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This article is about Iran's civilian nuclear program. For information about nuclear weapons, see Iran and weapons of mass destruction

The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program goes back many decades. In recent years global political change has caused Iran's program to fall under intense scrutiny and even led to charges that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran, however, has maintained that the purpose of its nuclear program is the generation of power; any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran ratified in 1970.

Background

On August 14, 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a member of Mujahedin-e-Khalq (regarded as a terrorist group by the U.S.) and critic of Tehran, revealed the existence of two secret nuclear sites, a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. In response, the U.S. has since late 2003 claimed that Tehran is seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements under the NPT, and also that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear missiles.

On November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program (not in itself a violation of the NPT) after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European Union (known in this context as the EU-3 or EU3). The measure was said at the time to be a confidence-building measure, to continue for some reasonable period of time, six months being mentioned as a reference. On November 24, Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later.

On August 8 and August 10, 2005, the Iranian government resumed its conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility, allegedly with continued suspension of enrichment activities. This led to (on September 19, 2005) the European Union pressuring the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to bring Iran's nuclear program before the United Nations Security Council . In January 2006, James Risen, a New York Times reporter, alleged in his book State of War that in February 2000, a U.S. covert operation - code-named Operation Merlin - to provide Iran with a flawed design for building a nuclear weapon, in order to delay the Iranian nuclear weapons program, had backfired. Instead, the plan may have accelerated Iran's nuclear program by providing useful information, once the flaws were identified .

On February 4 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27-3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa) to report Iran to the Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba.

History

The foundations for Iran's nuclear program were laid in the 1960s under auspices of the U.S. within the framework of bilateral agreements between the US and Iran. In 1967 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was built and run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a US supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT in place plans were drawn by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Iran's monarch) to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations across the country together with USA by the year 2000.

By 1975, The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had signed National Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," which laid out the details of the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in revenue. At the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels (950,000 m³) of oil a day, compared with about 4 million barrels (640,000 m³) daily today.

President Gerald R. Ford even signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle". The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."

The Bushehr project

File:Iranmap.jpg
Map of southern Iran, showing the location of Bushehr

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility is located 17 kilometers south of the city of Bushehr (also known as Bushire), between the fishing villages of Halileh and Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf.

The facility was the idea of The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out. He said that, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn." Instead, he wanted a national electrical grid powered by clean nuclear power plants. Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz.

In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk-Union A.G., a joint venture of Siemens AG and A.E.G Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196MWe nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp AG, and was to have been completed in 1981.

Kraftwerk-Union was eager to work with the Iranian government because, as spokesman Joachim Hospe said in 1976, "To fully exploit our nuclear power plant capacity, we have to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here is about saturated, and the United States has cornered most of the rest of Europe, so we have to concentrate on the third world."

Kraftwerk-Union fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West.

In 1984, Kraftwerk-Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq war continued. In April of that year, the US State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."

The reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes between March 24, 1984 to 1988. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear program was stopped until the end of the war.

In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor. The construction is being done by the state-controlled company Atomstroyexport (Russian for Atomic Construction Export), an arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry, Minatom. There are no current plans to complete Bushehr II reactor.

In late 2001, U.S. intelligence officers told journalist Seymour Hersh that Iran's most important nuclear facilities were not at Bushehr, which can be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but at clandestine sites under military control.

It was not until 2002 that the USA began to question Iran's nuclear intentions after the MKO (an anti-government guerrilla group) revealed the existence of the Natanz and Arak facilities.

Other facilities

File:ZPP.gif
Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP), Isfahan. Iran. Here, special alloys are made that have direct applications in claddings for nuclear power plants. The ZPP plant is also capable of producing other special alloys for industrial purposes.
  • Arak: A heavy water production facility. Iran is constructing a heavy water moderated reactor at this location, which should be ready for commissioning in 2014.
  • Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC): Run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). It is equipped with a US supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor capable of producing 600g of plutonium annually in spent fuel.
  • Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan: A nuclear research facility. The Isfahan Center currently operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI.
File:UCF.gif
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), Isfahan. Here, uranium oxides are claimed to be produced as well as uranium hexafluoride and other uranium compounds. This facility constitutes the fuel fabrication part of Iran's fuel cycle.
  • Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, located in Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. As of late October 2004, the site is 70% operational with 21 of 24 workshops completed. There is also a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) located nearby that produces the necessary ingredients and alloys for nuclear reactors.
  • Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center: Research facility investigating the applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. It is run by the AEOI.
  • Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Hashtgerd, Karaj: Established in 1991 and run by the AEOI.
  • Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Site: Construction is reportedly scheduled to be finished in mid-2005.
  • Lashkar Ab’ad pilot plant for isotope separation. Established in 2002, laser enrichment experiments were carried out there, however, the plant has been shut down since Iran declared it has no intentions of enriching uranium using the laser isotope separation technique.
  • Parchin: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
  • Lavizan II: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
  • Chalous: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
  • Yazd Radiation Processing Center

Official Iranian views

Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrializing nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically . Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. Iran also raises financial questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore .

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear program using indigenously-made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Program to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the program under U.S. pressure.

Iran has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-3 began to assert had been forfeited by the "clandestine" nuclear program that came to light in 2002. Iran and many other developing nations who are signatory to the NPT believe the Western position to be hypocritical, claiming that the NPT's original purpose was universal nuclear disarmament; the US, UK and France have all reduced their arsenals since the cold war, but none have disarmed. () Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not signed the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968 , India by 1974 and Pakistan by 1990 .

To date there is no direct publicly available evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran. However, there is evidence that Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan provided Iran with nuclear technology . The United States accuses Iran of seeking the "capacity" to build bombs, or obtaining technology which "could be" used to make bombs. In Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report the Director-General of the IAEA confirmed that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program." After one more year and over a thousand person-days of the most rigorous inspections, El Baradei again confirmed in Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities." On January 31st 2006, the IAEA reported that "Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency...including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations."

The Iran based newspaper Baztab recently reported that the United States had provided 5kg of 19.7% enriched uranium to Iran before the revolution.

Fatwa Against Production, Stockpiling and use of Nuclear Weapons

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. No text of the fatwa has ever been released although it was referenced in an official statement at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

U.S. and Israeli views

Since 2002, the U.S. has claimed that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil and natural gas reserves since oil power is cheaper to produce than nuclear power. Also, in testimony to Congress in 2003, hawkish John Bolton claimed that natural gas is currently being flared (burned off without being used) by Iran, if used for electricity generation, could be used to generate 4000 megawatts of continuous electricity - as much as all four Bushehr reactors . However the UK Parliament Office of Science and Technology on investigating this claim found it was not supported by an analysis of the facts — for example much of the gas flared off by Iran is not recoverable for energy use . Peak oil and the lag-time in building nuclear power plants (as demanded for the USA by President Bush in February 2006) also indicate that even oil-producers are wise to consider alternative power sources that will allow them to conserve oil, maximising income as global production reduces.

One theory behind the U.S.'s resistance to accepting Iran's nuclear power (and/or weapons) ambition lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the U.S. believes that it should guard against Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. At the moment, Israel, a very close ally of the US, is the only country in the region with a suspected nuclear weapons program - Israel does not confirm or deny this nuclear weapons capability.

Hardline Iranian leaders such as the new president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are openly hostile to Israel, engaging in Holocaust revisionism and calling for the State of Israel to be "wiped off the map" in 2001 and 2005 . An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would greatly reduce the deterrent capability of Israel's arsenal. Israel is much smaller in territory and population compared to Iran and fears the theocratic Iranian regime. Major Israeli think tanks and government sources claim that the "mutually assured destruction" concept of the Cold War would not be effective against Iran because of Israel's geographic and demographic weakness and the Iranian regime's unpredictability and hostility. Iran believes that Israel denying it the right to nuclear energy while also having this technology is hypocritical.

The existence of an Iranian nuclear weapon would also pose a potential threat to other US allies, such as Saudi Arabia. Finally, a credible Iranian nuclear deterrent would neutralize attempts at forcible "regime change" such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

International response

The claims and counterclaims have put pressure on Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear program. Some pressure has also come from Iran's trade partners: Europe, Japan, and Russia. In January of 2005, the European Union countries of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom suggested that Iran should be referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. This marked a turning point in the European stance with regard to Iranian nuclear ambitions, an unusual move in recent time which paralleled United States foreign policy views in the Middle East. Iran has claimed this to be a result of an attempt by the U.S. government to prevent it from obtaining nuclear technology.

UN Security Council chamber in New York

Regarding the involvement of the IAEA, under the auspices of the UN, Iran has responded to the American accusations by cooperating with the agency, since the enrichment activities they have recommenced are not in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In August 2005, Iranian officials said they had lost much of their confidence in the IAEA; the Speaker of the Majlis said that he regarded an IAEA resolution summoning Iran to suspend uranium conversion to be "illegal." Iran's degree of cooperation has, in general, varied depending on other geopolitical issues: at times the IAEA has had to admonish Iran, while at other times it has praised it. In January of 2005, IAEA Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei remarked that after three years of inspections, the IAEA could not confirm that Iran's nuclear technology program is for peaceful purposes.

IAEA Flag

Timeline

1967: The Tehran Nuclear Research Center is built and run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

July 1968: Iran signs the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and ratifies it. It goes into effect on March 5, 1970.

1970s: Under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Iran's King), plans are made to construct up to twenty nuclear power stations across the country with U.S. support and backing. Numerous contracts are signed with various Western firms, and the German firm Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens AG) begins construction on the Bushehr power plant in 1974.

1975: Massachusetts Institute of Technology signs a contract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to provide training for Iranian nuclear engineers.

1979: Iran's Islamic revolution puts a freeze on the existing nuclear program and the Bushehr contract with Siemens AG is terminated as the German firm leaves.

1982: Iranian officials announced that they planned to build a reactor powered by their own uranium at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre.

1983: International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors inspect Iranian nuclear facilities, and report on proposed cooperation agreement to help Iran manufacture enriched uranium fuel as part of Iran's "ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology." The assistance program is later terminated under U.S. pressure.

1984: Iranian radio announced that negotiations with Niger on the purchase of uranium were nearing conclusion.

1985: Iranian radio program openly discusses the significance of the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran with the director of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation.

1990: Iran begins negotiations with Russia regarding the re-construction of the Bushehr power plant.

1992: Iran signs an agreement with China for the building of two 950-watt reactors in Darkhovin (Western Iran). To date, construction has not yet begun.

January 1995: Iran signs an USD $800 million contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to complete reactors at Bushehr under IAEA safeguards.

1996: China and Iran inform the IAEA of plans to construct a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, but China withdraws from the contract under US pressure. Iran advises the IAEA that it plans to pursue the construction anyway.

August 2002: A leading critic of Tehran and former member of the National Council of Resistance (designated as a terrorist organization in the US and Europe) Alireza Jafarzadeh, relying on the information obtained from sources well placed within the Iranian regime, and leaked by Iran's main opposition organization, the MEK, exposed two secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak.

December 2002: The U.S. accuses Iran of attempting to make nuclear weapons.

16 June 2003: Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, declares that "Iran failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities" and requests "co-operative actions" from the country. However, at no point does the International Atomic Energy Agency declare Iran in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

October 2003: Iran begins to hold negotiations with IAEA members with respect to a more stringent set of nuclear inspections.

October 31, 2003: The IAEA declares that Iran has submitted a "comprehensive" declaration of its nuclear program.

November 11, 2003: The IAEA declares that there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to build an atomic bomb.

November 13, 2003: Washington claims that the IAEA report is "impossible to believe". The UN stands behind the facts provided in the report.

June 2004: Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister, responding to demands that Iran halt its nuclear program, says: "We won't accept any new obligations. Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognised by the international community as a member of the nuclear club. This is an irreversible path."

June 14, 2004: Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, accuses Iran of "less than satisfactory" cooperation during the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear program. ElBaradei demands "accelerated and proactive cooperation" from Iran. (NYT)

July 27, 2004: Iran breaks seals placed upon uranium centrifuges by the International Atomic Energy Agency and resumes construction of the centrifuges at Natanz. (AP)

July 31, 2004: Iran states that it has resumed building nuclear centrifuges to enrich uranium, reversing a voluntary October 2003 pledge to Britain, France, and Germany to suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities. The United States contends that the purpose is to produce weapons-grade uranium. (Reuters)

August 10, 2004: Several long-standing charges and questions regarding weapons-grade uranium samples are clarified by the IAEA. The samples match Pakistani and Russian sources which had contaminated imported Iranian equipment from those countries. (Jane's Intelligence)

August 24, 2004: Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declares in Wellington, New Zealand, that Iran will retaliate with force against Israel or any nation that attempts a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear program. Earlier in the week, Israel's chief of staff, General Moshe Ya'alon, told an Israeli newspaper that "Iran is striving for nuclear capability and I suggest that in this matter not rely on others."

September 6, 2004: The latest IAEA report finds that "unresolved issues surrounding Iran's atomic programme are being clarified or resolved outright".

September 18, 2004: The IAEA, the United Nations's nuclear watchdog agency, unanimously adopts a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.

September 21, 2004: In defiance of the United Nations, Iran announces that it will continue its nuclear program converting 37 tonnes of yellowcake uranium for processing in centrifuges. (Reuters)

October 18, 2004: Iran states that it is willing to negotiate with the U.K., Germany, and France regarding a suspension of its uranium enrichment activities, but that it will never renounce its right to enrich uranium. (Reuters)

October 24, 2004: The European Union makes a proposal to provide civilian nuclear technology to Iran in exchange for Iran terminating its uranium enrichment program permanently. Iran rejects this outright saying it will not renounce its right to enrichment technologies. A decision to refer the matter from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations Security Council is expected on November 25, 2004. (Reuters)

November 15, 2004: Talks between Iran and three European Union members, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, result in a compromise. Iran agrees to temporarily suspend its active uranium enrichment program for the duration of a second round of talks, during which attempts will be made at arriving at a permanent, mutually-beneficial solution.

November 15, 2004: A confidential UN report is leaked. The report states that all nuclear materials within Iran have been accounted for and there is no evidence of any military nuclear program. Nevertheless, it still cannot discount the possibility of such a program because it does not have perfect knowledge. (BBC)

November 22, 2004: Iran declares that it will voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment program to enter negotiations with the EU. Iran will review its decision in three months. The EU seeks to have the suspension made permanent and is willing to provide economic and political incentives. (Reuters)

November 24, 2004: Iran seeks to obtain permission from the European Union, in accordance with its recent agreement with the EU, to allow it to continue working with 24 centrifuges for research purposes. (Reuters)

November 28, 2004: Iran withdraws its demand that some of its technology be exempted from a freeze on nuclear enrichment activities. (BBC)

August 8 and August 10, 2005: Iran resumed conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility.

August 9, 2005: The Iranian head of state Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. The full text of the fatwa was released in an official statement at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

August 11, 2005: The thirty-five-member governing board of the IAEA adopted a resolution calling upon Iran to suspend uranium conversion, and instructing director general Mohammed ElBaradeil to submit a report on Iran's nuclear program by September 3, 2005. The resolution is considered by many to be weak since it does not include the threat of referral to the security council.

August 15, 2005: Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, installed his new government. Ali Larijani replaced Hassan Rowhani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran's top policy-making body, with nuclear policy in his purview.

September 15, 2005: At a United Nations high-level summit, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated Iran had the right to develop a civil nuclear-power programme within the terms of the 1970 treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He offers a compromise solution in which foreign companies will be permitted to invest and participate in Iran's nuclear program, thus ensuring that it cannot be secretly used to make weapons. The majority of the the U.S. delegation left during his speech, but the U.S./UN mission denied there was a walkout.

November 5, 2005: The Iranian government approved a plan that allows foreign investors to participate in the work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant. The cabinet also authorized the AEOI to take necessary measures to attract foreign and domestic investment in the uranium enrichment process. Xinhua

November 19, 2005: The IAEA released a report saying that Iran was still blocking nuclear inspectors from the United Nations from crucial military sites. IAEA Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei said in the report, "Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue." Separately, Iran confirmed that it had resumed the conversion of new quantities of uranium, despite an IAEA resolution to stop such work. CNA

January 2006: New York Times reporter James Risen published State of War, in which he alleged a CIA operation code-named Operation Merlin backfired and may have helped Iran in its nuclear program, in an attempt to delay it feeding them false information.

February 4, 2006: The IAEA votes 27-3 to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. After the vote, Iran announced its intention to end voluntary cooperation with the IAEA beyond basic Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requirements, and to resume enrichment of uranium.

See also

References

  1. . ISBN 0743270665. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |First= ignored (|first= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Last= ignored (|last= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Publisher= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Title= ignored (|title= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |Year= ignored (|year= suggested) (help)
  2. Template:News reference
  3. Template:Press release reference
  4. Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy, by Dafna Linzer. Washington Post Staff Writer. Sunday, March 27, 2005; Page A15.
  5. Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons by Cyrus Safdari, Le Monde diplomatique, November 2005
  6. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", IAEA report, 10 November 2003
  7. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", IAEA report, 15 November 2004
  8. "Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" IAEA report, 31 January 2006

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