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Baigais Gads

Stalin's Terror Descends on the Baltics

"Baigais Gads." Latvia's Year of Terror. Year of Horror. The first Soviet mass deportations took place on June 13th and 14th, 1941, estimated at 15,600 men, women, and children, and including 20% of Latvia's last legal government. Approximately 35,000 total (1.8% of Latvia's population) were deported during the 1940-1941 Soviet occupation, with 131,500 Balts deported in total. Fortunately, the Soviet-German war intervened, interrupting documented NKVD plans to deport several hundred thousand more Balts on June 27th and 28th, 1941.

Baigais Gads, however, is more than a sum of its atrocities. Latvia and the Baltics were a touchstone of Soviet intent and policy. Students of history would argue that they continue in that role even today: one only has to look to Russian Duma resolutions "reminding" Latvia it joined the USSR willingly and legally, and to Russian ministry posturings that to suggest otherwise is a fascist rewriting of history.

Terms and Realities of Soviet "Mutual Assistance"

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed August 23, 1939, cleared the path for Germany and the USSR to pursue their territorial interests in Eastern Europe. The Soviets pushed their agenda forward, having for some years already declared that any developments in the Baltics which were not to their liking would be viewed as a threat to Soviet security. Under this pretense, the USSR held a gun to the heads of the Baltics, forcing them to accept mutual assistance pacts. It was during talks in Moscow, on October 2nd, 1939, that Stalin told Vilhelms Munters, the Latvian foreign minister: "I tell you frankly, a division of spheres of interest has already taken place. As far as Germany is concerned we could occupy you." The implication was clear.

Estonia signed their "mutual assistance pact" with the USSR on September 28, 1939; Latvia following on October 5, 1939; and Lithuania shortly thereafter, on October 10th, 1939. In Latvia's case, the agreement called for Latvia to:

• lend bases to the USSR at Liepaja, Ventspils, and Pitrags until 1949;
• build special airfields for Soviet requirements; and
• grant the stationing of Soviet military garrisons totalling 30,000 troops.

At face value, this pact did not impinge upon Latvian sovreignty. Section 5 of the Pact reads as follows: "The carrying into effect of the present pact must in no way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their political structure, their economic and social system, and their military measures. The areas set aside for the bases and airfields remain the territory of the Latvian Republic."

These words were no more than a ploy. Earlier that year, a month after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, the General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) had already, in September, issued maps of the Baltic States, dated "First edition 1939", with the headings: "Litovskaya SSR," and "Latviskaya SSR"—that is, the Lithuanian and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republics.

The stationing of Soviet troops in Latvia under the terms of the mutual assistance pact marked the beginning of the fruition of long-standing Soviet desires to gain control of the Baltics. As early as December 3, 1922, the head of the Soviet War Information Department suggested that the USSR encourage Poland to occupy Lithuania; at the same time, two Soviet army corps would invade Estonia. With Lenin's concerns about potential negative impact on image and trade, the plan did not carry. Stalin, however, was in favor, and after Lenin's death he ordered the Estonian Communist party to organize a putsch in Tallin on December 1, 1924, which, should it succeed, would lead to the proclamation of the Estonian Soviet Republic.

With the success of this first stage, the Soviets nevertheless bided their time, being occupied with their invasion of Finland. This may have led to a false sense of security for Latvia. Four months after the arrival of Soviet troops in Latvia, Vilhelms Munters, addressing an audience at the University of Latvia on February 12, 1940, stated, "We have every reason to describe the relations existing between Latvia and the USSR as very satisfactory. There are people who will say that these favourable conditions are of a temporary nature only, and that sooner or later we shall have to reckon with internal-political and foreign-political pressure on the part of the USSR. The foundation on which they base these prophesies is a secret of the prophets themselves. The experience of our Government certainly does not justify such forebodings."

Munters was not aware that General Ivan Serov, Deputy People's Commissar of Public Security of the USSR, had already on October 11th, 1939—less than a week after the signing of the mutual assistance pact—issued and signed Order No. 001223, "regarding the Procedure for carrying out the Deportation of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia."

The USSR Stages Events in Order to Invade to Protect Its Security

The USSR's first openly belligerent act was to invade Finland. On October 5, 1939, the Finns had also been invited to Moscow to "discuss mutual problems." They refused, and on November 30, the USSR attacked Finland. (This was exactly the inevitability that the Baltics were hoping to avoid by signing the mutual assistance pacts. They knew they had no hope of successfully resisting a full-scale invasion.) Finland, however, did succeed in resisting, and on March 13, 1940, signed a peace treaty with the USSR. Finland did, however, give up the Hanko peninsula and parts of Karelia with the city of Viborg in return for guaranteeing its security. War was to break out again on this frontier.

With Soviet failure in Finland sealed for the moment, it was little more than a month after Munters' positive expressions that Molotov, speaking on March 25, 1940, announced Soviet intentions to annex the Baltic States, stating, "...the execution of the pacts progressed satisfactorily and created conditions favourable for a further improvement of the relations between Soviet Russia and these States." Improvement being the codeword for Soviet takeover.

In March and April, 1940, immediately after Molotov's speech, the Soviet press started attacks on the Latvian government. Next, the NKVD orchestrated a series of strikes in Riga and Liepaja. When those failed to develop into a general strike, the Soviets blamed failure on the "irresponsible element which spoils the good neighborly relations."

In anticipation, on May 17th, 1940, the Latvian Government secretly issued emergency powers to the Latvian minister in London, K. Zarins, designating A. Bilmanis, the Latvian minister in Washington, as his substitute. If Ulmanis and the Latvian government trusted in Latvia's western allies, they (and Eastern Europe) had their answer five years later at Yalta.

On May 28, 1940, Molotov accused the Lithuanians of kidnapping two border guards. The Soviets cut off any discussion, soon showing and rapidly playing their hand:

• June 14th—Molotov accuses the Baltics of conspiracy against the USSR, delivers ultimatum to Lithuania for the establishment of a government the Soviets approve of.
• June 15th—Soviet troops invade Lithuania and position troops to invade Latvia.
• June 15th—Soviets shoot Latvian frontier guards to provoke an incident.
• June 16th—Soviets deliver ultimatums to Estonia and Latvia, to be answered within 6 hours, demanding: (1) the establishment of pro-Soviet Governments which, under the protection of the Red Army, would be better capable of carrying out the Pacts of Mutual Assistance; (2) the free passage of Soviet troops into Estonia and Latvia in order to place them in the most important centers and to avoid possible provocatory acts against Soviet garrisons. Unable to resist on their own, Latvia and Estonia capitulate.
• June 17th—(Additional) Soviet troops invade Latvia and occupy bridges, post/telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting offices.
• June 17th—Vishinski introduces himself to President Karlis Ulmanis as Soviet special envoy.
• June 19th—Vishinski visit Ulmanis again, this time, to deliver the list of the new members of the cabinet of the Latvian government.
• June 20th—Ulmanis forced to approve pro-Soviet government which takes office; jailed members of the formerly illegal communist party released.
• July 5th—Decree issued announcing new elections; the Latvian democratic parties organize under the National Committee and attempt to participate.
• July 9th—Vilis Lacis, the Soviet-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, orders the National Committee shut down, its most prominent members deported. Note that deportations are already taking place from territory not (yet) part of the USSR.
• July 14th-15th—Rigged elections held in Latvia and the other Baltic states. Electoral documents found later proved that the results were completely fabricated.
• July 21st—The fraudulently installed Latvian puppet government illegally petitions to join the USSR. (This act was illegal under the Latvian Constitution, which required a plebiscite referendum for approving such an action: two thirds of all eligible participating and a plain majority approving.) Ulmanis forced to resign.
• July 22nd—Ulmanis deported to the USSR.
• August 3rd, 5th, 6th—The USSR grants the petitions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, respectively, to join.

Defining and Deporting Enemies of the State

Accurate numbers for the losses the Soviets inflicted on Latvia are not available. They can, however, be conservatively estimated at 290,000 dead from military action, executions, or deportation. Many more found refuge abroad. These losses all began during the Baigais Gads.

The purpose of the deportations was to eliminate the native middle class (replaced through aggressive Russification). Given Latvia's predominantly agricultural economy following independence, this meant elimination of most of Latvia's farming class. On June 22, 1940, all three Baltic parliaments passed initial resolutions on the nationalization of land, followed in Latvia by a Bill of Land Reform a week later. Initially, a maximum of 30 hectares of land could be used by a family, reduced during the second Soviet occupation to 15-20 hectares. Anyone holding more land was categorized as an enemy of the state. Based on land ownership in 1935, this put over 40% of Latvian farmers and their families into that category, destined for deportation.

Serov's Order No. 001223 applied to all the Baltics. The following NKVD order of November 28, 1940, was issued in Lithuania; this document was left behind when the Soviets evacuated. Similar orders were undoubtedly issued for Estonia and Latvia.
 

Other orders expanded on this list: any court officers or members, district heads, military and intelligence officers, officers of the border guard, anyone employed by the foreign ministry abroad, anyone related to someone in hiding from the government or who had fled abroad—which act made them a traitor to the state.

Standing order of the NKVD neé Cheka, published on December 25, 1918, states the above succinctly: "Your first duty is to ask the prisoner what class he belongs to, what were his origin, education and occupation. These questions should decide the fate of the prisoner."

When the mass deportations came, they were swift and efficient and came in the middle of the night. Deportees were given an hour or less to get ready to leave. They were allowed to take with them their belongings not exceeding 100 kg in weight (money, food for a month, cooking appliances, clothing). The families would then be taken to the railway station. That was when they discovered that the men were to be separated from the women and children: "In view of the fact that a large number of deportees must be arrested and distributed in special camps and that their families must proceed to special settlements in distant regions, it is essential that the operation of removal of both the members of the deportee's family and its head shall be carried out simultaneously, without notifying them of the separation confronting them.... The convoy of the entire family to the station shall be effected in one vehicle and only at the station of departure shall the head of the family be placed separately from his family ina car specially intended for heads of families." These trains were escorted by a NKVD officer and military convoy.

Packed into barred cattle cars, with holes in the floor for sanitation, the deportees left for Siberia to experience Stalin's liberation.

References

• "Latvia: Country & People," J. Rutkis, editor, Latvian National Foundation, Stockholm, 1967
• "Latvian Economic Review, No. 2 (18), April 1940," Alberts Zalts, editor, Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
• "The Story of Latvia - A Historical Survey," by A. Svabe, Latvian National Foundation, Stockholm, 1949
• "These Names Accuse-Nominal List of Latvians Deported to Soviet Russia," Latvian National Foundation, Stockholm, 2nd edition, 1982