriculture defines a "painful procedure" in an animal study as one that would "reasonably be expected to cause more than slight or momentary pain or distress in a human being to which that procedure was applied."

See also

• Moral status of animals in the ancient world

References

1. ^ Carbone, Larry. '"What Animal Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 149.
2. ^ The Ethics of research involving animals Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Accessed 27 February 2008
3. Talking Point on the use of animals in scientific research, EMBO reports 8, 6, 2007, pp. 521–525
4. ^ Rollin, Bernard. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone 2004, p. 150.
5. Griffin DR, Speck GB (2004) "New evidence of animal consciousness" Anim. Cogn. volume 7 issue 1 pages=5–18 PMID 14658059
6. Allen C (1998) Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives J. Anim. Sci. volume 76 issue 1 pages 42-7 PMID 9464883
7. Abbott FV, Franklin KB, Westbrook RF (1995). "The formalin test: scoring properties of the first and second phases of the pain response in rats". Pain. 60 (1): 91–102. doi:10.1016/0304-3959(94)00095-V. PMID 7715946. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
8. "Do Invertebrates Feel Pain?", The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The Parliament of Canada Web Site, accessed 11 June 2008.
9. Jane A. Smith (1991). "A Question of Pain in Invertebrates". ILAR Journal. 33 (1–2). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
10. ^ Leake, J. “Anglers to Face RSPCA Check,” The Sunday Times – Britain, 14 March 2004
11. DeGrazia D, Rowan A (1991) Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics Volume 12, Number 3, pages 193-211
12. Lockwood JA (1987) The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction The Florida Entomologist, Volume 70, Number 1, pages 70-89
13. C. H. Eisemann, W. K. Jorgensen, D. J. Merritt, M. J. Rice, B. W. Cribb, P. D. Webb and M. P. Zalucki (1984) Do insects feel pain? — A biological view. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences 40: 1420-1423
14. Tracey, J., W. Daniel, R. I. Wilson, G. Laurent, and S. Benzer. 2003. painless, a Drosophila gene essential for nociception. Cell 113: 261-273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0092-8674(03)00272-1
15. ^ L. Sømme (2005). "Sentience and pain in invertebrates: Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety". Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Oslo. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |quotes= ignored (help)
16. ^ Cephalopods and decapod crustaceans: their capacity to experience pain and suffering (PDF). Advocates for Animals. 2005. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |name= ignored (help)
17. Viñuela-Fernández I, Jones E, Welsh EM, Fleetwood-Walker SM (2007). "Pain mechanisms and their implication for the management of pain in farm and companion animals". Vet. J. 174 (2): 227–39. doi:10.1016/j.tvjl.2007.02.002. PMID 17553712. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
18. Duncan IJ, Petherick JC. "The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare", J. Anim. Sci., volume 69, issue 12, 1991, pp. 5017–22. pmid 1808195; Curtis SE, Stricklin WR. "The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview", J. Anim. Sci.. volume 69, issue 12, 1991, pp. 5001–7. pmid 1808193
19. Stamp Dawkins, Marian. "Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals," in Singer, Peter. In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave. Blackwell, 2006. p. 28.
20. Animal Welfare; Definitions for and Reporting of Pain and Distress", Animal Welfare Information Center Bulletin, Summer 2000, Vol. 11 No. 1-2, United States Department of Agriculture.

• Articles to be merged from November 2009
• Pain
• Animals