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Human factors in diving safety

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Dive safety is primarily a function of four factors: the environment, equipment,

individual diver performance and dive team performance. The water is a harsh and alien environment which can impose severe physical and psychological stress on a diver. The remaining factors must be controlled and coordinated so the diver can overcome the stresses imposed by the underwater environment and work safely. Diving equipment is crucial because it provides life support to the diver, but the majority of dive accidents are caused by individual diver panic and an associated

degradation of the individual diver's performance. - M.A. Blumenberg, 1996

Human error is inevitable and everyone makes mistakes at some time. The consequences of these errors are varied and depend on many factors. Most errors are minor and do not cause significant harm, but others can have catastrophic consequences. Examples of human error leading to accidents are available in vast numbers, as it is the direct cause of 60% to 80% of all accidents. In a high risk environment, as is the case in diving, human error is more likely to have catastrophic consequences. A study by William P. Morgan indicates that over half of all divers in the survey had experienced panic underwater at some time during their diving career. These findings were independently corroborated by a survey that suggested 65% of recreational divers have panicked under water. Panic frequently leads to errors in a diver's judgment or performance, and may result in an accident.

Human error and panic are considered to be the leading causes of dive accidents and fatalities

Only 4.46% of the recreational diving fatalities in a 1997 study were attributable to a single contributory cause. The remaining fatalities probably arose as a result of a progressive sequence of events involving two or more procedural errors or equipment failures, and since procedural errors are generally avoidable by a well-trained, intelligent and alert diver, working in an organised structure, and not under excessive stress, it was concluded that the low accident rate in commercial Scuba diving is due to this factor.

The study also concluded that it would be impossible to eliminate absolutely all-minor contra-indications of Scuba diving, as this would result in overwhelming bureaucracy and would bring all diving to a halt.


Dummy references to be used later

References

  1. Michael A. Blumenberg, 1996, Human Factors in Diving, Marine Technology & Management Group, University of California, Berkeley. http://archive.rubicon-foundation.org/6474
  2. Perrow, Charles. (1984) Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, Inc., New York.
  3. ^ Morgan, William P. (1995). Anxiety and Panic in Recreational Scuba Divers. Madison: University of Wisconsin, Sport Psychology Laboratory, Depaltment of Kinesiology. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8614760
  4. Staff. (1996). Reader Poll Results. SCUBA Diving. May. 32-33.
  5. Brown, C.V. (1982). Cardiovascular aspects of in-water black-out. In E.H. Lanphier (Ed.), The unconscious diver. Respiratory control and other contributing factors. 3034. Undersea Medical Society, Inc. Bethesda, MD. http://archive.rubicon-foundation.org/4278
  6. Elliott, David H. 1984. Introductory remarks to third session. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Volume 304, London, UK
  7. Shelanski, Samuel. (1996) High Anxiety. SCUBA Diving. May. 32-33.
  8. Vorosmarti, James Jr., MD, (Ed.) (1987), Fitness to Dive. Thirty-fourth Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society Workshop. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society, Inc., Bethesda, MD.
  9. ^ HSE-PARAS (1997), A Quantitative risk assessment SCUBA Diving. PARAS, Isle of Wight, England.
  10. Tetlow, Stephen (2006). Formal risk identification in professional SCUBA (FRIPS), RESEARCH REPORT 436, HSE, HM Stationery Office, Colegate, Norwich
  11. Gareth Lock, 2011, HUMAN FACTORS WITHIN SPORT DIVING INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS: An Application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), http://www.cognitas.org.uk.
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    Roberts, K.H., and M. Grabowski. "Some Requirements for Designing and Managing Reliable Complex Systems." PSAM II. An International Conference Devoted to the Advancement of System-based Methods for the Design and Operation of Technological Systems and Processes. San Diego, CA, March 1994.

    Roberts, K.H. "Functional and Dysfunctional Organizational Linkages." High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium. Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, July, 1994.

    Roberts, K.H. and W.H. Moore. "New Developments in Safety Management for the Maritime Industry: The International Safety Management Code." High Consequences Operations Safety Symposium, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, July, 1994.

    Roberts, K.H. "A Model for Managing Risk." Annual Meeting of the States/ British Columbia Oil Spills Task Force. Juneau, AK: July, 1994.

    Klein, R., G.A. Bigley, and K.H. Roberts. "Culture as a Mechanism of Control in High Reliability Organizations: An extension." Annual Meetings of the Academy of Management, Dallas, TX, August 1994.

    Roberts, K.H. "Reducing Human and Organizational Error in Oil Spills." California State Lands Commission. Oil Spill Prevention Symposium, Long Beach, CA, September, 1994.

    Roberts, K.H., G.A. Bigley, and R. Klein. "Organizational Culture in Nuclear Power Generation and Air Traffic Control." First International Conference on HF Nuclear Power Operation. Berlin, Germany, November, 1994.

  13. UNKNOWN ONE OF:

    Roberts, K.H. "Decision Making in High Reliability Organizations." Second Annual Conference on High Technology Organizations, Boulder, CO, January 1990.

    Roberts, K.H. "Avoiding Error: Experiences for High Reliability Organizations." Invited Symposium, Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, April 1990.

    Roberts, K.H., J.J. Halpern and S. Stout. "Organizational and Cognitive Factors Influencing Decision Making in a High Reliability Organization." Annual Meeting TIMS/ORSA, Las Vegas, NV, May 1990.

    Roberts, K.H. "A Conversation with Karlene Roberts." National Meetings of the Academy of Management, San Francisco, CA, August 1990.

    Roberts, K.H. "Research on Reliability Seeking Organizations." Council for the Advancement of Science Writing's 28th Annual New Horizons of Science Briefing, Philadelphia, PA, October 1990.

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