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Summaries of this article appear in Iowa class battleship and Zumwalt class destroyer. |
excellent article
i must say a very good article, is it possible to have the article at least nominated for good article status? good job editors/writers i enjoyed reading it. have a nice day —Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.28.16.42 (talk) 00:52, 8 January 2011 (UTC)
Errors corrected
I corrected a couple gramatical errors on this page on 8/7/08. Also, the last section "Recent Developments" suggests the possibility that the Iowa and Wisconsin may be returned to the naval register. While technically this is true in principle, have their been any inklings from congress or the navy that this is even a remote possibility? I feel like this is conjecture and false hope more than anything else. Clearly the author of this page loves battleships (as do I), but I honestly dont see it happening. -EO 8/7/08
- The odds of this are astronomically slim, but if congress wants to uphold the law it passed it will demand the Navy either get a new program togather for NGS or put the defunt programs back in action asap if they want the battleships to remain of the NVR, otherwise, me thinks they would be legally obligated to demand the navy reinstated the battleships during the reassessment phase. TomStar81 (Talk) 21:17, 7 August 2008 (UTC)
- What is the difference between them being put back on the register and the current plan to turn them into museum ships? Based on congress's request that nothing be permanently modified that would impede their reactivation, it seems like, if the navy ever wanted to recommission the BBs, getting rid of tour groups and exhibits would be the least of their worries. With the cost of all the other upgrades that would be required, it would seem to me there is virtually no difference between having them on or off the register. They're going to be preserved either way. I guess having them back on the register would give us a bit more hope of seeing them on the open seas again. -EO 8/8/8
- If they are listed on the register it means the navy has to shell out the cash to keep the ships operational, where as turning the ships into museums means the group that gets the battleship will be paying for the mainteince and all that other stuff. Thats the key difference. TomStar81 (Talk) 22:03, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
- Is there any difference in the standard they will be maintained to though? -EO 8/8/8 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.82.170.234 (talk) 03:02, 9 August 2008 (UTC)
- On the NVR they would be maintained as Category B assessts, meaning they would recieve maintience and service on an as needed basis. Off the NVR they will not recieve any maintence and service, so the odds are that off the NVR their conditions will deteriate some. TomStar81 (Talk) 03:06, 9 August 2008 (UTC)
Precisely. The only museum ship that I am aware of that is still "combat capable" is USS Constitution, the famous frigate from the War of 1812. The "operational" status of this ship (she is massively obsolete, and no amount of retrofitting would allow her to be useful in modern war, but she could still fight against another 18th cantury warship, which HMS Victory could not.) Placing the battlewagons on the NVR requires the Navy to expend resources both on mainatining the ships but maintaining a supply of spare parts and ammunition, equipment that has not been manufactured in decades. LordShonus (talk) 09:18, 28 November 2008 (UTC)
copy-edit of top
Tom, sorry I've littered it with inline comments; seemed the quickest, easiest way. On one level, the writing is lovely; but I still find lots of issues. It's not as easy as usual to characterise them. I think they concern ambiguity and lack of clarity. Can you get someone fresh to sift through it in detail? Tony (talk) 10:46, 12 August 2008 (UTC)
- I will look into it. Thanks for the input Tony, I knew I could count on you. TomStar81 (Talk) 02:41, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
Netfires?
Can we have a section about the use of the LCS Netfires Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System for support of ground forces?
Historically the most effective Naval Fire Support has come from the smaller platforms that were able to operate closer to the beaches. See for example Omaha Beach.
Hcobb (talk) 14:12, 15 September 2008 (UTC)
- I think that this wouldn't be a good candidate for inclusion here, as the article's subject content is more the role of the gun in the modern navy. I will look into it though to see if it should be in here. TomStar81 (Talk) 21:43, 26 September 2008 (UTC)
Well The Navy (does Earth have more than one real Navy?) has renamed the concept to Naval Surface Fire Support so perhaps we should rename our page with perhaps a historical footnote to those long ago days when ships supported the troops only with guns.
http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao95160.htm Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy's Near-Term Plan Is Not Based on Sufficient Analysis (Letter Report, 05/19/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-160).
BTW, was there ever such a day? I seem to recall hearing the phrase "The rockets' red glare" in a song about a long ago event...
Hcobb (talk) 20:18, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
- Actually, I'm thinking about a much more radical move: renaming and moving the page to cover a more international view of the debate. According to ALR, this is not merely a U.S. issue; if we can confirm it exists elsewhere, then I think the best thing to do would be to move the page to reflect the internation issue rather than just the U.S. issue and drop the FAC as a result of the transfer. TomStar81 (Talk) 20:32, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
- Naval fires is a standard military and naval activity. It's just that the US have held onto an anachronism far longer than is sensible. The debate died for most countries a few years ago as the requirement changed to a need for more accurate fire, using specific effect munitions, rather than just large volumes of HE. From a UK perspective the discipline is described as Naval Fires, which includes direct and indirect gunnery, commando gunnery, surface or submarine launched cruise missiles, illumination of PGM or delivery of air launched munitions from deck launched a/c. That is all in the context of associated military or amphibious operations in the littoral.
- I think it's fair just to reflect the current debate in the US as a specific article, although I'll confess that one of my WP bugbears is that many articles have a couple of handfuls of useful content, then interminable lists of how different countries approach the topic.
- With respect to the point above, unless the specific Netfires solution is directly associated with the debate, then it probably doesn't have a place in the article.
- ALR (talk) 21:16, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
Overplaying the thesis
Reading through the article I have a mild concern about POV, what I'm lifting from the text is a bias towards retaining the capability rather than an impartial overview of the debate. I think the main contribution to this is the significant proportion devoted to the work by the Engineer Col. It's not clear whether this was a student submission as part of his college course, or whether he is faculty. I'd assume from the following point about it being best thesis then it's a student submission. Having played the military education game myself I've got some concerns about how meaningful this actually is; selecting and supporting a contentious position gets some profile at the end of the course which helps with promotion and posting negotiations. I'm concerned enough that I'd remove the point about it being best thesis, it doesn't offer anything to this topic and it implies an authority that a student paper doesn't really have.
Of course I say all this from the position of agreeing with the USN view, that retaining these old hulls isn't cost effective and they're an anachronism in modern littorial warfare.
ALR (talk) 09:05, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
- The most important thing to remeber here is that this article was spun off from the Iowa class battleship article, so it is going to be bias to greater or lesser degrees toward the retention of the battleships. I have tried to tone down the bias a little since this article became independent in its own right, but I have seen the same material for over a year now and thus find that I can not always find the POV becuase I am use to reading it a certain way. I will disclose that I side more with the pro battleship camp, I think the ships could be put back into service, but I recognize that this would be a drain in funds and that the shells used would need to be modernized for any recomissioning attempt since a PGM can do the same job. In a sense, thats why I need people like you ALR: you are counterbalancing my view here and its helping us locate POV-ish material, so thanks for the help :) TomStar81 (Talk) 18:44, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
- Not so much just the direct drain in funding, but the increased manpower requirement in a military that is struggling to recruit, the increased legacy training requirement, doctrinal development in modern warfare etc.
- I think as it stands the article is a fair reflection, but the thesis does appear to have a bit too much weight.
- ALR (talk) 21:19, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
I am nearing the end of a 15 minute break online here, so I want to confirm one thing for the next time I get on: When you say "the theis", are you refering to the paper by Shawn W., the army corps of engineers full bird? TomStar81 (Talk) 21:55, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
- Yes, from the surrounding material it looks like he was a student at the time.
- ALR (talk) 05:12, 30 September 2008 (UTC)
- I am placing this here until I can address theconcerns others have raied about its inclusion in the article. TomStar81 (Talk) 22:09, 8 October 2008 (UTC)
- In 2007, a thesis report submitted to the Joint Forces Staff College/Joint Advanced Warfighting School by Shawn A. Welch, a Colonel in the Army National Guard's Corps of Engineers analyzed the current capacity for naval gunfire support and made several conclusion based on the progress made since the retirement of the last two Iowa-class battleships. Welch's thesis report, which earned the National Defense Universities award for Best Thesis in 2007, estimates that the full force of DD(X) destroyers needed to replace the decommissioned Iowas will not arrive until 2020–2025 at the earliest, and alleges that the U.S. Navy has not accurately assessed the capabilities of its large caliber gun ships since 1990. The report alleges that the Navy has consistently scaled back or outright canceled programs intended to replace naval gunfire support capacity, in the process making no significant gains for offshore fire support since the retirement of the last Iowa-class battleship in 1992. This failure by the navy to meet Congressional mandates to improve naval gunfire support has caused a rift with the United States Marine Corps and to a lesser extent the United States Army; in the case of the former, the concern is great enough that several three and four star generals in the Marine Corps have openly admitted to the press their concern over the absence of any effective ship based gunfire support, and two separate Commandants of the Marine Corps have testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee on the risks faced by the Marines in the absence of any effective naval gunfire support.
Why was the Thesis removed? The USMC cites it all of the time and it does a great job showing the US Navy has been full of BS. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.10.189.29 (talk) 03:40, 13 July 2010 (UTC)
Again Why was the thesis Removed? With Operation Bold Alligator it was brought up several times with the Navy. The Thesis belongs on this page. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.74.37.73 (talk) 06:49, 2 June 2012 (UTC)
Sinking battleships with aircraft has what to do with NSFS?
NSFS is all about the application of firepower from the sea to the shore. The ability to sink ships with aircraft does not speak to the ability to replace surface ships with aircraft for the land support mission.
For example a surface ship can float offshore for days or weeks while a heavier than air aircraft has a much shorter time on station. Also it has generally been easier to intercept manned aircraft than a shell or unmanned missile and the loss of a manned aircraft can cause political concerns with respect to the pilot and advanced technology of the aircraft.
Hcobb (talk) 20:43, 7 October 2008 (UTC)
- Verifiability, Not Truth. Thats the threshold for inclusion. I can verify via sourcing that some have proposed aircraft can do what the naval guns used to do. As a historian in training, I feel the need to support claims with historical evidence. Thats just how I do things. Be Bold if you do not agree, and Fix It if you think it needs to be fixed. We are open to all for editting, after all. TomStar81 (Talk) 22:32, 7 October 2008 (UTC)
- It was more topicality than truth. Planes attacking land targets is not the same as planes attacking warships.
- For this article I would split the aircraft/battleship "debate" into two parts. Part A being those things that can harm the battleships or at least keep them from doing their mission. Planes attacking battleships would be here along with subs, mines, anti-ship missiles, etc. Part B would be those things that can replace battleships for the land attack mission. Planes attacking land targets would go here along with ship or sub launched cruise missiles and such.
- I think splitting the article up in the midst of a FAC is unwise; nor do I think splitting the article the best solution anyway. I think we can achieve your point by noting the vulnerabilities of each alternative in their own section, i.e. planes being shot down and battleships being sunk. I might add some info if I can find some reasonable sources to cite. bahamut0013♠♣ 13:23, 8 October 2008 (UTC)
- I didn't mean to create new pages, but simply to reorganize this page to better focus on the NSFS debate rather than the case for or against battleships in general. The debate did not start with Pearl Harbor as there has always been a trade off between organic guns with the landing party verses ship mounted guns since the first gun or maybe even rocket was mounted on a ship. Aircraft and missiles launched from all platforms are just later alternatives that have been added to the mix. The trend throughout has not been towards increased volumes of fire, but more accurate and responsive fires. The case for or against battleships has little to do with the modern practice of using small ship's guns from small ships close to shore. Hcobb (talk) 10:24, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
More notably, the list of "battleships" in the "Air Superiority" subsection is very misleading. Utah, Limnos, and Kilkis were not battleships when they were sunk. Conti di Cavour was not lost. Roma's guns were not allowed to be manned at the time of her sinking. Schleswig-Holstein was long obsolete at the time of her sinking, and most of the balance of ths ships listed were in port, unable to manoeuver, where every ship is most vulnerable. The three legitimate air-attack sinkings of battleships, those of Prince of Wales, Yamato, and Musashi all required enormous amounts of ordinance, and would not have even been possible without large-caliber aerial torpedoes, which are undeliverable against modern air-defense systems, and undeployable from most jet-powered aircraft. The other argument that is missed in this section is the factor of sustained weight of fire. Not a single battleship-supported amphibious landing has ever been repulsed at the beaches, and this is the reason why. DMS4249 (talk) 22:03, 21 August 2010 (UTC)
End users of NSFS
I find it a little odd that MCCDC isn't mentioned at all. Shouldn't the end user requirements factor into the debate?
http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/DDG1000/Requirements_history.htm
- In December 1996, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) sent a memo to CNO outlining Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) requirements and milestones. In response, Department of the Navy developed a near, mid-term, and long term response plan. In a letter dated 19 March 2002 , MCCDC stated that the Marine Corps requires 24/7 all-weather, long-range Naval surface fires in support of amphibious operations from the sea. DDG 1000 meets the requirements for the “Mid-Term” detailed in this letter.
Hcobb (talk) 21:39, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
GAO report
The GAO's final report in response to the USS Iowa turret explosion examined the efficacy of keeping the Iowa class battleships in operation. The report concluded that the cost of maintaining the aging equipment on the battleships in a safe and mission-effective state was high, and perhaps prohibitive. The report also stated that it was difficult for the Navy to maintain and support a cadre of professional large artillery specialists. This was due to the fact that the only ships in the Navy that required experts in large guns were the few battleships, which in turn meant a reduced opportunity for career advancement for those officers and enlisted personnel assigned to large gun system support positions.
As a result, the GAO noted that it appeared that many of the junior enlisted personnel and officers assigned to the battleships were personnel that no one else wanted, i.e. sent to the battleships because it was a dead-end assignment and these men had no real future anyway because of their disciplinary or attitude problems. As noted in the investigation into the Iowa's explosion, the battleship's top officers had focused more on the ship's missile systems and small-caliber guns at the expense of 16-inch gunnery training and readiness, perhaps because those officers did not perceive any career enhancement to be had in spending much time on 16-inch gun operations. If the Navy decides to reactivate any of the battleships, they are going to have to be aware that maintaining them, including crew training, in the substandard state that the Iowa was in (and I know that some Iowa crewmen would argue that this wasn't the case, but several independent sources say that it was, as well as the Navy's investigation itself) at the time of the explosion is dangerous and reckless.
I understand that this is tangenital to the naval gunfire support debate. So, I'm not sure if it should be covered in the article or not, but I'm just throwing it out there for consideration. Cla68 (talk) 00:49, 28 January 2009 (UTC)
- Its defintely worth noting in the article, I'd say under the current development section since it goes toward not bringing the battleships back, but thats my own opinion. For the time being I suggest waiting and seeing what other think. TomStar81 (Talk) 04:48, 28 January 2009 (UTC)
- I'm not sure if any sources cover this, but it may be that the current emphasis on countering asymetric warfare, via precision missile and air strikes and using the littoral combat ships in shallow waters, may influence the Navy to shelve, for the time being, any serious proposals to bring back or develop large artillery systems. Cla68 (talk) 06:32, 28 January 2009 (UTC)
Wisconsin?/Recent Developments
Why does it say the navy is required by law to maintain Iowa and Wisconsin if Wisconsin is a museum now? If a ship is a museum, the navy can't reactivate it, can they? Therefore, I doubt the factual accuracy of the "Recent developments" section.
- Yes they can. Iowa and Wisconsin are permanently in the national defense fleet, and will be maintained to a bear minimum for years to come to ensure that they can be reactivated if the US determines it needs its battleships again. That is why the information is presented in the section. TomStar81 (Talk) 20:52, 1 February 2009 (UTC)
Debate over, nothing to support anymore
In 1999 the Marines pressed for a growth in Amphibious assault ships from the 2.07 Marine Expeditionary Brigades they had to the goal of 2.5 and now in the QDR they're fighting a rearguard action to defend 2.0.
And even if they had the ships, the Global War of Terror has left them with no time to train with them.
So since there isn't anything to support anymore, there's no need for a debate so either file this page as history or delete it. Hcobb (talk) 09:28, 16 June 2009 (UTC)
- The article probably needs a new title now that 'debate' is all but over, but it has considerable historic value and meets all the inclusion guidelines. Nick-D (talk) 09:57, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
Acronyms
NSFS or NSFS? The article uses both. 31.185.191.58 (talk) 19:02, 6 May 2012 (UTC)
"Alternatives to naval gunfire" section
I don't think naval gunfire is actually an alternative to naval gunfire. Herr Gruber (talk) 02:07, 23 July 2012 (UTC)
Ship size debate
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2013/07/28/is-americas-naval-supremacy-sinking/ Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Admiral Roughead comments: “The inconvenient truth is that a ship that is half the size doesn’t cost half as much. Deploying more ships is appealing, but to get to areas of interest such as the Middle East, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean we must cross vast waters and remain present for extended periods. Size, speed, endurance and lethality matter greatly, especially when forward bases can’t be assured at a time when foreign populations are prickly about sovereignty.”
- Can we change this article to a more general size of naval ships debate? Hcobb (talk) 00:42, 29 July 2013 (UTC)
- Welch, Shawn A. (2007-05-17). "Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap" (PDF). United States Army. Retrieved 2008-04-23.
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