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Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, also known as Albert Thảo (1922–1965), a major provincial leader in South Vietnam and infiltrator of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, was a communist agent of the Vietminh and later the Vietnam People's Army. As the overseer of Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Strategic Hamlet Program in the early 1960s, he deliberately forced the program forward at unsustainable speeds, constructing poorly-equipped and poorly-defended villages, in order to foster rural resentment against the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem, Nhu's elder brother.

During the First Indochina War, Thao was a communist officer in the Vietminh and helped oversee various operations in the Mekong Delta in the far south, at one point commanding his future enemy Nguyen Khanh, who briefly served the communist cause. After the French withdrawal and the partition of Vietnam, Thao stayed in the south and made a show of renouncing communism. He became part of the military establishment in the anti-communist south, and rose quickly up the ranks. Nominally Catholic, Thao befriended Diem's elder brother Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc; the devoutly Catholic Ngo family strongly favored co-religionists and had great trust in Thao, unaware that he was still loyal to the communists. He went on to serve as the chief of Kien Hoa Province, and gained fame after the area—traditionally a communist stronghold—suddenly became peaceful and prosperous. Vietnamese and American officials, as well as journalists, hostile and supportive of Saigon, misinterpreted this as a testament to Thao's great ability, and he was promoted to a more powerful position where he could further his sabotage. Thao and the communists in the local area had simply decided to stop fighting, so that the communists could quietly recuperate, while Thao would appear to be very skillful and be given a more important job where he could do more damage.

Through intrigue, Thao also helped destabilise and ultimately unseat two South Vietnamese regimes—Diem's and the military junta of Khanh. As the Diem regime began to unravel in 1963, Thao was one of many officers who planned a coup. Although Thao's plot was ultimately integrated into the successful plot, his activities promoted infighting which weakened the government and distracted the military from fighting the Vietcong insurgency. Throughout 1964 and 1965, as South Vietnam was struggling to establish a stable state after the ouster of Diem, Thao was involved in several intrigues and coup plots which diverted the government and army's efforts from fighting the Vietcong and building the nation. In 1965, he went into hiding after a failed attempt to seize power from Khanh and was sentenced to death in absentia. Although this coup also failed, the subsequent chaos forced Khanh's junta to collapse.

Thao died the same year he was forced into hiding; it is believed that he was murdered after a bounty was placed on his head. After Vietnam was reunified at the end of the Vietnam War, the victorious North Vietnamese communists claimed Thao as one of their own and posthumously made him a colonel.

Early Vietminh years

Born Phạm Ngọc Thuần, Thao was one of eleven children born into a northern Vietnamese Roman Catholic family. At the time, Vietnam was a French colony. The family held French citizenship but were anti-French; Thao's father, an engineer, once headed an underground communist organisation in Paris, which assisted the Vietminh's anti-French pro-independence activities outside Vietnam. After attending French schools in Saigon, Thuan changed his named to Thao and renounced his French citizenship. In his high school years at the Lycée Chasseloup Laubat, Thao met Truong Nhu Tang, who later became a high-ranking member of the Vietcong, a communist guerrilla organisation in South Vietnam. Tang described Thao as "my dearest friend" and recalled that they had "spent endless hours talking about everything under the sun. We were closer than brothers."

Thao spent his teenage years obsessed with his motorcycle. Despite being educated at an upper-class school that mainly catered to children of French colonial administrators and privileged Vietnamese— French was the medium of instruction and Gallic culture and history a major part of the curriculum—, Thao was attracted to nationalist politics. He participated in Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary campaigns for Vietnamese independence and joined the Vietminh.

In September 1945, Ho declared independence under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) following the withdrawal of Imperial Japan, which had seized control of the country from France during the Second World War. At the time, there was a power vacuum, as both Japan and France had been decimated by the war. There was an outbreak of nationalist fervour in Vietnam, and Tang and Thao joined the Vanguard Youth, an impromptu independence militia. Tang was assigned to be the leader of the local unit, but he left the movement soon after, leaving Thao in command. During this period, Saigon was regularly engulfed in riots.

In 1946, France attempted to reassert control over its colony and conventional military fighting broke out. Thao served with the Vietminh in the Mekong Delta in the far south of Vietnam during the war against French rule from 1946 to 1954. He almost met his end before he had started; he was apprehended by the local communists in My Tho, who saw his French-style dress and mistook him for a colonial agent. They tied him up and chained him to a block of stone before throwing him into a river to drown. However, Thao broke free of the weight and swam to safety. Thao proceeded further south and deeper into the Mekong Delta to the town of Vinh Long, where he was again arrested by the local Vietminh. Just as Thao was about to be executed by drowning, one of the communists realised that Thao was the brother of one of their comrades. Thao was released and rejoined his family, who lived in the region.

As a leader of the resistance, Thao was allocated the responsibility of indoctrinating the 1947 batch of recruits with Vietminh ideology. One of Thao's students was his future enemy, South Vietnamese General and President Nguyen Khanh. This group became the 410th Battalion and went on to fight near Ca Mau, the southernmost part of Vietnam. By 1949, Thao was in charge of the Vietminh espionage apparatus around Saigon and organised the guerrilla companies in the countryside. Thao was also involved in procuring arms. Filipino traders brought arms into southern Vietnam in return for rice, shrimp, pork, gold and banknotes. Following the French defeat in 1954 at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Thao helped evacuate communist fighters from South Vietnam and Cambodia in accordance with the accords of the Geneva Conference. Under the accords, Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel, pending national elections to reunify the country in 1956, and military personnel were to be evacuated to their respective sides of the border. In the meantime, Ho's Vietminh controlled the north under the DRV while the south was under the French-sponsored State of Vietnam.

However, Thao remained in the anti-communist south when Vietnam was partitioned and made a show of renouncing communism. He became a schoolteacher and later worked in a bank, as well as the Department of Transport. He consistently refused to turn in the names of his former comrades, claiming that they were merely patriots fighting against the French and were not communists. At the same time, one of Thao's brothers had been appointed as North Vietnam's ambassador to East Germany, having served as vice chairman of the Vietminh's Resistance Committee for the South during the war against the French. In October 1955, Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem ousted Emperor Bao Dai in a fraudulent referendum to determine the future of the State of Vietnam. Diem declared himself president of the newly proclaimed Republic of Vietnam. He scrapped the national elections, citing that South Vietnam was not a signatory to the accords of the Geneva Conference. This prevented reunification and Thao was permanently ensconced in the south.

Undercover communist in the South Vietnamese army

The American-backed Diem was a passionate anti-communist. In 1957, he initiated an "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign" to root out Vietminh members and their sympathisers. Thousands of people were killed or jailed but, in time, Diem's campaigns caused more sympathy for the Vietminh. Before 1960, various small-scale pro-Communist uprisings occurred in the countryside. Thao went on the run and hid in Vinh Long, worried that Diem's men were after him. In December 1960, North Vietnam's Politburo authorised the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, popularly known as the Vietcong. The Vietcong were dominated by communists, but portrayed itself as a nationalist militant organisation, stating its aim to be the "reunification of the fatherland" with the overthrow of the "disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration". The creation of the Vietcong marked an escalation in the scale and organisation of the insurgency that developed into the Vietnam War.

Thao's Catholicism helped him to avoid detection as a communist. He and his brother were the only members of the family who were not anti-communist. The remainder of the relatives were followers of Diem's brother Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, who had been the Bishop of Vinh Long during the war against France. Thao was also known to have a face that revealed nothing of his inner feelings.

Thuc's intervention helped Thao rise in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Thuc put Thao in touch with Tran Kim Tuyen, who was in charge of intelligence operations under Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was the head of the secret police and controlled the ARVN Special Forces. Thao began as a propagandist for various units of the army and for the secret Catholic Can Lao Party. The Can Lao's system of informants and secret cells helped create the atmosphere of a police state and maintained the Ngo family's grip on power. Tang opined that Thuc "undoubtedly considered that Thao's Catholic and family loyalties were stronger and more durable than his youthful enthusiasm for revolution". He felt that Thao had tricked Thuc into believing that he was no longer a communist, and that his inside knowledge would be useful to the Ngo family.

Thao started by training the Civil Guard. As a result of his family's Catholic connections, Thao rose steadily in the ARVN, since Diem's regime promoted officers primarily on religious preference and loyalty. Nhu sent him to Malaysia to study counterinsurgency techniques, and upon his return Thao became a vital part of Nhu's efforts to purge the army of disloyal officers. As Thao kept a close watch on those who commanded troops, lest they use their personnel in a coup, the leading officers were keen to maintain a good relationship with him and that increase his effectiveness as a spy.

Thao rose even further when the troops he commanded helped put down the November 1960 coup attempt against Diem. Thao assisted Khanh and Tran Thien Khiem to put down the revolt. All three were promoted, with the latter pair gaining the leadership of the ARVN and the combined forces respectively. This cemented the trio's close ties.

Thao was promoted to the post of chief of Kien Hoa Province, which the communists called Ben Tre Province. He covertly worked with the cadres of Nguyen Thi Dinh, a Vietcong leader who later became the highest ranking female communist in post-war reunified Vietnam. The area was a traditional communist stronghold, and anti-government attacks had increased in recent times, but it suddenly became peaceful when Thao arrived. There were rumours that Thao and the communists had decided to cease fighting for their mutual benefit; the guerrillas could quietly strengthen themselves, while Thao would appear to be successful and he would be promoted to a more powerful position where he could cause more damage to Diem. The lack of fighting between Thao's forces and the Vietcong proved to beneficial to the communist cause. In a three-month period in 1963, the Vietcong were able to recruit 2,000 men in Kien Hoa and formed two more battalions. Thao was praised by the Ngo family and American military advisors, who were unaware of his ruse. He received another promotion, and with it, more influence and contacts among the officer corps.

The US ambassador Elbridge Durbrow described Kien Hoa Province as an "agricultural showplace" and advised journalists to travel there to see Thao's successful administration. The influential American journalist Joe Alsop changed his plans so that he could spend more time in Kien Hoa, saying that the province "particularly inspires hope". In one operation by Thao's ARVN forces, American field journalists covering the battle saw their hours-long attempt to box in a Vietcong battalion yield only one farmer who lived in a hut with antigovernment slogans. Despite this, the American journalists and Vietnamese officers remained unaware that Thao was a double agent. In fact, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam misinterpreted the lack of attacks in Kien Hoa, while other provinces were being ravaged, as proof that Thao was one the few capable government officials in the Mekong Delta. Robert Shaplen wrote that "In all respects, Thao is one of the most remarkable Vietnamese around, being a conspiratorial revolutionary figure straight out of a Malraux novel and, at the same time, a highly sophisticated and astute man, whose talents, if only they were properly channeled, could profitably be used right now." Because Thao was a former leader of the Vietminh, outsiders thought that his apparent success was due his first-hand knowledge of communist tactics. During his period as the province chief, Thao set up the Council of Elders, a consultative body of 20–200 men and women, which were allowed to criticise local officials. He also advocated the creation of the Council of Patrons, a philanthropic body to raise money for community projects.

Strategic Hamlet Program

In 1962, Nhu began work on the ambitious Strategic Hamlet Program, an attempt to build fortified villages that would be secure zones for rural Vietnamese. The objective was to lock the Vietcong out so that they could not operate among the villagers. Thao supervised these efforts, and when told that the peasants resented being forcibly removed from their ancestral lands and put into forts that they were forced to build, he advised Nhu and Tuyen that it was imperative to build as many hamlets as fast as possible. This pleased the Vietcong, who felt that Thao's efforts were turning the rural populace against Saigon. Thao specifically had villages built in areas that he knew had a strong Vietcong presence. This increased the number of communist sympathisers who were placed inside the hamlets and given identification cards. As a result, the Vietcong were able to more effectively penetrate the villages to access supplies and personnel.

Later in 1962, United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited South Vietnam and was taken on an inspection tour of the country, accompanied by Diem and Thao. Perhaps because Thao divulged the tour details to Vietcong guerrillas, each of McNamara's stopovers was punctuated by bloody attacks on nearby ARVN installations. For example, when McNamara was in Binh Duong Province, five government soldiers were killed. As he flew from Da Lat north to Da Nang near the demilitarised zone, he was greeted by a Vietcong bombing of a southbound troop train, which killed 27 and wounded 30 Civil Guard members.

The fall of Diem

In 1963, the Diem regime began to lose its tight control over the country as civil unrest spread as a result of the Buddhist crisis. Large scale demonstrations by the Buddhist majority erupted in response to the government shootings of nine Buddhists in Huế who were protesting against a ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag during Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. With Diem remaining intransigent in the face of Buddhist demands for religious equality, sections of society began calling for his removal from power. Thao was part of the many plots that engulfed Saigon, destabilising the regime. Aiming for a 15 July coup, Tuyen consulted with Thao regarding his plans, but Tuyen was too closely associated with Nhu to recruit the necessary military aid and he was subsequently exiled by Nhu. Tuyen's group ended up being led by Thao but his initial coup plans were shelved when American CIA agent Lucien Conein instructed Thao's superior, General Khiem, to stop the coup on the grounds that it was premature. Thao's motivation for involvement in the plotting is generally attributed to communist instructions for him to cause infighting within the ARVN whenever possible. Thao resumed plotting, intending to stage the coup on 24 October. He had recruited various infantry, marine and paratroop units for his scheme, totalling 3,000 men. Thao's group did not carry out the coup after senior generals persuaded him to integrate his forces into their larger group, which was more likely to succeed. Thao reasoned that aligning himself with a group of officers that were likely to successful would yield more influence in the resulting junta. The coup was successfully executed on 1 November 1963, under the leadership of Generals Duong Van Minh and Tran Van Don.

Thao commanded around two dozen tanks, which formed a column in the streets surrounding the Presidential Palace at midnight, and helped launch the full scale attack at 03:30 on 2 November. The rebels eventually gained control of the building, and at daybreak Thao's forces stormed the palace, but found it empty; Diem and Nhu had escaped. A captured officer of the Presidential Guard revealed the brothers' hiding place and under the orders of Khiem, Thao went after them. Khiem ordered Thao to ensure that the brothers were not physically harmed. Thao arrived at the house in Cholon where the brothers were purportedly hiding and phoned the rebels back at the palace. Diem and Nhu were apparently listening in on an extension in another room and escaped. The brothers subsequently surrendered to an ARVN convoy led by General Mai Huu Xuan at a nearby Catholic church and were executed en route to military headquarters despite being promised safe exile.

The US media played an important part in the downfall of Diem, and their links to Thao have been the source of historical debate. The journalists' reporting of Diem's authoritarian rule, military failures, and attacks on Buddhists shifted American public opinion and put pressure on Washington to withdraw support for the Ngo family and seek a change of leadership. William Prochnau felt that the fall of Diem was the biggest influence of the media on American foreign policy in over six decades. Thao and Pham Xuan An—a Saigon journalist who was later shown to be a communist spy—had been the source of much of the media's information. Conservative revisionist historians have accused the media of bringing down Diem by publishing reports that, according to them, were based on false data disseminated by communist propagandists in order to unfairly malign Diem's rule, which they considered to be effective and fair towards Buddhists.

Participation in military junta

After the fall of Diem, Thao was designated by the head of state Minh and the civilian Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho to create the nucleus of a group called the Council of Notables, and promote it to the public. which, as an interim body of prominent civilians, would advise the military junta before it handed over power to an elected legislature under civilian rule. The Council of fifty-eight men and two women held its first meeting on 1 January 1964 at Dien Hong Palace in Saigon. The council was composed almost entirely of well-known professionals and academics and, as such, was hardly representative of South Vietnamese society; there were no delegates from the agricultural or labour sectors of the economy. It gained a reputation for being a forum of debate, rather than a means of enacting policy change and government programs for the populace. Tho and Minh assigned Thao with the task of encouraging a transition to democracy by facilitating the formation of a few political parties. This was ineffective, as many political parties with only a handful of members sprang up and squabbled. Within 45 days of the coup, 62 parties had formed but nothing meaningful resulted. In the end, these efforts proved to be irrelevant as Minh's junta and the accompanying Council of Notables were overthrown before the end of the month. During this period, Thao served as the head of military security and played a role in replacing Colonel Do Khac Mai with Nguyen Cao Ky as the head of the Vietnam Air Force. In the aftermath of the coup, Vietcong attacks increased markedly amid infighting among the Saigon leadership, which Thao had helped to stir up.

The generals sent Thao to Fort Leavenworth in the United States for six months in order to learn conventional warfare tactics. He also spent a month in England before returning to Vietnam. By this time, Minh's junta had been replaced in a 1964 January coup by Khanh. It is suspected that one of the generals' motives for deploying Thao overseas was his continual involvement in plotting. Khanh appointed Thao to be his press officer as well as an unofficial political adviser.

Later in the year, Khanh had become involved in a power struggle with his deputy Khiem as well as Minh, who had been retained as the titular head of state. Thao was a close friend of Khiem, so when Khanh prevailed in the power struggle, Khanh despatched Khiem to Washington as the ambassador with Thao was his press attaché. In August 1964, Khanh's leadership became increasingly troubled after he tried to augment his powers by declaring a state of emergency. This only provoked large-scale protests and riots calling for an end to military rule, with Buddhist activists at the forefront. Fearful of losing power, Khanh began making concessions to the protesters and promised democracy in the near future, which encouraged more groups to demand changes. The net result was that Khanh was less powerful and had to demote some noted Catholic and Diem supporters. On September 13, a Catholic-dominated group led by Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc, both of whom had been demoted, moved troops into Saigon but then withdrew after it became obvious they did not have the numbers to remove Khanh. Khiem and Thao were implicated in helping to plot Phat and Duc's attempted putsch and both were sent abroad by Khanh.

1965 attempted coup and death

In late December 1964, Thao was summoned back to Saigon by Khanh, who correctly suspected him and Khiem of plotting together in Washington. Thao suspected that Khanh was attempting to have him killed, so he went underground upon returning to Saigon, and began plotting in earnest, having been threatened with being charged for desertion. He sheltered in a house belonging to Tang's friend. The ruling junta appealed to Thao in newspaper advertisements and broadcasts to follow orders to report, but he ignored them. In mid-January 1965, the regime called for him to report to his superiors in the ARVN, warning that he would be "considered guilty of abandoning his post with all the consequences of such a situation" if he failed to do so. Due to his Catholicism, Thao was able to recruit Diem loyalists such as Phat. With Khanh's hold on power shaky, an anonymous source said that Thao was worried about how he would be treated if someone else took over: "Thao acted first, out of fear that if he did not, the other generals would overthrow Khanh and get rid of him as well. He knew that if the others overthrew Khanh his fate would be worse than Khanh's." During this time, Thao also kept in touch with elements of the CIA in an attempt to get American backing. Meanwhile, Khiem had been putting pressure on Khanh for over two months by charging him and the Buddhists of seeking a "neutralist solution" and "negotiating with the communists".

At the same time, Khanh's relationship with the Americans—particularly Ambassador and retired General Maxwell Taylor—had broken down over a series of policy disputes and personal arguments, and the Americans were trying to encourage Khanh's colleagues to overthrow him so that more hawkish policies could be enacted. The other generals wanted to overthrow Khanh and were aware that Thao—who was widely distrusted—was planning to make a move. They anticipated trouble in trying to keep their subordinates, who were becoming impatient with Khanh's ongoing tenure, from joining Thao. Between January and February, Thao continued to finalize the details of his own counter-coup, using the contacts he had cultivated over the past decades. Due to his religion, Thao was able to recruit Catholic Diem loyalists like Phat, who were opposed to the Buddhist influence being exerted on Khanh. Thao consulted Ky—who wanted to seize power for himself—before the plot, and exhorted him to join the coup, but the Air Force chief claimed that he remained neutral. Thao thus believed that Ky would not intervene against him, but Ky was strongly opposed to the likes of Thao and Phat.

American intelligence analysts had believed that General Don was involved in the coup with Phat and Thao, but this was proven false when the action started. Eight months after the coup was over, Don told the American historian George McTurnan Kahin that he had been plotting with Thao, who had planned for him to become Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the military, but that the Dai Viet and Thao's Catholic civilian allies had insisted on installing the Catholic Khiem. A month before the coup, American intelligence analysts had believed that Thao was planning to replace Khanh as commander-in-chief with Don.

Shortly before noon on 19 February, he used around fifty tanks, their crew and a mixture of infantry battalions to seize control of the military headquarters, the post office and the radio station of Saigon. He surrounded the home of General Khanh and Gia Long Palace, the residence of head of state Phan Khac Suu. The tanks were led by Colonel Duong Hieu Nghia, a Catholic member of the Dai Viet. The country was still trying to find stability, with Phan Huy Quat being appointed prime minister just three days earlier. Khanh managed to escape and flee to Vung Tau. His plane lifted off from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the country's military headquarters, just as rebel tanks were rolling in, attempting to block the runway. Thao's men tried to capture the Saigon base of the Republic of Vietnam Navy, and its commander, Admiral Chung Tan Cang, but were foiled, but they did capture a number of junta members at Tan Son Nhut.

Thao made a radio announcement stating that the sole objective of his military operation was to get rid of Khanh, whom he described as a "dictator". He said that he intended to recall Khiem to Saigon to lead the Armed Forces Council in place of Khanh, but would retain the civilian cabinet that answered to the generals. In doing so, he caught Khiem—at least nominally—off guard, asleep in his Maryland home. When informed of what was happening, Khiem sent a cable pledging "total support" to the plot. The coup group made pro-Diem announcements; theysaid that then-US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. "was wrong in encouraging the coup against Diem rather than correcting mistakes". A Catholic rebel officer made a speech extolling Diem, and mourning his loss. This gave the impression that the coup plotters wanted to roll back the country to a Diem-era position and punish those who had been involved in Diem's overthrow and execution. Thao's group also promised to aggressively fight the Vietcong and cooperate with the United States. Throughout the day, a series of anti-Khanh speeches were broadcast on radio, and the rebels claimed to have the support of four divisions, something that was regarded as dubious. American government analysts concluded that the rebellion was "primarily a move by die-hard neo-Diemists and Catholic military militants disturbed at the rise of Buddhist influence, opposed to Gen. Khanh and—in a vague, ill-thought way—desirous of turning back the clock and undoing some of the results of the November 1963 ouster of Diem." Among the civilians linked to Thao's plot were Catholic academics and a militant priest.

As Diem had strongly discriminated along religious lines, the rebels' commented caused a negative response among the Buddhist majority. The Buddhist activist monk Thich Tam Chau called on Buddhists to support the incumbent junta. The pro-Diem speeches also alarmed pro-Buddhist or anti-Diem generals, such as Nguyen Chanh Thi and Nguyen Huu Co, who had been part of the failed 1960 and successful 1963 coups against Diem respectively. They thought that Thao and Phat might seek revenge, driving many anti-Diem officers who may have otherwise been neutral or sympathetic to the coup, to swing more towards Khanh.

Although Taylor and US military commander General William Westmoreland wanted Khanh out, the pro-Diem political ideology expressed by Thao's supporters alienated them, as they feared that the coup plotters would destabilize and polarize the country if they took power. The Americans were worried that Phat and Thao could galvanize support for Khanh through their extreme views, which had the potential to provoke large-scale sectarian divisions, playing into the hands of the communists and hindering wider American objectives. In addition, they were also worried by Thao's intention to remove Quat and the civilian components of the government, whom he saw was "too susceptible to Buddhist peacemongering". In contrast, the Americans saw civilian participation in governance as a necessity. They were also worried that a Khanh victory would enhance his prestige, so they wanted to see some third force emerge and defeat both Thao and Khanh's factions. Westmoreland and Taylor decided to work for the failure of both Thao and Khanh, and helped to organize US advisers for the purpose.

Phat was supposed to seize the Bien Hoa Air Base to prevent air force chief Ky from mobilising air power against them, but he failed to reach the airfield before Ky, who circled Tan Son Nhut and threatened to bomb the rebels. Most of the forces of the III and IV Corps surrounding the capital disliked both Khanh and the rebels, and took no action. However, as night came, senior military opinion began to turn against Thao and Phat, although it was not clear at this stage whether the anti-Thao forces being organised and led by Thi were hostile to Khanh as well.

At 20:00, Phat and Thao met Ky, and insisted that Khanh be removed from power. The coup collapsed when, between midnight and dawn, anti-Thao forces swept into the city from the south along with some components of the 7th Airborne Brigade loyal to Ky from Bien Hoa in the north. Whether the rebels were genuinely defeated by the overwhelming show of strength or whether a deal was struck with Ky to end the revolt in exchange for Khanh's removal is disputed, although a large majority support the latter. According to the latter version, Phat and Thao agreed to free the members of the Armed Forces Council that they had arrested and withdraw in exchange for Khanh's complete removal from power. Possibly as a means of saving face, Phat and Thao were also given an appointment with the figurehead chief of state Suu, who was under the close control of the junta, to "order" him to sign a decree stripping Khanh of the leadership of the military and organizing a meeting of the junta and Prime Minister Quat's civilian cabinet. During the early morning, while the radio station was still in the hands of Thao's men, a message attributed to Suu was read out; it claimed that the chief of state had sacked Khanh. However, the authenticity of the announcement was put into doubt when loyalists took control of the station and Suu spoke in person, claiming otherwise. There were no injuries or deaths in the coup.

Before fleeing, Thao broadcast a message stating that the coup had been effective in removing Khanh. This was not the case as yet, but the Armed Forces Council later adopted a vote of no confidence in Khanh later in the day, and forced him into exile. Later in the morning, while on the run, Thao made a broadcast using a military radio system to call for Khanh's departure and defend his actions, which he described as being in the best interest of the nation. Phat and Thao were stripped of their ranks, but nothing was initially done as far as prosecuting or sentencing them for their involvement in the coup.

In hiding and death

While in hiding in Catholic villages, Thao expressed his willingness to surrender and cooperate with the government of Quat, if he and approximately fifty officers involved in the coup were granted amnesty. He also offered to go into exile in the United States, where his family had moved when he was sent there for training in 1964. In May 1965, a military tribunal sentenced both Thao and Phat to death in absentia. The death sentence was attributed to the influence of Thi, who had assigned hit squads to look for him. After the conclusion of the trial, it was announced that the Armed Forces Council would disband and give the civilians more control in running the government. Thi was believed to have agreed to the transfer of power to a civilian government in return for Thao's death. As a result, Thao had little choice but to attempt to seize power in order to save himself and he and Thi began to manoeuvre against one another.

On 20 May, a half dozen officers and around forty civilians, predominantly Catholic, were arrested on the charges of attempting to assassinate Quat and kidnap Thi and Ky. Several of the arrested were known supporters of Thao and believed to be abetting him in evading the authorities. Despite this, Thao himself managed to escape, even as a USD 30,000 bounty was put on him by the junta. On July 16, 1965, he was reported dead in unclear circumstances; an official report claimed that he died of injuries while on a helicopter en route to Saigon, after being captured north of the city. However, it is generally assumed that he was murdered or tortured to death on the orders of some military officials. One report holds that a Catholic priest betrayed Thao, while another claims that General Nguyen Van Thieu caught him. In his memoirs, Ky claimed that Thao was jailed and "probably from a beating". After the Fall of Saigon in 1975, a conspiracy theory emerged, maintaining that Thao went underground and worked in counterintelligence for the communist Central Office of South Vietnam, helping to hunt down Vietcong cadres who had defected to Saigon.

Legacy

Although Thao's last plot failed, his activities in 1965 and the resultant infighting led to a series of internal purges within the ARVN, and amid the instability, the Vietcong made strong gains across the country throughout the year. In response to the deteriorating military situation, the Americans began to deploy combat troops to South Vietnam in large numbers.

Thao was posthumously promoted by the ARVN to the rank of one–star general and awarded the title of Heroic war dead (Template:Lang-vi). After the Fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War, the communist government awarded him the same title and paid war pensions to his family, claiming him as one of their own. In 1981, the communists had his body exhumed and reburied in the "Patriots' cemetery" in Ho Chi Minh City (previously Saigon). Tang opined that Thao "was a man who throughout his life fought single-mindedly for Vietnam's independence". Tang, who later abandoned communism, said that Thao "was a nationalist, not an ideologue", and credited him with turning the military tide towards the communists by helping to bring down Diem and fomenting chronic instability and infighting for 18 months. Ho Chi Minh had reacted to Diem's death by saying "I can scarcely believe that the Americans would be so stupid". A communist report written in March 1965, soon after Thao's revolt had caused Khanh to depart, stated that "The balance of force... has changed very rapidly in our favor... The bulk of the enemy's armed forces… have disintegrated, and what is left continues to disintegrate".

Notes

1. ^ Shaplen, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
2. ^ Langguth, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
3. ^ Tang, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
4. ^ Jacobs, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
5. ^ Van de Mark, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
6. Goscha, p. 191.
7. Lindholm, Richard (1959). Viet-nam, the first five years: an international symposium. Michigan State University Press. pp. 48–50.
8. ^ Hickey, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
9. ^ Moyar, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
10. ^ Halberstam, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
11. ^ Wyatt, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
12. ^ Karnow, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
13. ^ Jones, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
14. ^ Hammer, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
15. ^ Winters, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
16. ^ Prochnau, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
17. ^ Tucker, p. 325.
18. ^ Kahin, {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help).
19. ^ Langguth, Jack (1965-02-20). "Khanh is back in power; his troops regain Saigon, putting down brief coup". The New York Times. p. 1.
20. ^ "Hours in an Anxious Saigon: How Anti-Khanh Coup Failed". The New York Times. 1965-02-21. p. 2. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
21. ^ "South Viet Nam: A Trial for Patience". Time. 1965-02-26.
22. "Dissident General Yields". The New York Times. 1965-02-20. p. 2.
23. Ky, p. 116.

References

• Goscha, Christopher E. (1999). Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885–1954. Surrey: Curzon. ISBN 0-7007-0622-4.
• Halberstam, David (2008). The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-6007-4. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York City, New York: E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
• Hickey, Gerald Cannon (2002). Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 0-89672-490-5.
• Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
• Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
• Kahin, George McT. (1986). Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York City, New York: Knopf. ISBN 0-394-54367-X.
• Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York City, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
• Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam: the war, 1954–1975. New York City, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
• Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
• Prochnau, William (1995). Once upon a Distant War. New York City, New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-8129-2633-1.
• Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: Andre Deutsch.
• Truong Nhu Tang (1986). Journal of a Vietcong. London: Cape. ISBN 0-224-02819-7.
• VanDeMark, Brian (1995). Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-509650-9.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (ed.) (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)
• Winters, Francis X. (1997). The year of the hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963 – February 15, 1964. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press. ISBN 0-8203-1874-4.
• Wyatt, Clarence R. (1995). Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-91795-9.

v t e Military of South Vietnam
Corps	I II III CMD IV
Divisions	1 2 3 5 7 9 18 21 22 23 25 Marines Airborne
Branches	Air Force Army Civilian Irregular Defense Group program Navy Popular Forces Regional Forces Junk Force Presidential Guard Combined Action Program
ARVN Sub-branches	Special Forces Rangers
Air bases	Bien Hoa Binh Thuy Cam Ranh Da Nang Nha Trang Phan Rang Phù Cát Pleiku Tan Son Nhut Tuy Hoa
Coup attempts and mutinies	1960 1962 1963 January 1964 September 1964 December 1964 1965 1966
Notable officers	Cao Văn Viên Chung Tấn Cang Đặng Văn Quang Đỗ Cao Trí Đỗ Mậu Dư Quốc Đống Dương Văn Đức Dương Văn Minh Hoàng Cơ Minh Hoàng Xuân Lãm Huỳnh Văn Cao Lâm Quang Thi Lâm Quang Thơ Lâm Văn Phát Lê Minh Đảo Lê Nguyên Khang Lê Nguyên Vỹ Lê Văn Hưng Lê Văn Kim Lữ Mộng Lan Lý Tòng Bá Mai Hữu Xuân Ngô Du Ngô Quang Trưởng Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Nguyễn Chánh Thi Nguyễn Đức Thắng Nguyễn Hợp Đoàn Nguyễn Hữu Có Nguyễn Hữu Hạnh Nguyễn Khánh Nguyễn Khoa Nam Nguyễn Phước Vĩnh Lộc Nguyễn Trọng Luật Nguyễn Văn Chuân Nguyễn Văn Hiếu Nguyễn Văn Mạnh Nguyễn Văn Minh Nguyễn Văn Thiệu Nguyễn Văn Toàn Nguyễn Văn Vy Nguyễn Viết Thanh Nguyễn Vĩnh Nghi Phạm Ngọc Thảo Phạm Phú Quốc Phạm Quốc Thuần Phạm Văn Phú Phan Trọng Chinh Phan Xuân Nhuận Tôn Thất Đính Trần Thanh Phong Trần Thiện Khiêm Trần Văn Đôn Trần Văn Hai Trần Quang Khôi Vũ Văn Giai
Ranks and insignia	South Vietnamese military ranks and insignia

Template:Persondata

• 1922 births
• 1965 deaths
• Assassinated military personnel
• South Vietnamese spies for North Vietnam
• People sentenced to death in absentia
• Recipients of a posthumous promotion
• South Vietnamese military personnel of the Vietnam War
• Vietminh members
• Vietnamese communists
• Vietnamese Roman Catholics