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Harry Dexter White (1892-1948) is the subject of a major new biography by R. Bruce Craig, _Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case_, The University Press of Kansas, 2004. The following is my review of this book:

In August 1948, Harry Dexter White, the distinguished architect of the international institutions created at Bretton Woods, appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities to defend his reputation. Two former spies, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, were alleging that he had spied for Russia. Bentley had never met White, but said his colleagues had passed information to her from him. Chambers claimed that White gave him documents for an underground Communist cell in the 1930s. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. His performance even impressed his interlocutor, Congressman Richard Nixon. But the strain was too great. He died three days later and a contrite HUAC retreated from the case.

But not J Edgar Hoover. He had opposed White's appointment as US executive director of the IMF in 1946 and later learned, from the secret "Venona" project, that his name appeared in some decrypted wartime Soviet cables. In 1953 he briefed Attorney-General Herbert Brownell who resurrected the politically charged case and declared that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement. When "Venona" was declassified in 1995, there was a recrudescence of neo-McCarthyite triumphalism: "Now we know," declared prominent historians.

Meanwhile Bruce Craig had for years been building an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Harry White case and was alarmed at the partisan literature spawned by "Venona". His own even-handed treatment rebukes others for writing like court-room prosecutors whose job is to put the most sinister case possible. The temptation so to do is great. With substantial evidence of espionage by some of White's friends, guilt-by-association is easy to assign. And for those seeking to justify the Cold War, the more spies "unmasked" the better.

Craig reviews the evidence in meticulous detail and shows that the more lurid allegations do not stand up: White was not responsible for provoking Pearl Harbor to divert the Japanese from Soviet borders; he did not subvert US policy when in 1944 the Soviets were given occupation currency plates (used wantonly, at great cost to the US); he was not acting on Soviet instructions when discussing a plan for the possible pastoralisation of Germany; and his advice on China was designed to keep the Kuomintang fighting Japan, not to promote Communist revolution.

Philosophically, he was a Keynesian New Dealer, not at all attracted to the Communist creed. As a dedicated Rooseveltian internationalist his energies were directed at continuing the Grand Alliance and maintaining peace through a liberal trade regime. He believed that powerful multilateral institutions could avoid the mistakes of Versailles and another world depression. Nothing supports Lord Skidelsky's claim, in his recent biography of Keynes, that White wanted to cripple Britain to help the Soviets.

According to Craig, White's passionate commitment to the noble ideals of Bretton Woods and the United Nations led him to talk too freely to the Russians - in particular to a special Soviet agent with whom he socialized openly at Bretton Woods and later in private - to try to keep them on board. Craig believes this was a "species of espionage", but espionage nonetheless.

He thus arrives at a rather strange "treasonable doubt" about a man striving to build a world that would remove the uglier features of both unfettered capitalism and Soviet-style planning. Ranged against him were Elizabeth Bentley, a brazen liar who had never met him; Whittaker Chambers, a chronic fantasist who possibly never met him either; and the fragmentary and ambiguous Venona decrypts. Despite these thin reeds, Craig thinks there could have been enough evidence to convict White of espionage in a court of law. However, as his actions were all consistent with administration policy, Craig clears him of disloyalty. Happily, White's bust now sits proudly alongside that of John Maynard Keynes in the IMF Board Room.

It seems that there is a desperate urge on the part of Harry White's detractors (some of whom have published mean-spirited and error-ridden reviews of Craig's book in some prominent newspapers) to show that, while his methods were heavy-handed, Joe McCarthy was right all along. There is a refusal to acknowledge that during WWII most Americans regarded the USSR as an admired ally and that those who dealt with their representatives in Washington were bound to have close, frank dealings with them. This became treasonable only retrospectively and for political reasons. Read Craig for ample evidence of this.

- Roger Sandilands (r.j.sandilands@strath.ac.uk)